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Abstract 
This doctoral thesis explores the current process of Norway becoming a multicultural 
society, more specifically when Norwegian Muslims challenge ‘white’ perceptions of 
the nation. I apply Tariq Modood’s theory of political multiculturalism to analyze this 
process in terms of public sphere negotiations between a politically mobilized assertive 
minority, the majority population and state policy responses. I analyze four empirical 
cases from the ‘integration debate’ in national newspapers between 2006 and 2010; the 
cartoon affair, the hijab debates and debates on secularism and the role of ‘native 
informants’. I theorize these as ‘discursive struggles’ and identify four competing 
ideological positions; a confrontational and a dialogical liberalism on the majority side, 
and a dialogic antiracist multiculturalism and forms of communitarianism among the 
minority. The two dialogue positions correspond to the distinction between state 
multiculturalism as diversity management and a bottom-up multiculturalism that starts 
with critical minority perspectives on racism. Both see liberal and Muslim values as 
open to interpretation and thus compatible, but the antiracist perspective combines 
dialogue with resistance against dominant anti-Muslim discourses. The thesis combines 
detailed empirical data from Norwegian public debate, comparisons with similar 
debates in other European countries, and a comprehensive theoretical discussion of 
multiculturalism, postcolonial perspectives on anti-Muslim racism, politicized Islam 
and Muslim feminism, and secularism and the public sphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sammendrag 
Doktoravhandlingen handler om den pågående prosessen der Norge utvikler seg til å bli 
et flerkulturelt samfunn. Jeg fokuserer på norske muslimers økende deltakelse i 
integreringsdebatten, og har valgt ut fire casestudier fra debatten i riksavisene i perioden 
2006 til 2010; karikaturstriden, hijabdebattene, sekularismedebatten og den såkalte 
kokosnøttdebatten. Disse analyseres i lys av britisk multikulturalistisk teori, nærmere 
bestemt Tariq Modoods teori om politisk multikulturalisme forstått som en 
forhandlingsprosess, der minoriteter utfordrer dominerende forestillinger i 
offentligheten, og majoriteten og staten gradvis kommer dem i møte. Fire ideologiske 
posisjoner identifiseres i debattene; en konfronterende og en dialogorientert liberalisme 
blant majoriteten, samt en dialogorientert antirasistisk multikulturalisme og en form for 
kommunitarisme blant minoriteten. De to dialogposisjonene gjenspeiler henholdsvis en 
statlig strategi for å håndtere mangfold ovenfra, og en minoritetsbevegelse nedenfra som 
tar utgangspunkt i antirasistiske perspektiver. Begge disse posisjonene oppfatter liberale 
og muslimske verdier som åpne for tolkning og dermed som forenlige, men 
minoritetens perspektiv kombinerer dialog med motstand mot dominerende 
forestillinger om en sivilisasjonskonflikt mellom vesten og islam. Avhandlingen 
kombinerer detaljerte empiriske data fra norsk integreringsdebatt, sammenligning med 
debatter i andre europeiske land, og en omfattende teoretisk diskusjon av 
multikulturalisme og rasisme, politisert islam og muslimsk feminisme, og sekularisme i 
offentligheten.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisor Tord Larsen at the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (NTNU) for constructive criticism during the writing process. 
At the early stages of the project I received comments and encouragement from 
Marianne Gullestad, Christine Jacobsen, Peter Hervik and Ruth Wodak.  
I also benefited from several research training courses, and would like to mention in 
particular the course on Media, Migration and Transnational Relations organized by the 
Migra-Nord network and Örebro University in Sweden.  
Buskerud University College in Drammen funded the project and provided a work 
environment where I could combine my research with teaching multiculturalism and 
human rights. Thanks also to colleagues for valuable discussions. 
Thanks to my family for love and support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All translations from the Norwegian language appearing in this thesis are my own, 
except where otherwise stated. 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
PART I – THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 – Introduction        3 
Objectives and research questions       7 
Theorizing public debate in a multicultural society     11 
A European ‘crisis of multiculturalism’      16 
Theorizing anti-Muslim discourses       20 
Anti-Muslim racism         25 
Hegemony and resistance        29 
Discursive struggles between four ideological positions    31 
The empirical field: National contexts      41 
Norwegian integration policy       49 
Phases in Norwegian integration debate      52 
Case studies and methodology       58 
 
PART II – CASE STUDIES 
Chapter 2 – The Cartoon Affair       65 
The Rushdie Affair         65 
Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons        69 
The Norwegian approach        73 
Analysis of media coverage        75 
Empirical analysis         78 
Media representation of protest organizers      78 
Fear of ‘extremists on both sides’       81 
Muslim leaders advise against the demonstration     85 
Coverage of the ‘white’ demonstration      87 
Coverage of the ‘Muslim’ demonstration      91 
Analyzing the protesters’ message(s): blasphemy or racism?   94 
Alliances with non-Muslims        104 
Government response: proposal to change blasphemy and hate speech laws 108 
The second Norwegian cartoon affair in 2010     110 
Conclusions          115 
 
xii 
 
Chapter 3 – The ‘Coconut Debate’      118 
The ‘Black consciousness’ of Malcolm X      121 
The Shabana Rehman debate        125 
The ‘Coconut Debate’        128 
Responses from ‘Islam critics’       131 
Responses from ‘native informants’       135 
Responses from Norwegian Muslims      137 
Theoretical discussion: groups and individuals in multicultural theory  140 
Concept of community in the Muslim tradition     141 
The ‘right to exit’         143 
‘Loyalty to culture’         145 
The ‘politics of exit’         147 
Muslims as a subversive group       150 
Politically contested ‘exit’ from Norwegian Muslim communities   152 
Conclusions          156 
 
Chapter 4 – The hijab debates       157 
Focus of this chapter         161 
The French hijab affair        164 
Norway: First round of the hijab debates, 2004     169 
Second round: “Veiled. Unveiled”, 2007      171 
Problematizing Western imperialist feminism     173 
Hijab and “Islamism” among Norwegian Muslims     179 
The ‘hijab-in-the-police’ debate in 2009      182 
Public emergence of Muslim feminism      185 
Public recognition of Ishaq’s debate contributions     189 
Islamic revivalism among Norwegian Muslim students    193 
Debate about the ‘morality police’       197 
Political responses         199 
Conclusions          201 
 
Chapter 5 – The secularism debate      205 
The Norwegian debate        208 
The ‘Islamist’ label         210 
Distancing from ‘extremism’        213 
Secular hegemony         219 
National versions of secularism       222 
Views on the state church        225 
Multiculturalism and post-secular society      228 
xiii 
 
Religion in the public sphere        230 
Religious contributions to public debate      239 
Conclusions          244 
 
PART III – CONCLUSION 
Chapter 6 – Conclusions        247 
Multiculturalism from above and below      252 
Multiculturalism as mobilization and negotiations     253 
 
 
 
Bibliography          257 
 
Articles from the media        276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Multiculturalism has been a hotly debated topic in Europe and North America in the last 
two decades. While anthropologists have made important contributions, much of the 
academic debate has taken place within the field of normative political theory. A major 
disagreement among political philosophers is about how multiculturalism relates to 
liberalism. A prominent advocate of a liberal version of multiculturalism, Will 
Kymlicka (2002:336-337), notes that until 1989, multiculturalism was usually equated 
with communitarian philosophy which disputes the liberal concept of the ‘autonomous 
individual’. According to him, it has become widely recognized that except for a few 
‘communitarian’ groups, most ethnic minorities in Western societies want to be equal 
participants in liberal society. Thus, debates are in most cases “debates amongst liberals 
about the meaning of liberalism”, i.e. debates among people who “endorse the basic 
liberal-democratic consensus, but who disagree about the interpretation of these 
principles” (ibid, 338-339). 
On one side of the debate, liberal critics of multiculturalism such as Brian Barry 
(2001:5-34), hold on to the classical liberal doctrine that every individual should have 
the same legal and political rights without regard to group membership, and reject the 
multiculturalist idea that justice requires accommodating religious beliefs and cultural 
practices. Philosophically, he defends what has been called the “Enlightenment project” 
(ibid, 16) as expressed by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, against the politicizing of 
group identities advocated by multiculturalism. (It should be noted here, that historical 
Enlightenment thinking defended pluralism against church and state hegemony; while 
contemporary defenders of ‘Enlightenment values’ protect status quo against challenges 
from marginalized groups; see Bangstad 2011:258; Titley & Lentin 2011:155.) Arguing 
that equal opportunity matters more than equal outcome, Barry defends the notion of 
state neutrality towards cultural diversity. Further, he regards state promotion of 
voluntary assimilation to national identity an appropriate policy (Barry 2001:72-80), as 
long as the majority is “difference-blind”, i.e. ceases to identify immigrants by ethnic or 
racial criteria and accepts them as equals. This position comes close to the ‘French’ 
model of the civic nation (ibid, 80). 
Kymlicka (2002:344-346) argues that the liberal principle of state neutrality expressed 
in this model of ‘strict separation’ and ‘benign neglect’ is appropriate to religion, but 
misleading when applied to ethnocultural diversity. He writes that the description of 
‘civic nations’ like the United States as only demanding adherence to neutral 
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constitutional principles, and thus as indifferent to ethnocultural identities, is inaccurate 
when taking into account that actual US policies have followed a ‘liberal-nationalist’ 
strategy of creating a national culture with a common language and institutions (though 
pluralistic in other regards such as religion). Though common American culture is 
admittedly ‘thin’, Kymlicka (2002:347) points out that it is ‘far from trivial’ and that 
“attempts to integrate people into such a common societal culture have often been met 
with serious resistance”. More specifically, immigrant minorities do not resist majority 
nation-building as such, but want to “negotiate the terms of integration” and demand a 
more multicultural approach (ibid, 354). Kymlicka notes that minorities no longer 
accept to be silenced and marginalized as they were in the era of assimilation policy. 
Instead they demand “a more inclusive conception of citizenship which recognizes 
(rather than stigmatizes) their identities, and which accommodates (rather than 
excludes) their differences” (ibid, 327).  
While Kymlicka agrees with the liberal-nationalist view that nation-building promotes 
distributive justice and deliberative democracy (ibid, 364), he also accepts Charles 
Taylor’s claim that “nation-building inescapably privileges members of the majority 
culture” (cited in Kymlicka 2002:348). Linking multiculturalism and nation-building, 
Kymlicka proposes that injustices resulting from majority nation-building can be 
compensated by granting minority rights. Thus, minority rights and nation-building will 
lend legitimacy to each other, in a similar way as the welfare state provided social rights 
to “integrate the working class into a national culture” (ibid, 328) to ensure their loyalty 
to the state rather than to ‘foreign ideas’ like communism. From a state perspective, the 
inclusion of social rights into an extended notion of citizenship was an instrument of 
nation-building; minority rights can serve the same purpose. Willing to grant minority 
rights to protect a group against assimilation pressure (‘external protection’), but also 
committed to individual autonomy, Kymlicka (2002:341-342) is concerned that those 
‘exceptions’ among minority groups that remain ‘illiberal’ will seek minority rights that 
restrict the freedom of their own members for the sake of group solidarity (“internal 
restrictions”). He is skeptical of accommodating conservative religious groups, and 
focuses on ‘isolationist’ religious sects in North America, but also mentions ‘arranged 
marriages’ among British Muslims and their attempts to restrict blasphemy in the 
Rushdie Affair. Kymlicka (1992:38-39) argues that these groups “want the power to 
restrict the religious freedom of their own members”, and suggests that minorities must 
be internally liberal in order to have a legitimate claim to minority rights (2002:230-
239). Based on a concern for women’s rights, Susan Moller Okin (1999:22-23) goes 
further than Kymlicka, and suggests that assimilation may be better for minority women 
than protecting minority cultures that oppress them. 
In his later writings, John Rawls argues that the appeal to a liberal conception of 
individual autonomy is ‘sectarian’ because it is not widely shared even in democratic 
societies (cited in Kymlicka 1992:50). More willing than Kymlicka to accommodate 
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religious pluralism, the late Rawls continues to defend individual rights by appealing to 
“a ‘political’ conception of the person as free and equal” (cited in Kymlicka 1992:54); a 
strategy which Kymlicka sees as a failed attempt to accommodate communitarian 
minorities, because it obscures the “potential conflicts between liberal principles and 
illiberal groups” (2002:230) while being no more sympathetic to the latter’s demands 
for internal restrictions (1992:54). In his ‘political liberalism’, Rawls (1999:176-179; 
2003:140) abandons the ‘comprehensive doctrine’ of “Enlightenment liberalism” 
(which he places on a level with religious doctrines; see 1999:143-148) in favor of a 
more pluralist notion of an ‘overlapping consensus’. He argues that there are “many 
liberalisms” with various interpretations and different political conceptions of basic 
principles of freedom, equality and justice (ibid, 141), which are supported by a number 
of reasonable secular and religious doctrines (with regard to Islam, Rawls (ibid, 151 n. 
46) refers to Abdullahi A. An-Na’im’s interpretation of shari’a as an ethics that supports 
constitutional democracy.).  
British theorist of multiculturalism Bhikhu Parekh (2000:13-15; 107) agrees with 
Kymlicka (2002:239) that the distinction between political and comprehensive 
liberalism is overstated, but argues that a multicultural society cannot be adequately 
theorized from within the framework of any particular political doctrine, including 
liberalism, understood as “a substantive doctrine advocating a specific view of man, 
society and the world and embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of life” and thus 
representing a particular cultural perspective (Parekh 2000:14). Instead, he suggests a 
theory of political dialogue (similar to Habermas’ deliberative democracy) between 
liberal and nonliberal cultures, which has a liberal orientation, but engages critically 
with liberalism, and departs from it in some aspects. Similar to Rawls’ theory of an 
overlapping consensus, Parekh (2000:132-141; see also Modood 2005:174) believes 
that there is a consensus on universal values such as freedom, equality and justice as 
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, while retaining a 
liberal bias, was born out of cross-cultural dialogue. These general universal values are 
not absolute, and need to be interpreted, prioritized and balanced in the context of 
particular societies with their different balances between the individual and the 
community. He takes into account that in any society, including liberal democratic ones, 
the danger remains that political leaders misuse their interpretative freedom to 
undermine these values. 
Parekh (2000:84-90; 200-204) characterizes the models of public deliberation 
developed by the later Rawls and Habermas as modified versions of civic 
assimilationism, which argue that a political community needs a shared political culture, 
while allowing diversity in civil society. In Parekh’s view (ibid, 89), Rawls’ approach is 
preferable to Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism (see Parekh 2000:101-104), but still leaves 
too little room for diversity for the following three reasons; (1) the private-public 
division discriminates against religious people who want a public role for their religion; 
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(2) it fails to take into account that the shared political culture reflects the consensus of a 
given time and is revised as a response to the challenge of new ideas, including those 
forwarded by minorities; and (3) that a monocultural public sphere based on a historical 
consensus among the majority exerts an assimilationist pressure on civil society. More 
specifically, Parekh argues that Rawls derives his political liberalism from a 
comprehensive liberalism without taking into account that those holding other 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines may want to give different definitions and priorities 
to the basic liberal values of the overlapping consensus. While retaining his own 
comprehensive doctrine, Rawls asks those holding other doctrines to reinterpret these in 
the light of public reason; thus putting pressure on communitarian or religious persons 
to articulate their doctrines in standard liberal language in order to qualify as 
‘reasonable’. Thus, Rawls’ restrictions on public reason do attempt to settle certain 
principles in advance, putting minorities at a disadvantage if they would want to 
renegotiate the consensus and redefine and reprioritize basic liberal values. Being 
largely individualist with universalist pretensions, political liberalism cannot 
accommodate demands for differential treatment.  
To sum up, Parekh (2000:109-111, see also Modood 2005:172-173) appreciates the 
attempts by thinkers like Rawls and Kymlicka to reinterpret and redefine classical 
liberalism to make it more hospitable to cultural and religious diversity, but criticizes 
them for continuing to absolutize liberalism (to varying extent). Although theirs is a thin 
liberalism with minimum content, Rawls and Kymlicka still demand that nonliberals 
must accept it in order to be tolerated. Parekh argues that this view is flawed; either this 
minimum content is essentially liberal, in which case making it a universal requirement 
violates the moral autonomy of nonliberals; or it is universally binding, in which case 
there is nothing particularly liberal about it except that liberals happen to appreciate it 
more than others. Instead, Parekh (2000:111-112; see also Modood 2005:174) suggests 
a “critical but sympathetic dialogue” that moves beyond tolerance and takes other 
perspectives as “conversational partners in a common search for a deeper 
understanding” of “the good life”. This requires a distinction between the universal and 
the liberal as discussed above, as well as a distinction between liberal society and 
western society, which includes many nonliberal groups including conservatives and 
socialists besides ethnic and religious minorities. Equating western society with 
liberalism means turning one particular but important aspect of society into its defining 
feature, and to give liberals a monopoly on defining which views are legitimate and to 
reshape society in their image. In the postcolonial literature, this conflation of the 
liberal, the western and the universal has been termed Eurocentrism, which according to 
S. Sayyid (2003) consists in an attempt to claim a Western monopoly on defining 
universal values, by presenting Western interpretations as universal while seeing all 
other articulations of values as particular. In other words, liberalism universalizes itself 
while particularizing all other ways of life (Parekh cited in Modood 2005:172). Parekh 
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is committed to a (thin) moral universalism which cannot be equated with liberalism, 
but as Tariq Modood (2005:181-182) points out, “his dialogical multiculturalism seems 
to presuppose and build on an already existing liberal culture” and it is thus “difficult to 
judge to what extent it is “beyond” liberalism and to what extent, especially in practice, 
it is a more open and less individualistic liberalism”. 
Objectives and research questions 
My aim here is to do an empirical analysis of public sphere debates at a particular time 
and in a particular national context, namely Norway in the period 2006-2010. More 
specifically, I will analyze four cases where Norwegian Muslims challenge dominant 
discourses of integration, all of which address the relationship between Islam and liberal 
values. Case studies of the Cartoon Affair (chapter 2), the ‘coconut debate’ (chapter 3), 
the hijab debates (chapter 4) and the ‘secularism debate’ (chapter 5) will throw light on 
particular Muslim interpretations of values such as, respectively, free speech, individual 
freedom, gender equality and secularism. I will discuss these empirical cases in relation 
to normative theories of multiculturalism, analyzing them in the light of each other. As 
a general framework, I find Tariq Modood’s (2005; 2007) sociological theory of 
political multiculturalism most suitable, because this approach emphasizes the 
importance of grounding multicultural theory in specific empirical contexts analyzed 
with a comparative methodology, rather than deriving ideal models for public 
deliberation and policy from abstract philosophical concepts (Modood & Favell 
2003:490-492; Modood 2005:187-188). A context-sensitive empirical approach may 
avoid the “unchallenged reproduction of anecdotal facts usually taken from newspapers, 
everyday discussion, or other theorists” (Modood & Favell 2003:493) which 
characterize much normative theorizing about multiculturalism, and may instead bring 
out “how certain issues of liberal principles become quite different from what they 
appear” (ibid) when taking into account the dimensions of inequality, cultural 
essentialism and racism (see also Phillips 2007:8-9; 21-31). 
Modood emphasizes the importance of national contexts (his own theory is based on the 
British one), especially when importing and applying theories developed in North 
American countries to a western European context with different multicultural 
experiences (Modood & Favell 2003:487; 493-494; Modood 2005:171; 189). He argues 
that the case of Britain is interesting because it bridges the experiences of North 
American ‘immigrant nations’ that have been culturally diverse from the start, and the 
presumably homogenous ‘old nations’ of Europe, where multiculturalism has become 
an issue as a result of more recent non-European immigration, of which a significant 
share come from Muslim countries (Modood 2007:2-9). Britain’s historical self-image 
is that of an ‘old nation’ but more accurately it is a union of four ethnic nations, 
including the Scottish, Welsh and perhaps Irish in addition to the dominant English. 
Due to Britain’s imperial past, it has a diverse minority population consisting of three 
8 
 
main groups, Caribbean and African Blacks; Indians; and South Asian Muslims. Like in 
the United States, minority issues have been understood within a paradigm of “race 
relations” focused on color racism (Modood 2007:9), and the Black American struggle 
has inspired British minority movements (ibid, 40). While ethnic minorities constitute a 
larger proportion of the general population in some continental European countries, 
Britain is regarded the most multicultural society in Europe, not simply in terms of state 
policy but because of much higher minority participation in the public sphere than in 
countries like France and Germany, whose models of the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nation are 
less inclusive of minorities, and where public integration debates largely consist of 
majority persons speaking about minorities. Modood also argues that unlike the ‘state 
multiculturalism’ of Canada and Australia, British multiculturalism has mainly 
developed as a result of the political mobilization of minorities in social movements 
from below.  
Drawing on British experiences,  his political theory of multiculturalism is empirically 
based in real-world political struggles, negotiations and debates, often led by second-
generation immigrants (ibid, 18-19), and is particularly concerned with the experiences 
of British and European Muslims. As opposed to the more philosophical theories of 
multiculturalism of Kymlicka and Parekh, which start with an abstract theoretical 
concept of culture, what matters to Modood (ibid, 37-40) are those identities and 
differences that are empirically important to minorities as expressed in their political 
mobilization. Thus, he avoids an essentialized notion of ‘culture’ as a defining property 
of minority groups, and instead uses the notions of ‘difference’ and ‘identity’ as socially 
constructed through the interplay of ascription and self-definition. He defines 
multiculturalism as a process of negotiation and dialogue, consisting of minority 
assertiveness, mobilization, protest and political struggle, as well as the state’s 
pragmatic accommodation of some of their concrete political demands in policy and 
institutional reforms. Minority mobilization typically starts with challenging negative 
differences ascribed to them by dominant discourses, and, following the American 
‘Black pride’ movement, tries to turn a “negative difference into a positive difference” 
to be proud of (ibid, 39). In this process, a minority group claims the right to speak for 
itself, to define itself in positive terms, but also the power to analyze and redefine the 
way it has been inferiorized and oppressed by the majority (ibid, 41-42). For example, 
British Asians have redefined color racism to articulate the cultural racism they 
experience, Black women have modified feminist theory to take into account the 
intersections of racism and sexism, and Muslim women challenge majority feminists’ 
claims that religion is necessarily oppressive. Since the Rushdie Affair, British Muslims 
have started asserting their Muslim identity in a similar way, and in the process they 
theorize their experiences of what has been called Orientalism (Said 1979; Yegenoglu 
1998), Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust 1997; Esposito & Kalin 2011) or anti-Muslim 
racism (Modood 2005:41). 
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While the British antiracist movement in the 1980s rejected state multiculturalism 
(Gunew 2004:15; 41), critical multiculturalists argue that multicultural policies must be 
explicitly linked to antiracism (ibid, 43), and British multiculturalism in the 1990s not 
only incorporated part of the antiracist critique, but also started taking the Muslim 
challenge seriously (Modood 2007:15-17). Antiracist protest and struggle has thus been 
a central part in the British process of becoming a multicultural society, and Modood 
argues that each minority’s resistance to racism is the primary means of real mutual 
integration; minorities challenge public discourse and political institutions, which 
respond and adjust to accommodate them (ibid, 50). Such a ‘critical multiculturalism’ 
from below is thus not primarily interested in ‘culture’ but in politicized ethnic 
identities, and in turning these from a stigma into a positive part of society (ibid, 43), 
resulting in the formation of hyphenated identities such as ‘Black American’, ‘British 
Asian’ or ‘Norwegian Muslim’. In a multicultural society, these identities are seen as a 
legitimate basis for political mobilization and lobbying rather than regarded as divisive 
or disloyal to the nation (ibid, 49).  
While Modood (ibid, 24-26) shares some of the same concerns as Kymlicka discussed 
in the introduction, namely that ‘state neutrality’ tends to privilege the majority in a way 
that puts an assimilationist pressure on minorities, which can in turn be compensated by 
accommodating minority demands, his multiculturalism shares with other critical 
theories of racism the emphasis on grounding analysis of hegemonic discourses in the 
perspectives of “conscious minority persons” as discourse analyst Teun van Dijk puts it 
(1993:18; see also Frankenberg 1993:5; 206). Modood (2007:64-68) argues that 
minorities have a distinct knowledge which can hold a “critical mirror” up to larger 
society; not only do they have primary knowledge about the marginalization and 
discrimination they experience, but they may also contribute with different perspectives 
on their shared society and its discourses, and he emphasizes that multiculturalism is 
about openly discussing such critical perspectives on attitudes, values and practices, and 
about allowing minorities to influence these. While Modood focuses on multicultural 
negotiations and minority mobilization, other theorists direct more attention to 
problematizing the dominant discourse. Applying American paradigms of critical race 
theory and whiteness studies to analyze Norwegian majority discourses, anthropologist 
Marianne Gullestad (2002; 2006:209) has analyzed how ‘white hegemony’ is 
challenged by minority voices, then re-articulated and reasserted in integration debates. 
Like Parekh, who emphasizes an “open-ended dialogue” among “culturally mediated 
interpretations of all universal principles” (cited in Modood 2005:183-184), Modood 
(2007:7-8; 64-68) takes existing liberal democracies as empirical context for his theory, 
but does not use liberalism as a framework marking the limits of multicultural politics, 
as Kymlicka does. Thus, Modood rejects the idea of liberal principles as a ‘package’ to 
be either accepted or rejected, as is sometimes argued, and favors a “respectful and 
critical engagement”. Agreeing that Parekh’s philosophy offers a basis for dialogue 
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between cultures on a global level, Modood (2005:183-184) questions how it fits with 
the empirical reality of immigrant minorities where the second and third generations 
may no longer be organized communities with different belief systems and practices, 
but move in the direction of either hybrid lifestyles or develop into ethno-religious 
communities living in societies where secularism is hegemonic.  
Like Rawls, Modood operates with a political conception of multiculturalism which 
does not depend on any particular comprehensive philosophy. He argues for the 
compatibility of ‘moderate’ liberalism and ‘moderate’ multiculturalism, as well as 
‘moderate’ Islam and ‘moderate secularism’; and is critical of their ‘ideological’ forms, 
which favor ideal models over empirical reality, and which have a dichotomizing and 
dualistic view of the world that makes dialogue, mutual respect and negotiated 
accommodation difficult (Modood 2007:130-132). The major obstacles against 
reconciling multiculturalism and liberalism today are the ideologies which speak of a 
clash of civilizations between the West and Islam. This dichotomizing view is found on 
both sides, in anti-Muslim discourses in the West as well as in radical Islamism, but the 
relationship between them is asymmetrical in terms of political and military power as 
well as intellectual support. Modood (ibid, 7) argues that his theory is compatible with 
both liberalism and postcolonialism (as well as others), and he is thus modest with 
regard to explicit postcolonial deconstructions of Eurocentrism (ibid, 124-125), though 
critical multiculturalism partly overlaps with such critiques (Gunew 2004:27; Titley & 
Lentin 2011:124). An important distinction often overlooked by advocates of 
incompatibility goes between critiquing Eurocentrism and rejecting ‘Western culture’. 
Postcolonial critique of Western exceptionalism is not anti-western, in much the same 
way as Parekh’s dialogical multiculturalism does not reject liberal values, but contests 
the presumption of liberal superiority (ibid, 87). 
Applying a British theory of multiculturalism to a Norwegian context demands a 
discussion of national differences and similarities. An obvious historical difference is 
between Britain’s imperial past and Norway’s traditional self-image as an ethnically 
homogenous nation (Eriksen 2011:3), though this difference should not be overstated; 
Norway has officially recognized national minorities, notably the indigenous Sami, who 
were subjected to assimilation until the 1970s. The country also participated in colonial 
practice and discourse (Gullestad 2006:40-43) as one of the world’s big shipping 
nations since 1850, through missionary activity and through close cultural and political 
ties with Britain. Norway’s colonial complicity (Keskinen et al 2009) remains largely 
unacknowledged, and unlike in Anglophone countries, speaking of ‘race’ (and to some 
extent, racism) is taboo for similar reasons as in continental Europe, particularly 
Germany. In postcolonial Britain, racism in its various forms has been problematized 
more than elsewhere in Europe, while the concepts of ‘new racism’ and ‘cultural 
racism’ (where ‘race’ is rhetorically replaced by ‘culture’) are not widely accepted in 
Norway (Bangstad 2011:252). 
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Contemporary Norway is a rapidly multiculturalizing society, due to non-European 
immigration. Norway is becoming more similar to Britain in terms of ethnic diversity, 
but also policy and public debate. In both countries, public integration debates have 
focused on the alleged incompatibility of Islam, although British debate has focused 
more on terrorism and economic costs of immigration, while Norwegian debate has 
taken a stronger cultural turn with a special focus on gender equality (Eriksen 2011:3). 
Until recently, minority voices were marginal in Norwegian debate, but this has 
changed in the last decade and since the cartoon affair in 2006, assertive Norwegian 
Muslims have been important contributors to public debate. No longer simply defending 
themselves against problems ascribed to them, Muslim voices have starting setting the 
agenda and criticize dominant discourses. The cartoon affair seems to have had a similar 
effect as the Rushdie Affair had in Britain, in changing a majority-dominated 
integration debate in the direction of negotiations about how the majority can 
accommodate Muslim minorities (Cesari 2011:39).  
While British theories of multiculturalism (Modood 2005; 2007; Parekh 2000) will 
serve as general framework; I will combine these with postcolonial perspectives in 
anthropology (Hage 1998, Mahmood 2005, Mamdani 2004, Asad 2003), also used by 
an increasing number of Norwegian anthropologists (Thorbjørnsrud 2003, 2005; 
Gullestad 2002, 2006; Jacobsen 2011, Bangstad 2008, 2009, 2011). For the analysis of 
specific case studies, I will also draw on insights from theories of new racism (Hervik 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2011), media studies (Kunelius, Eide, Hahn & Schroeder 2007; Eide, 
Kunelius & Phillips 2008; Eide & Nikunen 2011; Titley & Lentin 2011) and critical 
discourse analysis (Wodak & Reisigl 2001; Richardson 2004) in chapter 2, Black 
postcolonial theory (Fanon 1967; Malcolm X 1989) and sociology of religion (Bromley 
1998) in chapter 3, postcolonial and Muslim feminism (al-Hibri 1999, Abu-Lughod 
2002, Razack 2008, Yegenoglu 2006, Göle 1996, Mir-Hosseini 2006, 2007) in chapter 
4, and theories of secularism (Asad 2003, Casanova 2009, Bader 2009, Habermas 2005, 
Rawls 1999) in chapter 5.  
Theorizing public debate in a multicultural society 
In Habermasian theory of the public sphere, public deliberation is seen as central to the 
legitimacy of democratic governance. The idea is that rational debate between free and 
equal citizens serves as a continuous link between public opinion and formal political 
decision-making, and assures that government is responsive to public opinion also 
between elections. In a multicultural society, the public sphere takes on additional 
importance, by being the site for dialogue and negotiations between minority, majority 
and the state (Husband & Moring 2009:140). In contemporary European societies, 
public sphere deliberation mainly takes place in the mass media (Preston & Metykova 
2009:36), which acts as a gatekeeper deciding who gets access to public debate. This 
depends on the kind of media; while the political elite has regular access to television 
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news and debate programs, the more democratic internet has opened up arenas for 
ordinary citizens to express their opinions (including undemocratic opinions like racism, 
e.g. the growing network of anti-Islamic websites). The opinion pages of national 
newspapers seem to be the preferred arena for European intellectual elites and a main 
site for academic analysis of public debate (including my own study, which draws its 
empirical material from Norwegian national newspapers). The relationship between the 
public sphere and public opinion goes both ways, public opinion is represented in the 
media, but the media also shapes public opinion. The relationship is not straight-
forward; but depends on other factors; studies have shown that in societies where there 
is little personal contact between majority and minority population, media portrayal has 
a strong influence on majority perception of minorities (Hervik 2004; IMDI 2009). 
Important is also the question of minority representation in public debate; a democratic 
multicultural public sphere requires that a wide diversity of minority voices are 
represented, not only voices with sensational opinions or those most favored by 
mainstream media. Media access alone is insufficient to exercise free speech, as 
Husband (2000:207-208) argues, it must be accompanied by a “right to be understood”. 
Habermas is aware that not everyone is equally represented in the public sphere, and a 
critical normative question for public sphere theorists regards criteria for contributing to 
the public sphere. While there is agreement that debate should be open to all citizens, 
most theorists argue that there need to be restrictions on the kind of legitimate 
contributions, to assure a rational and democratic debate. Habermas’ ideal speech 
situation (also known as the domination-free dialogue) has come to resemble Rawls’ 
idea of public reasoning (Modood & Favell 2003:490). Both theorists emphasize that 
contributions should ideally be made in a ‘language’ that is generally accessible to all 
citizens (Habermas 2005:14; Rawls 1999:152), and arguments grounded in religious 
doctrines seem to be particularly problematic in this regard, as they are not necessarily 
seen as relevant arguments by non-believers and believers of other religions. Thus, 
religious arguments need to be ‘translated’ into secular language (Habermas 2005:15) of 
public reason (Rawls 1999:143). Importantly, both Habermas and Rawls (ibid, 142-144) 
distinguish between the informal public sphere (public debate) and formal political 
institutions (parliaments, courts and administration), where the former is fully open to 
any kind of contribution, whereas only arguments that meet certain criteria should be 
allowed to cross the institutional threshold and influence policy and law-making 
(Habermas, ibid). However, Rawls’ (1999:135) argues that citizens should ideally 
engage in public reasoning as if they were legislators, and Habermas’ discourse ethics 
promotes an ideal of rational argumentation where every citizen is equally entitled to 
participate, and where the strength of the better argument alone should prevail, 
regardless of individual participants’ social position or background. According to Rawls 
(ibid, 171), defining participants as ‘citizens’ means viewing them as free and equal 
individuals, assigning to each the same political position disregarding their social 
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situatedness in terms of class and ‘comprehensive doctrines’. Thus, this model of public 
deliberation places certain constraints on public reasoning and excludes certain kinds of 
contributions as illegitimate (Bader 2009). 
Feminist, postcolonial and multiculturalist critics have argued that this ideal is 
unrealistic; because someone’s knowledge is inevitably influenced by that person’s 
social position, personal experiences, identities and beliefs (Collins 2000; Harding 
2000) which cannot be abstracted away and ‘left at the doorstep’ when entering public 
debate. Rationalist models of the public sphere have also been criticized for failing to 
take sufficient account of asymmetries in power and hegemony (Modood & Favell 
2003:490; Bangstad & Vetlesen 2011:339), particularly in a multicultural society where 
marginalized minorities have a structural disadvantage, having limited political power 
and presence, lacking easy access to the media, and not always being well-versed in the 
language of dominant discourse (Parekh 2000:306). Using the Rushdie Affair in Britain 
as example, Parekh (ibid, 304-313) problematizes the Habermasian and Rawlsian 
models. He points out that in a multicultural debate, participants tend to “talk past each 
other”, defining issues in mutually unintelligible terms and having limited knowledge of 
each other’s background. British Muslims, as a “recently arrived immigrant minority” 
(ibid, 304) at the time, had few “biculturally literate” intellectuals and found it difficult 
to “articulate their reasons in a liberal language” (ibid, 312) although they did try (they 
did not primarily use Islamic arguments, but appealed to the British law against 
blasphemy). Unable to gain sympathy for their view in public debate, they turned to 
protest, which Parekh argues should be seen as a legitimate part of political deliberation 
alongside rational dialogue. In his view, dialogue should not only be an instrument to 
reach agreement on political issues, but also develop mutual understanding between 
groups, requiring both sides to critical examine and modify their assumptions. In the 
Rushdie Affair, British liberals were unwilling to concede that their fears of public 
religion might be unjustified and that Islam may not be a threat to freedom; while 
Muslims were unwilling to distance themselves from Khomeini’s fatwa, and unwilling 
to appreciate that religion changes over time, and that commitment to free speech is not 
necessarily equivalent to endorsing ‘Islamophobia’ (ibid, 311). In contrast to Rawls, 
Parekh (ibid, 307-310) argues that ‘public reason’ is not a presupposition for political 
debate, but a product of it, which is “constantly reconstituted and pluralized by it”, and 
consensus should be seen as a dynamic process rather than a given. He further argues 
that persuasion relies not only on presenting the weightier argument in rational terms, 
but also involves emotions, moral values and identity, as well as the character and 
reputation of the persuader. Arguments are given weight on the basis of moral values, 
experiences and judgment, and are articulated in particular languages which cannot be 
‘purified’ of their cultural associations. 
In their post-secular turn, both Rawls and Habermas accommodate some of these 
criticisms, particularly the objections from religious citizens. Habermas (2005:13-16) 
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acknowledges an ‘asymmetrical burden’ on religious citizens and emphasizes mutual 
‘learning processes’ where both religious and non-religious citizens need to develop 
‘self-reflective attitudes’. The latter, Habermas (2005:16-20) argues, should abandon a 
stubbornly rationalist attitude towards religion and instead help translate the ‘possible 
truth content’ of religious contributions. Habermas’ assumption that the translation 
requirement implies an asymmetrical cognitive burden for religious citizens seems not 
to take sufficient account of the extent to which contemporary religion, especially 
religious minorities in societies where secularism is hegemonic, are already self-
reflective and pluralist (Bader 2009:113-114) and that today, well-integrated and 
highly-educated second-generation European Muslims do have ‘biculturally literate’ 
intellectuals as Cora Alexa Døving (2012:40-43) argues with regard to the Norwegian 
hijab debates, where Norwegian Muslim participants merged religious and secular 
argumentation in a way that suggests that the theoretical division between religious 
reasons on one hand, and universal values and secular language on the other, is an 
artificial distinction.  
Rawls (1999:140-141; 151-154) recognizes to a greater extent than Habermas that 
religious doctrines, including Islamic ones, can endorse an overlapping consensus on 
constitutional democracy, while interpreting and articulating liberal values in different 
ways; and that citizens should have mutual knowledge of each other’s religious and 
non-religious doctrines. Veit Bader (2009:113-116) argues that the late Rawls’, who 
recognizes that there can be many legitimate interpretations of liberalism so that public 
reason must always remain revisable, holds a more inclusive position that comes closer 
to an ‘open model’ of deliberation, which encourages “as many voices as possible to be 
raised, listened to and responded to”. While the ‘post-secular’ revisions take into 
account the importance of learning about each other’s comprehensive doctrines through 
dialogue, and the need for critical self-reflection on all sides, Parekh (2000:312) still 
thinks that neither Rawls nor Habermas seem to sufficiently appreciate that political 
deliberation is always contextual and culturally embedded, is never based on rational 
arguments alone, and cannot be turned into a single universal model that fits all 
societies. 
Bader (ibid, 126) argues that only an open, inclusive model of public reason can 
challenge the particular interpretations that hide behind a fixed ‘universal’ version of 
public reason (the attempt to claim universality for particular interpretations 
corresponds to Eurocentrism, see Sayyid 2003). Habermas’ idea of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ is somewhat ambivalent with regard to the extent of ‘assimilation’ that can 
be required from immigrants. On one hand, he writes that the state must “preserve the 
identity of the political community, which nothing, including immigration, can be 
permitted to encroach upon, since that identity is founded on the constitutional 
principles anchored in the political culture and not on the basic ethical orientations of 
the cultural form of life predominant in that country” while on the other hand, as a result 
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of immigration, “as other forms of life become established the horizon within which 
citizens henceforth interpret their common constitutional principles may also expand” 
(Habermas 1994:139-140; quoted in Modood 1997:17). While Modood (ibid) rejects 
Habermas’ distinction as invalid because political principles inevitably reflect the 
shared values of a society, Christian Rostbøll (2008) interprets constitutional patriotism 
as an open model, and uses this to challenge the argument that free speech is non-
negotiable presented by the defenders of publishing the Danish cartoons. Presenting 
constitutional patriotism as a non-nationalist form of loyalty to the liberal state that 
accommodates cultural diversity, Habermas argues that “constitutional principles will 
and should be interpreted on the basis of a particular nation’s historical experience” 
(cited in Rostbøll 2008:25). Rostbøll interprets ‘historical experience’ as including “the 
experience of becoming a multicultural society” so that “interpretation is (and should 
be) a product of debate and can be altered by future debates among all members of the 
political community” (ibid, 24) including the Muslim minority. He argues that the 
particular Danish political culture and its interpretation of free speech should not be 
seen as a given, which immigrant minorities cannot question and simply have to 
assimilate, but argues that the political culture itself should be an object of democratic 
deliberation (ibid, 26).  
This open and inclusive view, in line with Parekh (2000:237) and Bader (2009:113-
116), challenges the view taken by defenders of the Danish cartoons, who defined free 
speech as an absolute and non-negotiable value placed beyond democratic deliberation. 
In their rhetoric, both Jyllands-Posten and the Danish government saw free speech 
simultaneously as a universal value and a particular value of the Danish national culture, 
thus conflating the abstract idea of free speech with the Danish interpretation of it. This 
view, Rostbøll (ibid, 5-6; 18) argues, excluded Danish Muslims from taking part in 
public deliberation about society’s shared laws and principles; they were denied the 
status as equal citizens and were offered only one way to be liberal, i.e. assimilation to 
Danish culture. In line with Parekh’s (ibid, 312) insistence that political deliberation is 
always contextual and culturally embedded, Rostbøll (ibid, 9) also argues that there is 
no culturally neutral way of interpreting liberal principles. The theoretical challenge is 
to reconcile the universality of liberal values with the acknowledgement that they are 
always connected to culture, but not to any specific culture. His solution is to think of 
liberal principles not as a non-negotiable given, but as dialogically constituted. This 
means that they are subject to “continued democratic deliberation, reinterpretation and 
revision”; any formulation of them is always provisional and can be improved in the 
light of new insights (ibid, 10). Such a view allows immigrant minorities to contribute 
with their own perspectives to the democratic process of improving the understanding 
and application of universal values. This process multiculturalizes liberalism rather than 
making it culturally neutral (ibid, 17-18). 
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In his analysis of Australian integration debates in the late 1980s, Ghassan Hage 
(1998:233-246) describes a situation where public debate neither included minority 
voices nor had much effect on policy until the populist One Nation party and the 
conservative Howard government transformed it into a political force in the 1990s. 
Integration debates were initiated by white Australians, who called for debate about 
what they perceived as minority problems, notably their ‘lack of integration’. Debates 
would take place among the majority, between nationalists and liberal multiculturalists 
who disagreed on how much diversity they could tolerate, but shared the belief that the 
white majority should supervise the integration process. In Hage’s analysis, a central 
function of the debate was to construct minorities as problematic objects that need to be 
managed by white national subjects. Regardless of whether the nationalist or liberal side 
dominated the debate, it depended on what Hage calls a “white policy fetishism” (ibid, 
235); that is, an exaggerated belief that the white majority ‘chooses’ which policy to 
lead towards minorities. He points out that the Australian government’s decision to 
formulate a policy of multiculturalism, among the first countries in the world in the 
1970s, did not primarily depend on a white decision, but on realizing that assimilation 
could no longer work and that only recognizing diversity could keep the nation united. 
‘On the ground’, a process of multicultural integration (as a two-way process) had been 
going on regardless of official assimilation policy. Hage argues that the tendency 
towards integration, including a degree of change in majority society, is inevitable and 
minimally affected by government decisions. A comparison of the wide differences 
between minority policies of various European states would show that certain policies 
may facilitate or slow down the integration process, but they have a rather limited 
effect; differences in the extent of real integration are small. Hage thus argues that when 
nationalists worry about minorities’ ‘lack of integration’, what they want is “more 
supervised integration” (where minorities have to prove their loyalty to the nation), 
while they actually fear “real integration”, where minority persons become equal and 
politically active citizens defining their belonging independently. Rather than as a 
meaningful instrument for formulating policy, Hage sees integration debates as a “ritual 
of white empowerment” (ibid, 241), which provides the majority with a sense of control 
over the nation; he argues that the presence of unchecked white nationalism assures the 
continuation of white hegemony, while white liberals can condemn nationalist populism 
as irrational, and claim for themselves a responsible “middle ground” as managers of 
diversity. 
A European ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ 
While multiculturalism as a state policy was first developed in Canada and Australia 
(and the United States to some extent, primarily in education policy) in the 1970s, 
European countries have chosen widely different policies towards minorities. Some 
countries, including Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden (Modood 2007:3), followed 
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the lead of Anglophone immigration countries, while others, notably France and 
Germany (Modood 2007:9), with their specific models of civic assimilationism and the 
ethnic nation respectively, but also countries like Denmark, never implemented a 
multiculturalist policy (Triandafyllidou, Modood & Meer 2011). Despite these 
differences, a European consensus has developed, where multiculturalism is seen as a 
“failed experiment” that needs to be replaced by a model of ‘civic integration’ focused 
on social cohesion and adherence to ‘national values’ (Modood 2007:11-12; Phillips 
2007:4-5, 21-22; Titley & Lentin 2011:2-3; 201). Examples abound, recently German 
chancellor Angela Merkel declared ‘multiculturalism has failed’ and British Prime 
Minister David Cameron said ‘multiculturalism is dead’ (see Modood 2012:39). The 
narrative of a “crisis of multiculturalism” (Modood 2007:10-14; Phillips 2007:4-8) 
became dominant in Britain during the years 2001-2005, but it was the Netherlands 
which saw the most dramatic policy reversals (Titley & Lentin 2011:202), initiated by 
influential right-wing politicians, including Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders (Fekete 
2006:3-5). Public concern with ‘Muslims’ started with the Rushdie Affair in Britain and 
the hijab affair in France, both in 1989 (Modood 2012:49). Anti-multiculturalist 
sentiment spread to the center-left as Muslims became associated with terrorism and the 
oppression of women, through a series of violent events during the first few years of the 
new millennium (including riots in English cities in 2001 and 2004, terror attacks in 
New York and Washington in 2001 and in London in 2005, and the murders of Fadime 
Sahindal in Sweden in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004), for which 
multiculturalism became a scapegoat (Phillips 2007:3; Titley & Lentin 2011:3). These 
violent events then served to single out problematic populations that were targeted by 
changes in policy and legislation across several countries; anti-terrorism measures in 
Britain, hijab bans in France and Germany, citizenship tests in the Netherlands and 
other countries, and restrictions on family reunification in Denmark (Razack 2008:129; 
Fekete 2006:2; Titley & Lentin 2011:126; 201-202; Cesari 2011:27-31). Despite anti-
multiculturalist rhetoric, most European countries including Germany and France have 
enacted multiculturalist policies; e.g. recognizing Muslims as a religious minority, 
though the creation of Muslim councils can be partly seen as “top-down efforts to 
control Muslims or channel them in certain directions” (Modood 2012:40). 
Multiculturalist accommodation in fact accelerated in the years 2000-2010 (ibid). 
Gavan Titley and Alana Lentin (2011) analyze how mediated events across Europe are 
linked to form a cumulative, pan-European crisis; drawing on insights from Hage on 
how integration debates are disconnected from the reality on the ground, construct 
minorities as problematic objects and attempt to prevent real integration. The two 
researchers apply Michel de Certeau’s concept of ‘recited truths’ (the production of 
social facts through narrativization and repetition; ibid, 21) to describe the gap between 
the narrative of a “failed experiment” of multiculturalism (understood as a unitary 
doctrine), and an empirical reality where multiculturalism was never adopted as official 
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policy, as in Merkel’s repudiation of a ‘German multiculturalism’ that never existed 
(Titley & Lentin 2011:2), and in the Danish rejection of multiculturalism, which is more 
a retreat from tolerance (ibid, see also Hervik 2004, 2011). However, this partial and 
erroneous crisis narrative is not simply unrelated to empirical reality, but used to 
delegitimize ‘lived multiculture’ (Titley & Lentin 2011:21). As a proxy for rejecting 
‘lived multiculture’ (ibid, 17), the attack on multiculturalism can be understood as a 
coded form of racism, and a central point in Titley and Lentin’s (ibid, 3-4) analysis is 
how this rhetoric simultaneously repudiates and reshapes racism. 
Media plays a central role in internationalizing integration debates by framing and 
linking local issues to international events (ibid, 125). In response to particular events, 
framed as evidence of ‘bad’ or excessive diversity (ibid, 134), politicians and other 
public figures call for debate, which is never seen as ‘open’ and ‘honest’ enough (ibid, 
6). While being justified with reference to Habermasian ideas of public deliberation, 
these  repeated calls for integration debate have little influence on policy, and are better 
understood as ‘ritual debates’ (ibid, 128-131) in Hage’s sense. As such, integration 
debates become a ritual of exclusion (ibid, 200); a technology to problematize minority 
populations that serves to reassure the majority of its control over the nation. With 
reference to Hage’s argument that practices of both racism and tolerance confirm 
majority power to control and set limits for diversity, Titley and Lentin (ibid, 31) argue 
that Muslim minorities now challenge these ‘fantasies’ of national management. Either 
the state accommodates or seeks to contain such challenges, it responds pragmatically to 
‘lived multiculture’ relatively independent of what currency the term ‘multiculturalism’ 
has in public opinion at a given time (ibid, 42). 
According to Titley and Lentin (ibid, 195), contemporary European integration 
discourses combine cultural racism with ‘assertive liberalism’, thus equating 
‘integration’ with cultural homogeneity and the superiority of Western values. Drawing 
on the topos of a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Samuel Huntington’s idea that after the cold 
war, global conflicts would no longer be along economic or ideological lines, but 
between cultures or ‘civilizations’ defined primarily by religion; this view singled out 
Muslims as the new ‘enemy’ of the West), integration rhetoric opposes ‘real integration’ 
in line with Hage’s suggestion that “worrying about migrants who do not integrate, or 
integrate enough, may in fact be a fear of real integration” (cited in ibid, 196). In this 
view, European integration politics is fixated on the role as manager of integration, 
multiplied by the European self-image as supervisor of civilization. While its 
contemporary form differs from classic nation-building and cultural homogenization, 
‘integration’ discourses always combine nationalism and liberalism, and are primarily a 
matter of control, of the government’s need to demonstrate its ability to manage 
diversity (ibid, 201-204). 
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Parekh (2006:186-187) agrees that part of the explanation for complaints about Muslim 
minorities’ ‘lack of integration’ can be found within the ‘totalist’ logic of the integration 
discourse. European Muslims are generally well-integrated in the economic and 
political sense, but allegedly fall short of the expectation to internalize what is often 
called ‘Western values’. He argues that nationalists and liberals share an assumption 
that the political unity of the state requires a culturally unified nation. While nationalists 
openly demand assimilation, the liberal concept of ‘integration’ tolerates diversity in the 
private sphere, but still promotes a more or less monocultural public sphere. The 
distinction is less clear in practice, as there will be a pressure to align the private sphere 
with public values, justifying state intervention in the private lives of minorities and 
requiring them to internalize public values. Further, politicians often mean 
‘assimilation’ (a one-way adjustment where minorities do not ‘disturb’ mainstream 
society and become as much as possible like the majority) when talking about 
‘integration’ (a mutual process where also the majority is expected to make changes to 
accommodate minorities) (Modood 2012:27; 2007:47). Theorists like Parekh, Modood, 
Hage, and Titley and Lentin, have argued that integration debates are out of touch with 
empirical reality on the ground. Significantly, the perception of Muslims who ‘fail to 
integrate’ has no basis in empirical evidence (Parekh 2006:180-187; Modood 2007:153-
154). Feminist theorist of multiculturalism Anne Phillips (2007:23-24) criticizes the 
cultural essentialism of those rejecting multiculturalism, and argues that they overstate 
the degree of value difference when identifying groups as ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’. While 
people differ individually, culturally and in terms of class and gender, “these differences 
do not map onto simple binaries like liberal or nonliberal, Western or non-Western”, 
and in Europe at least, ‘deep’ value conflict is rare (ibid, 65).  
A number of surveys of Muslim attitudes seem to confirm this view. John Esposito and 
Dalia Mogahed’s (2007) worldwide Gallup poll on Muslim views shows that a vast 
majority of Muslims (as opposed to the extremist minority usually highlighted by 
Western media) see ‘Western’ and ‘Muslim’ values as compatible, and support free 
speech, democracy and gender equality, which most women and the majority of men 
see as compatible with their religion. However, rather than declaring adherence to 
“Western values”, they justify these principles with reference to Islam. They are 
nuanced in their criticism of the West; they admire Western democracy, but lament the 
breakdown of traditional (family) values and criticize specific (foreign) policies. They 
do not reject “Western culture”, but want their own model of democracy, which may 
include sharia (in its diverse interpretations) as a source of legislation, but reject that 
religious leaders should have a role in law-making (theocracy). They want to improve 
relations with the West, but are asking for greater respect for the Islamic religion.  
Surveys among Muslim minorities in Europe show similar results; a majority of French 
Muslims associated Islam with peace, tolerance and the protection of women, in 
contrast to majority perceptions of Islam as fanatic, violent and oppressive of women 
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(Phillips 2007:23). European Muslims may be more secular than their counterparts in 
Muslim countries, but are generally more religious than the majority population (Cesari 
2011:40-41); a vast majority of British Muslims say that religion is of personal 
importance to them (Modood 2005:160). For Norwegian Muslims, mosque attendance 
is lower than in Britain, and only a small minority support sharia laws or think society is 
immoral; but Pakistanis and Somalians, the two largest groups, say that religion is very 
important to them; while Norwegians as a whole are among the least religious in Europe 
(NOU 2011:14; p. 315). (While Christians tend to define themselves as either religious 
or not; religious practice is more of a gliding continuum among Muslims, who are less 
likely to be ‘atheist’; see Vassenden & Andersson 2011:587). Attitudes towards the 
“West” are similar to the global poll; 90 per cent want more integration and support 
gender equality and free speech; at the same time as they were overwhelmingly opposed 
to publishing the Mohammed cartoons (which indicates that respect for Islam matters to 
them), and significantly critical of military interventions (TNS Gallup 2006; NOU 
2011:14, p. 313-319). What most Muslims want, if we can generalize, is neither 
assimilating “Western values” nor separating from the West, but to integrate the two 
with each other. 
Thus, the conflict between Western and Muslim communities is political rather than 
cultural; it is more about policy than about principles (Esposito & Mogahed 2007:xi). 
Further, the poll indicates that the conflict is asymmetric in the sense that the majority 
of Muslims are more open towards the West, and more nuanced in their criticism of the 
West. While Muslim ‘extremism’ is relatively marginal, the idea that ‘Islam’ and ‘the 
West’ are incompatible ‘civilizations’ is widespread in the West, in the media, politics 
and public opinion (Modood 2012:16). About 40 per cent of the French, German and 
Norwegian populations perceive Islam as a threat to national identity (NOU 2011:14; p. 
315); and an annual Gallup in Norway over the years 2005 to 2010 shows that more 
than 50 per cent of the Norwegian population think that Islamic values are incompatible 
with basic Norwegian values (IMDI 2010:22). A similar proportion also say that 
immigrants should assimilate (NOU 2011:14; p. 317). Given that a large majority of 
Muslims want to integrate and think that their religion is compatible with liberal values, 
why does every second “Westerner”, even theorists like Taylor, Barry (2001:27) and 
Kymlicka, share a misperception that the two have incompatible values? 
Theorizing anti-Muslim discourses 
Discourses constructing Muslim values, culture and religion as incompatible and 
inferior to those of the West have played a major role in the widespread rejection of 
multiculturalism, and have been theorized under various concepts including 
Islamophobia (a form of xenophobia expressing an unfounded and irrational fear of 
Islam; see Runnymede Trust 1997; Esposito & Kalin 2011), Orientalism (the colonial 
construction of the Muslim world as the West’s negative mirror image; see Said 1979; 
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Yegenoglu 1998), and as anti-Muslim racism (a form of ‘new racism’ or ‘cultural 
racism’ that constructs Muslims as essentially different and inferior and discriminates 
against them on this basis; see Modood 2005; Abbas 2011). The concept of 
‘Islamophobia’ has become an increasingly common term in the last two decades to 
describe the ‘clash of civilizations’ thinking that posits Islam as an ‘enemy’ of ‘Western 
civilization’, particularly in popular debates about multiculturalism. While remaining 
controversial both theoretically and politically in many European countries, the concept 
has become relatively widespread and accepted in Britain not only as a ‘lived 
experience’ but also as an analytical term (ibid, 63-64; Cesari 2011:21-23). Edward 
Said (1985:99) referred to it in his 1985 essay “Orientalism Reconsidered”, and 
Modood (1993a:87-90; 1993b:97-99) used it when criticizing Kymlicka’s assumption 
about British Muslim ‘fundamentalists’ who wanted ‘internal restrictions’ in the 
Rushdie Affair. Here, Modood defined it as ‘ignorance’ and ‘prejudice’ appealing to 
‘taken-for-granted stereotypes’ which may be unintended, but often found among 
Western intellectuals. The term was popularized through a series of reports on the 
discrimination of European Muslims, starting with the British Runnymede Trust report 
in 1997, followed by The European Monitoring Centre on Xenophobia and Racism 
(EUMC 2002) and the 2004 United Nations conference Confronting Islamophobia: 
Education for Tolerance and Understanding (Esposito 2011:xxii-xxiii). 
The Runnymede Report defines Islamophobia as “the dread, hatred and hostility 
towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and 
attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims” and which results 
in exclusion, discrimination and false presumptions that the Islamic religion is a violent 
political ideology with values incompatible and inferior to those of the West (cited in 
ibid). The report identified seven features of Islamophobia; Islam is constructed as (1) 
monolithic, (2) substantially different, (3) threatening, and (4) politicized. Further 
characteristics are that (5) any Muslim criticism of the West is rejected, (6) fear of Islam 
is mixed with anti-immigration racism, and (7) Islamophobia is considered ‘natural’ and 
unproblematic (Abbas 2011:65). Besides political objections that the term exemplifies a 
form of ‘political correctness’ that censors opinions and stifles critical debate, as an 
analytical concept it has been criticized for generalizing various forms of anti-Muslim 
hostility into an “irrational fear” and for exclusively focusing on religion at the expense 
of the multiple forms of discrimination (such as anti-immigrant, class and racial 
discrimination) with which it overlaps (Cesari 2011:22-25). Fred Halliday (1999:898) 
argues that the attack is directed at Muslims as a people, not against Islam as a faith. 
Thus, it seem problematic to conflate ignorance and fear of Islam (analogous to 
‘xenophobia’ and ‘homophobia’) with open hostility towards Muslims (which may be 
better theorized as a form of racism) and the legitimate criticism of radical forms of 
Islam (Abbas 2011:64). With regard to the latter criticism, it has been pointed out that 
the concept can be misused to impose restrictions on internal dissent within Muslim 
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communities (as Kymlicka has argued) and more generally, that it can be used to 
discredit legitimate criticism of religion (see Bangstad 2011:254-255). Bangstad (ibid) 
argues that the fact that an analytical concept is inaccurate and can be misused is no 
reason to reject it; and recommends ‘Islamophobia’ to be used in a restricted sense. 
Even so, he notes how widespread and naturalized the phenomenon of Islamophobic 
speech is across the political spectrum in Norway, at the same time as the liberal elite 
mostly sees the analytical concept as an attempt to stifle legitimate criticism of religion 
rather than as identifying a form of racism (ibid, 247). 
Referring to a “modern and secular anti-Islamic discourse” (Cesari 2011:21) appearing 
in public integration debates, triggered by Muslim immigration, the Iranian revolution, 
and terrorist acts, contemporary Islamophobia in popular culture, politics and media 
partly reproduces and builds on academic ‘Orientalism’ (Zebiri 2011:173) as expressed 
by Bernard Lewis, a widely recognized Middle East expert and American foreign policy 
advisor who originally coined the term ‘clash of civilizations’ popularized by 
Hungtington. Said (1985:98) criticized Lewis as a “main spokesman” of Orientalism, 
and he appeared as a prominent example in Said’s (1979) classic book. Drawing on 
Foucauldian discourse theory and Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, Said (1994:1-7) 
defines ‘Orientalism’ as the western construction of “knowledge” about the ‘Orient’ 
which is inextricably linked to Western domination over the Middle East, which is the 
place of Europe’s richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and 
languages, its cultural contestant and its most significant ‘Other’. As such, the ‘Orient’ 
has helped define Europe as its contrasting image, and Orientalist discourse rests on this 
fundamental distinction between the West and the East. Being relatively independent of 
any correspondence with a ‘real Orient’, Said argues that this Western knowledge 
tradition ‘creates’ or ‘Orientalizes’ its object of knowledge, and that rather than being a 
veridic discourse about ‘the East’, Orientalist knowledge is primarily a sign of western 
dominance and hegemony which consistently constructs Europe as superior to the 
Other. Said (ibid, 300-301) summarizes the “principal dogmas of Orientalism” which 
“exist in their purest form” today in studies of Islam; (1) an absolute difference between 
a rational, developed, humane and superior West and an inferior Orient, (2) abstractions 
about the Orient are always preferred to contemporary empirical reality, (3) the Orient is 
eternal, uniform and incapable of defining itself, thus Western generalizations are 
‘objective’, and (4) the Orient is fundamentally to be feared or controlled. As feminist 
theorists like Meyda Yegenoglu (1998) have pointed out, Orientalism is gendered and 
operates with particular stereotypes of the exotic and submissive Muslim woman and 
the irrational and fanatic Muslim man (see also Abbas 2011:74). These images are 
reproduced in contemporary hijab debates (my chapter 4), where the Orientalist 
exoticization of Muslim women and the desire to unveil and ‘liberate’ them has 
reemerged (Maira 2011:113), and on the other side the hijab has become a symbol of 
resistance to assimilation (Abbas 2011:72). As Kate Zebiri (2011) points out, gender 
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and violence have been persistent themes in anti-Muslim discourse, as reflected in the 
focus on violence against women, but also in the cartoon affair, where the most 
provocative cartoons depicted the prophet as a terrorist surrounded by women in burqas.   
While constructions of Islam as a negative contrast to the West date back to the colonial 
era and before, they have been revived after the end of the Cold War, when Huntington 
popularized the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’. In Lewis’ version, the primary conflict 
is within the Muslim civilization, between “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims”. In the 
“war on terror”, this idea became the driving force in American foreign policy intended 
to liberate “good” Muslims, defined as those who share the “Western” values of 
secularism, freedom and democracy, from those “bad” Muslims who were perceived as 
“fundamentalists” and “anti-modern” (Mamdani 2004:20-24). The distinction between 
two categories of Muslims, defined culturally as either westernized or anti-Western, as 
the dominant framework for understanding current international politics, opens up for 
perceiving non-assimilated Muslim minorities in Western countries as an ‘enemy 
within’ and has been used to justify assimilation policy in some countries and underlies 
integration rhetoric in others (Razack 2008:108). When the discourse of good Muslims 
and bad Muslims is linked to a neo-nationalist ideology that links culture to descent and 
sees Muslims are unassimilable, individuals of ‘Muslim descent’ are faced with the 
impossible task of repeatedly proving themselves to be ‘integrated enough’ in terms of 
loyalty to ‘western values’ (ibid, 122). Contemporary Orientalist discourse builds on, 
but does not simply reproduce, earlier constructions of Islam as the ‘Other’ of Western 
modernity, civilization and Christianity (Maira 2011:10; Abbas 2011:65). A significant 
development is that the Christian aspects of historical Islamophobia have been replaced 
by secular ideas (Zebiri 2011:174-175). While the characteristics ascribed to the Other 
have changed (when serving as the negative mirror of Christianity, Islam’s sexual 
morality was demonized for being too liberal; today’s secular discourse favors sexual 
liberation and demonizes veiling), there is also continuity; the themes of gender and 
violence remain central, and like historical Orientalism served to justify colonialism, it 
still serves to justify specific Western political interests such as the war in Afghanistan 
(ibid; Fekete 2009:193). 
Contemporary anti-Muslim discourses are fueled by a number of sources, including the 
media, secular skepticism about religion, anti-Muslim political forces and intellectuals. 
While not openly Islamophobic (with some exceptions), mainstream media plays an 
important role because sensationalist news coverage leads to an exaggerated focus on 
violence at the expense of more positive stories (as I will further discuss in chapter 2). 
In European media coverage of Muslim minorities, this means that there are far fewer 
stories about successful integration and the daily life of Muslims than about incidents of 
violence against women, terror threats and extreme opinions (Cesari 2011:33-34). Even 
in British media (which did not reprint the Danish cartoons, as opposed to newspapers 
in many other European countries), the dominant view of Muslims focused on their 
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‘failure to integrate’, ‘unreasonable demands’, ‘mixed loyalties’, ‘support for 
extremism’, ‘obscurantism’ and the incompatibility of values; and notably, this view 
corresponded closely with public opinion (Zebiri 2011:177). As a large part of 
European majority populations has little knowledge of Islam, their perceptions are 
influenced by stereotypical portrayal in the media even when this image is not 
representative of most Muslims (Abbas 2011:71). While not necessarily anti-Muslim, a 
widespread ideological form of secularism (see my chapter 5) which draws on 
Enlightenment ideals and rhetoric and sees religion in largely negative terms, also 
contributes to a lack of understanding and sympathy with Muslim demands, which 
cannot be accommodated from this viewpoint (Esposito 2011:xxvi). Part of the 
explanation for the widespread fear of Islam is that contemporary Islam is believed to 
represent a European past (the Middle Ages), where religion was powerful and 
oppressive (Zebiri 2011:187). In a Norwegian study of the links between whiteness and 
secularism, drawing on Goffman’s theory of the ‘stigma’, Anders Vassenden and Mette 
Andersson (2011) argue that in secularized Europe, and especially Scandinavia, secular 
beliefs are normative while religious belief is stigmatized. Parallel to the dynamics of 
whiteness, Christians may ‘pass’ as non-religious since their stigma is non-visible, 
while being Muslim is a visible stigma, signified by ‘race’ as a ‘sign given off’ as well 
as by the hijab as an intentional ‘sign given’ in Goffman’s terminology. 
On the other hand, anti-Muslim racism is actively promoted by a network of anti-
Muslim organizations, politicians, intellectuals and activists, often on the internet (Ali et 
al. 2011). The more explicitly Islamophobic among these, like Geert Wilders (see 
Fekete 2009:200), Daniel Pipes (see Said 1985:96-98; Ali et al. 2011), Bruce Bawer and 
Bat Ye’or (see Bangstad 2011:249-250), propagate the idea that Muslim migrants are 
colonizing Europe and threaten to turn it into a totalitarian Islamic state, “Eurabia”. 
These writers rhetorically conflate the distinction between Islam and Islamism, and 
draw an analogy between Islam and fascism (Bangstad 2011:248), thus construing 
European Muslim minorities as a disloyal ‘fifth column’ or ‘enemy within’ (Abbas 
2011:74), accompanied with a view that left-wing ‘multiculturalists’ have betrayed 
Western nations by opening their borders. While such an ideology led to the July 22, 
2011 terror attack against the Norwegian Labor Party’s youth camp, much of the same 
ideas are shared by more mainstream intellectuals like Paul Berman and Lewis, who has 
argued that multiculturalism means a European ‘surrender’ to Islam (cited in Esposito 
2011:xxv). Right-wing populist parties in many European countries including the 
Norwegian Progress Party, also draw on these discourses to varying extent, carefully 
balancing their appeals to both extreme-right and more moderate voters (Bangstad 
2011:257). Ex-Muslims or individuals from a Muslim background (such as Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali) play an important role in validating these ideas of an Islamic threat (Maira 
2011:120; Ali et al. 2011:56). Following Lewis’ distinction of the good, Westernized 
Muslim versus the bad, fundamentalist Muslim (see Mamdani 2004), Western media, 
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politicians and the anti-Islam network actively recruit and promote ‘native informants’ 
or what Hamid Dabashi (2011) calls ‘comprador intellectuals’; among presumably 
‘good’ i.e. secularized Muslims (to be further discussed in chapter 3).  
In Norway, these international figures have inspired not only right-wing extremist 
groups like Stop the Islamization of Norway (SIAN) and the Norwegian Defense 
League (NDL), but also a number of more mainstream anti-Muslim activists and 
intellectuals, including Hege Storhaug’s Human Rights Service, Hans Rustad’s 
Document.no, and Walid al-Kubaisi (Bangstad 2011:248-254). In a study of the 
Norwegian anti-Muslim network and its international connections, Lars Erik Berntzen 
(2011) found a level of mutual recognition between the Progress Party, Rustad and 
Storhaug, who cites Lewis as a source of inspiration. These three mainstream players 
distance themselves from the more explicit racial rhetoric of Ole Jørgen Anfindsen’s 
Honestthinking.org, who cites Pipes as inspiration; and express ambivalence towards 
SIAN, which they regard as too extreme and thus undermining their cause. Instead, 
Storhaug and the Progress Party emphasize the connections to the Danish Conservative 
Party of former Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen; and to ‘secularized’ Muslims 
like Hirsi Ali and al-Kubaisi (ibid, 85-88). Having repeatedly been granted public 
funding after pressure from the Progress Party (see Fri Tanke, November 24; 2011), 
Storhaug is arguably one of the most influential activists seeking to restrict the role of 
Islam and ‘Muslim culture’ in the Norwegian public sphere, as her rhetoric focuses on 
feminism, individual freedom and national loyalty, and she also reaches out to other 
political parties including the conservative wing of Labor (Berntzen 2011:86; I). Her 
organization, the Human Rights Service, has been described by the Antiracist Center as 
a cornerstone in the domestic hate industry and one of the most prominent producers of 
hate and prejudice in Norwegian society in recent years (Dagbladet, March 26, 2010). I 
will further discuss her role in chapter 3, which analyzes the political role of ‘native 
informants’ in the light of postcolonial theory (Fanon’s theory of colonial mentality and 
Malcolm X’s critique of Black Americans who have ‘internalized racism’), theories of 
multiculturalism (Kymlicka, Parekh and Phillips on ‘internal dissent’ and ‘exit’) and the 
sociology of religion (David Bromley’s theory on different forms of (politicized) exit 
from religious groups), and in chapter 4 on the hijab debate, where I will problematize 
‘white feminism’ in the light of postcolonial and Muslim feminist criticism.  
Anti-Muslim racism 
Modood (1997:4) regards the term Islamophobia as ‘somewhat misleading’ because 
contemporary anti-Muslim prejudice is “more a form of [cultural] racism than a form of 
religious intolerance”. While anti-Muslim prejudice is often seen as a form of ‘new 
racism’ or ‘cultural racism’ characterized by a rather recent shift in rhetoric from ‘race’ 
to ‘culture’ (Hervik 2004:151), biological racism was already in the colonial era 
intertwined with Orientalist discourses (Said 1994; Maira 2011:110). What has been 
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called the ‘racialization of culture’ (Titley & Lentin 2011) and the ‘culturalization of 
politics’ (Mamdani 2004), which underwrites current Western hostility towards Muslim 
immigrants and the ‘war on terror’, thus has significant continuities with colonial 
racism. In one of few articles on Islamophobia in Norway, Bangstad (2011) discusses 
under what conditions Islamophobia can be understood as a form of racism. Drawing on 
Mattias Gardell (2011), he argues that the basis of Islamophobia is an ‘essentialist 
differentiation’ combined with an idea of ‘civilizational inferiority’ which is common to 
other forms of racism. Essentialist differentiation means that it is assumed that the way 
Muslims think and act is determined by their religion, with the implication that persons 
categorized as ‘Muslim’ may be targeted regardless of their individual beliefs and 
religious practices (Bangstad 2011:250-251). To distinguish ‘Islamophobic speech’ 
from legitimate ‘criticism of religion’, Bangstad (ibid, 258-259) suggests the following 
criteria; it is (1) based on an essentialist idea of Islam that supposedly determines the 
thought and action of Muslims, and on (2) an idea of civilizational inferiority; and it is 
(3) obviously incorrect and hateful with the intention to stigmatize or discriminate. Two 
of these criteria, essentialist differentiation and ascribed inferiority, correspond to 
criteria of ‘new racism’ as defined by several researchers, including Peter Hervik, 
Michel Wievorka and Tariq Modood, who all emphasize that racism necessarily 
consists of a combination of these two. Bangstad’s third criterion, requiring an intention 
to discriminate, is more in line with current hate speech legislation rather than with 
antiracist theory which argues that consequences matter rather than intentions. Notably, 
Norwegian government policy also defines discrimination by its effect, regardless of 
racist motivations which are hard to evaluate (see St.meld. nr. 49 (2003-2004), p. 64). 
Thus, acts of racism do not depend on intentions, but on the power to translate 
racialized thinking into acts of discrimination. Hervik (2004:151-153) defines ‘new 
racism’ as requiring three elements; (1) a dichotomy between us and them, where (2) 
the Other is made inferior and incompatible, and (3) power to translate racialized 
thinking into racist acts. This definition includes both differentiation (a dichotomy 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’) and ‘inferiorization’ (of the Other’s culture) as necessary 
criteria, in addition to the power to transform racialized thinking into negative social 
consequences for minorities. ‘Power’ in this sense refers to “the institutional power to 
control access to the labour market, political office, education, and the media, but also 
the power to use symbolic resources to engage institutional power” (ibid, 153); thus 
including the media’s power to shape public opinion. 
It is sometimes held by ‘colorblind’ anti-racists that differentiation (a dichotomy 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’) per se is racism. Against this view, Hervik argues that such a 
distinction is part of any identity formation, and only constitutes racism when combined 
with inferiorization. Discussing ‘cultural racism’, Wievorka (1997:141-148) argues that 
Islamophobia is racist only “if Muslims themselves are constructed as a natural 
category, and their behavior, real or imagined, is presented as informed in some way or 
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another by an essence, by innate attributions or an almost genetic cultural heritage” 
(Wievorka 1997:142). He agrees that racism, whether in a ‘classical’ or ‘new’ form, 
necessarily combines two distinct discourses; a differentialist and segregationist 
discourse that defines the Other as irreconcilably different, and a “universalist” or 
assimilatory discourse that defines the Other as inferior. In a given empirical situation, 
one of them may dominate, as in the comparison of French and British colonial racism, 
which emphasized assimilation and difference, respectively. Wievorka writes that anti-
racism has often become trapped in the contradictions between universalism and 
differentialism; leading universalist anti-racists to reject multiculturalist movements 
demanding the right to be different, while differentialist anti-racists have neglected the 
universal rights of individuals (ibid, 147-148). In multicultural debate, these two groups 
of self-identified anti-racists have called each other racist, as exemplified in the Black 
American division between Martin Luther King Jr.’s ‘colorblind’ humanism in the civil 
rights movement, which argued that all humans are equal and entitled to the same rights 
regardless of color; and the color-conscious anti-racism of Malcolm X, which created a 
politicized Black identity that promoted positive difference (Modood 2005:29-30). 
Rather than defining ‘new racism’ as replacing ‘race’ with ‘culture’, Modood (ibid, 27-
33) argues that cultural racism builds on biological racism; and points out that ideas 
about the Other’s cultural inferiority were also part of the biological racism in colonial 
times. He suggests: 
While biological racism is the antipathy, exclusion, and unequal treatment of 
people on the basis of their physical appearance or other imputed physical 
differences, saliently in Britain their non-whiteness, cultural racism builds on 
biological racism a further discourse that evokes cultural differences from an 
alleged British, civilized norm to vilify, marginalize, or demand cultural 
assimilation from groups who also suffer from biological racism (ibid, 28-29).  
In this view, cultural racism is a combined, or two-step, racism that presupposes 
‘racialization’ of the group which is stereotyped as culturally inferior. While the new 
nationalist rhetoric in Europe no longer emphasizes whiteness, but instead promotes so-
called ‘Western values’, Modood (ibid, 37) points out that “it is much more likely that 
the hostility against perceived cultural difference will be directed primarily against non-
whites rather than against white minorities”. While racialized groups are identified by 
physical markers such as skin color, it is not implied that their ‘culture’ is biologically 
determined. There may however be an assumption of cultural determinism which raises 
doubts about the possibilities for assimilation, despite the fact that certain non-white 
individuals are defined as exceptions to general stereotypes applied to the group as a 
whole (ibid, 38-39). Modood (ibid, 8-18) discusses whether there can be cultural racism 
only with universalism and inferiorization, where “assimilated or hybrid Asians, those 
not strongly identified with Asian culture, might not experience exclusion by whites” 
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(Modood 2005:8). He concedes that a discourse which makes an absolute distinction 
between cultural behavior and physical ancestry, and only discriminates against those 
people perceived to be culturally different, may be better defined as culturalism rather 
than as racism; in practice however it is more likely that “discrimination would be 
exercised against all people of Asian ancestry, regardless of their fit against the image 
of Asian culture”, a situation which would be cultural racism because “nearly all of a 
group, identified by color and descent, are being judged by an essentialized image of a 
group” (ibid). Modood further argues that since cultures are internally diverse, a non-
religious Muslim would still be targeted as a cultural Muslim, and a non-cultural Asian 
would be targeted as an Asian by background, i.e. birth and ancestry.   
A number of scholars including Modood (ibid, 10) draw a parallel between anti-Muslim 
racism and anti-Semitism. Anti-Jewish attitudes among Christians changed from 
religious prejudice to racism when forcedly converted Jews began to be suspected of not 
being true Christians in 16th century Spain, where a doctrine developed that “their old 
religion was in their blood” and that conversion was impossible. Later, in the Nazi 
version, anti-Semitism was detached from religion and became instead a paradigmatic 
case of biological racism. Contemporary anti-Jewish prejudice has again been detached 
from biology (except in Neo-Nazi ideology) but it is generally accepted that anti-
Semitism is a form of racism, while anti-Muslim prejudice is often seen as “religious 
intolerance”. Modood thus argues that “religion can be the basis of racialization as long 
as the religion of a group can be linked to physical ancestry and descent” (ibid, 11), 
often marked by physical appearance as in “Muslim-looking people” or by a Muslim 
family name. Physical appearance and names form the basis of racial profiling in anti-
terrorism measures (Razack 2008:29-34). Muslims are thus ‘racialized’, visually 
identified by (South Asian or Arab) appearance, names and dress, and then ascribed 
cultural and religious stereotypes like fanaticism, unwillingness to integrate etc. 
(Modood 2012:50). 
A common argument against the concept of ‘cultural racism’ is expressed by George 
Fredrickson (cited in Modood 2005:14-16), who argues that it is not racism because it 
allows for assimilation; assuming that members of a stigmatized group can voluntarily 
change their identity. Modood argues that this view is mistaken; not primarily because 
religion or culture is unchangeable, but because ‘race’ also opens for assimilation. Even 
classical anti-Black color racism (as in the USA) makes exceptions for assimilated 
‘mixed-race’ individuals who could ‘pass for white’. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2003:278-
280) thus argues that contemporary US racism is better understood as a continuum with 
an intermediary group of ‘honorary whites’ that are partially assimilated and share the 
political attitudes of white superiority. On the other hand, the idea that religion is about 
beliefs that can be voluntarily given up, has been characterized by Modood (2007:70-
71) as “sociologically naïve and a political con”, because being identified as a Muslim 
is not primarily about individual beliefs, but about ancestry. Being born into a Muslim 
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family, or being born into a society where ‘looking like a Muslim’ or being Muslim 
creates suspicion, hostility or discrimination, has little to do with individual choice; 
although Muslims do respond differently to this situation, some will resist and others 
will “try to stop looking like Muslims” (ibid). In this context, a religious identity is not 
primarily about beliefs and practice, but is an ascribed and self-identified communal 
identity; sometimes less open to individual choice than ‘passing for white’, as when 
Muslims are singled out as the most unassimilable group in Europe (Modood 2005:16-
17). Contemporary anti-Muslim racism holds contradictory views about assimilation; 
Muslims are expected to assimilate into majority culture, but at the same time they are 
often considered ‘unassimilable’ because their religion supposedly determines their 
thought and action. This particular combination is effectively oppressive, because 
whatever Muslims do in order to successfully assimilate, they may be suspected of not 
being assimilated ‘enough’. 
British anti-racism in the 1980s was modeled on the African American struggle, and did 
not take into account the cultural racism directed against Asians, who did not easily 
identify as Black (ibid, 30-33). While some antiracists condemn the assertion of 
minority identities such as Asian, Indian or Muslim as ‘culturalist’ or even ‘racist’, 
Modood (ibid, 104-106) argues that authentic antiracism for Muslims inevitably will 
have a religious dimension, because “their sense of being and their surest conviction 
about their devaluation by others comes from their historical community of faith and 
their critique of the West” (ibid, 104). Thus, antiracism needs to accept oppressed 
groups on their own terms rather than ignore their lived identities and impose on them a 
spurious identity as ‘blacks’. On the other hand, Muslims also need to rethink 
antiracism, since the classical Muslim view of racial equality has the same shortcomings 
as the ‘color-blind’ universalism associated with Martin Luther King Jr. An effective 
anti-racist alliance would require that radical anti-racists recognize the importance of 
culture and religion, while culturally stigmatized minorities need to recognize the 
existence of color racism. Theoretically, this means taking into account both the 
positive, self-defined identity (‘mode of being’) and the negative, ascribed difference 
(‘mode of oppression’). These two aspects of identity are not equivalent even in the case 
of Black Americans, who also go beyond a purely political black consciousness and 
draw strength from recovering African cultural roots. 
Hegemony and resistance 
In his analysis of western discourses that misrepresent Islam and construct it as an 
inferior ‘Other’, Said employs the Foucauldian notion of power as “governmentality”; 
an impersonal force that seeks to control its subjects by “re(-)forming” them and 
making them conform to their place in the social system (Moore-Gilbert 1997:36), and 
where the key instrument of power is ‘knowledge’. He adapts the Foucauldian idea that 
‘discourse’ as the medium of power ‘constructs’ the objects of its knowledge (ibid). 
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However, Said recognizes to a greater extent the role of agency, both in terms of 
intention and the possibility of resistance to the dominant discourse. Thus, for him, 
Western domination is a “conscious and purposive process governed by the will and 
intention of individuals as well as by institutional imperatives” (Moore-Gilbert 1997:37) 
rather than an impersonal force. From Gramsci, Said employs the idea that ‘cultural 
hegemony’ works alongside material forces of power such as government and the law, 
and both theorists focus on discourses in ‘civil society’ as the “medium through which 
power operates most effectively” (ibid, 38). Analyzing Said’s classical work, Bart 
Moore-Gilbert (ibid, 49) argues that Foucault’s pessimistic view about the possibilities 
of resistance seems to dominate over Gramsci’s more optimistic view, and that this is a 
weakness in Said’s conception of Orientalism. Said pays insufficient attention to how 
hegemonic discourses reproduce, why they arise, and the struggles they go through to 
become and remain dominant. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and resistance is better 
suited to understand hegemony as a process in concrete historical events, where power 
relations are continuously reasserted, challenged and modified in discursive struggles. A 
Gramscian perspective takes account of the process of resistance from counter-
discourses which challenge, contest and negotiate power, as well as the internal 
contradictions within the dominant discourse (ibid, 49-52). Theorists of new racism 
often apply the Gramscian notion of hegemony and counter-hegemony (Werbner 
1997a:13; Gullestad 2006b:25), and study the discursive struggles between hegemonic 
discourses and counter-discourses (Modood 2005:9, 44; Amir-Moazami 2004:7-10; 
Hervik 2004:249; Steien 2007:44). These perspectives take into account both agency 
and structural power; hegemony is understood as unstable, always challenged by 
counter-discourses, but also rearticulated and reaffirmed. Various theorists differ in 
emphasizing the power of dominant discourses or the dynamics of negotiations, and this 
is closely related to the empirical situation in the countries they have studied. 
Modood’s (2006:40-41) focus on public sphere ‘negotiation’ reflects the British context 
where minorities in general and Muslims more lately have achieved a strong voice and a 
degree of influence. He describes the public sphere as “essentially contested and indeed 
created through ongoing discursive contestation and political struggles” (ibid) and 
regards this as the primary means of “integration”, which “flows from the process of 
discursive engagement as marginal groups begin to assert themselves confidently in the 
public space, and others begin to argue and reach some agreement with them” (ibid). He 
argues that policy and legislation may be less important for integration than public 
debate, which “allows for the changing of certain attitudes, stereotypes, stigmatizations, 
media images and national symbols” (ibid). While some legislation against racism may 
be necessary, the multicultural goal of respect goes beyond the scope of the law and 
relies on “the sensitivity and responsibility to refrain from what is legal but 
unacceptable” (Modood 2007:57). Through minority protest in public debate, the 
dominant group may learn what is offensive to others and develop empathy.  
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In France and Germany, Muslim minorities have had less access to the public sphere 
and a smaller impact on challenging dominant discourses than in Britain, as shown by 
Schirin Amir-Moazami’s (2004:8) study of the hijab debates, where Muslim women’s 
counter-discourses are mostly expressed in a separate sphere and less openly challenge 
dominant discourses of media and public intellectuals (ibid, 22-23). Hervik’s 
(2004:249) study of new racism and new nationalism also describes a more 
‘Foucauldian’ situation, where the dominant political discourse has become hegemonic 
through media influence and has largely displaced the competing discourse of tolerance 
among ordinary Danes. In her study of Norwegian debates, Gullestad (2006b: 195-215) 
sees public debate as a discursive struggle, where majority hegemony is challenged by 
counter-hegemonic ideas when minority voices join the public sphere, but hegemony is 
rearticulated and reconfirmed when minority voices are marginalized and majority 
opinions emerge as ‘neutral’. 
Discursive struggles between four ideological positions 
Applying the theoretical perspective on discursive struggles between hegemony and 
resistance to multicultural debate, four distinct ideological positions can be identified 
according to two cross-cutting dimensions. First, there is a distinction between 
dominant (majority) positions and resistant (minority) positions, and second, between 
confrontational or separatist positions based on cultural essentialism, and dialogue-
oriented positions emphasizing shared values and compatibility. While there are 
nuances within each position, a degree of overlap between them, and a possibility of in-
between positions, both the empirical as well as theoretical material suggests that 
various debate contributions can be distinguished in terms of these four categories. In 
their analysis of the cartoon affair, Risto Kunelius and Elisabeth Eide (2007:16-18) and 
Kunelius and Amin Alhassan (2008:90-95) identified four different positions based on 
philosophical criteria; (1) liberal fundamentalism, (2) liberal pragmatism, (3) dialogic 
multiculturalism, and (4) religious or ethnic fundamentalism. These are distinguished by 
two cross-cutting dimensions; between ‘universalism’ and ‘cultural relativism’ 
(Kunelius & Eide 2007:17) or ‘contextualism’ (Kunelius & Alhassan 2008:90), cross-
cut by a distinction between ‘communication within cultures’ (‘fundamentalism’) and 
‘communication between cultures’ (‘dialogue’). There is significant correspondence 
between these and my own categorization; and I agree with the way there have defined 
the latter dimension as a distinction between a tendency to define values as non-
negotiable aspects of their ‘culture’ (which makes intercultural communication difficult 
and may lead to conflict) as opposed to a pragmatic approach that understands values as 
(to varying extent) subject to political negotiation.  
Taking my empirical material as a point of departure rather than starting with 
philosophical criteria, I think the former dimension is more accurately defined in terms 
of majority and minority perspectives. This distinction should not be understood in a 
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culturally essentialist or deterministic way which would imply that individuals from the 
majority or minority necessarily hold these positions; a strong standpoint epistemology 
of this kind would be ideological rather than reflecting empirical reality, and would fail 
to take into account how hegemony and resistance works. Rather, my distinction 
between majority and minority perspectives reflects the feminist and postcolonialist 
argument that knowledge is situated and socially positioned in structures of power 
(Gunew 2004; see also Harding 2000; Collins 2000) and reflects the experiences and 
interests of the knowing subject. This theoretical claim finds strong empirical support in 
the integration debates I analyze, while at the same time being able to account for the 
highly significant exceptions where minority individuals support majority perspectives 
(e.g. so-called ‘native informants’) as well as majority individuals who support minority 
perspectives (notably the antiracist position which takes minority perspectives as point 
of departure for critical analysis). Thus, what has been called ‘universalist’ perspectives 
is more accurately understood as attempts by the dominant social group to claim 
universality for its own perspective while marginalizing minority perspectives as 
‘particularist’. The postcolonial criticism of such ‘false universalisms’ as Eurocentrism 
(Sayyid 2003) is paralleled by feminist critiques of the male bias hiding behind gender-
neutral concepts in much contemporary liberal theory (Phillips 2007:32-33). 
Thus, defining the distinction between majority and minority positions in terms of 
universalism and relativism is misleading (though the term contextualism is more 
accurate). In this regard, I agree with Phillips (ibid) and Rostbøll (2008), who argue that 
the dichotomy between universalism and relativism is unhelpful because universal 
values are always expressed in particular contexts. Taking into account these critical 
perspectives on power and hegemony, the dialogic minority position (3) is more 
explicitly identified with antiracism and critical multiculturalism. In my analysis, I have 
called the four ideological positions (1) ‘confrontational liberalism’ (which speaks of a 
clash of civilizations and argues that liberal values such as free speech are absolute and 
non-negotiable), (2) ‘dialogical liberalism’ (which takes a more pragmatic approach to 
liberal values as subject to political negotiations), (3) ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ 
(which represents a critical, dialogical engagement with dominant discourses) and (4) 
‘minority communitarianism’ (in different forms, including cultural and religious 
conservatism and traditionalism, but also ‘political Islam’; which to various extent share 
an idea of cultural autonomy, separatism or self-sufficiency and are skeptical of 
Western influence).  
In the following, I will elaborate on what distinguishes the positions from each other. 
According to Phillips (ibid, 22-23), the contemporary rhetoric of ‘integration’ and 
‘community cohesion’, accompanied by a preoccupation with identifying ‘core values’ 
that characterize each nation and which minorities need to accept in order to become 
citizens, implies that minorities are unfamiliar with core principles of democracy and 
equality. While not necessarily openly nationalist or assimilationist, this form of 
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assertive liberalism “invokes a stereotypical contrast between Western and non-Western 
values that replays monoculturalism in a more political guise” (Phillips 2007:23). As 
Phillips points out, the generic values of democracy and human rights cannot be 
claimed to belong to any particular nation nor are they exclusively liberal, European or 
Western as if non-Western immigrants are unfamiliar with and need to be taught about 
human rights. Instead, the idea that such values are ‘European’ “draws on and reinforces 
stereotypical distinctions between liberal and illiberal, modern and traditional, Western 
and non-Western cultures” (ibid). This view differentiates between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and 
makes it clear that ‘our values’ are superior. 
As a European paradigm of national identity, ‘confrontational liberalism’ (position 1) 
draws quite explicitly on ideas of a clash of civilizations; and somewhat less openly on 
anti-Muslim discourses. While strictly speaking not ‘liberal’, such ‘illiberal’ liberalism 
can be understood as a neo-nationalist appropriation of liberal rhetoric. In this populist 
discourse of European identity politics, liberal values are claimed as part of European 
identity and in each country particularized as part of a national culture into which 
immigrants are expected to assimilate. Statistics from Norway indicate that half the 
population agrees that immigrants should “strive to become like Norwegians as much as 
possible” (cited in St.meld.nr. 49, 2003-2004, p. 67). Also referred to as ‘identity 
liberalism’ (Titley & Lentin 2011:116-121), this view claims to defend liberal values 
against the threat of illiberal forces (mainly represented by Muslims) allegedly 
accommodated by multiculturalism. Analyzing the new nationalism and new racism in 
Denmark, Hervik (2011:236-241) points out how this position combines ideas of 
cultural incompatibility and inferiority with neoconservative ideas inspired by Carl 
Schmitt, who argued that politics is about identifying and confronting your ‘enemy’. 
Thus, the public sphere is seen as a battlefield, and willingness to dialogue, negotiate 
and accommodate is seen as a sign of weakness. In line with this thought, parts of 
Danish media constructed Danish national identity as against a Muslim enemy, and the 
government rejected the Muslim ambassadors’ request for dialogue and refused to offer 
a (genuine) apology. Similar confrontational views have been expressed in academic 
comments on the Rushdie and cartoon affairs; Brian Barry (2001:31) writes that “the 
right to mock, ridicule and lampoon is inseparable from the right to free speech” while 
Randall Hanssen (2006:8) argued that Muslims “cannot be accommodated through a 
revision of those norms and principles”.  
Dialogical liberalism (position 2) clearly rejects the two basic characteristics of 
‘confrontational liberalism’, i.e. the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ and the Schmittian 
idea of confrontation. Instead, it draws on ideas of deliberative democracy, arguing that 
dialogue can generate an intercultural consensus on core values (Phillips 2007:41). 
Theoretically, this more pragmatic approach corresponds to Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism and Rawls’ pluralism, which provide liberal arguments for 
accommodating cultural and religious minorities, respectively. As discussed earlier, 
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these theorists agree that minority groups mostly share liberal values, although they may 
interpret them differently. While accepting that there is more than one way to be liberal, 
these theorists remain within a liberal framework thought to be neutral, but which 
justifies certain limits to tolerance and restraints on public reasoning. From a minority 
perspective, these approaches have been criticized for exaggerating the scale of value 
conflict (see Phillips 2007:41) and for being less liberal than they appear (Modood 
2005:19-20). Parekh (1995:97), for example, comments that liberals speak of an open-
minded dialogue, but remain skeptical about others’ beliefs and dogmatic about their 
own. While agreeing that not all differences can be tolerated, Parekh criticizes liberals 
for conducting dialogue on their own terms, without taking a critical look at their own 
assumptions. Instead of excluding some voices as ‘unreasonable’, he argues that the 
determining principles should be dialogically derived and consensually grounded, not 
imposed by a narrowly defined liberalism. 
The difference between ‘dialogic liberalism’ and ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ (position 
3) lies less in their underlying philosophies than in how they are politically situated; and 
the limits of ‘dialogical liberalism’ can be understood by paying attention to how it is 
positioned in power relations between majority and minority. Sneja Gunew (2004:5-17; 
see also Titley & Lentin 2011:14-15) distinguishes between ‘state multiculturalism’ 
understood as “a set of government policies designed to manage cultural diversity” 
(ibid, 5) and ‘critical multiculturalism’ “used by minorities as leverage to argue for 
participation, grounded in their difference, in the public sphere” (ibid, 16-17). As a state 
policy for diversity management, as in Canada and Australia, multiculturalism is co-
opted by the state for its nation-building projects and linked to practices and discourses 
which police and control diversity. In this discourse, a main issue is which differences 
are compatible with liberal culture. Consequently, minorities tend to be constructed as 
problems and their illiberal practices contrasted with Western values. Thus, she argues 
that state multiculturalism is often complicit with assimilation policy and racism 
because it is based on a liberal pluralism which fails to take account of power structures 
and implies a ‘hidden white norm’ from which minorities diverge, in the sense theorized 
by critical analysts of whiteness (Frankenberg 1993; Garner 2006). ‘Whiteness’ can be 
understood as the ‘unmarked’ identity of the dominant social group, which appears 
neutral from a majority perspective but becomes visible from a minority perspective 
(ibid, 259-262). Ruth Frankenberg (1993:1) defines whiteness as referring to a position 
of structural advantage (white privilege); a perspective or ‘standpoint’ from which white 
people look at the world (Eurocentrism); and “a set of cultural practices that are usually 
unmarked and unnamed” and which are assumed to be normative, neutral and universal 
(ibid, 202-204). Whiteness is thus “an invisible perspective, a dominant and normative 
space against which difference is measured” (Dyer cited in Garner 2006:259). The 
normative ‘content’ of whiteness is linked to ideas that allegedly characterize (Western) 
‘civilization’; including individualism, rationality and secularism.  
35 
 
Critical multiculturalists point out that liberalism is closely linked to the state; it is state-
centered in the sense of taking the perspective of the state and approaching issues of 
multiculturalism in the way of an ideal legislator or policymaker (Modood & Favell 
2003:493-494). Historically, liberal philosophy provided ideological justification for the 
state’s dismantling of traditional communities and the creation of an individualist 
political culture (Parekh 2000:34). Identifying with and speaking from the perspectives 
of the state and of the national majority, and being insufficiently aware of the 
implications of this position, ‘dialogical liberalism’s claim to neutrality is betrayed by 
its (often unconscious) reflections of the dominant culture and by being insufficiently 
open to minorities, who are more often ‘tolerated’ than accepted as equal partners in a 
genuine dialogue conducive to mutual learning. Antiracist multiculturalism makes no 
claims to neutrality, but argues that minorities must be equal participants in negotiating, 
defining and interpreting common values and principles, and explicitly starts with 
critical minority perspectives on hegemonic discourses.  
From such a perspective, Pnina Werbner (1997:262-263) argues that multiculturalism 
and antiracism must be combined in order to recognize the complementarity of the 
universal and the particular, of our commonalities and differences. She criticizes liberal 
theorists of multiculturalism for failing to see how cultural racism denies commonalities 
across difference, e.g. when Taylor and Kymlicka through factual errors create an 
impression that mainstream Islam is incompatible with liberalism, thus reproducing an 
anti-Muslim bias that is prominent in elite discourses (Modood 1997:3). The difference 
between state multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism can be further illustrated by 
comparing Kymlicka’s perspective with Modood’s. While Modood’s theory starts ‘from 
below’ with those differences that are important to minority groups as expressed in 
concrete demands and political mobilization, and understands multiculturalism as the 
process of negotiation (between minority, majority and state) which may result in 
pragmatic state accommodation, Kymlicka tries to derive an ideal model for appropriate 
state policy from an abstract, often reified, concept of culture. While arguing that some 
minority demands should be accommodated, Kymlicka (2002:342-347) writes from a 
state perspective where he sees multiculturalism as a government strategy to justify 
nation-building, where the state gains legitimacy among minorities by accommodating 
some of their demands. His historical parallel to social democratic accommodation of 
working-class demands, in order to create loyalty to the state, integrate workers in the 
national culture, and prevent them from supporting foreign ideas such as communism 
(ibid, 328-329), indicates a nationalist strategy of containment, especially if 
accommodation is modest and does not address structural issues (see Titley & Lentin 
2011:15).  
While Kymlicka assumes that “in most cases, ethnocultural groups in Western 
democracies are not in fact seeking to limit the basic liberties of their own members, 
and are not seeking to prevent their members from questioning and revising traditional 
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practices and customs” (2002:342), he remains skeptical about ‘conservative ethno-
religious groups’ and demands that minorities must be ‘internally liberal’ in order to 
claim legitimate minority rights. While pragmatically accommodating cultural 
minorities, Kymlicka’s theoretical argument is more concerned with defining the ‘limits 
of tolerance’. As Modood (2007:63) has argued, the liberal concept of ‘tolerance’ falls 
short of multicultural recognition, acceptance or respect, since it implies refraining from 
taking action against a difference one disapproves of. As such, the concept of tolerance 
implies a negative attitude towards difference, and the power to choose between 
tolerance and intolerance. In his discussions of ‘internal restrictions’ among European 
Muslims, Kymlicka (ibid, 340-341) seems to exaggerate the extent of value conflict. As 
Modood points out, Kymlicka’s assumption that European Muslims try to gain state 
support to restrict the legal right of individuals to heresy, apostasy and to refuse 
arranged marriages, seems to be derived from majority discourses about Islam as an 
illiberal other, rather than from actual political demands made by Muslims. While 
Modood (2006:52) recognizes that the state must protect the rights of minority 
individuals oppressed within their own communities, he criticizes Kymlicka for 
generalizing the point about internal restrictions into a “fundamental principled 
constraint upon multiculturalism” (Modood 2007:29), which means that liberal theory 
serves as a non-negotiable standard against which minority practices are to be 
evaluated. Kymlicka can thus be seen as reflecting a top-down approach rather than 
entering into critical dialogue with minority individuals, which would offer a more 
accurate diagnosis of existing problems (Al-Hibri 1999:42).  
While recognizing that ‘state neutrality’ is unfair to cultural minorities because it 
inevitably privileges the dominant group, Kymlicka defends ‘neutrality’ towards 
religion. Modood argues that a radical secularism (which insists that religion should 
have no public role) cannot be neutral between religions; it inevitably favors privatized 
religion, which is primarily about personal beliefs and conduct as in Lutheran 
Protestantism, over those that include communal obligations and political action. A 
radically secular state consequently demands that religions with public ambitions give 
them up, thus contradicting the principle of neutrality. Some liberals solve this 
contradiction by making explicit that the liberal state should encourage individualistic 
religions over communalistic ones; with the consequence that the state is seen as unjust 
by members of communalistic religions (Modood 2005:144). While what Modood calls 
‘radical’ or ‘ideological’ secularism’ is often taken for granted in liberal theory; Rawls 
gives a more reasoned justification. However, Modood (ibid, 19-20) argues, 
This secularism is less liberal than it seems and is part of the political culture and 
policy assumptions that make it difficult for Western societies to be just to 
Muslims. It is an obstacle to seeing the problems of Muslims and sympathizing 
with them, to seeing aspects of the oppression of Muslims, to recognizing 
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Muslims, and to offering solutions to them similar to those given to other 
oppressed and disadvantaged groups. 
Instead, he suggests ensuring that those marginalized by the dominant ethos are given 
access to the public sphere so their voices can be heard, and points to the ‘moderate 
secularism’ found in India, where the state does not identify with any religion, but 
supports religions and allows a public role for them (Modood 2005:145). In such a 
‘moderate’ form of secularism, Modood argues that the challenge is to find a way for 
people of different religions as well as non-religious persons to reason with each other 
in public debate and be able to reach conclusions that have legitimacy across faiths; and 
to avoid conflict by mutually limiting criticism of each other’s fundamental beliefs 
(ibid). Instead of ‘neutrality’, Modood (ibid, 147) advocates including religious views in 
the public sphere, with an ideal that they will be translated into nonreligious 
considerations so that contributions to political discourse can be seen as relevant to all. 
Modood’s view is similar to the later Rawls and Habermas, who in their post-secular 
turn distance themselves from what they call ‘Enlightenment liberalism’ (Rawls) and a 
’secularist stubbornness’ (Habermas 2005:20), and instead allow religious arguments 
into public debate provided that they get translated into a political language that is 
accessible to all, before crossing the institutional threshold between the informal public 
sphere and state institutions such as parliaments and courts (ibid, 14-15). While the late 
Rawls no longer defines this political language as ‘secular reason’, Habermas continues 
to equate public reason with secular reason. However, Habermas (ibid, 16) suggests 
that, 
The requirement of translation is even a cooperative task in which non-religious 
citizens must likewise participate, if their religious fellow citizens are not to be 
encumbered with an asymmetrical burden. Whereas citizens of faith may make 
public contributions in their own religious language only subject to the proviso 
that these get translated, the secular citizens must open their minds to the 
possible truth content of those presentations and even enter into dialogues from 
which religious reasons then might emerge in the transformed guise of generally 
accessible arguments. 
Habermas (ibid, 18) thus asks secular citizens to give up an ideological secularist view 
that “perceive[s] religious traditions and religious communities as archaic relics of pre-
modern societies”, and which “can obviously not be expected to take religious 
contributions to contentious political issues seriously” in favor of a more open view that 
helps to assess religious contributions for possible truth content that can be translated 
into secular language and justified by secular arguments in legislative and policy-
making institutions. The Rushdie Affair (in Britain), where liberal secularists rather than 
Christians were most strongly opposed to Muslim protest (Modood 2009:174), serves as 
an example of this translation process, where Muslim protestors initially argued in terms 
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of religious concepts of apostasy and blasphemy, before settling on demanding a ban 
against religious discrimination parallel to legislation against racial and ethnic 
discrimination (Modood 2007:142). Similarly, in the cartoon affair, Muslim protests 
included arguments about blasphemy (reflecting the position I have called ‘minority 
communitarianism’) and arguments about anti-Muslim racism (reflecting the position I 
have called ‘antiracist multiculturalism’). Modood (2005:142) argues that it is only in 
their radical, ideological forms that Islam and secularism clash, while mainstream, 
moderate secularism is not only compatible with mainstream, moderate Islam, but the 
two moderate versions are also philosophically closer to each other than either one is to 
its radical versions. In mainstream Islam, there is sufficient separation between private 
beliefs and the public sphere to facilitate dialogue across religions; there is thus no 
reason to exclude Muslims from participation in public debate on the grounds that their 
politics are not secular enough. 
Another strand of ‘dialogical liberalism’ is ‘cosmopolitanism’ (associated with Paul 
Gilroy and Stuart Hall in Britain, and Thomas Hylland Eriksen in Norway); an attitude 
that accepts difference, celebrates diversity and cultural hybridity, and sees values as 
emerging from intercultural dialogue and embedded in particular contexts (see also 
Phillips 2007:69-70). The cosmopolitan approach emphasizes a sense of ‘multiculture’ 
where people have fluid and multiple identities which they combine in individual ways 
in various contexts, with British Caribbeans as a typical example (see Modood 2011:5). 
The cosmopolitan approach rejects nationalism and speaks about the creation of a more 
inclusive “new we” (see ibid, 3; in Norway, this rhetoric is expressed by Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre). While cosmopolitanism goes beyond ‘individualist 
integration’ (which has no place for minority identities in the public sphere) in the sense 
that it positively values diversity and seeks to dethrone the dominant culture in favor of 
cultural mixing, it is primarily an attitude rather than a policy. As a politics, it does not 
differ much from ‘individualist integration’ (ibid, 5-7; 2012:33). Thus, 
‘cosmopolitanism’ falls short of multiculturalism. For Phillips (2007:69-70), the 
cosmopolitan perspective (in practice, if not always in theory) tends to reproduce a 
hierarchy of cultures by seeing cultural hybridity as more characteristic of Western 
culture, thus reproducing the problem of dominant group claims to ‘universalism’.  
Modood goes beyond the individual diversity of cosmopolitanism and advocates the 
accommodation of minority group identities and values in the public sphere (2011:5-8). 
Taking British South Asians, who tend to be more culturally conservative than 
Caribbeans, as his point of departure, he argues that multiculturalism must have room 
for both individual diversity and ethno-religious communitarianism, and emphasizes 
that individuals should be free to choose between assimilation, cultural mixing or 
cultivating group membership. While acknowledging that there may be a genuine 
concern about some groups becoming too inward-looking and not interacting enough 
with others, he criticizes those who promote one single model of integration (either that 
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is assimilation, individualist integration or cosmopolitan diversity) for all minorities, 
and then complain that ‘Muslims’ continue to be visible as a distinct group when they 
should not be, and attributing this to a separatist tendency allegedly encouraged by 
multiculturalism. He argues that such separatism has never been part of any theory or 
policy of multiculturalism, it represents a fundamental anxiety among critics of 
multiculturalism, who sometimes see separatism as a defining feature of it (Modood 
2012:36-37). To the contrary, the multicultural theories of Taylor, Kymlicka, Parekh, 
Phillips and Modood himself, as well as policies in Canada, Australia and Britain all 
aim at ‘integration’ (ibid, 41).  
The differences between multiculturalism and separatism, or between the positions I 
have called ‘minority communitarianism’ and ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ can be 
illuminated with a further discussion of cultural essentialism and hybridity. From their 
various positions, critical multiculturalists like Phillips (2007:15) and Modood as well 
as Gilroy, as a theorist of hybridity, take a nuanced position which rejects both cultural 
essentialism and the kind of anti-essentialism of opponents of multiculturalism, who 
promote a ‘culture-blind’ approach and argue that ‘groups do not exist’. While more 
skeptical of group-based multiculturalism than Modood, Phillips (ibid, 8-9; 29) defends 
a ‘multiculturalism without culture’, i.e. a ‘revised’ multiculturalism that does without 
essentialist or reified ideas of culture, which tend to explain the behavior of minority 
individuals as determined by their culture in contrast to the supposedly rational, 
autonomous western individual. Like Modood, she criticizes political theorists such as 
Kymlicka for not taking sufficiently into account the anthropological and sociological 
critique of the concept of culture (ibid, 16-19) and the now widespread agreement 
among theorists that “cultures” are not isolated, homogenous wholes as was sometimes 
claimed by classical anthropology. She argues that both supporters and critics of 
multiculturalism have exaggerated the “unity and solidity of cultures” and the extent of 
value conflict, thus mistaking contextual political issues for cultural conflicts.  
Neither Gilroy (1993:100-102), theorizing hybridity grounded in the British Caribbean 
experience, nor Modood, theorizing group-based multiculturalism based on British 
Muslim experience, defend the cultural essentialism found in certain forms of Black 
Nationalism and radical Islam, which promote cultural separatism over multicultural 
integration, i.e. the position I have called ‘minority communitarianism’ (which may also 
include less ideological and more traditionalist views which hold that the cultural 
community should limit (Western) influence from the outside). While promoting an 
ideal of hybridity, Gilroy criticizes the anti-essentialist position for its “arrogant 
deconstruction of blackness” (ibid, 100), which effectively denies the specificities of the 
Black experience of racism. Thus, while skeptical of Black cultural essentialism which 
emphasizes African roots, Gilroy defends a political concept of Black identity that is 
based on the experience of racialization. Similarly, but going further than Gilroy, 
Modood criticizes the politics of anti-essentialism used to deny Muslim claims for 
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group rights. Those who oppose political demands in the name of ‘culture’ (including 
forms of state multiculturalism, Black Nationalism and Muslim ‘fundamentalism’) have 
often claimed that “’cultures’ or ‘groups’ do not exist in the ways presupposed by 
multiculturalism” (2007:92). Opponents of multiculturalism have appropriated anti-
essentialist rhetoric and claim that multiculturalists see minority cultures as “discrete, 
frozen in time, impervious to external influences, homogenous and without internal 
dissent” and see ‘culture’ as determining the behavior of people with a certain ethnic 
background and origin (Modood 2007:89-97). Against this construction of a straw man, 
Modood points out that neither political multiculturalism nor minority mobilization 
depends on cultural essentialism; “the political uses of ethnicity or culture do not 
depend upon erasing […] change and internal complexity – upon believing that a 
culture has a primordial existence or a singular, deterministic, essential quality” (ibid, 
93). Instead, ‘cultures’ can be understood more like languages; “there can be 
identifiable, distinct cultures even under conditions of dominance, interaction and 
hybridity, and multiculturalism can be a political response to such a legacy” (ibid, 95). 
Group coherence is “neither a fiction nor an essence but more akin to family 
resemblance” (in a Wittgensteinian sense).  
Modood (ibid, 97-114) argues that while multicultural discourses are based on a variety 
of claims about culture, some of which are essentialist and others are not, theorists of 
anti-essentialism are themselves essentialist when attributing a false importance to 
elements of essentialism in those discourses. In other words, the essentializing move 
lies in the misguided search for discursive coherence more than in the political 
phenomena that are accused of essentialism. Theoretical critiques of group identities are 
usually suspicious and antagonistic towards the concept of groupness employed by 
ethno-political entrepreneurs, but Modood points out that there is nothing fictitious 
about unity achieved through political mobilization by these entrepreneurs, although the 
degree of successful mobilization may vary. To illustrate, he draws a parallel to the 
Marxist distinction between a ‘class-in-itself’ and a ‘class-for-itself’ and argues that 
“politics can play a large role in creating a certain kind of collective identity and action 
but would be unlikely to succeed if some element of shared circumstances and/or ways 
of living were not already present and could be drawn upon to weave a political project” 
(ibid, 112). This does not imply that each individual is a member of a group or member 
of only one group, and the political consciousness and organization will depend on the 
external social circumstances as well as on internal features, so that in one context, 
individuals may prioritize membership in the working-class and in others, a Muslim 
identity. While ethnic identity entrepreneurs do have political motives, anti-essentialists 
have their own political agenda when they selectively apply anti-essentialist critique to 
undermine certain group claims. Historically, anti-essentialism has been used as a 
political rhetoric against feminism and blackness; today it is most often used to deny 
Muslim demands (ibid, 114).  
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Modood (2005:18-19; 208) recommends that multicultural policy recognizes the 
legitimacy of both hybrid pluralism and cultural mixing, as well as the development of 
ethno-religious communities like Muslims, especially in a context of liberal, secularist 
bias in favor of the former. His position draws on the empirical situation of British 
South Asian Muslims, who tend to be more culturally conservative than other minority 
groups such as British Caribbeans. While there is great individual variation with regard 
to behavioral conformity with cultural and religious practices, the vast majority has a 
strong primary group identity as Muslims (Modood 2012:35; 2007:106-109). This 
shared Muslim identity does not mean the same thing to each individual; for some, 
being Muslim is simply a background, for others, it can be primarily about personal 
religious faith and practice, a matter of community membership, or a political counter-
ideology to Western modernity. While the demand for recognition concerns Muslims as 
a religious group rather than Islam as a faith; this does not mean that religious leaders 
and their discourses are less legitimate as community spokespersons than other Muslim 
voices (ibid, 133-136). 
The empirical field: National contexts 
Despite the existence of a transnational European public sphere, defined as involving 
“common issues debated at the same time by a variety of actors and located in different 
places which virtually recognize and interact with one another”, the national media 
plays a unique role as the main carrier of these negotiations of different ideas and values 
(Krzyzanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2009:5-6). As a general rule, public debate 
takes place within the frame of national media, with significant differences in how 
specific events and values are interpreted in specific countries (ibid, 265-267). 
Characterized as a “transnational media event” (Eide et al 2009), the 2006 cartoon affair 
represents an exception, where a domestic integration debate in Denmark developed 
into a ‘media-constructed’ (Triandafyllidou et al 2009:239) pan-European international 
political crisis. Even in this case, debates took place in the national media of each 
country, where coverage was framed by national political elites (ibid, 38). Thus, specific 
integration debates always originate with specific ‘events’ that are intensively debated 
by media and politicians in a particular national context (Fekete 2004:19), and can be 
understood as transnational when ‘imported’ into another national context by media or 
by specific political interests, including governments, minority activists and anti-
Muslim organizations (Hervik 2011, Fekete 2006, Razack 2008). When specific debates 
travel from one country to another, the general public may be unaware of the original 
context so that the issue can be selectively represented and manipulated by ‘spin 
doctors’ (Hervik 2011), who adjust the arguments to suit the new national context, for 
example when the hijab debate, originating in a French context of radical secularism, 
was translated into an issue of gender equality when debated in Norway (Jacobsen 
2005:164). 
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While central features of public integration debates, including a dominant ‘integration’ 
rhetoric, right-wing populism, secular hegemony (Modood 2005:19) and widespread 
anti-Muslim sentiment (Modood 2009:164), are shared across a number of European 
countries, they also vary significantly between particular national contexts. In the 
following, I will locate Norway in comparison to significant other European countries 
(Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) with regard to 
models of the nation, right-wing populism, forms of secularism, minority populations 
and multicultural policy. Norway is an interesting case as it is located at the crossroads 
of different tendencies found in some or all above-mentioned countries; and despite not 
being a member of the European Union (though a member of the European Economic 
Agreement (EEA) and the Schengen agreement on border control), Norway is far from 
insulated from European debates on multiculturalism. 
Norway is often characterized as being positioned somewhere in between the French 
model of the ‘civic nation’ and the German model of the ‘ethnic nation’, sharing some 
features of both. While contemporary France and Germany both diverge from these 
ideal models, France has traditionally been conceived of as a homogenous nation 
constructed through nation-building and assimilation of citizens into French culture, a 
model also expressed in French colonial policy, which emphasized the ‘civilizing 
mission’ and where (at least in theory) immigrants from the colonies could become 
French citizens and acquire equal rights if they acquired French culture. France is 
characterized by a centralized state with a ‘colorblind’ approach to minorities, who are 
recognized only as individual citizens and not as members of any group (Melotti 
1997:75-77), in contrast to a pragmatic and decentralized British model, also linked to 
the colonial policy of indirect rule, which took differences for granted (ibid, 78-79). The 
German nation, on the other hand, is traditionally defined by ancestry and immigrants 
cannot easily become German; rather they tend to be defined as ‘foreigners’ even after 
generations of residence. Germany does not see itself as a ‘country of immigration’ and 
‘guest workers’ were until recently excluded from citizenship (Modood 2009:165); they 
were not expected to ‘integrate’ but to preserve their language and culture so that they 
may return to their home country in the future (Melotti 1997:80-83). 
While official Norwegian integration policy and citizenship law today is closer to the 
civic nation model, popular conceptions of Norwegian national identity tend to 
emphasize ethnicity. Like Germany and Denmark (until 1973), Norway was until 1975 
open to labor migrants defined as ‘guest workers’. Despite the presence of national 
minorities and indigenous people on Norwegian territory, the Norwegian nation has 
traditionally been conceived of as an ethnically and culturally homogenous community. 
Like in Germany and other Scandinavian countries, the concept of ‘race’ is ‘taboo’ 
(Hervik 2004:149; Vassenden & Andersson 2011:579) and while ‘skin color’ is 
sometimes used as a substitute (Gullestad 2006a:73), ‘white Norwegians’ are usually 
referred to as ‘ethnic Norwegians’ in contrast to ‘immigrants’ which in popular 
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discourse most often refers to non-white people (Gullestad 2006b:44). According to the 
Norwegian Language Council, supposed to reflect ‘normal’ language use, the term 
‘ethnic Norwegian’ is defined by descent and descendents of immigrants, even if born 
in the country and holding Norwegian citizenship, cannot become Norwegian in this 
sense; however “one does not have to be ‘ethnic Norwegian’ to refer to oneself as a 
Norwegian or to be called Norwegian” (Lane 2009:214-220). A distinction is thus 
drawn between ‘Norwegian’ and ‘ethnic Norwegian’, where the former is open to 
immigrants who integrate into Norwegian culture and acquire citizenship (as in the 
French model), while the latter category is reserved for those of Norwegian ancestry (as 
in the German model) (see also Jacobsen 2011:51). In Norway, the term ‘ethnicity’ is 
thus used roughly equivalent to the ‘racial’ distinction between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ 
in English-speaking countries, and differs from Eriksen’s (2002:4) cultural definition of 
ethnicity as “aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and 
are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive”. As Gullestad (2006a:70-73) 
points out, ‘racial’ characteristics are linked to ‘culture’ when visible makers of foreign 
ancestry such as ‘non-Norwegian appearance’ and foreign-sounding names are taken as 
indications that a person does not share basic Norwegian values. Thus, Norwegian 
national identity is configured as white (ibid, 87), and with the rise of the ‘new 
nationalist’ (Gullestad 2006b, Hervik 2006) discourse in the 1990s, the nation was 
increasingly defined ‘ethnically’ in terms of ancestry and descent, drawing an 
opposition between an ‘us’ (majority Norwegians belonging to the nation), and ‘them’ 
(immigrants defined as ‘guests’). 
Similar to a number of other European countries, including France (Front National), the 
Netherlands (several parties), and Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Norway has a 
large and influential right-wing populist party that combines neoliberal and anti-
immigrant policies. Le Pen’s Front National has been characterized as a prototype of 
European neo-nationalist parties. While in France, the entire political spectrum rejects 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ multiculturalism (Amir-Moazami 2005:22; Modood 2007:13), the Dutch 
and Danish radical right has provided parliamentary support for center-right 
governments in exchange for influencing policy in an anti-multiculturalist direction. 
With important media supporting the anti-immigrant agenda, these two countries have 
seen a remarkable change in dominant political attitudes towards minorities and 
Muslims in particular. In Norway and other countries, social democratic parties have 
responded to the rise in right-wing populism by taking over and implementing neo-
nationalist policies (Hervik 2004:153). The Netherlands was a pioneer of 
multiculturalism with its minority policy from 1983 (Modood 2007:12-13), but has in 
the last two decades seen policy reversals and very explicit anti-Muslim rhetoric (Fekete 
2006:4). In 1994, Frits Bolkenstein (VVD; Conservative party) won the elections after 
using anti-multiculturalist rhetoric, Pim Fortuyn’s party list, using anti-Islamic rhetoric 
would have done well were he not assassinated days before the 2002 election (Cesari 
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2005:48; Sniderman et al 2004:46). In 2004, filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered 
by a Muslim fanatic for making an anti-Islamic movie, the script of which was written 
by Somali refugee-turned-right-wing politician, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who holds that 
Muslims have to assimilate into a superior Western culture (Fekete 2006:11). After the 
2010 elections, the center-right government is backed by Geert Wilders anti-Islamic 
Freedom Party. From 2001-2011, Denmark was ruled by a center-right coalition led by 
conservative Anders Fogh Rasmussen, backed by the Danish People’s Party. The 2001 
election campaign was dominated by anti-Muslim rhetoric (Hervik 2006), and the 
government accommodated the Danish People’s Party’s demands and introduced one of 
the strictest immigration laws in Europe; which is particularly restrictive on family 
reunification (Fekete 2006:6; Razack 2008:129). As Hervik (2006; 2011) shows, the 
Danish right has actively cooperated with various newspapers to mobilize voters; in 
1997, Pia Kjærsgaard of the newly founded Danish People’s Party worked with the 
tabloid Ekstra-Bladet in a campaign against immigrants, and in 2005, Jyllands-Posten 
printed the Mohammed cartoons, aligning itself with the government’s anti-Muslim 
position (Modood 2009:218). While Denmark was never multiculturalist, the populist-
media alliance managed to displace the previously dominant discourse of ‘tolerance’ in 
favor of an intolerant approach to cultural difference (Hervik 2006; 2011). 
Norway is often characterized as somewhere in between nationalistic Denmark and 
more multiculturalist Sweden. Comparing the three Scandinavian countries, Tore 
Bjørgo (1997:56-57) points to the general legitimacy enjoyed by nationalism in those 
countries that were occupied by the Nazis during World War II. In Norway, Denmark 
and the Netherlands, right-wing populists can evoke the positive associations of 
nationalist liberation and resistance against occupation (Muslim immigration is 
frequently compared to the Nazi invasion, supported by multiculturalist ‘traitors’) in a 
way they cannot in former expansionary great powers like Sweden (which was neutral 
during the war), Britain and Germany, where ‘nationalism’ is now routinely equated 
with racism and xenophobia. In the latter countries, however, Neo-Nazi extremists are 
more active, in part because these countries did not experience the Nazis as occupants 
and national traitors during the war. The Norwegian populist right and anti-Muslim 
network have partly succeeded in importing debates, policy proposals, rhetoric and 
provocations (Fekete 2006:13-14), including the French hijab ban, Dutch anti-Muslim 
films, and Danish cartoons and immigration restrictions. The cartoon affair showed the 
limits to such influence, when the Norwegian center-left government chose dialogue 
over confrontation (Steien 2007:44-45) and arranged a reconciliation meeting between 
Muslim representatives and the right-wing evangelical editor who had republished the 
cartoons. As in Britain (but unlike Germany and France), Norwegian mainstream 
newspapers did not print the cartoons; they did however promote heated public debate, 
giving access to both anti-Muslim rhetoric and increasingly also critical Muslim voices.  
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In the process of becoming a multicultural society, it has been argued that Norway 
follows one generation behind Britain, where second-generation immigrants have 
criticized a white cultural hegemony, which exaggerates and contains ethnic and racial 
difference in a subordinate position (Melotti 1997:80). In British debates, antiracist and 
multiculturalist perspectives are prominent and minorities with ‘double identities’ are 
more active participants than in countries like France and Germany (Modood 2009:164; 
2005:190). More specifically, it seems that the 2006 cartoon affair played a similar role 
in Norwegian debate about Muslims as the 1989 Rushdie affair did in Britain. In 1989, 
British media focused on Muslim extremists, while moderate Muslims were largely 
absent from public debate. At the time, there were few self-identified Muslims in the 
media, only persons with a Muslim background (ibid, 203), but in the early 1990s, 
British Muslims started asserting themselves in the public sphere (Modood 2009:167). 
While Muslims had failed to get any support for their protest against The Satanic 
Verses, their opposition to the ‘war on terror’ from 2001 onwards was shared with a 
large proportion of the British population. Modood (2005:203-204) argues that by 2001, 
there was a “greater political maturity among British Muslims” which opened for 
alliances with the political left and other sections of the population. After the 9/11 terror 
attacks, moderate British Muslim contributors and public intellectuals took collective 
self-criticism, denounced extremism and called for a “reinterpretation of Islam”. 
In notable ways, the Norwegian Muslim minority population is more similar to that of 
Britain than those of France and Germany. While the two latter countries have larger 
immigrant populations, these are not only predominantly Muslim but of a single ethnic 
origin; Turkish in the case of Germany and Maghrebi (Algerian, Moroccan and 
Tunisian) in France. In Britain, South Asian Muslims represent one of three large 
minority groups (Indians and Blacks being the other two) (Modood 2012:15). Like 
Denmark and the Netherlands, Norway has a much more diversified non-European 
minority population (about 7 per cent of the total population in 2012). Muslims, from a 
variety of countries, constitute about half of non-European immigrant minorities (4 per 
cent of the total Norwegian population have a background from Muslim-majority 
countries, while 2 per cent are registered members of Muslim congregations). An 
important parallel to Britain is that the largest Norwegian minority group is Pakistani 
(followed by Somalians and Iraqis). Like their British counterparts (Modood 2005:105-
106) a decade or two earlier (British borders were open to postcolonial migration until 
1962), Norwegian Pakistanis starting arriving as labor migrants in the 1960s and 1970s 
(borders were closed in 1975). Later, the Norwegian Pakistani minority has grown 
through family reunification and today represents the largest ‘second-generation’ 
(followed by Somalians); particularly in the capital Oslo. While European Muslim 
minorities are mostly working-class (as opposed to the United States, which actively 
recruits highly educated immigrants), second-generation British and Norwegian 
Muslims have statistically higher levels of education than their counterparts in France, 
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Germany and the Netherlands (Modood 2010:70-73; Cesari 2011:26-27). Education is 
an almost necessary qualification for successful participation in public debate, and many 
‘assertive Muslims’ in the Norwegian public sphere are well-educated second-
generation Pakistanis (often young professionals or students of medicine or law). Unlike 
first-generation immigrants, who in a new country may feel more like ‘guests’ who 
should not make excessive demands upon their ‘hosts’, these Norwegian-born women 
and men confidently demand the same right to define their Norwegian identity and 
citizenship, and influence their shared society, as ‘ethnic Norwegians’ do. As Modood 
(2005:191-192) points out; this sense of entitlement is more common among minorities 
in the US, where the right to settle is not an issue (for African Americans, anyway), and 
Britain, where imperial history gave colonial subjects the right to entry, and where 
public debate was influenced by American minority discourses. British discourses have 
also been introduced to Norwegian debate by Pakistanis with links to Britain.     
While Muslim contributors to the debates I have analyzed are diverse in terms of ethnic 
background, they mostly belong to what Christine Jacobsen (2005:157) describes as an 
“aspiring middle class”. While their parents migrated to Norway from a rural 
background where practice of Islam was intertwined with cultural traditions (ibid, 158; 
see Modood 2005:103-106 for British Pakistanis), the younger generation often 
criticizes these cultural traditions and search for an ‘authentic’ Islam emphasizing 
individual reflection. As Jocelyne Cesari (2005:5) points out, young European Muslims 
increasingly distrust religious mediation by clerics, religious leaders or organizations, 
and focus on living in accordance with ‘Muslim values’ rather than observing 
prescriptions for specific religious practice such as prayer rules. The Muslim Student 
Society (MSS) in Oslo, where a number of publicly assertive Muslims are members, is 
characterized by an “Islamist revivalism” that asserts the public relevance of Islam as a 
“complete way of life” rather than as a secularized and privatized personal faith. Like 
Muslim youth and student organizations in other European countries, notably Britain 
and Sweden, the MSS engages with questions of how to live a Muslim life in a 
European society, with a special focus on political participation and gender equality 
(Jacobsen 2005:157-158). Jacobsen (ibid, 159) writes that, 
Defending Islam from what is experienced as a systematic misrecognition by 
Norwegian society, and especially the media, has come to be seen as one 
important part of their religious practice. Countering negative images of Islam in 
the media, in politics […] is seen as a religious duty as part of the greater jihad. 
This form of Islamic revivalism can be understood in terms of Muslim resistance to 
majority hegemony, and as an attempt to separate Islam from the cultural traditions of 
the parental generation and the imams. Instead of emphasizing ethnic identity, they 
identify as Norwegian and transnational Muslims (ibid, 160-161). As a result, several 
young Muslim women with an MSS background have emerged in public debates as 
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‘Muslim feminists’ defending the right to wear the hijab as a personal choice (to be 
discussed in detail in chapter 4). Increasingly, the younger generation is making its 
voices heard in the public sphere, criticizing anti-Muslim racism in mainstream society, 
but also criticizing the older generation, which still dominates among the imams and 
leaders of Muslim congregations, for being too defensive and passive on important 
political issues in Norway. Such a generational divide, often reflecting the distinction 
between ‘minority communitarianism’ and ‘antiracist multiculturalism’, is common in 
European Muslim communities (Jacobsen 2005:157). Modood (2009:166) theorizes 
European Muslim assertiveness as a “catching-up” with the discourses of anti-racism 
and feminism, which are modified to suit the specific marginalization experienced by 
Muslims. 
As a religious group, Muslim minorities challenge the European hegemony of 
secularism, understood as the separation between church and state but more importantly 
the idea that “religion and religious groups should not play a role in politics” (Modood 
2005:19). Secularism is practiced differently in various national contexts. In the US, the 
constitution guarantees strict separation of church and state, but there is a strong 
Protestant, evangelical fundamentalism, religion plays an important role in American 
civil society and it is common for politicians to speak publicly about their religious 
beliefs. In Europe, a radical or ideological secularism that advocates an absolute 
separation between religion and politics is found only in France, while other European 
countries practice moderate forms of secularism which can be characterized by a 
relative separation between state and church; a pragmatic “historically evolved and 
evolving compromise with religion” (ibid, 142). The French form of radical secularism, 
laïcité, not only demands strict separation between state and church, but the state also 
promotes the privatization of religion (Modood 2009:178). This served to justify the 
hijab ban in schools in 2004 (ibid, 165), combined with other arguments including that 
the hijab is a symptom of Muslim self-segregation (Cesari 2005:47), and the protection 
of women’s rights (Fekete 2006:16-17). Beginning with three Muslim girls wearing a 
hijab in school in 1989, the headscarf affair started a debate about the incompatibility 
between Islam and the French principles of assimilation and laïcité (Fekete 2004:20; 25-
27), a debate which finally resulted in a legal ban in 2004 (Kastoryano 2006:57-59). In 
Germany, the relationship between church and state is characterized by cooperation 
rather than conflict as in France (Modood 2009:179-181; Amir-Moazami 2004:20; 
2005). There, headscarf debates were less heated than in France, and resulted in bans for 
teachers in state schools in some German states. At the same time, German Muslims 
have been able to institutionalize a public space for Islam by demanding equal status 
with Christian Churches, which have a privileged role in Germany as compared to 
France. Also in the Netherlands, Muslims have achieved state funding for religious 
schools and Muslim media, in line with the Dutch model for dealing with organized 
religion, based on the historical principle called ‘pillarization’ (Modood 2009:181). 
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With regard to secularism, the Norwegian situation most closely resembles that of 
Britain, which has a state church, close links between state and church, and public 
funding for minority religions, but at the same time the population is among the most 
secularized and least religious (discussed in more detail in chapter 5), and politicians 
usually do not speak about their personal faith (Modood 2009:177). While most people 
consider religion a private matter, there is a significant minority of American-style 
right-wing evangelical fundamentalists (including Magazinet, which brought the Danish 
cartoons to Norway; see Engebrigtsen 2010:82), which holds conservative views on 
family values, supports Israel and is skeptical of Muslims. 
A policy analysis of twenty-one countries (cited in Modood 2012:40 n. 12) shows that 
accommodation of minorities has actually accelerated since 2001, during the period of 
widespread anti-multiculturalist and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Even those countries which 
never followed a multicultural policy, such as France, Germany and Denmark 
(Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer 2011), have in practice accommodated Muslims 
based on existing models of secularism. Thus in 2003, the French government 
established a national Muslim Council (Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman) to 
represent French Muslims. While such a council can partly be seen as a “top-down 
effort to control Muslims” (Modood 2012:40), it also implies recognizing a religious 
group, and as such represents a form of multicultural accommodation that is 
incompatible with French principles of assimilation and laïcité.  
Britain has continued to accommodate Muslim demands in the last decade, despite the 
rhetorical retreat from multiculturalism among British center-left intellectuals and New 
Labour politicians, who blamed multiculturalism for promoting cultural separatism and 
segregation and allowing Muslim radicalism and extremism (Modood 2007:10-12). 
Modood (2005:207-208) describes British multiculturalism as “a social, bottom-up 
movement”, where political mobilization and protest has been a means of integration, 
understood as a two-way process where “public discourse and political arrangements 
are challenged but adjust to accommodate and integrate the challengers”. Modood 
(2009:169-173) argues that while Muslims make their own distinctive demands, 
including the public recognition of religious identities, these build on previous advances 
made by anti-racism and feminism, and follow a western liberal-democratic logic rather 
than being derived from Islamic discourses. While a minority of British Muslims have 
expressed support for extremists like the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, the majority of 
Muslims condemned the terror attacks, but were equally opposed to the British-
American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Modood 2005:199), which are the main cause 
of political extremism. When domestic Muslim assertiveness is linked with international 
solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles (Modood 2007:136-139), political Islam 
parallels pan-African Black Nationalism as an internationalist expression of Muslim 
resistance against Western dominance (Modood 2009:173). British accommodation of 
Muslim demands includes a legal ban on religious discrimination in employment from 
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2003, which gives Muslim women the right to wear a hijab; state funding for some 
Muslim schools; and new legislation protecting against “incitement to religious hatred” 
passed in 2006. Unlike the ban on inciting racial hatred, the former requires “an 
intention to stir up hatred”, which may be hard to prove. Nevertheless, during the 
cartoon affair, British newspapers voluntarily refrained from publishing the cartoons, in 
Modood’s words (2007:57); they recognized that “they had the right to republish the 
cartoons but that it would be offensive to do so”. While these policies may seem 
disturbing to secularists, they parallel existing British anti-discrimination policies 
protecting other groups (Modood 2009:170-173).  
Norwegian integration policy 
In the most recent policy document (St.meld.nr. 49; 2003-2004), presented by the 
center-right Bondevik government in 2004, Norwegian integration policy is defined not 
as a form of ‘multiculturalism’, but as in line with a ‘diversity policy’ that has 
developed in several other European countries. (The center-left Stoltenberg government 
has announced a new white paper on the topic in 2012; expected to continue the 
emphasis on community cohesion, loyalty to shared values and accept for diversity, but 
also focus on employment and belonging.) Seeking a balance between individual 
diversity and shared values, such a diversity policy recognizes complex identities and 
“multiple ways of being Norwegian” (ibid, 33). While emphasizing “loyalty to the 
fundamental values of Norwegian society, like democratic procedures, human rights and 
gender equality” in line with Habermas’ ‘constitutional patriotism’, these values are 
defined as “shared political values, which are not particular to Norway” (ibid, 61). In 
line with Rawls (1999), the white paper sees these values not as static, but states that 
everyone has the right to “seek to influence the content of these fundamental societal 
values through political and civil processes”. Rather than seeking a broad consensus on 
values, the policy paper supports a minimum definition of shared values, which protects 
the right to difference, but limited by respect for human rights (St.meld.nr. 49; 2003-
2004; p. 34). In case of conflict between different human rights, individual rights should 
take precedence over group rights (ibid, 41). 
In the government’s view, the content of basic values must be discussed over time in 
relation to concrete issues (ibid, 34); many of which should not be politically regulated, 
but left to civil society (ibid, 39). This is in line with the liberal American model 
(supported by Rawls), which distinguishes between state and society and leaves 
questions of the good life to the ‘cultural marketplace’ of civil society. But the 
Norwegian social democratic state also has a more ‘perfectionist’ tendency, which sees 
issues of the good life as subject to political deliberation and state action (in line with 
the early Habermas’ critical project). This more communitarian view, where social 
issues should be politicized (see Kymlicka 1989 for a more detailed discussion), is also 
expressed in the white paper. Namely, the Norwegian state wants to stimulate processes 
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in civil society (St.meld.nr. 49; 2003-2004, p. 39), encourage minorities to become 
more visible in the public sphere (ibid, 66), and exert normative influence on people’s 
choices where these are unsuitable for legal regulation. In the case of gender equality, 
the law is expected to have a “normative function” in the private sphere (ibid, 50), in 
agreement with Okin (1999). While sometimes reflecting value conflicts, the 
government believes that certain “unwise or oppressive” practices may result from “lack 
of knowledge” (St.meld.nr. 49; 2003-2004, p. 47). “Dialogue” is seen as the preferred 
strategy to make policies more legitimate by promoting minority participation and 
influence in civil society; aimed at giving voice to a variety of interests, independent of 
group membership (ibid, 48). While recognizing the risk that contemporary integration 
policies, e.g. with regard to the best interest of children, may repeat historical mistakes 
from the time of oppressive assimilation policies towards national minorities, the 
government emphasizes in line with Kymlicka, that there are fundamental differences 
between national minorities, who are entitled to group rights, and immigrant minorities, 
for whom the “preservation of their own culture” is mainly a “private and voluntary 
issue” (ibid, 50). 
In a critical analysis of the policy paper, Randi Gressgård (2005) notes that the 
government is less concerned with the tension between individual rights and group 
rights, which was the main focus of the previous white paper on integration (St.meld.nr. 
19; 1996-97; analyzed by Gressgård & Jacobsen 2003). Instead, cultural diversity is 
(almost exclusively) recognized on the individual level and posited against community 
cohesion and shared values, making ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’ of individuals into the 
larger Norwegian community, the main political challenge (thus replacing the 
dichotomy of communitarian minorities and individualistic majority, with individualist 
minorities and a communitarian larger society). Gressgård (2005:74) argues that cultural 
recognition is primarily seen not as a goal in itself, but as a means to achieve 
integration, in ideological continuity with the previous policy document, where 
‘multicultural dialogue’ is primarily an instrument to increase legitimacy and loyalty to 
shared values, thus resembling a Norwegian monologue. When universal values are 
turned into symbols of political loyalty to Norway, the white paper suggests that 
immigrants lack knowledge about human rights, democracy and gender equality, while 
Norwegian citizens are constructed as carriers of universal norms. Gressgård identifies 
this as an instance of Eurocentrism. Further, she criticizes the state paternalism in the 
government’s intention to influence people’s choices and educate minorities about ‘their 
own good’ (ibid, 76); and analyzes this ‘empowerment policy’ as an instance of the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality; a form of indirect rule where self-reflective 
individuals are ‘responsibilized’ (see also Titley & Lentin 2011:44; 176) and guided to 
realize ‘their own good’. State expectations are internalized as part of what individuals 
demand of themselves; merging individual self-discipline and state control (Gressgård 
2005:77); a characteristic of neoliberal governmentality (to be further discussed below). 
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While the 2004 policy document to a greater extent emphasizes a dialogue on the 
interpretation of shared political values along the lines of Rawls and Habermas, it also 
shows continuity with the previous white paper from 1997, which focused on the 
dilemma between group rights and individual rights with regard to gender equality, and 
was characterized by Gressgård and Jacobsen (2003:76) as representing a Norwegian 
monologue, where goals are defined in advance by the majority; a one-way process in 
line with Okin’s (1999) suggestion that assimilation may be better than multiculturalism 
with respect to minority women’s individual rights. Here, the Norwegian Gender 
Equality Act not only serves as a non-negotiable framework for integration, but the 
government seeks to assist the liberation of minority women by educating them about 
what gender equality means in ‘Norwegian everyday life’ (Gressgård & Jacobsen 
2003:73-76). This white paper lumped together universal human rights, Norwegian 
ideals and practices on one side, contrasted with undesirable minority practices 
including female circumcision, forced marriages and veiling; thus reproducing an 
essentialist cultural dichotomy between a liberal Western culture and patriarchal 
minority cultures; which disregards differences between practices and ideals and 
competing interpretations of ideals on both sides (to be further discussed in chapter 4). 
In a more theoretical discussion about multicultural dialogue, Gressgård (2010) 
elaborates on her criticism of the liberal pluralist approach to ‘diversity management’ as 
expressed in Norwegian white papers. Following Wendy Brown, she identifies a key 
problem in using ‘tolerance’ as a tool to manage, regulate and incorporate the 
‘threatening other within’. Minorities are invited to dialogue only insofar as their 
influence legitimizes policy (ibid, 6), based on pre-defined notions of integration 
assuming that majority values are universal (ibid, 11). As such, the Norwegian approach 
can be characterized as a ‘pseudo-open’ monologue, which continues dominating the 
‘other’ through assimilation and culturalization, rather than as a genuine dialogue, open 
to truth claims of others, which allows prevailing norms and categories to be challenged 
by a ‘resistance’ which demands that dominant forms become aware of their own limits 
and recognize that they represent one among many different ways (ibid, 106-137; 
drawing on Hans-Herbert Kögler’s and Christopher Falzon’s theories of dialogue). 
Analyzing the Norwegian government’s response in the cartoon affair in 2006, Ada 
Engebrigtsen (2010) characterizes Norwegian practice as “ambivalent 
multiculturalism”. She argues that until the cartoon affair, ethnic and religious 
minorities in Norway have been few and powerless, and the Sami protest movement in 
the 1970s was the only time that a minority had challenged majority hegemony; this 
conflict ended assimilation policy and resulted in their recognition as an indigenous 
people. In Engebrigtsen’s (ibid, 68-70) view, the Sami conflict taught the state and 
majority a lesson that influenced subsequent minority policy, which may henceforth be 
described as “ambivalent multiculturalism”, a dual approach of individual integration 
and collective recognition (e.g. public support for minority organizations), which 
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combines aspects of ‘equality as sameness’ (Gullestad 2006b:170) with recognizing 
cultural differences. She argues further that Norway’s relative homogeneity has 
prevented the development of an explicit multicultural policy, and despite a shift 
towards understanding integration as a mutual process of accommodation, the idea that 
“Norwegianness is superior to most other ways of life, values and practices is still 
present” (Engebrigtsen 2010:71) alongside government initiatives to bridge perceived 
cultural divides, including a state-sponsored, institutionalized inter-religious dialogue 
between Christians and Muslims. The cartoon affair showed that Norwegian Muslims 
had become a powerful minority group that could mobilize if necessary, and which the 
government had to take seriously (Leirvik 2006). Engebrigtsen (ibid, 82) sees the 
Norwegian management of the crisis as exemplifying an “emerging multiculturalist 
praxis” between the government and Muslim leaders, which signaled a recognition of 
the minority as Norwegian citizens first, and secondarily as Muslims demanding equal 
respect. Thus, the cartoon affair does not represent a clash of civilizations, but rather a 
“decisive instance” in the process of integration towards a situation where Muslims are 
no longer marginalized (ibid, 79). Many Norwegian Muslims felt that this compromise 
did not go far enough in recognizing the way they had been hurt by the cartoons as part 
of broader anti-Muslim sentiments (this is the focus of chapter 2). 
Phases in Norwegian integration debate 
From the late 1980s onwards, the populist right set the agenda for integration debates. 
The term “integration policy” had its breakthrough in public debate in 1993, when the 
Progress Party made it a central part of their policy and rhetoric (Hagelund 2003; 
Gullestad 2006a:81). While such rhetoric was initially perceived as racist by politicians 
of ‘respectable’ parties, it soon became part of the mainstream, which took over the 
underlying frames of interpretation (ibid, 82). Established in 1973 as a neoliberalist 
protest party against taxes and public spending, the Progress Party had its breakthrough 
in the 1987 local elections, after turning to anti-immigrant rhetoric (see Hagelund 
2003). During the campaign, party chairman Carl I. Hagen presented a letter allegedly 
written by a Muslim immigrant in Oslo by the name of Mustafa, which declared that 
Muslims would take over Norway and establish an Islamic state. Though media soon 
revealed that the letter was false, the party won 12 per cent of the votes (see Bangstad 
2011:257). Despite this early example of Islamophobia, anti-immigrant rhetoric in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was still dominated by economic arguments and had not yet 
been culturalized in terms of defending western liberal values against Muslim 
fundamentalism (Gullestad 2006a:78). The rhetoric against ‘excessive generosity’, 
which spread from management literature, via the populist right to the Labor Party, and 
then to anthropologists, is an interesting illustration of the ideological links between 
neoliberal attacks on social democracy and anti-immigrant attitudes.  
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The term ‘snillisme‘ (‘excessive generosity’, also translated as ‘foolish generosity’ by 
Gullestad 2006a:81) was introduced into Norwegian political debate in the campaign for 
the 1989 national elections by Conservative leader Jan P. Syse and Progress Party 
chairman Carl I. Hagen, before it was taken over by Labor Party politician Rune 
Gerhardsen in 1991. However, the term occurred in a book on business management a 
few years earlier, when Gisle Espolin Johnson (1987) criticized ‘excessive generosity’ 
as a key feature of social democracy, which accommodates the “weak”, settles for the 
mediocre, and above all, is “a serious obstacle for result-oriented, efficient and 
profitable work” (ibid, 24).  According to the author, ‘excessive generosity’ is the 
“misunderstood” softness, consideration and willingness to compromise, which 
dominated in the 1970s, when “the goal of a business was not to make profit, but to deal 
with people” (ibid, 14). Johnson argues that the democratization of work relations and 
general society which resulted from the accommodation of demands from diverse social 
movements, be replaced with a return to the old values of authority, discipline, duty and 
hard work that characterized the Protestant work ethic (ibid, 25-27). The attack on 
‘excessive generosity’ is described as a “reaction against the one-sided softness and 
understanding […] towards persons who do not want to contribute anything, or who 
deliberately exploit their freedom. A reaction against the democratization…” where 
“everyone is heard” and “everyone is entitled to an opinion” (ibid, 26).  
While Johnson focused on business management in his book, Labor Party politician 
Rune Gerhardsen’s (1991) book applies the term to criticize aspects of Norwegian 
social democracy that he wants to reform. His campaign against ‘excessive generosity’ 
entails strict demands on immigrants to learn the language and adjust to Norwegian 
society, on welfare recipients and on criminals (ibid, 10). Gerhardsen targets various 
marginalized groups, and emphasizes that they have to do their “duty” before they can 
demand their “rights” (ibid, 21). He describes ‘excessive generosity’ as a political 
ideology and practice where all demands, needs and interests are accommodated; 
something which undermines individual responsibility (ibid, 29). With regard to 
immigrants, he specifically criticizes the “system and practice that has uncritically 
accommodated the demands and desires of immigrants”, which allows them to cheat on 
welfare (ibid, 53), and instead demands that they respect Norwegian laws, norms and 
values (ibid, 54). Similar rhetoric was later reflected by social anthropologist Unni 
Wikan (1995; 2002). In her book “Generous Betrayal” (Wikan 2002), she argues that 
the welfare system undermines the capacity of refugees to become self-sufficient and 
autonomous citizens and creates poorly integrated welfare clients (see Djuve 2011:118), 
and advocates making “demands on immigrants” (Wikan 2002:4). In line with Progress 
Party rhetoric that immigrants exploit the ‘excessive generosity’ of the Norwegian 
welfare state (Djuve 2011:118), these books call for a reassertion of the power of 
economic and political management, justifying stricter demands from above, and 
attacking the legitimacy of demands from below. In this sense, the critique of ‘excessive 
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generosity’ captures the key ideas of the neoliberal reaction against democratic 
advances made by social movements such as the labor movement and multiculturalism. 
While neoliberal discourse pathologizes lower class behavior and immigrant behavior in 
similar ways, Steve Garner (2010:4; 19) notes an important difference in his study of 
British whites’ sense of entitlement; white persons are assumed to be entitled to benefits 
until they prove otherwise individually; immigrants are collectively suspected of being 
‘asylum-seekers’ who are unwilling to integrate and choose to receive undeserved 
benefits, until they individually prove the opposite. 
In their discussion of the links between neoliberalism and anti-multiculturalist rhetoric, 
Titley and Lentin (2011:162-163) draw on David Harvey’s understanding of 
neoliberalism as a political project “to restore the power of economic elites” and Wendy 
Brown’s analysis of neoliberalism as a discourse which reduces politics to economics 
and judges everything from individual action to state policy in terms of economic 
rationality and profitability. The neoliberal form of ‘governmentality’ constructs 
subjects who are expected to manage themselves according to the costs and benefits of 
certain actions. Disregarding structural constraints of power and discrimination, 
‘integration’ is constructed as an individual responsibility, as a choice (ibid, 3; Garner 
2010:13). Those who ‘choose wrong’ or fail to become autonomous are themselves to 
blame and subjected to discipline by the state (Titley & Lentin 2011:168-170), as 
reflected in paternalistic ‘welfare-to-work’ programs. Eriksen (cited in ibid, 175-176) 
has pointed out how neoliberalism distinguishes ‘good diversity’, which reflects 
individual autonomy and is “economically profitable and morally harmless”, from ‘bad 
difference’, which opposes individualist rationality, e.g. headscarves and family 
solidarity that impede personal freedom. Thus, neoliberalism can support individual 
diversity, but opposes group-based multiculturalism. Within this top-down logic, 
multiculturalism can be misrepresented as the majority’s well-meaning, but misplaced 
generosity and concessions to minority demands, while minority struggles and social 
movements are made invisible (ibid, 186), as exemplified in the Norwegian books 
attacking ‘excessive generosity’. 
Anne Britt Djuve (2011) sees the changes in Norwegian integration policy in the 1990s 
in the context of a broader shift in social policy, from a situation where no conditions 
were enforced on welfare recipients towards a stronger emphasis on obligations. She 
found that the Norwegian discourse of social inclusion through employment 
(corresponding to the “work line” in social policy) has achieved broad political support 
by appealing both to the left and the right, combining a discourse of empowerment and 
rights with a neoliberal discourse that seeks to control behavior through economic 
sanctions (ibid, 116-121). In contrast to British social policy, which has a stronger 
neoliberal orientation, Norwegian integration policy remains more social democratic, 
being influenced by ideas of empowerment and gender equality; however, as in other 
European countries, Norwegian social democrats have also embraced the neoliberal “no 
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rights without duties” rhetoric (Djuve 2011:122), as exemplified by Gerhardsen. The 
combination of a discourse of empowerment with neoliberalism is also evident in Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s comment on International Women’s Day in 2012, when he 
said that women’s employment rate, which at 75 per cent in Norway is 16 points higher 
than the OECD average, has contributed more to the national economy than the entire 
Norwegian oil industry (Klassekampen, March 9, 2012). In state feminist discourse, it 
seems that economic profitability takes normative precedence over women’s individual 
right to choose how to live their lives. The ‘work line’ approach sees ‘culture’ as 
obstacle to women’s participation in the labor market, disregarding that due to structural 
discrimination, fulfilling ‘career’ choices may not be available for many working-class 
and minority women, who may find staying home with children more rewarding than 
the physically demanding and low-paid jobs they have access to, as May-Len Skilbrei 
(2004) has argued.      
Around the turn of the millennium, the integration debate entered a more polarized 
phase in connection with a series of ‘violent events’ in the years 2000-2005 (Titley & 
Lentin 2011). Internationally, the threat of Muslim terrorism became a major issue after 
9/11 2001, while Norwegian debate focused more on violence and oppression of women 
within Muslim minority communities (Gullestad 2006b:50) and Islam was held 
responsible for female circumcision, forced marriages and honor killings. Parallel to 
Okin’s theoretical arguments; Norwegian debate was dominated by feminist rhetoric 
against multiculturalism, which argued that “integration” was the solution to these 
problems. Two prominent proponents were Storhaug and Wikan, whose position has 
been described by Razack (2008:107-144) as “racism in the name of feminism”. 
Specific cases received widespread and sensationalist media coverage and caused a 
public debate characterized by a ‘moral panic’, including the Kadra documentary on 
Muslim leaders’ alleged support for female circumcision in the autumn 2000, stand-up 
comedian Shabana Rehman’s campaign against forced marriages, and the honor killing 
of Fadime Sahindal in the winter of 2002 (to be discussed in more detail in chapter 4). 
Violence against women within minority communities was interpreted in terms of a 
culture clash between Western values of individual freedom and gender equality, and 
“Muslim fundamentalism”, and led to proposals across the political spectrum to stricter 
immigration control and force those already here to “integrate”. According to 
postcolonial feminist Sherene Razack (ibid, 5), these majority responses exemplify a 
racist logic of the “white savior”, where “civilized Europeans” allegedly liberate 
oppressed Muslim women from dangerous Muslim men; a colonialist logic that has 
been revived to justify current Western imperialism under the guise of the “war on 
terror”. At this stage, a number of young minority women joined public debate as 
‘native informants’ (to be discussed in more detail in chapter 3) providing first-hand 
evidence of oppressive practices. As these women focused primarily on oppression of 
women within minority communities, mostly supported majority positions and did not 
56 
 
address the problem of racism, they did not challenge ‘white public space’ (Gullestad 
2006b:51). Rather, they became media stars and were treated as “honorary Norwegians” 
(Gullestad 2006a:74; 2006b:51). In 2002, Gullestad publicly criticized Rehman’s role in 
the media, for diverting public attention and crippling critical awareness (ibid, 56). 
While minority women who had assimilated white hegemonic politics became 
celebrities and ‘honorary Norwegians’, critical voices were silenced and ridiculed, 
particularly conservative Muslims, but also minority feminists who had been working 
for women’s liberation without distancing themselves from their cultural and religious 
background and communities. 
Drawing on Hage (1998), Ali Esbati (2009) comments that Norwegian integration 
debate is dominated by a rhetoric that “we must dare to have a debate about the 
problems” (ibid, 44). This rhetoric is not only used by the populist right, but also by 
newspaper editors, commentators and politicians who take distance from anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. While calling for debate appears rational and embodies ideals of free speech, 
independent media and liberal democracy, employed to analyze and solve existing 
‘problems’, Esbati writes that this is not the case with public integration debate, which 
is not intended to solve any problems, but rather the description of problems is a goal in 
itself. Public debate “divides the world into a ‘we’ without problems, which discusses a 
‘them’ which has problems” and further, “a ‘them’ who are a problem” (ibid). Despite 
immigration critics’ claims to be courageous, immigrants are described as problems all 
the time, and the only risk associated with ‘daring’ to criticize is being called racist. 
Paralleling Titley and Lentin’s (2011) analysis, Esbati (ibid, 45-47) points out that 
across Europe, right-wing populists call for ‘debate’ intended to construct immigrants as 
problems. The alleged ‘problems’ do not need to have a basis in (Norwegian) empirical 
reality; instead a constant repetition of mistaken and generalized claims about Muslims, 
conveniently based on horror stories that took place in other countries, gradually turns 
into ‘truth’. For example, the ‘honor killing’ of Fadime in Sweden in 2002, was in 
Norwegian debate linked to Islam, even if the Kurdish girl’s family was actually not 
Muslim (Gullestad 2006a:88, Dessau 2003). 
Hage’s claim that the constant problematization of minorities in integration debates is 
really about preserving white control; is supported by Progress Party spokesman for 
integration policy, Per Willy Amundsen (quoted by Esbati 2009:49-51): “It serves no 
good just talking about how great it is to have a multicultural society. Someone needs to 
take charge and manage”. Esbati goes on to argue that rather than a disagreement 
among equals, institutionalized integration debate can be characterized as a powerful 
elite harassing and bullying minorities (ibid). While calls for debate are often justified 
by the claim that problems posed by immigrants are something “ordinary Norwegians” 
are concerned about, Esbati draws on van Dijk’s (1993) research on elite racism and 
argues that when ordinary people’s everyday prejudices are carried over into the public 
sphere and uttered by powerful persons, it becomes racism; though media and other 
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elites claim to be exercising free speech. An example of such “denial of racism”, where 
minority complaints about racism are rejected as aggressive and over-sensitive 
(Gullestad 2006b:47-48) is when debate editor Knut Olav Åmås of Aftenposten 
(September 27, 2010) writes that a lesson to be learned from the cartoon affair, is the 
need to become more thick-skinned, more insensitive and not be so easily offended. One 
of the scariest things taking place today, he argues, are the ongoing UN attempts to 
extend protection against racism to religious groups. He argues that words and actions 
are completely separate, and believes that restrictions on free speech will lead people to 
violent acts. After the 2011 terror attack in Norway, Arne Johan Vetlesen, Bushra Ishaq, 
Sindre Bangstad and Thomas Hylland Eriksen (Aftenposten, August 22, 2011) take a 
different view. Drawing on J.L. Austin’s speech act theory, they point out that insisting 
on an absolute distinction between words and actions is to abdicate from any moral 
responsibility for the reality that can be and is created by hate speech, and point out 
that historically, genocide is prepared ideologically through systematic dehumanization 
of “the enemy”. Thus, terrorism cannot be prevented by giving voice to extremists in 
the media; increasing public tolerance of hate speech is more likely to reinforce such 
views. After 7/22, we are thus obliged to struggle against Islamophobia and racism.  
The Norwegian Directorate for Integration and Diversity (IMDI 2009) reports that 
media analysis confirms that Muslims in particular are portrayed as a problem in 
generalizing and stereotypical ways, and for many majority persons, media is still the 
primary source of knowledge about immigrants. For those without personal 
relationships with immigrants, media is likely to have strong influence; opinion polls 
indicate that half of the Norwegian population thinks that ‘integration’ has failed (ibid, 
14). In Norway as elsewhere in Europe, Muslims experience more discrimination than 
other minorities, while being ‘better integrated’ than other minorities in terms of 
employment and education (ibid, 12). At the same time, significant developments 
indicate that Norway is becoming a more multicultural society; media coverage has 
become more diverse, with positive stories alongside problem-oriented ones (ibid, 5); 
people living in more multicultural cities of Norway have more personal relationships 
with immigrants and are more positive towards cultural diversity (ibid, 11). Statistics 
show that social integration, defined by language skills, education and employment is 
quite successful in Norway, with higher levels of minority employment and education 
than in other European countries. The second-generation, especially women, are more 
likely to attend higher education than white Norwegians (ibid, 3). 
In relation to these developments towards a more multicultural society, integration 
debates have also entered a new phase. As IMDI (ibid, 9) notes, “the perhaps most 
noticeable change in the last few years is that more and more people with immigrant 
background are active and visible participants in public debate”. Since the 2006 cartoon 
affair, many educated and assertive Norwegian Muslims have become participants in 
public debate, often criticizing the terms and form of the integration debate and 
58 
 
challenging majority hegemony. The integration debate is no longer primarily a ritual 
where majority persons worry about the lack of Muslim integration (Hage 1998; Esbati 
2009; Titley & Lentin 2011), but has become a become a multicultural debate where 
politically assertive minority persons challenge white hegemony and attempt to 
negotiate the terms of integration by making political demands from the majority and 
the state (Modood 2007). Critical minority voices not only challenge majority 
hegemony, but also the majority’s role as supervisor of integration. Thus, Norwegian 
Muslims have started worrying about white problems (Hage 1998:247) and public 
debate has itself been identified as a problem. One of these new voices, medicine 
student Mohammed Usman Rana (quoted in IMDI 2009:9) worries that the increased 
participation of assertive Muslims may backfire by strengthening anti-Muslim 
sentiments. Many Norwegian Muslims have pointed out that public opinion is becoming 
increasingly hostile, a perception supported by reports from the Council of Europe’s 
commission against racism and intolerance (ECRI 2004).  
Case studies and methodology 
These critical interventions in public debate by Norwegian Muslims, and the 
multicultural negotiations and discursive struggle they give rise to as they protest, 
challenge and resist anti-Muslim racism and assertions of majority hegemony, form the 
empirical focus of this thesis. The chapters are organized around four empirical case 
studies of debates on specific topics. Each chapter is built up chronologically; first I 
provide a background of the international and Norwegian national context of the debates 
in question (the Rushdie Affair in Britain and the Cartoon Affair in Denmark in chapter 
2, criticism of the role of ‘native informants’ (such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Salman 
Rushdie) in supporting ideas of western superiority in chapter 3, international debates 
about gender and Islam, feminism and multiculturalism; and the hijab debate in France 
in chapter 4, and the debate about secularization, secularism and Islam in chapter 5). 
In terms of methodology, I will mostly use an anthropological approach characterized 
by comparative, contextualizing ‘interpretive analysis’ (Gullestad 2006b:194-195) to 
analyze contributions to the opinion pages of national newspapers. In chapter 2, I will 
also analyze newspaper coverage of Muslim protest, drawing on Ruth Wodak’s critical 
discourse analysis (CDA), which has been used by a number of researchers in the study 
of racist discourse. CDA is a critical methodology which aims at delegitimizing 
discourses identified as hegemonic; i.e. those backed by institutionalized power, 
including the state and media; by bringing out what is implicit in the text; e.g. how a 
positive self-presentation implies a negative mirror image, even when not mentioned 
explicitly. My use of CDA has a more limited purpose of critical anti-racist analysis, 
without necessarily subscribing to the wider normative position drawn from 
Habermasian theories of discourse ethics and rational deliberation (Wodak & Reisigl 
2001:263-271). In other words, it is not my purpose to distinguish ‘good reasons’ or 
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rational arguments in Habermas’ sense (Wodak & Reisigl 2001:265) from illegitimate 
discriminatory rhetoric and fallacious argumentation, but I use the methodology to 
identify racist discourses. While CDA has often been used in contexts where the 
dominant discourse is not directly challenged by critical counter-discourses, both 
Wodak and Teun van Dijk (1993:18), studying elite discourses in Austria and the 
Netherlands, emphasize that a CDA approach to racist discourses should take as a 
starting point the counter-hegemonic perspectives of ‘conscious minority persons’. 
Wodak and Reisigl (ibid, 45-85) have developed a five-step methodology for the 
linguistic analysis of racist discourses, where they investigate five types of discursive 
strategies; (1) referential terms for individuals and groups such as ‘white’ or ‘Muslim’, 
and (2) predicational terms which attribute positive or negative characteristics to those 
groups; these two can identify dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as well as the 
inferiorization that occurs when the Other is ascribed negative characteristics. Further, 
they employ linguistic categories from (3) argumentation theory, such as implicit 
connotations called “topoi” and violations of the rules of rational discourse, called 
“fallacies” that are used to justify discrimination; as well as (4) perspectives from which 
statements are expressed, and (5) whether statements are intensified or mitigated. For 
reasons of clarity, I have chosen to limit the use of linguistic terminology in my analysis 
(I have done a detailed linguistic analysis of this material elsewhere; see Stokke 2009). 
With regard to media coverage of Muslim minorities, John Richardson (2004) has used 
CDA to study the representation of Muslims in British newspapers. His comprehensive 
approach combines textual analysis with the wider context of social and discursive 
practices, including the discourses of ‘Orientalism’, racism and ‘Islamophobia’; as well 
as the characteristics of journalism, such as sensationalism as a ‘populist’ means to 
increase sales, the presence of minority journalists and the use of sources (ibid, 4-47), as 
well as the intended audience (ibid, 229-230). Richardson’s textual analysis draws on 
the work of Wodak and Reisigl (2001), who focus on how actors are named and 
characterized (Richardson 2004:56-57) in order to identify the ‘positive self-
presentation’ and ‘negative other-presentation’ typical of racist stereotypes. Richardson 
(ibid, 55; 69) employs van Dijk’s concept of an ‘ideological square’ of stereotypes and 
prejudices that frame news reporting on Muslims, which can be identified in the texts 
through the terms used to name and divide ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ascribe positive and 
negative characteristics to the two opposed categories (ibid, xx). Drawing on 
argumentation theory, Richardson follows Wodak and Reisigl’s method of identifying 
rhetorical topoi; i.e. parts of argumentation that remain implicit, and finds several 
stereotypical topoi that help construct Muslims as a threat; including the threat of 
‘Muslim political violence’ and extremism, the threat to democracy posed by 
authoritarian Muslim leaders, and the threat of gender inequality (ibid, 75-93). Implicit 
references to a ‘clash of civilizations’ are also referred to as a topos (ter Wal, 
Triandafyllidou, Steindler & Kontochristou 2009:246). In the coverage of Muslims, 
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‘hidden’ argumentative schemes typically reinforce Orientalist dichotomies between the 
West as ‘rational’ and ‘democratic’ and Muslims as ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘violent’ 
(Richardson 2004:69-75). Thus, Richardson (ibid, 8) argues that knowledge of 
Orientalist scholarship, and its modern counterpart Islamophobia, is central to 
understanding contemporary journalistic and academic representations of Islam and 
Muslims. While ‘fear’ of the ‘Islamic Other’ is a key ingredient of Orientalism (ibid, 6), 
Richardson follows Halliday and Modood in preferring the term ‘anti-Muslim racism’ 
to emphasize that we are primarily analyzing aggression against Muslims rather than the 
fear of a religion (ibid, 22-23). 
In the remaining case studies, I do not analyze media coverage, but selected 
contributions to debates where minority voices are present, so that the dynamics and 
negotiations between hegemonic discourses and counter-discourses can be studied in 
discursive interaction. I use a more anthropological approach, which Gullestad 
(2006b:194-195) describes as “interpretive analysis” where she selects typical 
arguments that show the dynamics of discursive interaction. A central aspect of this 
method is to contextualize the material on different levels. An analytical point of 
departure is the criticism emerging from discursive interaction, which I interpret in the 
light of relevant theory, as well as contextualize within wider discourses and compare 
with other cases and settings. In this way, my analysis stays closer to empirical reality, 
and avoids imposing interpretations which do not take seriously what people actually 
say. I follow Modood (2005:5) when he seeks “to achieve an understanding of society 
that is anchored in the comprehension of agents themselves”. This does not imply 
merely descriptive analysis which ignores the motives behind certain discourses, but my 
theoretical interpretation will illuminate the perceptions of actors, including social 
structures which also depend on how actors understand it. 
My empirical material consists of news articles including interviews, and contributions 
to the debate pages, from major national newspapers in Norway in the period 2006-
2010. Since this study does not have quantitative ambitions, the material is selected 
according to the criteria of relevance to the four ‘debates’ I have chosen as case studies. 
I have selected the following cases primarily because they constitute empirical data of 
an emerging Muslim assertiveness in Norway, which can be theorized in terms of the 
perspectives on multiculturalism and anti-racism discussed above. There are important 
differences between the empirical data of the four cases; two cases have been selected 
because they are Norwegian versions of major European debates; the cartoon affair 
(chapter 2) and the hijab debates (chapter 4). These two ‘affairs’ have been widely 
covered and debated in all major national newspapers, moving in and out of media 
attention in periodic cycles over several years. The other two cases are clearly 
demarcated debates among contributors to the opinion pages of Norway’s largest 
newspaper, Aftenposten, and lasted for a couple of months each. These are interesting 
because both started with op-ed contributions written by Norwegian Muslims, who 
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criticized dominant media discourse, and in return attracted hostile reactions in the form 
of other contributions. In chapter 3, I analyze the so-called ‘coconut’ debate started by 
Iffit Qureshi; and in chapter 5, I analyze the debate on secularism started by Mohammed 
Usman Rana. 
In chapter 2, I will analyze two demonstrations in Oslo in February 2006 in response to 
the Norwegian republication of the Danish cartoons, and an interestingly replay in 
February 2010 after a Norwegian newspaper published its own Mohammed cartoon. 
This case will be analyzed on two levels; first the media coverage of the Muslim protest 
(using insights from CDA), and second, an analysis of the discursive struggles between 
the four ideological positions discussed earlier. In the cartoon affair, the two opposed 
majority perspectives were quite explicit; the confrontational approach that dominated 
in Denmark and the dialogic approach of the Norwegian government. Among the 
Muslim protesters, a multiculturalist tendency that saw the cartoons as racist can be 
distinguished from a more religiously conservative tendency to define them as 
blasphemy (which I categorize as ‘communitarian’ because it refers to norms internal to 
the Muslim community). An interesting struggle was the one between Muslim leaders, 
who accepted the government position, and 1500 Norwegian Muslims who defied their 
advice and marched through the streets. 
Chapter 3 analyzes a much smaller debate in Aftenposten in the spring of 2006, which 
started with an op-ed article by a Norwegian Muslim (or rather, Scottish Pakistani as 
she prefers to identify herself), Iffit Qureshi, who criticized those minority persons who 
have assimilated anti-Muslim sentiments and have become ‘native informants’ to anti-
Muslim political interests. The ‘coconut debate’ was about minority persons who 
demonize their own background and use new racist and assimilationist rhetoric, and 
took place among a few regular participants in public debate. Beyond this, it attracted 
little attention despite this being a controversial topic that deserves more attention in 
theoretical debate about multiculturalism and racism. While both the phenomenon and 
the criticism of ‘native informants’ is widespread, it rarely becomes the subject of 
critical public debate or academic analysis. Drawing on Malcolm X and Fanon, 
Qureshi’s arguments belong to the discourse of political anti-racism, but her debate 
opponents from the confrontational camp, Storhaug and al-Kubaisi, ascribed to her a 
cultural conservative view that opposes cultural mixing and demands ethnic loyalty.  
In chapter 4, I analyze the hijab debates in 2007 and 2009. Following the French hijab 
ban in 2004, the Progress Party and Storhaug called for Norway to follow suit. My 
analysis focuses on the debate about Storhaug’s (2007) book on the hijab. While many 
individual politicians supported her views, Storhaug was criticized in the media by 
Muslim women and by feminist academics familiar with postcolonial feminist critique. 
This debate will be compared to another hijab debate in 2009, after a young Muslim 
woman wrote a letter to the government asking if she would be able to wear the hijab if 
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she decided to become a police officer. The government initially gave a positive 
response, but backed down after heated public debate. Following this decision, the 
Muslim feminist perspective, emphasizing a woman’s right to wear the hijab and make 
her own career choices, had a breakthrough in public debate. The hijab debates can be 
seen as a discursive struggle among feminists representing the confrontational and 
antiracist positions. Notably, many majority feminists supported the Muslim feminist 
position (as in other European countries, see Fekete 2006:18), and while ‘white 
feminism’ found some support among politicians, Storhaug’s position became difficult 
to defend after assertive Muslim women got access to speak for themselves. 
My last case study, in chapter 5, is a national debate stirred by Mohammed Usman 
Rana’s award-winning op-ed in Aftenposten, where he criticizes a ‘secular extremism’ 
that is opposed to religion in the public sphere. Speaking partly from a conservative and 
partly from a multiculturalist viewpoint, Rana wrote that Norway is faced with a choice 
between French and American models of secularism. Though he personally favors the 
American model (which would imply abolishing the state church), he was perceived as 
an ‘Islamist’ by secularist critics. The article attracted many responses, both hostile and 
supportive, and gave rise to academic discussion about the meaning of secularism in a 
Norwegian context (notably Bangstad 2008; 2009). This debate will be analyzed in the 
light of Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories about religion in the public sphere, and 
conclude with some comments on the relationship between secularism and Islam, and 
whether religious revival can make a positive contribution to contemporary society. 
All four cases will be analyzed within a general framework of multicultural 
negotiations, white hegemony and anti-Muslim racism. In all of these debates, Muslims 
do not reject liberal values, but protest against absolutist interpretations of those 
principles. Muslims do not reject free speech, individual freedom, gender equality and 
secularism, but demand to negotiate their meaning, scope and limits. What they protest 
against are attempts to monopolize definition and absolutist construction of liberal 
values (Parekh 2006:185), despite the fact that these values and principles take different 
forms and are restricted in different ways, in different western countries. Case studies 
will deal with these negotiations of values; free speech, racism and religion (chapter 2); 
internal dissent, communal solidarity and betrayal (chapter 3); conceptions of gender 
equality in relation to racism and religion (chapter 4); and moderate and radical forms of 
secularism, and the public role of religion (chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Cartoon Affair 
 
 
The cartoon affair was a significant event in Norway’s process of becoming a 
multicultural society, marking the beginning of Muslim assertiveness in the public 
sphere and indicating that Muslims had become a powerful minority that could mobilize 
politically and had to be taken seriously (Leirvik 2006; Engebrigtsen 2010:82). As such 
an event, it can be compared to the British experience of the Rushdie Affair (Modood 
2005:203-204; 2007:37-50; 2009:167), which raised similar issues regarding the 
principle of free speech and its limits in terms of blasphemy and racism. In this chapter, 
I analyze Norwegian newspapers’ coverage of the demonstrations against the 
Mohammed cartoons that took place in Oslo in February 2006 as well as a ‘second 
round’ in February 2010. Key issues include how protesters were represented, which 
voices were heard and highlighted in the media, how the intended message(s) of the 
demonstrators were understood and responded to in the public sphere. I also discuss the 
specific demands raised by protesting Norwegian Muslims in the context of political 
multiculturalism, and analyze how the four ideological positions identified in the 
introduction were expressed in these debates. Before turning to the empirical data, I 
provide a brief background of developments leading to the Norwegian cartoon debate, 
including the Rushdie Affair in Britain and Norway, the cartoon affair in Denmark and 
its escalation into an international crisis, and a review of the cartoon affair in Norway.  
The Rushdie Affair 
While the Rushdie Affair in 1989 had a significant impact on multicultural debates in 
Britain, and is one of the reasons why British newspapers did not reprint the Danish 
cartoons in 2006 (Modood 2006:6), it was an important event also in Norway. Here it 
impacted less on debates about multiculturalism and integration, which were still 
largely undeveloped at the time (as discussed in the introduction), but played a role in 
subsequent debates about free speech and religion (Austenå 2011; Bangstad & Vetlesen 
2011:338). After Khomeini’s ‘fatwa’, Norwegian publishers, writers, editors and 
intellectuals strongly defended the right to free speech, and in 1993, there was a still 
unsolved assassination attempt on publisher William Nygaard, which is generally seen 
in connection to the Rushdie Affair (ibid). I am less interested in the Iranian death 
sentence, and instead focus on Muslim minority protests. British Muslims had been 
protesting against Salman Rushdie’s book Satanic Verses, which was published on 
September 26, 1988, for several months before the ayatollah issued his infamous fatwa 
on February 14, 1989 (Modood 2006:6). There are a number of similarities between the 
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Rushdie affair and the cartoon affair; notably both cases involve publications which 
Muslims perceived as ‘deeply offensive’ (Parekh 2000:298) and insulting their prophet. 
Both cases escalated gradually from local Muslim protests in European countries to 
international interventions by Muslim countries; and both publications were framed by 
European liberals as a matter of free speech, while Muslims saw them as blasphemy and 
racism. A notable difference is that Rushdie was also accused of apostasy or “turning 
his back on Islam” (this issue will be discussed in chapter 3).  
In the Rushdie Affair, Western Muslims started protesting immediately after the book 
was published, first by writing to the publishers requesting a dialogue; the publishers 
rejected with a reply that Muslim outrage was due to their “misunderstanding” that the 
book was a work of fiction which did not describe historical events. Several Muslims 
wrote detailed critiques of the book; few of these were published because, in the words 
of one Muslim critic, Shabbir Akhtar (1989:37), the “press stereotyped the peaceful 
Muslim protests as anti-intellectual, indeed fascist, attempts to curtail democratic 
freedoms of speech…” Muslims argued that the issue was not free speech versus 
censorship, but a distinction between legitimate criticism and slander, and that free 
speech should be exercised with responsibility (ibid, 39). When, in Parekh’s (1989:62) 
words, their “noisy but peaceful protests” and “fairly large but mostly unreported 
demonstrations”, got them nowhere, British Muslims decided to burn a copy of the 
Satanic Verses in front of the Bradford City Hall on January 14, 1989 (Akhtar 1989:42-
43), This attracted media attention, and as Parekh (1989:62) reports, “Muslims were 
called ’barbarians’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘fanatics’, and compared to the Nazis”. After some 
British Muslims tried to internationalize the issue by appealing to leaders of Muslim 
countries (ibid, 63), Khomeini pronounced his death sentence against Rushdie. While 
the fatwa was rightly condemned by liberals, it also led racist stereotyping of British 
Muslims (ibid, 68; 2000:301), who were “portrayed as trouble-makers refusing to 
‘assimilate’…” (Akhtar 1989:45) and newspapers started questioning tolerance and 
multiculturalism (Parekh 1989:65). The British government dismissed Muslim 
demands, stating that free speech was a ‘fundamental’ and ‘non-negotiable’ principle 
(Parekh 2000:302). 
Akhtar (1989), who played a central role in British Muslim protests, defends a 
“fundamentalist” Muslim perspective. He emphasizes that respectful criticism of the 
Islamic tradition is ok; Rushdie’s book however is abusive to the extent that it may 
serve as a “litmus-paper test for distinguishing faith from rejection” since “any Muslim 
who fails to be offended” ceases to be a Muslim (ibid, 35). Although a work of literary 
fiction, Rushdie’s characters are recognizably close to historical events involving the 
Prophet Mohammed, his family and companions; the book draws on common tropes of 
Orientalism, and is written in abusive language. Notably, the name of Rushdie’s main 
character is Mahound, a derogatory name for the Prophet Mohammed used by 
Christians in the Middle Ages. Akhtar (ibid, 4-6) saw the book as a “calculated attempt 
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to vilify and slander Mohammed”, which describes the prophet as an “insincere 
impostor”, his household as a brothel, and the Koran as “a confused catalogue of trivial 
rules about sexual activity and excretion”. Additionally, the Satanic Verses is written 
with “the knowledge of an insider” including the “insider’s awareness of the outrage 
such a portrayal would cause” (Akhtar 1989:27) as Rushdie has a Muslim background, 
and even described himself as “a courageous and liberal Muslim daring to confront the 
obscurantism and rigid authoritarianism of a fundamentalist minority” (ibid, 39). 
Following the fatwa, Norwegian Muslims protested against the planned publication of a 
Norwegian translation of the book. According to VG (February 23, 1989), an “Islamic 
Defense Council” was set up to represent about 20 000 Norwegian Muslims originating 
from a range of countries with Pakistanis as the largest group. They emphasized they 
would use all legal means to stop the Norwegian edition of the Satanic Verses; 
appealed to Aschehoug Publishers’ director William Nygaard and to government, hired 
a lawyer to prepare a lawsuit under Norwegian blasphemy legislation, and considered 
appealing to the International Human Rights Tribunal, as imam Alama Mushtaq Chisti 
said; it is a human rights violation to offend billions of people. The imam refused to 
comment on Khomeini’s fatwa, saying that they only want to speak about the 
Norwegian edition, but also made it clear that we do not encourage any Muslim to break 
Norwegian law. On February 25, they gathered 3000 people for a peaceful 
demonstration (a high number considering the size of the Norwegian Muslim population 
at the time), which VG (February 27) called the biggest Muslim event ever held in 
Norway. The newspaper quoted the slogans Stop the book in Norway; Do not insult 
Muslims; and noted that at no time was direct support for ayatollah Khomeini’s death 
sentence expressed. Aftenposten (February 27) noted that, it was made clear that the 
protest was directed at Aschehoug Publishers […], not against the government or the 
Norwegian people, and quoted Chisti; we support free speech, but Rushdie has used 
very abusive language and insulted a billion Muslims worldwide with his book. While 
this ‘moderate’ protest was covered in news reports, media also highlighted the 
‘extremist’ Syed Bokhari, a Norwegian Pakistani and local Labor Party politician, who 
caused outrage among politicians with his public support for the fatwa; VG (February 
23) quoted him; any Muslim must be willing to kill the author if he gets a chance. 
According to Chisti, Bokhari had no relations to protest organizers. Aschehoug did meet 
with the Muslims’ lawyer, but refused to stop the planned publication. Four years later, 
on October 11, 1993, Nygaard was seriously injured in an assassination attempt; the 
crime was never solved but it is widely assumed to be a result of the fatwa. Later, the 
Rushdie affair became the immediate reason for appointing a governmental Commission 
on Freedom of Expression. Being dominated by majority individuals, this commission 
did not see much reason to restrict free speech (see Bangstad & Vetlesen 2011:338). 
In his assessment of British debates after the Rushdie affair, Parekh (2000:303) 
describes much of it as focused on the death threat, while Muslim demands were 
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dismissed as ‘fundamentalism’ incompatible with ‘freedom’. After things calmed down, 
the situation changed and both sides became more willing to accommodate each other. 
Akhtar argued that the book “should be banned because it reinforces prejudice against 
an already maltreated religious minority” (1989:49). While he had been interpreted as 
an apologist for fundamentalism, he now used a political argument about racism rather 
than a religious argument. Akhtar noted a change on the other side; where “self-
proclaimed defenders of freedom of speech as an absolute right” (ibid, 52) 
acknowledged that Muslims did have a legitimate case. By May 1989, two claims were 
generally accepted; that Muslims of a variety of opinions had been offended, and that 
free speech is a negotiable rather than absolute value in a liberal democracy (ibid, 53; 
58-59). In Britain, the Rushdie affair thus led to public debate about whether and how 
existing laws can be used to restrain offensive expressions, including blasphemy, racism 
and libel (see Parekh 2000:313-321; Modood 2005:113-130; Akhtar 1989b). The 
preferred Muslim position, expressed by Akhtar (1989a:57-58; see also 1989b), settled 
on demanding the same legal protection for “the collective dignity” of religious groups 
as the one given to groups defined by ‘race’ and gender; seeking an amendment to laws 
against racial hatred rather than blasphemy legislation. Parekh (1989) takes a critical 
view of Muslim protesters, “whose leaders did not know how to handle the media and 
speak in idioms intelligible to their white fellow citizens” (ibid, 68). While 
acknowledging Akhtar’s “more sophisticated line” (ibid, 68-69), Parekh criticizes his 
defense of ‘fundamentalism’ and focus on ‘apostasy’ as unpersuasive. In Parekh’s  
(2000:305) analysis, Muslim spokespersons initially “found it extremely difficult” to 
“articulate their reasons in a liberal language”, but gradually developed more coherent 
arguments; that the book misrepresented Islam, spoke about the Muslim religion in 
abusive language, and reinforced anti-Muslim prejudice (ibid, 299; 1990:699). 
Peter van der Veer (1997:101-102) argues that the angry reactions of British Muslims 
were justifiable and not necessarily ‘fundamentalist’ but rather can be seen as “political 
resistance to the assimilative tendencies of the nation-state”. Their demand for 
extending blasphemy laws can be understood as “their own cultural project for living 
hybrid cultural lives in a non-Islamic nation” (ibid). Modood (2005:104) describes 
Muslim protests as mainly “spontaneous working-class anger and hurt pride” (at this 
time, there were fewer educated minority persons), and points out that their anger was 
“not so much a Muslim response as a South Asian Muslim response” (ibid, 106). As 
such, their reactions had little to do with fundamentalism, which is primarily a 
movement among the educated middle class, but more with a traditional South Asian 
cultural reverence of the prophet, which is strongest among the rural working class 
(ibid, 106-107). Edward Said, while defending the right to publish the book, questioned 
whether it was “intellectually fair and politically wise” for someone with a Muslim 
background to join Orientalist discourse and reinforce western prejudices about Islam 
(cited in Parekh 1989:69). Modood (2005:119) notes that rally posters and interviews 
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with British Muslims, referred to “honor” and “dignity” more often than to 
“blasphemy”, and that these issues “cannot be understood as a narrowly theological 
matter”. He also points out that while representatives from Muslim countries spoke 
mostly of apostasy, Western Muslims preferred the blasphemy argument, as an 
adaptation to Western legal systems which recognize the latter but not the former 
(Modood 1993b:97-98). Akhtar (1989b:24) concluded that “in a secular society like 
Britain, the Muslim’s best bet is to campaign for a law making certain kinds of conduct 
or publication socially unacceptable as opposed to religiously offensive” and that, rather 
than the blasphemy law, “the Race Relations Act needs amendment”, extending the 
definition of ethnicity to cover groups identified by religion. According to Modood, the 
Rushdie affair was thus “an attempt by Muslims […] to press their claim to be 
recognized as an oppressed group in British society, as a group whose essential dignity 
must be respected by the rest of society”. It was “a demand to be incorporated with the 
same kind of legal protection as other oppressed groups” (ibid, 124), such as women, 
ethnic and racial minorities (as discussed in the introduction, their demands have been 
partly accommodated in Britain). 
Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons 
The Danish cartoons of Mohammed were published in the country’s largest newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005. Twelve cartoons were printed under the 
headline Faces of Mohammed. The most provocative and widely debated of them 
portrayed a bearded man with a bomb in his turban, and the Islamic creed (the shahada) 
written on the bomb (Alhassan 2008:40-41; Levey & Modood 2009:218). Several other 
cartoons signified Muslim violence and oppression of women; but some were critical 
comments on the cartoon affair (see Alhassan 2008 for a comprehensive analysis of all 
twelve cartoons); one of them showing a schoolboy writing in Persian on the 
blackboard: “The journalists of Jyllands-Posten are a bunch of reactionary 
provocateurs” (Alhassan 2008:45). In Erik Bleich’s (2006:17-18) analysis, the cartoons 
range from positive portrayals of Muslims to some that are not only offensive but can be 
classified as “hate speech that should be sanctioned by law”. Jyllands-Posten’s editors 
explained that they invited cartoonists to submit drawings of Mohammed in order to 
stop ‘growing self-censorship’ in the Danish public sphere, where people are too 
‘politically correct’ and afraid of hurting the feelings of religious minorities (Kunelius 
& Eide 2007:10). Some weeks earlier, Danish newspapers had reported on Kåre 
Bluitgen’s difficulty finding artists to illustrate his children’s book on the Prophet 
Mohammed (ibid, 9; Levey & Modood 2009:217; Hervik, Eide & Kunelius 2008:31). 
This account of illustrators’ self-censorship due to fear of Muslim repercussions was 
repeatedly told as a reason for Jyllands-Posten’s cartoon publication, but it was rarely 
mentioned that Bluitgen was already known for previous “controversial publications 
and provocative attacks on Muslims” (Boe & Hervik 2008:216; see also Carens 
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2006:36); although two of the cartoons depicted the drawing assignment as a PR stunt 
for advertising Bluitgen’s book (Alhassan 2008:42). 
The cartoons were accompanied by the following text, written by the newspaper’s 
culture editor Flemming Rose (quoted in Kunelius & Eide 2007:10); 
The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special 
position, insisting on special consideration of their religious feelings. It is 
incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must 
be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule… 
On previous occasions, the newspaper had argued that criticism and ridicule of religion 
were necessary provocations to ‘speed up’ the integration of Muslims (Boe & Hervik 
2008:213). This justification explicitly refers to an ‘incompatibility’ between ‘secular 
society’ and ‘some Muslims’ who want ‘special consideration’ of their ‘religious 
feelings’, thus reflecting the topos of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Rose echoes Barry’s 
(2001:31) comment on the Rushdie Affair; that “the right to mock, ridicule and 
lampoon is inseparable from the right to free speech”, thus constructing free speech as 
absolute and non-negotiable. Framing consideration of religious feelings as 
incompatible with free speech, Jyllands-Posten sought in advance to deny the 
legitimacy of possible Muslim protests, which could be construed as a ‘rejection’ of 
‘modern, secular society’. Thus, Jyllands-Posten’s position is in line with 
‘confrontational liberalism’ as discussed in the introduction. 
On October 9, the Islamic Society in Denmark demanded an apology from Jyllands-
Posten and a withdrawal of the cartoons. Five days later, between 3000 and 5000 
Muslims peacefully demonstrated against the cartoons in Copenhagen. At the same 
time, two of the cartoonists received death threats (Levey & Modood 2009:219; 
Kunelius & Eide 2007:10; Hervik, Eide & Kunelius 2008:32). In a letter dated October 
12, eleven ambassadors from Muslim countries asked to meet Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen to discuss the situation of Muslims in Denmark, using the cartoons as 
an example of a problematic issue. A week later, Rasmussen turned down their request, 
insisting that the government could not interfere with press freedom (Kunelius & Eide 
2007:10; Hervik, Eide & Kunelius 2008:33). In December, the cartoon affair developed 
into a diplomatic crisis after two delegations of imams from the Islamic Society in 
Denmark travelled to Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries to gain support for their 
case from Arab political leaders. This delegation’s lobbying efforts in the Middle East 
contributed to a boycott of Danish goods and recalling of ambassadors (Levey & 
Modood 2009:219). By this time, the Council of Europe criticized the Danish 
government’s handling of the issue (Kunelius & Eide 2007:10-11), and a group of 
retired Danish diplomats publicly criticized the refusal to meet the ambassadors as an 
“unheard of diplomatic act” (Hervik, Eide & Kunelius 2008:34). Towards the end of 
January 2006, Jyllands-Posten and the government made an effort to show sympathy 
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with offended Muslims, but did not apologize for the publication (Hansen 2006:9). The 
situation escalated and culminated in early February with massive protests in the Middle 
East; several Danish embassies were attacked and on February 4, the embassies of both 
Denmark and Norway in Damascus were put on fire. Many Western governments 
expressed solidarity with Denmark, and newspapers in countries like France and 
Germany showed solidarity by printing the cartoons (Levey & Modood 2009:219, 
Hervik, Eide & Kunelius 2008:34). 
In international media coverage, the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ became a key 
phrase, mentioned explicitly in many opinion pieces and implicitly framing much news 
reporting (Kunelius & Eide 2007:12). Editors and columnists often criticized this idea 
as a prediction that might become a self-fulfilling prophecy thanks to extremists, while 
most people on both sides wanted to avoid such a situation. At the same time, news 
coverage tended to reproduce the clash thesis by highlighting extremists and violent 
demonstrations (ibid, 19). Kunelius and Eide (ibid, 20) point out that domestic politics 
impacted strongly on the tone of debate, especially when national political elites had 
made diplomatic efforts to calm down the situation. French, British and Swedish media 
started with a cautious and diplomatic approach in line with their governments, but later 
switched to a more confrontational defense of free speech that distinguished their own 
position from the government. French newspapers republished the cartoons, while 
media in more multiculturalist Britain and Sweden did not (ibid, 13). 
The cartoon affair soon gave rise to academic debates. Randall Hansen (2006) defended 
the publication on liberal and secularist grounds. Rejecting the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
thesis and the view that Muslim and Western values are incompatible (ibid, 8), he 
argues that the cartoons are not racist. While they do represent “hatred of a religion” 
(ibid, 12), religion should be a “fair target” of criticism, mockery and ridicule in a 
liberal democratic society. He argues that free speech is non-negotiable (ibid, 16); thus 
Muslims “cannot be accommodated through a revision of those norms and principles” 
(ibid, 8). While accepting the possibility that the cartoonists, editors or Danish society 
may be hostile to Muslims (ibid, 11), he argues that “this offence is the price of living in 
a liberal society” (ibid, 15) which Muslims are free to protest, but they cannot demand 
criminal sanctions (ibid, 16). Hansen thus rejects the argument that the cartoons qualify 
as hate speech. Brendan O’Leary (2006:25-27) presents a similar argument, but makes 
the additional claim that Muslim outrage was “manufactured” by “Islamists” referring 
to the imam delegation that traveled to the Middle East, including in their portfolio 
more offensive cartoons that had not been printed in Jyllands-Posten. In a more nuanced 
analysis, Jytte Klausen (2009) emphasizes the Egyptian government’s role in the 
escalation of the crisis (see also Engebrigtsen 2010:74); “Egypt had been building a 
diplomatic offensive against the Danes for months, and the imams had never made it to 
Cairo if they had not been invited” (Klausen 2009:8, see also 35-38; 63-82). Klausen 
(ibid, 147) also discusses the Danish government’s motives for refusing to meet with 
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Muslim diplomats, seeing this in the context of Fogh Rasmussen’s alignment with US 
foreign policy under President George W. Bush and American neo-conservatism, and 
his dependence on parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party, which uses a 
nationalist rhetoric of a ‘culture war’ between Danes and Muslims (Klausen 2009:148-
165). 
While further discussion of the international aspects falls beyond my scope, it is 
necessary to distinguish and explain the Danish confrontational approach and the 
Norwegian dialogue approach in their national contexts, as reflections of already 
established policies. The Danish government had been the first to invite Rushdie in 
1996; and in 2004, Fogh Rasmussen’s Liberal Party gave its annual liberty prize to 
Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali (Meer & Mouritsen 2009:338). Per Mouritsen (2006) 
analyzes the Danish government’s confrontational mode of defining free speech as non-
negotiable (ibid, 70) as culturalizing universal liberal values, claiming them as the 
property of a particular nation (ibid, 73). In Denmark, with little support for any notion 
of multiculturalism, opinion is split between a “national or communitarian liberalism” 
(Meer & Mouritsen 2009:337) represented by the right, and a more tolerant 
“universalistic or colour blind liberalism” (ibid) represented by the left. The dominant 
Danish understanding of ‘constitutional patriotism’ was not pluralist in Rawls’ sense of 
allowing different versions of liberal universalism, but instead represented a 
‘comprehensive liberalism’ linked to a particular Danish culture, seen as superior and 
genuinely liberal and democratic (Mouritsen 2006:84-86). Thus, the Danish model is 
not open to “deliberative contestation of the specific particularity of liberal political 
cultures, indeed for the very acceptance of alternative views as reasonable in a debate” 
(ibid, 88) and excludes the emergence of a new generation of Muslims who “frame 
identities by presenting democratic and liberal credentials as part and parcel of a 
religious outlook” (ibid). 
While Jyllands-Posten’s framing of the cartoons as an issue of free speech under threat 
was often taken for granted in public debate (Eide, Kunelius & Phillips 2008:18), 
Hervik and Clarissa Berg (2007:25) see the cartoon affair in the context of the “re-
politicization of the press” and emphasize that Danish newspapers took differing 
positions. While Jyllands-Posten aligned itself with the government, the social-
democratic Politiken was critical of both Jyllands-Posten and Fogh Rasmussen (Meer & 
Mouritsen 2009:339). It would thus be inaccurate to see the cartoons as a result of a 
particular Danish view on free speech threatened by Islam; they are better understood as 
situated in the context of a politicized national media landscape (Hervik & Berg 
2007:36-37; Hervik 2008:59). Having studied Danish media coverage since the 1990s, 
Hervik (2006:228-229) notes that much of Jyllands-Posten’s coverage “constructs an 
image of Islam as the enemy”, and culture editor Rose has previously expressed his 
sympathies for neo-conservative and anti-Islamic writers such as Lewis, Hitchens and 
Fukuyama (Hervik 2008:72). 
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Hervik (2008) also analyzes the Danish government’s use of ‘spin doctors’ to influence 
media coverage (spinning refers to a form of political communication to the media, to 
manage and control the news by formulating rhetoric with a certain angle on the truth; 
see ibid, 62-63). In his response to the ambassadors’ letter, Fogh Rasmussen selectively 
focused on free speech and the cartoons; while the ambassadors had in fact requested a 
meeting to discuss their general concern about widespread negative focus on Muslims 
in Denmark. As a result of this spin strategy, the letter was instead interpreted as a 
request for legal intervention with Jyllands-Posten, which could legitimately be rejected 
(ibid, 65). In an interview with that newspaper on October 30, 2005, carrying the 
headline: Fogh: Freedom of Speech Must Be Used for Provocation, the Prime Minister 
said; I will never accept that respect for people’s religious convictions should lead to 
constraints on the possibilities of the press for bringing critique, humour or satire, and 
enlightened and free societies are more successful than un-enlightened and non-free 
societies, exactly because some dare to provoke and criticize authorities and I must say 
that the terrorists’ aim is to make us all so scared that we give up the fundamental 
values of our society (quoted in ibid, 66-67). Here, the clash of civilizations topos 
appears, contrasting our ‘enlightened and free’ society with the ‘un-enlightened and 
non-free’ societies of ‘the terrorists’. In Hervik’s (ibid) analysis, the international crisis 
was a fact after Fogh Rasmussen had rejected the ambassadors and from then on, his 
strategy aimed at damage control, trying to put himself in a favorable light and blaming 
Muslims for escalation; by (1) insisting that the issue is about free speech; (2) 
expressing personal disagreement with the publication; (3) regretting the offense 
caused; (4) blaming the imam delegation; and (5) placing responsibility on Muslims. 
The Norwegian approach 
Whereas Denmark had “no formalized consultation between Muslim communities and 
the state” (Mouritsen 2006:74), the Norwegian government’s choice of dialogue can be 
explained by three factors; (1) the existence of an institutionalized inter-religious 
dialogue between Muslims and Christians (Engebrigtsen 2010:80; Leirvik 2006, 
2012a); (2) a foreign policy emphasizing dialogue, peace and reconciliation (Eide, 
Kunelius & Phillips 2008:12; Steien 2008:41), and (3) an integration policy with a 
strong focus on dialogue (as discussed in the introduction). While Oddbjørn Leirvik 
(2006) emphasizes the role of interfaith dialogue between mainstream Christians and 
Muslims in civil society as an important factor in countering the tendencies to a 
Christian form of Islamophobia resulting from an alliance between the ‘new Christian 
right’ and the Progress Party, the two latter policy factors may be more significant; in 
contrast to Denmark’s neo-conservative government, Norway had a newly-elected 
social-democratic government which had expressed a positive view of multicultural 
society (Engebrigtsen 2010:80). Among these three forms of dialogue, civil society 
interreligious dialogue probably comes closer to genuine dialogue open to mutual 
change (Grung cited in Leirvik 2012a:19) than the two other cases of dialogue as a 
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policy instrument. As a state strategy, dialogue is necessarily asymmetrical and may be 
better understood as an instrument of persuasion; which may legitimize policy and can 
thus be more effective in bringing about results than the confrontational alternative. As 
a policy instrument, dialogue may be used as a strategy to teach the ‘other’ about liberal 
values such as free speech (Vetlesen & Bangstad 2011:338). 
Soon after the small, conservative Christian journal, Magazinet, republished the Danish 
cartoons on January 10, 2006 (Kunelius & Eide 2007:11) and before the international 
escalation of the conflict (Steien 2007:41), the Foreign Ministry responded by providing 
its Middle Eastern embassies with a list of arguments regretting the offense to Muslims 
caused by the cartoons, which were seen as creating unnecessary conflict. While stating 
that free speech is a fundamental right, it mentioned legal restraints on hate speech; the 
latter point was criticized by the opposition after the diplomatic checklist was leaked to 
the media (Engebrigtsen 2010:75-76). In early February, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr 
Støre (who most explicitly emphasizes dialogue over confrontation as a social 
democratic approach to promote peace, reconciliation, democracy and universal human 
rights both internationally and domestically, see Dagsavisen, March 10, 2006) and 
Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg publicly regretted the publication of the cartoons, while 
making it clear that the government could not interfere with free speech (Engebrigtsen 
2010:76). Støre met with the Norwegian Islamic Council, which “promised to use its 
contacts to support the Norwegian government’s case” (ibid) in Muslim countries. The 
government supported a delegation of members from the established Muslim-Christian 
interfaith dialogue to meet with Yusuf al-Qaradawi, head of the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research (ibid, 77; Leirvik 2012a:13). On February 10, Minister of Labor 
and Social Inclusion Bjarne Håkon Hanssen facilitated a ‘reconciliation meeting’ 
between Magazinet editor Vebjørn Selbekk and Islamic Council leader Mohammed 
Hamdan (Steien 2008:46-47), where Selbekk regretted the consequences of the 
publication and Hamdan accepted his ‘apology’. The Islamic Council called off further 
protests (Engebrigtsen 2010:77), the government successfully calmed down the 
situation, but also turned Magazinet, representing the “new Christian right” and a rather 
marginal publication in Norway, into a scapegoat (ibid, 80-82; Steien 2008:41-42). The 
same day as the reconciliation meeting, the Antiracist Center together with 60 other 
organizations, although none of them Muslim, arranged a peace demonstration, where 
about 300, mostly non-Muslim, persons attended, including several members of 
government and other politicians. 
An independent group of Norwegian Muslims, who called themselves “The 
Volunteers”, however, decided to go through with their planned rally against the 
cartoons on February 11. This group was not satisfied that the government held only 
Magazinet responsible, while not addressing anti-Muslim sentiments in general. Neither 
were they happy that community leaders accepted this solution and cancelled further 
protest. A peaceful demonstration counting 1500 Norwegian Muslims took place 
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although all Muslim organizations had advised against participation. This rally became 
an opportunity to let their voices be heard for many ordinary Norwegian Muslims, who 
had not previously gained access to the media, and whose views were not represented 
by their leaders either.  
Analysis of media coverage 
Solveig Steien’s (2007:44-47) analysis of editorials notes that mainstream Norwegian 
newspapers started on a more confrontational line of defending free speech as an 
absolute value (although they did not print the cartoons), but switched to a position of 
dialogue after the violence in the Middle East and the government-facilitated 
‘reconciliation’. The free speech frame dominated western media internationally (Eide, 
Kunelius & Phillips 2008:18), and also Norwegian media often reduced Muslim 
complaints about the cartoons to complaints about blasphemy, which could be easily 
dismissed as illegitimate in a secularized society. Steien (ibid) notes that Norwegian 
newspapers made attempts to open up debate, in particular debate editor, Knut Olav 
Åmås, of Norway’s largest newspaper Aftenposten, who actively sought out minority 
contributors to the opinion pages during the cartoon affair. While a variety of Muslim 
voices were represented in the media, minority contributions that were published tended 
to support hegemonic views. Media coverage of the demonstration showed that many 
Norwegian Muslims did not only frame the cartoons as blasphemy (ibid, 45), but also 
within a wider context of anti-Muslim racism in the media.  
Bolette Blaagard (2010:1-4) notes that media played a central role in reviving 
nationalism and racism in several European countries including Denmark, where the 
cartoons were published as a contribution to a domestic integration debate before it 
became a ‘transnational media event’ (Eide, Kunelius & Phillips 2008:11-13). In my 
analysis of media coverage of Muslims protests, an initial impression based on 
empirical data and Steien’s (2007) and Phillips’ (2008) studies, is that Norwegian 
newspapers gave more access to a variety of Muslim viewpoints than some other 
European national media, although stereotypical coverage was also present. Shawn 
Powers (2008:351-352) argues that media coverage of demonstrations and protests is 
highly revealing of media’s ideological positioning, as framing of protests is often 
aligned to editorial outlooks. His study of how British media covered Muslim protests 
against the cartoons, found that while Muslim leaders mostly attempted to protest in 
very ‘western’ ways, newspapers chose to emphasize the most violent demonstrations, 
and picked out the more extreme slogans and banners from the crowd of protesters. 
Powers points out that emphasizing violence and extremism is part of a strategy to 
dramatize and sensationalize news, which increases collective perceptions of threat and 
public fear (ibid, 354), which in turn make audiences crave for more information and 
increase media consumption. Sensationalist coverage thus contributes to escalate cross-
cultural tensions and make dialogue more difficult.  
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Richardson’s (2004) study of British newspaper coverage in the late 1990s found that 
British Muslims were categorized as non-British mostly through an implicit contrast 
with ‘British’ characteristics and occasionally through explicit ascription of ‘Islamic’ 
characteristics, in conservative and liberal newspapers (ibid, 113-117; 152-153). An 
international comparison of news coverage (ter Wal, Triandafyllidou, Steindler & 
Kontochristou 2009) found that while Dutch (like Italian and Greek) newspapers 
frequently employed the ‘clash of civilizations’ topos, British newspapers focused more 
on the need to ‘mediate’ in the conflict between ‘the press’ and ‘Muslims’. This study 
(ibid, 248-249) concluded that British coverage avoided dichotomies between 
Europeans and Muslims, represented a diversity of views and quoted different sources, 
including British Muslims. In a more detailed analysis, Angela Phillips and Hillel 
Nossek (2008) note that British newspapers initially did not cover the cartoon affair, but 
after the cartoons had been republished in major European media, they unanimously 
“condemned the European press for stirring up anger amongst “their” minorities” and 
defended their own decision not to print the cartoons with reference to “tolerance and 
restraint” (ibid, 239; see also Phillips & Lee 2007:68), which reflected an allegedly 
superior, British way of ‘diversity management’ (Phillips & Nossek 2008:246), 
followed up by a statement by British foreign secretary Jack Straw, who denounced the 
reprinting in other European countries as “gratuitously inflammatory” (ibid, 240).  
On February 3, 2006, the ‘extremist’ group Al-Ghuraba gathered a few hundred people 
for an angry and provocative demonstration in London, using extreme slogans 
threatening ‘Europe’ with terrorism (Phillips 2008:105; Abbas 2011:70). British editors 
responded in anger as if the demonstrators had betrayed their tolerance and restraint 
(Phillips & Nossek 2008:246), condemned the demonstration and demanded that the 
protesters be arrested for “incitement to murder” and possibly deported (Abbas 2011:70; 
Phillips 2008:240). Despite the non-violence and small size of this protest, it received 
massive negative coverage. More moderate Muslim organizations unanimously 
denounced the ‘extremists’ and organized bigger demonstrations, which were barely 
reported and even dismissed (ibid, 241; see also Phillips & Lee 2007:74; 77). Among 
these, 5000 Muslims took part in a peaceful rally directed not only against the cartoons, 
but also against the previous protesters, under the slogan “United against Islamophobia, 
united against incitement, united in our love of the Prophet” (Abbas 2011:70). But news 
reports emphasized extreme voices among British Muslims and showed little interest in 
more moderate viewpoints (Phillips & Lee 2007:68-70), and changed the dominant 
framing from ‘dialogue’ to ‘confrontation’, while the discourse of ‘antiracism’ or 
‘dialogical multiculturalism’ was given space only as a minority discourse (ibid, 77; 
Phillips & Nossek 2008:246). By letting extremists speak for British Muslims in 
general, the newspapers promoted the ‘clash of civilizations’ discourse (ibid, 241-242). 
Together with the London bombings six months earlier, the cartoon affair also marks a 
turning point in British debate, a shift away from multiculturalism (ibid, 246; 250). 
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Phillips (2008) discusses to which extent media in different countries opened for debate 
about the cartoons, and whether Muslim voices were heard. In her comparison of 
debates in Canada, Sweden, Britain and Norway, she notes that in Britain (and Sweden), 
where the cartoons were not printed, the level of ‘tolerance’ decreased as the crisis 
escalated. In most European countries, debate was dominated by the two hegemonic 
positions of ‘confrontation’ and ‘dialogue’; Canada seemed to be the only western 
country were an antiracist, multiculturalist perspective was given sufficient space in the 
media to challenge hegemony. While most British Muslim contributors and left-wing 
intellectuals argued from an anti-racist position, Norwegian (and Swedish) Muslim 
commentators (e.g. Shabana Rehman) tended to argue from a ‘liberal fundamentalist’ 
position (ibid, 107-109). The ‘Muslim fundamentalist’ view which was emphasized in 
news reports was rarely ever seen in debate pages. Phillips found that Norwegian (and 
Swedish) newspapers were more open to a diversity of Muslim voices than British 
newspapers were. A significant difference was that British Muslim voices were 
included to represent “the Other” and argue against the cartoons, while Norwegian 
Muslim voices were included to represent the ‘liberal’ view and defend the cartoons. In 
Swedish newspapers, which had the greatest representation of Muslim voices, a contrast 
was apparent between Muslim journalists who defended ‘confrontational liberalism’, 
and Muslim intellectuals, who like their British counterparts argued against the cartoons 
from an anti-racist position (ibid, 111). Phillips concludes that in each country, minority 
voices tend to be positioned to confirm dominant discourses; British ‘multiculturalism’ 
sees Muslims as primarily different (either negatively as ‘extremists’ or positively as 
‘antiracists’), while Norwegian integration policy favors ‘assimilated’ Muslims (ibid, 
112-114). Phillips and Nossek (2008:250) note that when minority persons accept the 
majority-assigned role, they are praised by media; otherwise they are ‘condemned’. 
Elisabeth Eide and Kaarina Nikunen (2011:9-11) found that while Norwegian media 
recently gives space to a variety of minority voices, these tend to be fitted into polarized 
categories such as the ‘Adaptive Hero Other’, referring to ‘assimilated’ individuals who 
are “represented favorably in the media due to their adherence to ‘European-ness’ and 
their critique of backward and negative practices within their ‘own’ minority” (ibid, 9); 
the ‘Villain Other’ who are represented negatively, and include also “conservative 
leaders without a record of abuse” and “conservatively dressed Muslim women” (ibid, 
10), and the ‘Dialogic Other’ emphasizing the normality of hyphenated public identities 
and “the need to accept and respect people who want to preserve their religious 
traditions” (ibid, 10-11). Many Norwegian Muslims resist being classified as 
‘spokespersons’ for their ethnic or religious community (Eide 2011:73; 76-77), as in 
Britain, where minority persons tend to be defined as representing their community in 
the public sphere (Phillips & Nossek 2008:245). Phillips (2008:113) notes that in 
Norway, critical Muslim voices spoke primarily through street protests; and asks; were 
they heard or misrepresented by the media? Below I attempt to answer that question. 
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Empirical analysis 
For detailed analysis I have selected 14 news reports from major Norwegian newspapers 
in the period from February 3 to 12, 2006; starting with the initial call for demonstration 
and including reports published the day after the protest. Half of the articles came out 
before the demonstration, and cover a variety of opinions about whether or not to join, 
expressed in interviews with Norwegian Muslims. The remaining articles are news 
reports covering the ‘peace demonstration’ on February 10 (2 articles), and the Muslim 
protest on February 11 (5 articles). This sample includes most reports covering the 
protests in the following national daily newspapers; Aftenposten, the largest subscription 
newspaper, with a conservative political orientation and circulation of approx. 300 000; 
Dagsavisen, a social-democratic subscription newspaper with circulation of approx. 
30 000 (but widely read among the ‘political elite’); Klassekampen, a left-wing 
subscription newspaper with approx. circulation of 10 000 (also widely read in 
‘political’ circles); Dagbladet, a liberal tabloid with approx. circulation of 200 000 
(with a tendency to cater to a female audience), and last but not least; VG, the largest 
tabloid with a ‘populist’ and sensationalist orientation, circulation approx. 350 000. At 
the time, VG had Norway’s most comprehensive and updated online newspaper (most 
printed articles are also published online), from which I have included a few articles. 
Contrary to the polarized situation in Denmark, and more similar to the British press 
(Meer & Mouritsen 2009:339), Norwegian newspapers share a national consensus on 
minority issues (to promote ‘integration’), and I did not find much systematic 
correlation between the newspapers’ political orientation and a more or less favorable 
coverage of minority voices. However, political ‘broadsheets’ such as Aftenposten and 
Klassekampen report less about everyday minority issues, but instead promote debate 
about these issues. Other papers show more interest in reporting and interviewing 
minority persons (Dagsavisen and Aften; which is Aftenposten’s evening edition serving 
as Oslo’s local newspaper). Among the tabloids, Dagbladet reports and debates about 
minority women’s issues, while VG is more interested in crime, terrorism and war. All 
main newspapers have a few journalists with minority background; many of them 
Muslims. These are often asked to report on minority issues (see Richardson 2004:41-
44 for a critical discussion), as they are thought to have greater knowledge of issues and 
broader networks in their communities; giving access to more sources. Several articles 
in my sample are written by journalists with a Muslim background, and while minority 
journalists may experience a conflict between loyalty to the media and loyalty to their 
ethnic community (ibid, 42-43), it seems that their reports sometimes do show a more 
nuanced understanding and let minority voices be heard to a greater extent.  
Media representation of protest organizers 
While newspapers’ heavy reliance on official and ‘expert’ sources tends to privilege and 
reproduce dominant views, for example when ‘white’ academics are quoted as ‘experts’ 
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on minority issues, Richardson (2004:45-47) points out that any news organization can 
produce “oppositional news” that challenge the dominant ideological framing. In 
particular, the ‘event-centric’ nature of news can accommodate the reporting of counter-
hegemonic demonstrations, as well as give access to, quote and ‘foreground’ 
oppositional sources. The first article that mentions the plans for a Muslim 
demonstration is an example of such ‘oppositional news’. Written by a journalist with a 
Muslim background, and published in VG’s online edition (it did not appear in the print 
version) on February 3, 2006, this article is positive in its representation of protest 
organizers. The headline, Inviting to a demonstration, and story lead; Norwegian 
Muslims distribute flyers in mosques on Friday to invite people to a demonstration 
against the Mohammed insults, uses terminology with positive connotations. The call to 
protest is represented as an ‘invitation’, implying that this is not a closed activity of a 
religious minority, but that the general public is welcome to join. Organizers are 
referred to as ‘Norwegian Muslims’, the hyphenated identity which is the preferred term 
of self-identification for many Norwegian Muslims (Eide 2011:76-77) and as such, the 
‘correct’ term to use (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:69), which avoids reproducing the 
opposition between ‘Norwegian’ and ‘Muslim’ (Richardson 2004:113). 
In terms of framing, use of direct quotes expresses involvement rather than distance 
(Reisigl & Wodak 2001:81). The article quotes from a flyer distributed at Friday prayer 
at an Oslo mosque, the Islamic Cultural Center; Because of the insults against the 
Prophet, we hold a demonstration on Saturday 11 February at 2.30 p.m. at Grønlands 
Torg. The exact time and place is quoted, thus VG helps the organizers mobilize. Few 
other reports repeated this information, which could enable readers without a network in 
the Muslim community to join. Slogans are also quoted directly; Are you fed up with 
media’s abuse of free speech?; How long shall they offend and provoke to divide 
society?; and Unite and show how respect should be. In a later section, I discuss the 
content of slogans; suffice it for now to note that they reverse the dominant positive 
self- and negative other-presentation; the protest is directed against the ‘media’, which 
is described with a range of negative terms; ‘abuse’, ‘offend’, ‘provoke’, ‘divide’; while 
Muslim organizers present their own agenda in positive terms; ‘unite’ and ‘respect’.  
Quoting slogans assures that the protesters’ agenda is represented accurately. The 
organizers are identified by their signature on the flyer; The Volunteers; a term with 
positive connotations of agency, initiative, social responsibility and generosity.  
 
The journalistic norm of ‘balanced reporting’, which requires quoting other sources 
with competing views (Richardson 2004:45) is met by interviewing an imam, Mehboob 
ur-Rahman, at the mosque where the flyer was distributed. While not advising against 
the demonstration (yet), he calls on Muslims to keep their calm; Muslims must not get 
agitated. Evil must be fought with good. Use your head and control your emotions. This 
quote is ambiguous; it contains implicit references to the cartoons as ‘evil’, but also 
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describes ‘Muslims’ as potentially ‘emotional’ (irrational) and ‘agitated’ (aggressive), 
reflecting common stereotypes (Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Richardson 2004:121). The 
statement may be interpreted as ‘patronizing’ by those who want to join the protest, but 
can also be interpreted as a religious appeal. Understood this way, the imam counters 
another stereotype; that unlike Christians, Muslims tend not to ‘turn the other cheek’ (or 
‘fight evil with good’) but respond with violence. More interesting in a political context, 
is that the imam reportedly met the Foreign Minister the same day. In contrast to the 
Volunteers, ur-Rahman is extremely satisfied with the [government’s] response, and 
fully understands their reaction. Using intensifying terms such as ‘extremely’ and 
‘fully’, he appears to uncritically accept the government position, including its framing 
of the crisis as the work of one man [Selbekk] and not Norway; reflecting an 
argumentative strategy of ‘blaming’ or ‘scapegoating’ (Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:243) 
the Magazinet editor. The imam’s attitude towards the government can be understood in 
the context of previous media debates where Muslim leaders were blamed for unwanted 
minority practices such as female circumcision in the Kadra case (Talle 2003).  
 
On February 6, Dagsavisen prints an article with the headline Norwegian Muslims want 
to demonstrate on Saturday; also a mostly positive angle. The story lead reads; Via 
SMS, Muslims are called to demonstrate against the Mohammed cartoons on Saturday. 
Several mosques support the plans. The slogans on the organizers’ flyer are quoted 
directly, and it says that the same message was spread via SMS. The actual content of 
the article, however, is more ambiguous with regard to ‘several mosques support[ing] 
the plans’. It says that the ‘World Islamic Mission’ mosque wants to follow the Islamic 
Council, whose leader Mohammed Hamdan is quoted; We know about the plans to 
demonstrate and have told our youth that this must be done peacefully and not end up 
with violence or incidents. If violence occurs, it will only help the extremists. The 
Islamic Council leader does not express a clear position in support of the protest; but 
calls on the ‘youth’ to protest peacefully, otherwise ‘it will help the extremists’. At this 
stage, it is not clear whether this refers to Muslim extremists, white racists or both. 
 
A member of a Muslim congregation, who later became secretary-general of the Islamic 
Council, is quoted in support of the protest, but he clarifies the next day that he did not 
speak on behalf of the mosque. The article reads, Spokesperson Mehtab Afsar at the 
congregation Minhaj-ul-Quran says they urge Muslims to take part in the 
demonstration. Afsar is quoted; We do this for two reasons: First, we think it is 
important to send a signal to larger society about how offended Muslims are by this 
case, and second to show that it is possible to use peaceful means such as the right to 
demonstrate. This article uses direct quotes and allows the ‘spokesperson’ to explain 
why he wants to demonstrate. He speaks a political language, using a phrase from 
political debate; ‘to send a signal’. Like the imam above, he seeks to counter the 
stereotype of Muslims as violent and aggressive, by proving that ‘it is possible to use 
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peaceful means’. He invokes ‘the right to demonstrate’ which is part of the discourse on 
free speech, thus emphasizing that he supports this principle. The interview with Afsar 
also exemplifies the problematic issue of minority ‘spokespersons’. While Dagsavisen 
assigns to him the role of ‘spokesperson’, he clarifies his role the next day (Dagsavisen, 
February 7); as a private citizen, I think all Muslims are entitled to take part in a 
peaceful demonstration, and I will also do so myself. As an example of resisting 
classification as community ‘representative’ rather than as an individual (Eide 2011:73), 
he makes clear that he speaks as a ‘private citizen’, and not as ‘spokesperson’. Media 
has tended to treat minority individuals willing to be interviewed as spokespersons of 
their community, regardless of whether they hold formal leadership roles (for a minority 
critique of the role ‘spokesperson’, see also the young lawyer and politician Abid Raja’s 
(2008) autobiography titled “Spokesman”). More significant to the political dynamics 
around the anti-cartoon protest, Afsar is quoted; It is not the mosque [Minhaj-ul-Quran] 
that is behind this demonstration, and the congregation board has not taken a position. 
As of February 7, four days before the demonstration, no official spokesperson or 
community leader has yet taken a position for or against the announced protest. 
Fear of ‘extremists on both sides’ 
To understand the reluctance of Norwegian Muslim organizations to support the 
demonstration, we need to take into account the general sense of crisis which 
culminated this week (Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:239-240), described by Steien (2007) 
as “A Norway almost at war”. Moderates on both sides feared escalation after two 
violent incidents had taken place on February 4. In Damascus, Syria, protesters had 
burned down the Norwegian Embassy. Although this act of ‘Muslim violence’ took 
place in the Middle East, it contributed to pre-existing fear of Muslim extremism, which 
in turn incited right-wing extremists to respond with threats of violence. Later that day, 
framed as an ‘act of revenge’ in the media, a Palestinian had been stabbed by two 
‘ethnic Norwegians’ in Skien. According to local newspaper Varden (online, February 
6), one of them had asked why do you burn our flag in the Middle East? during the 
attack. Police chose to see the incident as a drunken row rather than as an act of racism, 
but leader of the Antiracist Center, Nadeem Butt, told Dagsavisen (6 February) that the 
incident frightened Norwegian Muslims, and that the Islamic Council had received 
death threats from right-wing extremists. Council leader Hamdan is quoted; Now that a 
man has been stabbed, I am of course scared that extreme-right groups will turn to 
violence and do more than just making threats. These worries were shared by Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg, who told the newspaper that he is afraid that ‘extreme forces on 
both sides’ will flourish. 
In the days before the protest, several articles carried headlines focusing on ‘fear’ (VG, 
February 6, and Dagbladet, February 11), and another focused on ‘boycotting the 
demonstration’ (Dagsavisen, February 11). All three texts reported that Muslim leaders 
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had decided to advise against participation, because organizers were ‘unknown’; ‘no 
responsible organization’ backed the protest and it could lead to violent confrontation 
with right-wing counter-demonstrators. Two other articles (Aften, February 8, and 
Klassekampen, February 10) instead focused on the International Socialists’ decision to 
support and join the demonstration in solidarity with young Norwegian Muslims. In the 
following section, I analyze the three negative reports; the latter two will be discussed in 
the section about possible alliances with non-Muslim antiracists. 
VG’s article written by minority journalist Kadafi Zaman appeared in print and online 
on February 6, and seems more up-to-date with events. It contradicts Dagsavisen’s 
article the same day (discussed above), which claimed that several mosques support the 
demonstration. Under a sensationalist headline, Norwegian Muslim leaders fear a mass 
battle, VG reports that fear of extreme-right activists has caused Muslim leaders to 
advise against the announced demonstration. The story lead states that, Muslim leaders 
have tried to stop a demonstration in Oslo organized by the unknown group “The 
Volunteers” for fear of violent clashes. In contrast to the early articles with a positive 
framing discussed above, this text uses a series of negative terms; ‘fear’, ‘mass battle’ 
and ‘violent clashes’. The ‘Volunteers’ who had been portrayed positively before, were 
now constructed as an ‘unknown group’ and a possible party to ‘violent clashes’, which 
may appeal to the readers’ ‘fear of the unknown’ and contribute to make the public 
suspicious of the organizers’ intentions and agenda. The dramatic language of the 
headline and story lead may not have been written by the journalist but added by editors 
to increase the article’s news value, and exemplify what Richardson (2004:47-49) 
identifies as a common stereotype in the coverage of minorities, who are routinely 
linked with “threat, hostility and violence” especially in headlines. In his study of the 
British press, he found that coverage of minority demonstrations often emphasized 
violence between opposing extremist groups, and tended to represent anti-racist 
protesters as a more immediate threat and cause of racist hostility, thus problematizing 
the minority rather than prevailing racist hostility. This is just what the headline and 
story lead does here; it mentions ‘Norwegian Muslim leaders’ and ‘The Volunteers’ as 
the actors involved, but the main content actually problematizes ‘right extremists’, 
‘nationalists’ and a ‘neo-Nazi group’ who threaten Muslims. 
The main content uses more moderate language, and does not omit who might incite 
trouble; key Muslim leaders have tried to stop the event for several days, because of 
fear that right extremists will incite trouble, as happened in Denmark. The article notes 
that, the young Norwegian Muslims who are behind the initiative refuse to be stopped, 
and the information about the time and place of the demonstration is repeated. The main 
part of the article reports about rumors on the internet that ‘nationalist’ group ‘Vigrid’ 
(which unsuccessfully ran for parliament elections in 2009) will burn the Qur’an in 
front of protesting Muslims. It reports that the Islamic Council has received death 
threats from a ‘neo-Nazi group’. These details reverse the dominant image of majority 
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fear of Muslim extremists by reporting concrete cases of ‘white threats’ and the 
resulting fear among Norwegian Muslims. The only (reported) incident of violence in 
the cartoon affair in Norway was the stabbing in Skien. As a consequence of these 
threats, leader of the Antiracist Center, Nadeem Butt, leader of the Islamic Association, 
Basim Ghozlan, and deputy leader of the Islamic Council, Senaid Kobilica, all advise 
against participation. Butt is quoted; we must not contribute to being presented as 
extremists. Now we have to calm this down. We have in the last few days received 
several signals that right-extremists are mobilizing their forces. The antiracist leader is 
probably aware of prevalent reporting patterns and knows that if the right incites 
violence, Muslims and antiracists are likely to be presented as extremists, as 
Richardson’s (2004) study found. In the past, left-wing antiracist groups have 
repeatedly confronted neo-Nazis on the streets in Oslo, and events have usually been 
portrayed as ‘clashes between opposing extremists’. Norwegian Muslims had no history 
of political rioting until 2009, when a joint protest with left-wing groups against Israel’s 
war in Gaza developed into stone-throwing and window-smashing.  
On the morning of the demonstration, Dagbladet (online, February 11) publishes an 
article whose headline focuses on ‘fear’ and constructs Muslim protesters as possible 
threat; Fearing faceless prophet-demo, followed by the lead; Police refuse to say who 
has called for today’s demonstration against the drawings of the prophet Mohammed. 
Highlighting the anonymity of organizers with the word ‘faceless’ followed by ‘police 
refuse to say’, the newspaper plays on public ‘fear of the unknown’ and contributes to 
make majority readers suspicious of the protesters’ agenda. The rather uncommon word 
‘faceless’ not only denotes ‘unidentifiable’ and suspicious, but carries specific 
connotations with regard to a Muslim tradition of depicting Mohammed without facial 
features to comply with a ban against idolatry (drawing images of the Prophet), and to a 
custom of covering the face among conservative women (burka or niqab) and male 
extremists not wanting to be identified. This term contributes to stereotype organizers as 
conservative, ‘fundamentalist’ or even extremist, which further contributes to 
perceptions of ‘threat’. As in VG’s article above, the headline omits information about 
who fears the protest. The only actors mentioned in the story lead are the ‘police’ whose 
spokesperson says quite the opposite of what the headline suggests in the interview; that 
police have a ‘dialogue’ with organizers and ‘no indications of trouble’. Dagbladet’s 
headline and lead thus selectively highlight negative parts of the content and could 
possibly mislead readers to believe that police ‘fear’ a ‘faceless’ demonstration.  
The headline is actually based on a quote from Aslam Ahsan, leader of the Association 
for Pakistani Children, who is also interviewed. He has been a ‘spokesperson’ since the 
1970s and is known in the media as a “well-integrated” immigrant who usually does not 
challenge majority views, but emphasizes that immigrants should ‘adjust’ to Norwegian 
society. As such, he exemplifies media preference for minority voices that support 
hegemonic positions. At the beginning of the article, he is quoted; I will most strongly 
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advise anyone against participating in the announced demonstration because it is 
faceless and frameless. In this tense situation, this may be scary. Ahsan characterizes 
the demonstration in negative terms (‘faceless’ and ‘frameless’) and thus ‘scary’. He 
uses an intensifying term (‘most strongly’) to state his opinion (‘advise against’) in what 
seems to be one of the most negative quoted statements about the demonstration, which 
the article ‘balances’ by repeating the more moderate rejection by the Islamic Council 
before stating the announced time and place of the protest, as well as quoting slogans 
from the flyer and SMS message. 
In the same article’s next paragraph, we learn that organizers are not as ‘faceless’ after 
all, at least not to the newspaper, which has found out who they are; not a homogenous 
group that insists to demonstrate despite the warnings. It is allegedly a mix of young 
people of Pakistani, Kurdish, Somali and Moroccan background calling themselves 
“The Volunteers”. (Note confrontational terms such as ‘insist’, ‘despite’ and ‘warnings’ 
which may construe organizers as stubborn and disobedient; rather than simply young 
people making an independent political decision that differs from the opinions of 
authority figures; see Richardson (2004:121) on confrontational language to 
characterize Muslims). The journalist also contacted one of those assumed to be among 
the organizers, but was rejected and threatened to be reported for harassment if we [he] 
called again. The newspaper has thus been able to identify organizers, but their request 
for an interview was turned down. Aften (on February 8) reports a similar experience, as 
it talked to one of the organizers, who confirmed that they are determined to go through 
with the planned demonstration, but refused to give an interview as; he has to follow the 
strict guidelines of the group which forbid talking to journalists. Note again the words 
‘strict’ and ‘forbid’ that correspond to a perception of Muslims as authoritarian. In place 
of an interview with organizers, Dagbladet has another “well-integrated” spokesman, 
Farid Bouras of the organization Youth Against Violence, who also urges people to stay 
away from the demonstration, explain why organizers did not want to talk to the press. 
He is quoted; the reason for the rejecting attitude is probably that they think the media 
is to blame for disseminating the Mohammed cartoons which they think offend their 
beliefs. Bouras uses the mitigating terms ‘probably’ and ‘they think’, which distance 
him from the protesters’ view and imply that he does not blame the media nor find the 
cartoons religiously offensive. A possible reason why media prefer to speak to regular 
sources who confirm dominant views, is that they have access to these, while those 
more critical are more often reluctant to speak to media because their views may be 
misrepresented (Gullestad 2006:48-67). 
Towards the end of the article, police inspector Johan Fredriksen explains in an 
interview why they ‘refuse to say’ who is behind the demonstration; we have a policy 
not to inform about it [who has applied for permission to demonstrate] because those 
who arrange the demonstration own their message and their own audience. We have a 
dialogue with the organizer and agree on the framework that should apply. This is how 
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we make the organizers responsible and uphold free speech. Using ‘neutral’ 
bureaucratic language, the statement from the police avoids negative characterization of 
organizers and even uses positive terms such as ‘dialogue’, ‘agree’, ‘responsible’ and 
‘free speech’, reflecting the government’s ‘liberal’ vocabulary. In the next quote; we 
hope the reconciliation contributes to make our job easier. However, we are aware that 
this is a tense situation, but so far there are no indications of trouble. We don’t have an 
enemy image of the organizer; he acknowledges that the situation is ‘tense’ but also 
explicitly refutes the reasons for fear (‘no indications of trouble’) and suspicion of 
organizers (‘we don’t have an enemy image’). The statements from police contradict the 
logic of a ‘clash of civilizations’ suggested by Dagbladet’s headline.  
Muslim leaders advise against the demonstration 
The same day (February 11), Dagsavisen highlights opposition to the demonstration, 
under the headline; Boycotting the demonstration, followed by the lead; Muslims no 
longer have any reason to demonstrate after Vebjørn Selbekk’s regret. The article 
reports from the Islamic Council press conference after the ‘reconciliation meeting’ 
with Selbekk. Here, the Islamic Council reportedly issued an unusually clear statement 
(note the term ‘unusually clear’ implying that Muslim leaders’ statements are usually 
not considered clear enough by the press; they have regularly been accused of ‘speaking 
with two tongues’ when refusing to condemn other Muslims’ bad practices, or have 
tried to find a middle ground reconciling conservative views with liberal principles); We 
advise against participating in demonstrations not backed by any responsible 
organization. Islamic Council leader Hamdan specified; this applies to the 
demonstration that has been called via SMS. Some are likely to be upset that we advise 
against participation, but we represent 46 religious organizations in Norway when we 
say no. The council, an umbrella organization for the majority of Norwegian Muslim 
congregations, seeks to present itself and its member organizations as ‘responsible’ in 
contrast to the organizers of the demonstration, who are implicitly construed as 
‘irresponsible’. Several members of the Islamic Cultural Center emphasize that they 
accept Selbekk’s regret, and that everything is forgiven. They go even further in 
discrediting those who still want to demonstrate; those who show up are not serious 
Muslims, and those who do not accept the regret are not serious, justified by the 
religious imperative to forgive when people admit they have made a mistake. The 
position reflected here also accepts the government’s version, where Selbekk became a 
scapegoat while mainstream media go free of criticism. 
After the demonstration, several Norwegian Muslims criticized the Islamic Council’s 
acceptance of this position, and this was covered in two newspaper articles after the 
demonstration. In Dagsavisen’s news report from the demonstration (February 12), this 
was the main framing and content. Under the headline, -Politicians put pressure on the 
imams, followed by the lead; 1500 Muslims defied the imams’ advice not to 
86 
 
demonstrate. The organizers claim politicians have put pressure on the imams and the 
Islamic Council, we read that; organizers of the demonstration suggest that political 
pressure was the reason when the imams asked people to stay away from the 
demonstration. One of the organizers who spoke at the rally, Roqayya Kalaycy, is 
quoted; politicians try to influence the mosque communities far too much, and we do not 
like that. Organizers emphasized that they do not represent any organization or political 
orientation, but want to be a voice for Muslims in Norway. An unnamed representative 
of the Islamic Council rejects that they were pressured by politicians; we operate 
independent of politicians. No politicians participate when we have meetings and make 
our decisions. However, it seems clear from news reports that Muslim leaders had at 
least two ‘dialogue meetings’ with members of government; and that the government’s 
intention was to calm down the situation and avoid escalation. The Islamic Council 
accepted Magazinet’s regret, and decided to advise against the demonstration. 
Regardless of formal procedures of ‘independence’ and what was explicitly said by 
politicians, Muslim leaders worried about possible escalation and were eager to reach an 
agreement that could prevent this.  
“Political pressure” can be subtly exerted when parties realize their relative positions of 
power, as minority journalist Wasim K. Riaz (Aften, February 16) captures in a 
commentary with the headline, Imams on the defensive. He notes that Muslim leaders 
cooperated with the government from an early stage to find a ‘quiet’ solution; they 
accepted Magazinet’s regret and prevented escalation. In the process, they failed to 
represent their own members, and this internal disagreement was played out in the 
media, perhaps for the first time. Riaz concludes that the imams, who have been 
criticized by Norwegian authorities, politicians and by their own for so to speak every 
single negative act committed by a Muslim, should be happy that they were publicly 
defied, because this helps break down stereotypes;  
It turns out that the same imams do not have as much power over Muslims as 
politicians and media would have it. When more than 1000 Muslims publicly 
defy the imams and the Islamic Council, there is reason to believe that several 
thousand Norwegian Muslims put their own thoughts and ideas higher than what 
an imam says. Only naïve politicians believe that the imam is everything in a 
Muslim’s life.  
The perceived and actual power of imams in Norway has been critically discussed by 
several researchers (Jacobsen 2011:260-262; Leirvik 2012b:222-223; Døving 2012:26-
33). A series of media cases focusing on crime, violence, terror or unacceptable cultural 
practices, including the Kadra affair in 2000 and the debate after the murder of Theo 
van Gogh in 2004 (Døving 2012:26-31; see also chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis) created 
a public image of imams as ”generally authoritarian, traditionalist and out of touch with 
Norwegian realities” (Jacobsen 2011:262), while their actual importance in authorizing 
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particular Islamic practices is often limited (Jacobsen 2011:260), as young Muslims 
increasingly turn to internet clerics for advice (Døving 2012:44; see also further 
discussion in chapter 4). In the cartoon affair, Muslim leaders were praised in the media 
for their willingness to dialogue, but media also focused on their disagreements with the 
younger generation (Døving 2012:30), but for the first time, the imams and the Islamic 
Council were publicly criticized for being ‘too loyal’ and too compromising with the 
government (Leirvik 2012b:223). As Muslim leaders become increasingly ‘integrated’ 
in the public sphere and recognized through institutionalized dialogue with the 
government, which strengthens their power, Leirvik (2012b:222-223) comments, the 
more the ever-more ‘moderate’ leadership will be challenged by a more ‘radical’ 
internal opposition, as seen in the cartoon protests. A survey (TNS Gallup 2006:17-18) 
shows that while 50 per cent of the general population believes that Muslims generally 
follow the advice of imams, only 25 % of Norwegian Muslims agreed. Public 
disagreement between leaders and youth may thus have helped to correct majority 
misperceptions about authoritarian Muslim leaders, who lack loyalty to Norway, and 
young Muslims as either conservative, obeying religious leaders, or rebellious, defying 
religious leaders as part of rejecting religious traditions.  
Coverage of the ‘white’ demonstration 
Klassekampen (February 10) reports that in connection with the ‘reconciliation 
meeting’, the Antiracist Center, supported by the Church, faith and aid organizations, 
human rights organizations and the traditional peace movement, on short notice took 
initiative for a demonstration emphasizing the need for dialogue, respect, peace and 
nonviolent conflict resolution to take place in the afternoon of February 10. The article’s 
headline, White and broad for respect and dialogue, links the racializing term ‘white’ 
with three positive attributes; ‘broad’, ‘respect’ and ‘dialogue’, reflecting a positive self-
presentation of the ‘majority’ (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:58). The main content focuses on 
the absence of Muslim organizations, which means that this is a majority demonstration; 
hence characterized as ‘white’ as opposed to ‘Muslim’. Implicitly, the headline also 
serves to discredit the announced Muslim demonstration the next day because a 
negative other-presentation can be inferred, where the ‘non-white’ protest is attributed 
the opposite characteristics of ‘narrow’ and ‘confrontational’. While certainly 
representing the ‘majority’ and its dominant ideology of ‘dialogue’, the term ‘white’ is 
also misleading since the leader of the Antiracist Center, who organized the 
demonstration, is Nadeem Butt, a Norwegian Pakistani. 
It is reported that no Muslim organizations are joining this afternoon’s peace 
demonstration, and quotes Butt’s statement at a press conference the day before, where 
he explains the absence of Muslim organizations; the Islamic Council says that in the 
current situation, they will not participate in any kind of demonstration. Other Muslim 
organizations say the same. The antiracist leader further elaborates on what they mean 
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by the ‘current situation’; during his 30 years in Norway, he has never experienced such 
a widespread fear among Muslims of what awaits them if the conflict about the cartoons 
escalates further. He is quoted; for the first time, many people who have never before 
been scared, including myself, ask ourselves whether we have a safe future here in 
Norway. It is noteworthy that in a situation where Muslim organizations are afraid of 
joining a broad ‘majority’ demonstration expressing the government’s dialogue position 
because they fear racism, the Antiracist Center chooses to represent only the 
government’s focus on ‘dialogue’ and ‘peace’, and does not address the problem of 
racism, which seems to be the main concern of Norwegian Muslims.  
Two newspapers (Dagsavisen and Dagbladet, both February 11) printed news reports 
from the ‘peace’ demonstration; both focused primarily on the main speech given by 
finance minister and Socialist Party leader, Kristin Halvorsen, and the small number of 
people who had turned up. Under the headline, Socialist leader praises Selbekk and 
Hamdan; Dagsavisen reports; Finance Minister Kristin Halvorsen and integration 
minister Bjarne Håkon Hanssen took the lead in the demonstration for peace, free 
speech and religious respect. The peace demonstration that was supposed to unite the 
citizens of Oslo across religions yesterday afternoon was dominated by white 
Norwegians. Among the 60 organizations that supported the demonstration, none were 
Muslim. The leader of the Antiracist Center was disappointed that Muslim 
organizations did not support the event… The quoted text contains a positive self-
presentation linking two members of government with positive values such as ‘peace’, 
‘free speech’ and ‘religious respect’; further describes the demonstration as ‘dominated 
by white Norwegians’. The term ‘white’ most often appears in the media when the 
absence of minorities is criticized, whether this is due to exclusionary majority practices 
or because of minority unwillingness to ‘integrate’. In this case, ‘white’ presence is 
linked to positive qualities and contrasted to the ‘disappointing’ absence of Muslims. 
Explicitly, the ‘disappointment’ is attributed to Butt, but the newspaper adopts his 
perspective as its own, exemplified by phrases such as ‘supposed to unite’ rather than 
more distancing terms. Dagbladet’s (print version) article carries the headline; Only 300 
for peace, where the word ‘only’ can be interpreted as expressing disappointment, since 
we know that Norwegian media supported the ‘dialogue’ position. The article notes, 
with a certain amount of journalistic self-irony, that; at first, there were almost as many 
reporters as demonstrators present, before quoting the police’s crowd estimate at 300 
people. The demonstration as well as its coverage may thus be interpreted as the liberal 
elite’s self-congratulatory celebration of its tolerance, which Muslims should have 
joined if they wanted to avoid disappointing the ‘host’. 
Both reports quote extensively from the main speaker, finance minister and leader of the 
Socialist Party at the time, Kristin Halvorsen, who represented government. Dagsavisen 
notes her praise of the ‘reconciliation’ between Selbekk and Hamdan. She is quoted; In 
particular, the way the Islamic Council leader accepted the regret, gives me hope. [...] 
89 
 
This is how we will create peace and reconciliation. It is noteworthy that Halvorsen 
praises the Muslim leader’s forgiveness rather than the editor’s regret, which may be 
interpreted that making Muslims accept what the government says, is ‘how we will 
create peace and reconciliation’. It is further reported that; Kristin Halvorsen admitted 
that the reactions in the Middle East have affected Norway’s international self image, 
but stated that we should not let extremists define our worldview. This statement implies 
that the government is determined to continue its dialogue policy in line with Norway’s 
self-image as a ‘peace nation’ and not be influenced by ‘extremists’ to view the world in 
terms of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Dagbladet quotes more from her speech, which 
shows the government’s positionality. The socialist leader said; we Norwegians are 
used to be seen as peaceful and welcome. Now we are threatened, she said, and 
emphasized the importance of not letting a small number of extremists set the agenda. 
While it may have been intended to include Norwegian Muslims, the term ‘we 
Norwegians’ works as a reference to ‘white Norwegians’ because it is difficult for many 
Muslims, having often been treated with suspicion, to identify with being ‘used to be 
seen as peaceful and welcome’. According to the literature of critical whiteness studies 
(see Frankenberg 1993:1), being ‘used to be seen as peaceful and welcome’ is 
characteristic of ‘white privilege’ and an experience often not shared by non-white 
persons in a white society that treats them with suspicion. 
Similarly, when she says ‘now we are threatened’ this may be intended to refer to both 
majority and minority Norwegians, given the reports of widespread fear among 
Norwegian Muslims. However, this is where she focuses;  
100 persons threw stones at the Norwegian embassy in Tehran. We have to 
remember that there live at least ten million people in Tehran who did not join 
the attack. And if a small minority tries to harass Muslims in Norway, we must 
remember that 4.5 million people do not wish to do the same. 
In this quote, she refers primarily to the ‘threat of Muslim violence’ (Richardson 
2004:75; 78) in the Middle East, and emphasizes that most Muslims did not attack 
Norway. With this specification, it is reasonable to interpret her statement about ‘not 
letting a small number of extremists set the agenda’ as an appeal to the majority not to 
generalize about Muslims and violence. In the next sentence (‘and if a small minority 
tries to harass Muslims in Norway’), phrased as an afterthought beginning with ‘and’, 
she acknowledges that there are ‘extremists on both sides’ as the Prime Minister had 
said before. While the description of a moderate mainstream and a limited number of 
extremists on both sides has some fit with empirical reality, it plays down the 
asymmetrical relationship indicated by a number of surveys showing that about half of 
the majority population has negative perceptions of, and attitudes towards Muslims 
(discussed in the introduction). With regard to the cartoons, a survey (TNS Gallup 
2006:9-12) shows that 90 percent of Norwegian Muslims opposed the cartoon 
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publication (42 per cent wanted to punish the publishers); while only 48 per cent of the 
general Norwegian population thought it was wrong to publish the cartoons (and 14 per 
cent wanted to criminalize it).   
Halvorsen’s statement minimizes anti-Muslim racism with a series of mitigating terms 
(the word ‘if’ expresses doubt about whether harassment of Muslims takes place; 
‘small’ and ‘minority’ minimize the extent; and ‘tries’ expresses doubt about whether it 
has consequences), and claims that almost the entire Norwegian population (‘4.5 
millions’) do not ‘wish’ to harass Muslims. Thus, she distances herself from the 
perspective of Norwegian Muslims who would be protesting against perceived racist 
harassment by the media the next day, and in effect, this constitutes a classic example of 
argumentative ‘denial of racism’ (Richardson 2004:120). In this regard, Bangstad and 
Vetlesen (2011:339) have noted that majority individuals, who due to their background 
and social position hardly ever risk being subjected to hate speech; often do not reflect 
over asymmetric power relations; a shortcoming that seems to be reflected also in the 
Habermasian approach to dialogue which dominates Norwegian debate. When minority 
experiences of racism are not taken into account, the government’s dialogue position is 
not perceived as neutral, but rather as a majority monologue that is not open to take 
seriously and accommodate critical minority perspectives (Gressgård 2005:74; 
Gressgård & Jacobsen 2003:76; Gressgård 2010:106-137), which it instead labels 
‘extremist’. Halvorsen’s use of the term ‘Muslims in Norway’ rather than ‘Norwegian 
Muslims’ indicates that she does not include Norwegian Muslims in her sense of ‘we 
Norwegians’ (see Richardson 2004:113); this helps explain why few Norwegian 
Muslims showed up for a demonstration dominated by politicians who did not represent 
their experiences and interests.  
Halvorsen’s use of ‘we Norwegians’ can be contrasted with demonstration organizer 
Nadeem Butt, quoted in Dagsavisen; We Norwegians have together experienced the 
Mohammed cartoons here in Norway, and the reactions in the Middle East. We have 
been in agreement that free speech is a right we must use with good sense, and we have 
taken distance from the burning of our flag. He uses an inclusive ‘we’ (marked by the 
word ‘together’), acknowledges that ‘extreme’ acts have taken place on both sides (‘the 
Mohammed cartoons’ and ‘the reactions in the Middle East’), but emphasizes that 
moderate people from both majority and minority agree not to support these acts, and 
instead ‘use free speech with good sense’ and ‘take distance from burning our flag’. 
While employing the discourse of ‘extremists on both sides’, Butt avoids the division 
between ‘Norwegians’ and ‘Muslims’ and, while not explicitly addressing anti-Muslim 
racism, he acknowledges the position that free speech should be used ‘with good sense’.  
In her speech, it is not quite clear whether Halvorsen perceives the government as a 
‘neutral’ facilitator of reconciliation between Norwegian Christians and Norwegian 
Muslims; or as a party to a dialogue between ‘Norway’ and ‘Muslims’ (especially when 
91 
 
referring to Muslims in the Middle East). This ambivalence is characteristic of 
‘dialogical liberalism’ which tends to conflate the universal and the national, and deny 
its own partiality (as discussed in the introduction). Much of her speech, as analyzed 
above, reveals that she speaks from a ‘white’ perspective, reflecting the experiences and 
interests of the ‘majority’ (Frankenberg 1993:202-204). She marginalizes minority 
perspectives and constructs herself and the government’s position as neutral (Gullestad 
2006:194-195), by assuming a middle ground from which they can facilitate ‘dialogue’ 
between ‘extremists on both sides’, but without letting the ‘extremists’ influence their 
worldview. To achieve this, she uses the strategy of ‘scapegoating’ (Triandafyllidou et 
al. 2009:243) and blames the conflict on a ‘small number of extremists’ on both sides; 
notably in Muslim countries, but perhaps also among the Norwegian majority. This 
argumentative strategy denies that many mainstream Norwegian Muslims criticize anti-
Muslim racism without being extremists; and that many of them experience harassment 
at the hands of mainstream media and politicians. 
Coverage of the ‘Muslim’ demonstration 
The Muslim demonstration on February 11 was widely covered with online articles in 
VG and Dagbladet (February 11), as well as articles in the printed Sunday editions of 
Aftenposten, Dagsavisen, VG and Dagbladet (February 12). (Klassekampen does not 
come out on Sundays.) Coverage varied in extent, from two full and well-illustrated 
pages in Dagbladet’s print version to shorter articles in Aftenposten and VG. Content 
and topics that were highlighted were remarkably similar across newspapers, with the 
exception of Dagsavisen, which foregrounded the political pressure on the imams 
discussed earlier. Dagbladet (print) had the most negative angle, followed by VG 
(print), while the online articles of both tabloids to a high extent let the protesters speak 
for themselves by quoting from speeches and interviews. 
All articles except VG’s print version reported that about 1500 persons joined the 
protest march from the inner city neighborhood of Grønland where many Norwegian 
Muslims live, to Parliament. Dagbladet (online) substantiates the crowd estimate with a 
reference to information chief, Unni Grøndahl at the Oslo Police. Most articles noted 
that the demonstration had been organized by private citizens (Aftenposten), who did 
not represent any organization or political orientation (Dagsavisen), but wanted to be a 
voice for Muslims in Norway (Dagsavisen). VG and Dagbladet’s print articles simply 
referred to the organizers as The Volunteers, while VG (online) reported that they were 
ordinary Norwegian Muslims and quoted the female lead organizer, Roqayya Kalayci; 
We held this demonstration because we wanted the voice of Norwegian Muslims to be 
heard. In the latter report, her concluding remarks after the demonstration are quoted;   
We have faced a lot of opposition, and there were many who wanted us not to 
hold this demonstration. But we think it is important that ordinary Muslims get 
to say their opinion. I am satisfied with our demonstration. 
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The same statement is also quoted in the newspaper’s print edition (VG; February 12); 
There has been so much opposition, so many attempts to stop us from doing this, 
both from mosque communities and politicians. But today we were able to say 
what we wanted. I am very satisfied. 
Note the difference in wording, indicating that what newspapers present as ‘direct 
quotes’ may be paraphrased citations which differ significantly from what was said. 
With regard to the attempts to stop the demonstration, Dagbladet (online) and 
Aftenposten noted that Muslims leaders had warned against the demonstration, 
Dagsavisen wrote that the demonstrators had defied the imams’ advice against 
participation, and Dagbladet (online) even claimed that they had defied the great imams 
(sic). The latter newspaper’s print version quotes Hamdan, who sounds ‘defensive’;  
This is their choice. They express themselves and there is freedom of expression 
in this country. [...] We have urged people to calm down, and we have asked 
them not to join demonstrations we don’t know who is behind. This has been an 
advice from the imams and not an order. That means people have a free choice. 
All newspapers noted the heavy police presence, described in detail by Aftenposten; a 
formidable police force followed the demonstration. Mounted police and commando 
cars flanked the march, anti-terror patrols were positioned in strategic places and large 
amounts of civilian-clothes officers with earplugs mixed with the crowd; and 
Dagsavisen; Police had turned up in great numbers, with special forces, a helicopter 
and armoured vehicles. Neither neo-Nazis, who had announced counter-demonstrations, 
nor Pakistani gang members, who said they would join the protest, showed up. VG 
(online) quotes Unni Grøndahl at the Oslo Police, who said they were very satisfied 
with the demonstration, and had a good dialogue with the organizers, who were well-
organized with their own guards to control the crowd. She said; there are no reports of 
any incidents at all. This was well done, both by the organizers and the police. Also 
Dagsavisen quotes the police; Tor Langli of the Oslo Police said; we are very satisfied 
with the organizers. Media focus on police presence, absence of criminals and counter-
demonstrators, and police praising organizers, indicates that violence was expected, as 
VG (print) notes; there prevailed a certain nervousness that individuals would use the 
occasion to fire guns or explosives to cause riots. As discussed before, media coverage 
of minority protests often highlights violence (Richardson 2004:49) and may use an 
argumentative strategy of the ‘topos’ of threat of ‘Muslim political violence’ (ibid, 75). 
Most newspapers described the demonstration with variations of the phrase ‘noisy, but 
peaceful’. Dagsavisen incidentally used these exact words, the same as in Parekh’s 
(1989:62) description of British anti-Rushdie protests. Aftenposten carried the headline; 
Calm, but noisy. Dagsavisen and Dagbladet (online) described protesters as angry. Both 
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‘noisy’ and ‘angry’ are terms often attributed to minorities in ‘racist discourse’ (Reisigl 
& Wodak 2001:55; Richardson 2004:121). While demonstrations in general tend to be 
‘noisy’, news reports (Dagsavisen; Dagbladet online also in the story lead) mention that 
demonstrators shouted Allahu akbar or God is great; thus emphasizing the religious 
(and ‘exotic’?) aspect of the protest. Dagbladet (print) refers to a named protester, who 
marched in front, shouted loudly and waved the Qur’an. Two ‘white’ bystanders are 
quoted; it is frightening that it does not take more than a few cartoons to start all this 
(in a highlighted quote); reflecting a fear of Muslim fanaticism. 
VG’s (print) article carries the headline; Demonstration leader stops trouble; followed 
by the lead; Here, Roqayya Kalayci, leader of the Mohammed demonstration in Oslo, 
stops the young and short-tempered from taking over the event. It is reported;  
A group of young Muslims tried to incite the crowd by shouting Allahu akbar! 
(Allah is great) in their highest pitch and several repetitions. Before it boiled 
over, the female demonstration leader, Roqayya Kalayci grabbed her 
microphone and appealed to all those wanting a peaceful demonstration without 
violence or confrontations: – I don’t like someone not in charge trying to derail 
this demonstration. Let’s put that on the account for boiling youth blood.  
Dagbladet (print) also refers to this ‘attemped coup’ by a group of young people, some 
of them wearing masks, who were quickly put in their place by the demonstrators’ own 
guards. Two newspapers reported this minor event in a way reflecting the ‘topos of 
threat’ of Muslim extremism (Richardson 2004:75). 
Newspapers also commented on the place of women in the rally. Dagbladet (online) 
writes in the story lead, Women walked at the back of the protest march, and note 
further down; the demonstrating women had their own section at the back of the march. 
The article substantiates this claim by showing a picture of a group of veiled women, 
with the text; separate women’s section at the end. Today’s demonstration had all the 
men in front. Dagbladet’s printed article repeats these claims three times; in the lead, at 
the end of the main body, and below a picture of veiled women, where it says that about 
100 women walked in a separate section. Dagsavisen briefly mentions the same, while 
Aftenposten contradicts this and reports; the women walked in front. Apparently there 
was a ‘women’s section’ at the back of the parade, as in the annual Labor Day parades, 
where women’s organizations walk at the back, but women also join other sections. 
Given that the lead organizer was a woman, it seems Dagbladet made a ‘hasty 
generalization’ (later repeated by Dagsavisen) to support a preconception about Muslim 
gender segregation and women’s oppression; employing what Richardson (2004:75; 89) 
calls the ‘topos of threat of Muslim gender inequality’. In the Norwegian context, where 
gender equality is defined as a key national value, this claim discredits the 
demonstration as ‘reactionary’. Mariette Lobo of the International Socialists, the only 
political group in Norway that supported and participated in the protest, shares this 
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interpretation writing in their magazine, Gnisten (no.4, 2007); Media discredited the 
demonstration. [...] Newspapers wrote that women were forced to march at the end of 
the parade. Talk about confirming prejudice. In reality, the demonstration was led by a 
woman, and women could march wherever they wanted. Reading partial news reports 
together, we learn that women were present among the leaders, at the front; and at the 
end of the parade.  
So far, analysis shows that the liberal newspaper Dagbladet had a more negative angle 
reflecting more Orientalist topoi than other newspapers. Dagsavisen and Aftenposten 
take a more moderate and ‘neutral’ approach, while VG’s online articles stand out by 
extensively interviewing and quoting protesters, focusing on the political message rather 
than on negative descriptions. My findings partly corresponds to Richardson’s 
(2004:229) findings from Britain, where broadsheet newspapers, in order to retain their 
educated, ‘white’ middle-class readers, adopt a ‘white’ perspective that speaks ‘about’ 
Muslims rather than ‘to’ them. In Norway, this would apply to Aftenposten and 
Klassekampen, which report less from the demonstrations, but promoted debate about 
Islam. Richardson (ibid, 230) notes that elite broadsheet newspapers, whose journalists 
and readers are more highly educated, are more likely to place threatening, violent, 
sexist and intolerant activities of Muslims into a stereotypical frame of cultural conflict 
between the West and Muslims, drawn from a ‘collective cultural memory’ (Connerton, 
cited in ibid). This may partly explain the differences between the liberal middle class-
oriented Dagbladet and the more ‘populist’ VG, which gave more voice to Norwegian 
Muslim perspectives and relied more on interviews with ‘ordinary people’ rather than 
elite sources. In Britain, the liberal middle-class broadsheet, The Guardian, stood out as 
having the more extensive coverage of the cartoon crisis, more focus on extreme 
Muslim voices in news reports (Phillips & Lee 2007:70; Phillips 2008:109), and more 
strongly condemned ‘extremists’ in its editorials (Phillips & Nossek 2008:240-241).  
Analyzing the protesters’ message(s): blasphemy or racism?  
For an analysis of Muslim demands, and whether protesters got their message through 
or were misrepresented in the media, newspaper articles contain four sources; (1) direct 
quotes from flyers and other messages distributed to mobilize for the demonstration; (2) 
selective quotes from speeches given at the rally; (3) interviews with organizers and 
participants; and (4) pictures (especially picture series published online) show posters 
carried by protesters, and allow us to identify more than 20 different slogans, some of 
which were quoted and commented in news reports. These slogans showed great 
diversity in form and content; performing a range of speech acts, from ‘truth claims’ 
defining reality from the protesters’ perspective, via denouncements of certain acts, to 
ethical appeals and legal demands that made specific requests to the majority, media or 
politicians. The content ranged from religious declarations of faith, via slogans 
expressing liberal ideals of ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘mutual respect’, and appeals for 
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responsible use of free speech directed at the media, to denouncements of hate speech 
and demands for protection against it. Key words such as ‘the cartoons’, ‘blasphemy’ 
and ‘racism’ were rarely expressed, but could be inferred. In the following, I analyze the 
various messages expressed in the protest in more detail, before linking them to 
theoretical discussions about the politics of multiculturalism.   
As mentioned, the slogans on flyers and SMS messages distributed by organizers were 
repeatedly quoted directly in newspaper reports. In the coverage after the 
demonstration, they were again quoted by Dagsavisen and Dagbladet (online); 
Are you fed up with media’s abuse of free speech?      
 How long shall they offend and provoke to divide society?    
 Unite and show how respect should be. 
These slogans indicate the key message of the protest; ‘media’ is their main target. The 
protesters want an end to a problem defined as ‘abuse of free speech’ to ‘offend’ and 
‘provoke’, resulting in a ‘divided society’. As a solution, they suggest ‘unity’ and 
‘respect’. Notably, Norwegian Muslim protesters identify media as the responsible 
party, unlike the widely-reported London ‘extremists’, who directed their protest against 
‘Europe’ (Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:246; 249). While that Muslim protest used 
extreme slogans such as “Europe is the cancer and Islam is the cure”, “Free speech, go 
to hell” and “Europe will pay, your 9/11 is on its way” (Hansen 2006:10; Bleich 
2006:20), which promoted a ‘clash of civilizations’, Norwegian Muslims distanced 
themselves from such rhetoric, rejecting a ‘divided society’ and promoting ‘unity’. 
Further, they make it clear that they support the principle of ‘free speech’ but argued 
that it should be restricted if ‘abused’ to ‘provoke to divide society’ – a paraphrase of 
‘incitement to hatred’. This means that flyer slogans are phrased in ‘secular’ language; 
while mentioning ‘insults against the prophet’ as immediate reason for the protest, 
slogans refer to liberal principles; ‘free speech’ must be accompanied by ‘mutual 
respect’. Several slogans on posters carried by protesters emphasized ‘mutual respect’; 
compatible with a ‘dialogue’ position; 
 Mutual respect, please        
 You and yours, me and mine        
 Do you want a sweet life? Stop making it sour for others!    
 Building a good society takes time, tearing it down takes seconds 
The first three slogans emphasize mutuality, consistent with a multiculturalist 
understanding of ‘integration’ as a two-way process (Modood 2007:48). The last slogan 
points out that building such a society is a time-consuming process, while breaking it 
down by creating conflict, as the cartoons and ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric contribute 
to, can happen quickly.   
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The cartoons are only mentioned implicitly; instead protesters refer to a general problem 
beyond the cartoon issue. The words ‘how long’ and ‘fed up’ indicate that media has 
‘offended’ Muslims and ‘incited hatred’ against them also before printing the cartoons. 
In this respect, Modood (2006b:5) argues that the cartoons are a trigger rather than the 
main issue; this “handful of humiliating images” becomes a symbol for a wider context 
where Muslims feel disrespected; including discrimination, economic marginalization 
and the ‘war on terror’. VG’s online report (February 11) quotes extensively from 
speeches outside Parliament; including one speaker, Abdul Latif, who says; 
You may wonder why we are here. Can we not accept an apology? Yes, we 
accept the regret, but we protest against how media deliberately puts Muslims in 
a bad light. We feel harassed, and we are here because we demand that Norway 
tolerates us. 
The speaker emphasizes again that the main target is the media, which ‘deliberately’ 
portrays Muslims in a negative way. Norwegian Muslims ‘feel harassed’ by media and 
have gathered to ‘demand’ that they be ‘tolerated’. He clarifies that the protest is not 
directed against ‘Norway’ or ‘Norwegians’; We have nothing against you. We are 
grateful to all those who have wished us welcome, and we thank Norwegians for 
listening to us today. Saying this, Latif counters the stereotype of ‘ungrateful 
immigrants’ who make ‘excessive demands’. 
Several newspapers acknowledge that they were the protesters’ target. Dagbladet online 
(February 11) uses part of a slogan as its headline; Shame on you, media, and notes 
below a picture that protesters were angry at media; quoting the slogan shown on the 
picture; Shame on you, media, for making hate speech (I return to the content of this 
slogan below). Dagsavisen (February 12) reports that; the demonstrators protested also 
against how Norwegian media handled the Mohammed cartoons; quoting the above 
slogan as well as another saying; Media, mouthpiece of lies. Without quotations, 
Aftenposten (February 12) reports that; slogans expressed that Muslims in Norway have 
long felt harassed in the media and that now it’s enough. The latter comment captures 
the message that the cartoons are part of a larger picture of negative media focus on 
Muslims. The following poster slogans explicitly mention the media: 
 Shame on you, media, for making hate speech     
 Media, stop terrorizing us and our lives      
 Media, mouthpiece of lies        
 Politicians and media, this is the result of your irresponsibility  
In terms of speech act analysis, the first slogan ‘condemns’ the media for ‘making hate 
speech’; the second represents an appeal, requesting media to stop ‘terrorizing’ Muslims 
(the term ‘terrorizing’ used as a variation on the word ‘harassing’ used by a speaker); 
the third slogan is a descriptive ‘truth claim’, arguing that media is spreading ‘lies’. The 
97 
 
last slogan ‘blames’ the affair on the ‘irresponsibility’ of media and government. It also 
appeared in another version, placing blame on the government; what we witness now is 
the government’s arrogance and irresponsibility. Three other slogans implicitly address 
media by mentioning ‘free speech’, and elaborate on this message; 
What we witness now is the result of misused freedom of expression   
 Your freedom of expression ends when you step on my feet    
 The caricatures are lying, freedom of expression is to say the truth 
Media’s ‘irresponsibility’ can be interpreted as their ‘misuse’ or ‘abuse’ of free speech, 
and the three latter slogans are variations on calls for ‘responsible’ use of free speech. 
The first refers to ‘misuse’, a variation on the flyer slogan about the ‘abuse’ of free 
speech. Two others specify appropriate limits or restrictions on free speech; ‘when you 
step on my feet’ can be interpreted as a colloquial way of referring to the line between 
‘respectful’ and ‘offensive’ speech. The last slogan is interesting, being the only that 
explicitly mentions the cartoons, and elaborates on the ‘media, mouthpiece of lies’ 
above. The distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘truth’ implicitly reflects the liberal 
justification for free speech as an instrument in the search for truth, which is reflected in 
libel laws; reports that publicly defame a person are only protected by free speech if 
they are true; otherwise newspapers can be sued and punished for libel. The slogan 
claims that the caricatures are ‘lying’, e.g. misrepresenting Muslims as terrorists, and 
are thus guilty of group defamation and libel. 
In addition to the above-mentioned slogan that condemns media for ‘making hate 
speech’, three others also refer to ‘hate speech’; 
 Stop the hate speech         
 Stop the war! Stop the racist harassment!      
 Muslims demand protection against hate speech and bullying 
The second of these, used by the International Socialists, is the only explicit reference 
to ‘racism’, which is understood in the context of ‘the war’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. (I 
return to a discussion of the role of this political group in the section about alliances 
with non-Muslims.) While the first slogan implicitly appeals to media to ‘stop the hate 
speech’, the latter demands protection from the government. This slogan is significant, 
as the only explicit demand on the government to enforce hate speech legislation. Under 
Norwegian law, hate speech (in Norwegian, the law refers more formally to ‘hatefulle 
ytringer’ rather than ‘hets’ as used in the slogans. Both mean ‘hate speech’ but the 
Justice Ministry found the former more ‘informative’ (Ot.prp. no. 8 (2007-2008), point 
10.7.4.1); Swedish and German legislation use linguistic equivalents of the latter) is a 
punishable offense, defined in article 135a of the Penal Code, popularly known as the 
“racism paragraph”. Similar to legislation in other European countries, the law protects 
against “threatening or scornful” speech as well as against promoting “hatred, 
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persecution or contempt” of someone on the basis of skin color, national or ethnic 
origin, religion and homosexual orientation. On paper, the law should protect Muslims 
against hate speech, but in practice it is rarely and restrictively enforced. Bangstad & 
Vetlesen (2011:336) argue that this lack of enforcement has weakened minority 
individuals’ protection against racism, at the same time as hate speech has become more 
widespread in the public sphere. This means that the slogan ‘Muslims demand 
protection against hate speech’ does not ask the government to change the law, but to 
enforce existing legislation. 
Besides hate speech legislation, Norway had a “dormant” blasphemy law, article 142 in 
the Penal Code, which on paper protects the beliefs of all legally recognized religions 
against “insults”; in contrast to British law, Norwegian legislation also protects Islam. 
The Norwegian blasphemy law, however, has not been enforced since 1933, although 
some Norwegian Muslims have asked for its revival. News coverage of the protest 
reported that; the protesters demanded that Parliament protects Muslims by reviving the 
dormant blasphemy paragraph (Dagsavisen, February 12). Organizers expressed this 
demand in a letter to be sent Parliament when they have collected enough signatures. 
This letter was read aloud by one speaker, Sehraz Anjeem, quoted by VG online 
(February 11); we wish to be protected against the insults and harassment we have 
experienced in recent weeks. We hope that the dormant blasphemy paragraph will be 
revived, so that it may protect us. Aftenposten (February 12) reports that Anjeem 
appealed to revive the blasphemy law; so that it may protect Muslims against religious 
hate speech (sic). It is interesting that the speaker wants the blasphemy law to protect 
‘Muslims’ (as a group of believers) against insults, harassment and hate speech; rather 
than to protect religious beliefs as such.  
Protesters made no reference to the concept of blasphemy, neither in slogans, interviews 
or speeches – they only refer to the blasphemy law. Analyzing the Rushdie affair, 
Parekh (1990:698) argues that Muslim protesters used the concept of blasphemy 
“because it made most sense to their intended audience and because it enabled them to 
take advantage of the existing law against it”, although blasphemy is a Judeo-Christian 
concept with “no exact equivalent” in Islam (Levey & Modood 2009:223). Akhtar 
(1989:70-72) elaborates that a notion of blasphemy exists in Islam, but it is not 
punishable under Islamic law, which mostly prescribes penalties for ‘social crimes’ as 
opposed to ‘personal’ offenses. If committed by a Muslim believer, blasphemy may 
lead to suspicions of ‘apostasy’, which has traditionally carried a death penalty if 
aggravated by “treason” to the Muslim community. In an essay on the cartoon affair 
discussing Western and Muslim concepts of blasphemy, Talal Asad (2009:36-41) notes 
that Arabic speakers used a secular term for ‘insult’ rather than any of the Arabic terms 
commonly translated as ‘blasphemy’. Compared to liberal ideas, he argues that in the 
Islamic tradition, the limits of individual freedom are articulated differently in relation 
to private and public spaces; Islam regulates public behaviour more strictly, but protects 
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private space more strongly. In line with this, Islamic law guarantees personal freedom 
of belief, but not the public expression of any belief with the intention of converting 
people. In the Christian tradition, thoughts alone can be blasphemous, while for 
Muslims, social practices matter more than individual beliefs. The Islamic concept of 
blasphemy is thus defined by its social consequences, and better understood as an 
‘insult’ against the religious community, in contrast to the liberal conception of 
blasphemy as attack on ideas or beliefs.  
Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (2009) discuss the cartoons (primarily the 
one showing a bomb in the turban) within a liberal framework of legal restrictions to 
free speech, and identify three analytically separate dimensions of blasphemy and 
racism (ibid, 217; 220); (1) breach of the Muslim prohibition against depicting the 
prophet, (2) attack on religion, suggesting that Islam is violent, and (3) attack on a 
religious group, suggesting that Muslims are violent (ibid, 222-242). With regard to the 
first, this prohibition in Islamic law does not apply to non-Muslims, and is not covered 
by Western blasphemy laws, which require ‘insult’ or ‘ridicule’. None of the statements 
of Norwegian Muslim protesters indicate that they protested the depiction of 
Mohammed per se, but rather the negative misrepresentation (‘lies’ about the prophet). 
Even if Muslims tend to perceive an attack on Islam as an attack on Muslims, the 
authors (ibid, 229-230) argue that these two analytical dimensions should not be 
automatically conflated, but require detailed empirical analysis. Relevant legislation in 
liberal democracies has developed from banning the former, blasphemy, to a ban on the 
latter, religious hate speech, which recognizes incitement to religious hatred as a form 
of racism. The authors support this move, which narrows the definition of the offense, 
and regard the targeting of Muslims as a religious group a more serious offense; it is a 
form of racism that possibly justifies legal action. With regard to the ‘worst’ cartoon, 
Levey and Modood (ibid, 238-239) argue that this exceeds the appropriate limits for 
caricatures, and can be seen as negative stereotyping, reinforcing prejudice and 
demonizing Muslims. A challenge to the claim that the cartoons are racist is the 
argument that Muslims are a religious group, not a ‘race’, and thus cannot be victims of 
racism, presented by Hansen (2006:12) and O’Leary (2006:26) in a debate with 
Modood (2006b; 2006c:55-57) and Bleich (2006:17), who argue that cultural and 
religious groups can be ‘racialized’ and that the cartoons are part of a current process of 
racializing European Muslims (Levey & Modood 2009:241). Bleich (ibid) defines 
‘racialization’ as “essentializing of an entire group based on a primordial identity 
marker, and the classification of such a group as inherently dangerous and inferior”. He 
defends criticism of religion, but argues that the two cartoons portraying the prophet 
with a sword and with a bomb qualify as punishable hate speech (in contrast to British 
and Norwegian hate speech laws, Danish legislation does not include groups based on 
religion; Bleich 2006:21), because they cast “Mohammed, the spiritual forefather of the 
entire group, as inextricably linked to violence”; thus linking all Muslims to violence.  
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Several statements from Norwegian Muslim protesters defy an easy distinction between 
blasphemy and racism, and ask for respect and protection of both Muslim believers and 
their values, some explicitly argue that in order to respect Muslims, it is necessary to 
respect their religion. VG online (February 11) quotes the lead organizer, Roqayya 
Kalayci, in the headline; Respect our values; again in the story lead and more fully at 
the beginning of the main text; we wish [...] that our lives and values be protected and 
respected. In Dagbladet online (February 11), Issam Kahloul explains why they are 
protesting; our integrity is attacked every day. We are peaceful people and want 
everyone to respect our religion. Several poster slogans emphasize that beliefs and 
believers may be intimately linked and cannot easily be detached; 
 Respect our faith; then you respect us!      
 Peace and respect for our values       
 Values exist because they are valuable      
 Freedom to practice our religion 
Discussing the Rushdie affair, Modood (2005:121) argues that the distinction between 
beliefs and believers is problematic in the case of “beliefs that form the self-definition 
of a group”. More specifically, he argues that “a defamation of the prophet is indeed a 
defamation of Muslims”, because Muslims believe that their honor and good name 
depends on upholding the honor of the Prophet. This view was expressed by several 
interviewed protesters; Trond Ali Linstad, a convert to Islam, is quoted in Dagbladet’s 
print version (February 12); from certain camps there is a strong attack on the prophet 
and Muslims. This is a protest against those attacks. Similarly, the same article quotes 
Saleh Abdolbasset; we are marching here to show that the Prophet is precious to us. 
VG’s online article (February 12) quotes Abdul Latif; Mohammed is more important to 
us than our selves. Even if he is dead, he is alive in our hearts.  
Saba Mahmood (2009:66-67) argues that framing the cartoon affair as a clash between 
‘free speech’ and ‘blasphemy’ means accepting certain preconceptions about what kind 
of offense the cartoons caused, and how it might be addressed in liberal society. She 
criticizes the “immediate resort to juridical language” by both sides, which privileges 
the state and the law in solving matters of religious difference at the expense of ethical 
and political questions. While some dialogue-oriented liberals acknowledged the racism 
behind the cartoons, they were troubled by the religious dimension of Muslim protests 
(ibid, 68). Mahmood argues that Muslims’ intimate relationship with the Prophet differs 
from the secularized Protestant understanding of religious symbols as separated from 
individuals who choose to believe in them; “Muhammad is regarded as a moral 
exemplar whose words and deeds are understood not so much as commandments but as 
ways of inhabiting the world, bodily and ethically” (ibid, 75). This means that those 
who love the Prophet try to emulate and realize his behavior. Mahmood suggests that 
the sense of moral injury felt when the prophet is insulted, is distinct from the idea of 
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blasphemy; rather than a violation of law, it is a “perception that one’s being, grounded 
as it is in a relationship of dependency with the prophet, has been shaken” and this 
cannot be properly expressed in the juridical language of rights or in the political 
language of street protests (Mahmood 2009:78).  
Mahmood (ibid, 79-81) discusses Modood’s widely-supported framing of the cartoons 
in terms of racism, in order to appeal to hate speech laws. Arguments about 
‘racialization’ of Muslims have met opposition from critics who argue that religious 
identity is categorically different from racial identity, as ‘race’ is allegedly biological 
and thus unchangeable, whereas religion is a matter of ‘choice’. Similar to Modood 
(2007:70-71; see my discussion in the introduction), Mahmood problematizes the idea 
that religion is ‘a matter of choice’; which she identifies as resting on a distinctly 
Protestant conception of religion as “private belief”. On the other hand, she argues that 
European Muslims’ appeals to hate speech laws in order to protect their religious beliefs 
will in turn regulate, transform and ‘secularize’ their beliefs, and suggests that, if they 
want to preserve a distinctly Muslim imaginary of relating to their Prophet, and promote 
greater understanding of their ‘religious difference’ among the majority, European 
Muslims should turn to ethics rather than to the law (Mahmood 2009:87-89). As we 
have seen in the Norwegian Muslim protest, ethical appeals for ‘respect’ and 
‘responsibility’ were perhaps more central than demands for legal protection. 
From a public order perspective, it makes sense to ban cartoons that are considered 
racist in order to avoid the kind of crisis that developed in the cartoon affair. On the 
other hand, a legal ban would deny the majority an opportunity to learn about the 
sensibilities of a minority. Modood (2006b:4) argues that legal intervention is 
sometimes necessary; especially when there is a risk of incitement to hatred, a risk to 
public order, or it would lead to reinforce prejudice and discrimination. In most cases, 
however, he does not support banning racist speech and images, and argues that “where 
matters are not or cannot easily be regulated by law one relies on protest as well as 
empathy” (ibid) – that is, through public debate and protest, majority individuals and 
institutions learn what is offensive to minorities (Modood 2006a:41; 2007:57; see also 
Bleich 2006:19; 22). From a more liberal rather than antiracist perspective, Carens 
(2006:34-35) argues that the cartoons do not qualify as hate speech and should be 
legally permissible; however, he argues that “most liberal newspapers [...] generally 
acknowledge some responsibility to exercise discretion [...] in what they publish”. 
Exercising self-restraint when aware that something would offend a minority group, is 
compatible with a liberal norm; to treat minority groups in a democratic society with 
due respect (ibid, 37). Appeals to be treated with ‘respect’ seemed to be among the most 
frequently used slogans in the Norwegian Muslim demonstration. 
Besides slogans drawn from liberal and antiracist discourses, some poster slogans were 
phrased in a clearly religious language; others can reasonably be interpreted as such; 
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 Islam is the truth         
 We condemn the lies about the prophet      
 When truth comes, lies disappear      
 Lies end, truth doesn’t        
The first slogan is literally a ‘religious truth claim’. Leirvik (2006) comments that this 
slogan may indicate the presence of Islamists, but such statements are to be expected 
from a proselytizing religion. The second slogan implicitly condemns the cartoons as 
‘lies about the prophet’ and as such can be interpreted within a discourse of free speech 
as truth-seeking. The last two are more ambiguous; a reasonable interpretation is that 
they refer to the cartoons as ‘lies’ (misrepresentation) about Muslim violence, while 
‘truth’ is represented by peaceful Muslim protesters. While these slogans, and 
particularly the first, are likely to be interpreted as expressions of ‘religious 
fundamentalism’, Modood (2005:122) argues that as a group with a primarily religious 
identity, Muslims “draw strength from the [non-secular] sources of their group pride” in 
order to resist discrimination and defamation. Attacks on this source are particularly 
devastating; Muslims often regard insults against the Prophet as worse than other forms 
of harassment, and even non-practicing Muslims tend to show solidarity with their 
religious community when the Prophet is under attack. Modood (ibid, 123) concludes 
that abusive attacks on Prophet Mohammed such as those found in the Satanic Verses 
and among Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons, are not “part of the healthy clash of ideas that all 
beliefs ought to be subject to”, but rather represent “incitement to community hatred, 
based on an intimate knowledge of what will hurt and set the communities apart”. 
The protesters’ messages reflect several of the ideological positions discussed in the 
introduction. Slogans calling for ‘mutual respect’ and referring to limits of ‘free speech’ 
are compatible with ‘dialogical liberalism’; slogans appealing to stop ‘hate speech’ are 
consistent with ‘antiracist multiculturalism’, while calls to revive the blasphemy law 
can be seen as more consistent with a ‘minority communitarian’ position which refers to 
community-specific norms (although it translates a Muslim offense into a Christian 
concept in order to appeal to a Norwegian norm that is now widely seen as obsolete). 
Statements from all three discourses were represented in newspaper coverage, but there 
was a tendency to highlight religious language, e.g. news reports over-represented the 
shouting of ‘allahu akbar’, the slogan ‘Islam is the truth’ and the call to revive the 
blasphemy law. Several slogans indicate that the distinction between ‘blasphemy’ and 
‘racism’ is not necessarily as clear-cut to Muslim believers as it is to some liberal 
thinkers, as expressed in the slogan ‘respect our faith, then you respect us’. As Cora 
Alexa Døving (2012:42) notes in her analysis of the hijab debates (to be discussed in 
detail in chapter 4), religious arguments may be indistinguishably merged with 
universal values and dominant secular language, something that is overlooked in 
Habermas’ (and to a lesser extent Rawls’) model, which operates with an artificial 
division between religious and secular languages that require ‘translation’. 
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As a contribution to public debate, the purpose of street demonstrations goes beyond 
declaring one’s religious faith; it is intended to appeal to a non-Muslim general public. 
As discussed by Modood (2005:118-204; 2007:142) and Parekh (1989:68; 1990:699; 
2000:299) in their analyses of the Rushdie affair, this may imply some extent of 
‘translating’ religious arguments into a ‘generally accessible language’ (Habermas 
2005:16-18). It appears that Muslim protesters in Oslo succeeded comparatively well, 
indicating that organizers had a well-thought-out political strategy aimed at getting 
across a nuanced message that showed a diversity of opinions among Norwegian 
Muslims, allowing them to combine slogans drawn from a religious discourse with both 
liberal and antiracist discourses. Probably expecting that media would quote selectively 
and try to portray them as ‘religious fundamentalists’, the strategy of using a large 
number of posters with a diversity of slogans seems to have worked, as those slogans 
were visually quoted in pictures, bypassing journalistic and editorial interpretation. 
In a highly secularized society, where many intellectuals and contributors to public 
debate show what Habermas (2005:20) has called a “secularist stubbornness”, 
statements in a religious language that simply express ‘religious truth claims’ are 
unlikely to be taken as serious contributions to political debate and more likely to 
convince the majority that those expressing them, are ‘religious fundamentalists’. In 
order to mobilize non-Muslim Norwegians to show solidarity against anti-Muslim 
racism, to have their demands accommodated by the government, and to make a 
successful appeal to the media to show restraint in exercising free speech, it is necessary 
to articulate these appeals and demands in a generally accessible language. While this 
may not represent a ‘cognitive burden’ on religious citizens as Habermas (2005:16) 
suggests, there are empirical examples that correspond to his call on secular citizens to 
‘open their minds’ and assist in the translation process.  
Leirvik (2012a) argues that interreligious dialogue; as a genuine dialogue which may 
include atheists, focuses on social life rather than theology (ibid, 19), and is 
characterized by mutual openness to attitude change; may lead to an ethical consensus 
expressed in a general language of shared human values rather than particular religious 
interests. As such, Habermas’ translation requirement is fulfilled (ibid, 15), as religions 
meet in a pluralist overlapping consensus (Rawls) on universal human rights (ibid, 18). 
Leirvik believes that the language of human rights is not only a secondary shared 
language, but that it transforms religions (ibid, 18) in the direction of a shared humanist 
ethics (ibid, 22), which he calls ‘secularity’ (which is distinct from more ideological 
‘secularism’ (ibid, 7-9) and corresponds to Rawls’ ‘public reason’ and Habermas’ ‘post-
secular reason’; ibid, 16). Below, I discuss two empirical examples of such ‘translation’; 
the alliances between Muslims and secular antiracists when the International Socialists 
supported and participated in the Muslim protest; and an attempt by the Norwegian 
government to transform blasphemy legislation into hate speech legislation. 
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Alliances with non-Muslims 
Three news reports focus on non-Muslims’ support and solidarity. Before the rally, 
Aften (February 8) and Klassekampen (February 10) interviewed members of the 
International Socialists declaring political support, and after the protest, Dagsavisen 
(February 12) interviews professor of social medicine, Per Fugelli, who joined on 
ethical grounds. Fugelli is known for fronting controversial issues in public debate, and 
defending the views of marginalized groups in particular. Under the headline, Healthy 
to demonstrate, quoting Fugelli, Dagsavisen reports that the professor took part in the 
protest march. The newspaper notes that the overwhelming majority of yesterday’s 
demonstrators had a Muslim background, and Fugelli was one of few with an ethnic 
Norwegian background who participated. We learn that he lives in the predominantly 
Muslim neighbourhood of Grønland, and wants to support his neighbors. He is quoted;  
I was there to show solidarity with Norwegian women and men who feel that 
their god and their dignity had been stepped on. There were many neighbors 
who participated, and they are people we have learned to appreciate. They 
deserve support when they feel that someone is harassing them.  
Fugelli does not justify his solidarity in political terms, but in an ethical language of 
care for fellow human beings who ‘deserve support’ when they are ‘harassed’ and their 
‘dignity’ is ‘stepped on’. He refers to them not primarily as ‘Muslims’, but as 
‘neighbors’, ‘Norwegian women and men’ and ‘people we have learned to appreciate’. 
He clarifies that he does not support the demand to revive the blasphemy law, but thinks 
it is great to see that young people speak up when they’ve had enough. He elaborates;  
It took courage and independence. Old authority figures were against the 
demonstration, and larger Norwegian society feared violence. Nonetheless, they 
marched for what they believe in. One could tell from those who marched, it did 
them good being able to express frustration after years of feeling insulted had 
been suppressed.  
Here, he speaks as a doctor (or psychologist), when saying that it is healthy to express 
long-suppressed frustrations. He praises the ‘young’ for their ‘courage’ and 
‘independence’ to stand up for their beliefs, against disapproval from authorities and 
fear of violence. Fugelli hopes the protest can be a turning point, and lead to people 
learning to become curious about each other; implicitly drawing on a discourse of 
multicultural dialogue and mutual learning. In a final quote, he makes a political remark 
about not letting the Progress Party create conflicts, but primarily, he exemplifies a 
public expression of empathy with Norwegian Muslims in non-political terms. 
Under the headline, Supports controversial demonstration, Aften reported that the 
International Socialists in Oslo support the young Muslims and join the rally. The 
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International Socialists are a non-party political group, constituting the Norwegian 
branch of the International Socialist Tendency led by the British Socialist Workers 
Party. They were the only political organization in Norway that had consistently 
addressed, analyzed and confronted anti-Muslim racism, as reflected in numerous 
articles in their monthly magazine Gnisten. Aften’s article interviews board member 
Randi Færevik; I think it is about time to show support for the Muslims in connection 
with what has happened – including the war in Iraq and the stabbing of a Muslim in 
Skien after the cartoons were printed. Færevik places the cartoon protest in a wider 
political context that includes the Iraq war. Representatives of the International 
Socialists are also given space in the left-wing newspaper, Klassekampen; under the 
headline, Support the Muslims!, it is reported that Norwegian left activists will support 
the young Muslims’ demonstration at Grønland in Oslo.  
Editor of Gnisten, Andreas Ytterstad, says in an interview; When some of the Muslims 
in Oslo dare to stand up against the hate speech, they deserve full support. We share the 
Muslims’ anger at the oppression they suffer, and we will join to call attention to the 
war and the racism that underlies this entire conflict. Like Færevik, he primarily points 
to the wider context of the ‘war on terror’ and racism, and elaborates; ever since 9/11, 
right-wing forces have tried to convert political conflicts into religious war. He 
mentions President Bush’s use of the term ‘crusade’ and draws a link to the cartoons;  
Jyllands-Posten has continued this conversion, and far too many are deceived 
and speak about reconciliation and dialogue without addressing the political 
conflicts. Many people say that the cartoons were the drop that made the cup 
run over, but few speak about the cup... 
Ytterstad’s analysis refers to what theorists have called the ‘culturalization of politics’ 
(discussed in the introduction) where the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is an example, 
and moves on to criticize the government position of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘dialogue’ for 
unintentionally reproducing this neo-conservative discourse while attempting to build 
bridges between ‘cultures’ or ‘religions’ without addressing underlying politics. On the 
other hand, he uses a somewhat narrow definition of ‘the cup’ that runs over, referring 
only to military conflicts; the ‘war on terror’, Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine.  
In an editorial (republished in a shortened version as an op-ed article in Klassekampen 
on February 23) of their magazine, Gnisten (no. 2/2006), where the cartoon protest was 
the main topic, Ytterstad elaborates on ‘the cup’ that ran over; this was the drop of 
insult that made the cup of racism, demonization and the ‘war on terror’ flow over 
(Interestingly, this line was left out in Klassekampen’s version). This means that the 
International Socialists recognize anti-Muslim racism as a problem, seeing it in the 
context of Western imperialism in Muslim countries. However, referring to the cartoons 
as a ‘drop of insult’ perhaps plays down the significance of the (religious) offense and 
disrespect felt by Muslims. Ytterstad writes on behalf of the International Socialists;  
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We were disappointed to see how few people from the Norwegian left who 
attended. And let’s be honest, it wasn’t because they feared unrest, neither was it 
blind faith in Jonas Gahr Støre’s diplomatic skills. The left was reluctant to 
participate because they were influenced by the demonization of Islam. 
While the Norwegian left may have been influenced by anti-Muslim racism (a number 
of left-wing intellectuals have joined the confrontational rhetoric); Modood (2006b:5-7) 
suggests two reasons for the lack of sympathy for Muslims among Europeans, including 
left-wing antiracists. First, a lack of recognition of the existence of anti-Muslim racism, 
arguing that the way Muslims are treated is ‘only’ hatred of religion, not racism; and 
second, that religion is (and should be) a fair target for mockery and ridicule (Hansen 
2006:12). With regard to the former, the International Socialists do acknowledge that 
Muslims are subject to racism. In a commentary in the same issue of Gnisten, Jon W. 
Sandven elaborates on their understanding of anti-Muslim racism; 
The caricatures cannot be seen as separate from the enemy image that has been 
created of Islam and Muslims after 11 September 2001. […] Islamophobia has 
become the most visible and “respectable” form of racism in the West after 
September 11. The drawings that depicted the prophet as a terrorist must be 
seen in this context.  
While placing the cartoon affair in the context of Western imperialism and anti-Muslim 
racism, the International Socialists seem to go further in ‘translating’ Muslim religious 
sensibilities into material politics. With regard to Modood’s second reason, Ytterstad 
writes that many socialists’ skepticism of religion rests on a superficial reading of Karl 
Marx’ line “religion is opium for the people”, while Marx’ and Engels’ critique of 
religion was more nuanced; “religious suffering is simultaneously an expression of real 
suffering, and a protest against real suffering”. Ytterstad argues that while religion may 
be used by political power to justify oppression; political protest can also be expressed 
within a religious framework. In another commentary in Gnisten, Susan Lyden, explains 
the Muslim call to revive the blasphemy paragraph; 
A racism paragraph exists, but is not used to stop the demonization. When anti-
discrimination laws fail, it is perhaps not so strange that some Muslims have 
wanted to revive the blasphemy paragraph. 
This quote suggests that Lyden sees racism as the primary issue, and interprets appeals 
to blasphemy legislation as a subsidiary argument ‘when anti-discrimination laws fail’. 
Ytterstad rejects the idea that Muslims are more deeply religious than Westerners. In the 
terminology of Habermas (2005:20), the International Socialists make a contribution to 
translate religious language into political arguments, but does this translation fall short 
of a ‘mutual learning process’ which also accommodates the Muslim request for 
‘respect’ of their religious feelings? It seems that the International Socialists partially 
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overcome the “secularist stubbornness” common on the political left, and recognize 
political arguments behind a religious guise, but they also seem to reproduce a 
distinction between political and religious that is less clear-cut among Muslims. 
Analyzing the Rushdie affair, Modood (2005:103-107) notes that many British 
antiracists who wanted to show solidarity with Muslims, carried the slogan ‘Fight 
racism, not Rushdie’. This approach failed to understand Muslim reactions, because 
addressing the problem of racism does not in itself lessen their religious pain. Seeking 
to answer why “the most socially deprived and racially harassed group” could bear the 
material deprivation and “explode in anger only on an issue of religious honor” (ibid, 
104), Modood suggests that the failure of mutual understanding is rooted in antiracists’ 
blindness to issues of culture and religion, while Muslims do not think of themselves as 
suffering racism based on skin color. As Muslims feel their oppression most in the 
dimension they value the most, and resist it from the dimension that gives them the 
greatest psychological strength, “authentic “antiracism” for Muslims [...] will inevitably 
have a religious dimension and take a form in which it is integrated with the rest of 
cultural concerns” (ibid). 
In the Rushdie affair, British antiracists acknowledged racism but were ignorant of the 
living realities that racism obscures. Modood suggests that antiracism should begin by 
“accepting oppressed groups on their own terms”. Antiracists need to learn from the 
Muslim minority they want to show solidarity with, but at the same time, Muslims have 
something to learn from antiracists as Muslim thinking on racial equality is a ‘color-
blind’ approach “unable to sanction any program of positive action to tackle the 
problem once it is acknowledged to exist” (ibid, 105). Alliances between Muslim 
minorities and white anti-racists (as well as other non-white groups) need to start from a 
minority’s self-asserted identity, and combine this with an analysis of racism (ibid, 106-
107). Since the Rushdie affair, British antiracists have developed their understanding 
about anti-Muslim racism and no longer reject talk of Muslim religious identity as 
irrelevant to politics, and have built alliances and coalitions with left-wing groups 
(Modood 2005:205-206). Linked to the British Socialist Workers Party, the Norwegian 
International Socialists’ analyses and practices draw on British experiences as indicated 
by Mariette Lobo (2007), who writes that the British left has recognized Muslims as 
potential allies, while the Norwegian left is “not quite there yet”. 
Despite certain shortcomings in understanding the importance of religious identity to 
Muslims, their political analysis of the government’s dialogue position is sophisticated. 
The International Socialists position themselves in the discursive struggles between the 
four positions, and their own ideological framing illustrates the differences between the 
antiracist and the dialogue position. On behalf of the International Socialists, Ytterstad 
supports the Muslim protesters who defied Muslim leaders, the government and 
mainstream media; all representing a hegemonic ‘dialogue’ position. He writes;  
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“When Selbekk and the Islamic Council leader can build bridges, everyone 
can,” Bjarne Håkon Hanssen said at the “reconciliation meeting” [...] “Let’s 
remove the last drop of the Magazinet editor, and forget the cup that runs over.”   
Ytterstad criticizes the government for narrowly defining the conflict as one between 
Magazinet and the Muslim minority. This strategy blamed only Magazinet, turned 
Selbekk into a scapegoat who had to ‘apologize’ and let Hamdan accept the apology on 
behalf of Norwegian Muslims. This framing focuses only on the trigger, absolves 
mainstream media of responsibility for anti-Muslim racism, and ignores the Muslim 
protests in a wider context. Susan Lyden accurately phrases this criticism; 
There has been an attempt from the Norwegian government to distinguish itself 
from the Danish by emphasizing that here, we want reconciliation and dialogue. 
Imams and young Muslims are called to meetings; they have to accept “our” 
freedom of expression, refuse to support resistance shown by other Muslims, and 
pacify their own ranks. 
Lyden criticizes the ‘dialogue’ position as a ‘top-down’ approach where the government 
dictates the terms of the ‘dialogue’; Norwegian Muslims have to accept the dominant 
position on ‘free speech’ and suppress resistance in their own communities; ‘pacify 
their own ranks’. This is not a genuine dialogue, characterized by mutual 
accommodation, but reflects a white perspective that denies mainstream racism and 
blames the minority for extreme forms of racism (when Muslims were asked to remain 
calm in order not to provoke right-wing threats); only if minorities remain passive 
towards racist expressions, we can prevent an increase in racism; i.e. an argumentative 
strategy that blames the victim (see Richardson 2004:48). While ‘antiracism’ is a 
critical bottom-up approach starting with minority perspectives, as Ytterstad implies in 
the following statement; a condition for credible dialogue is solidarity – and 
participation in the struggle of the oppressed; the ‘dialogic liberalism’ position is a 
political strategy used by the government to maintain hegemony and contain minority 
resistance. Doing so, it may be a more effective strategy of ‘diversity management’ 
(Gunew 2004:5-6; 15-17; Hage 1998:233-244) than the ‘confrontational’ approach. 
Government response: proposal to change blasphemy and hate speech laws 
On December 19, 2008, the government announced in a press release (no. 155-2008, 
Ministry of Justice) that it would provide “better protection against hate speech” in a 
law proposal for a new Penal Code. The government wanted to extend the Hate Speech 
Act (§ 135a) to include “qualified attacks on religion” and replace the dormant 
Blasphemy Act (§ 142), which would be abolished. The proposal is justified with 
reference to “preventing serious conflicts in society”; as attacks on minority religions 
“can be perceived as attacks on minority groups more easily now than before”. For 
blasphemous speech or “qualified attacks on religion” to be punishable, it would be 
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required that they are “ridiculing” or “strongly insulting”, “far from any factual 
argumentation” and “not part of processes facilitated by free speech; the search for 
truth, democracy and free formation of individual opinion”. Expressions of atheism and 
criticism of religious faith would be protected by free speech. 
The law proposal (Ot.prp. no. 22 (2008-2009), section 13.2) argues that the emergence 
of a multicultural society in Norway could give the Blasphemy Act new relevance; and 
explicitly mentions the cartoon crisis as leading to EU discussions of blasphemy 
legislation. The proposal argues that while the Blasphemy Act “presumably” protects 
individuals’ religious feelings as opposed to the Hate Speech Act’s protection of 
individuals and groups based on their religious faith, the distinction is not clear-cut in 
practice, and there are no decisive legal precedents. Taking into consideration the 
opposing views of both the Commission on Freedom of Expression (1999), which 
recommended abolishing the Blasphemy Act, as well as of the preceding center-right 
Bondevik II government (2003), which argued that qualified attacks on religion should 
be equally punishable as attacks on religious believers, the Ministry of Justice concludes 
that free speech must be balanced with other considerations, and recognizes that 
religious faith is often attached to strong emotions and deeply anchored in a person’s 
identity, so that attacks on religious faith may negatively influence a person’s everyday 
life. It suggested that the current Hate Speech Act only partially protects religious 
minorities, and should be extended to cover “qualified attacks on religion”, as a 
compensation for abolishing the Blasphemy Act. 
About a month later, a massive protest campaign against the law proposal emerged in 
the media. VG reported on January 23 that a group of professors, including former free 
speech commission leader Francis Sejersted, anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen, 
popular authors, and ‘Islam critics’ (including Lars Gule, al-Kubaisi, Sara Azmeh 
Rasmussen, Gunnar Skirbekk and Storhaug) started a signature campaign called “No to 
punishment for criticism of religion”. They linked the law proposal to the cartoon affair 
and even the Rushdie affair; author Roy Jacobsen noted that; it looks like it is designed 
to prevent the kind of expressions like the Mohammed cartoons. The next day, editorials 
of VG, Aftenposten and Klassekampen joined the protest. VG expressed no doubt that 
the cartoon affair was the reason behind the law proposal, argued that there is a 
fundamental difference between insulting a person and attacking a religion; and noted 
that it is sensational that the government cannot guarantee the legality of the 
Mohammed cartoons. Aftenposten called for the proposal’s withdrawal, and noted that 
Justice Minister Storberget, who had expressed his personal opinion that none of the 
cartoons should be banned, would leave it to courts to decide, thus obscuring 
fundamental principles of free speech. On the other hand, the newspaper praised the 
decision to abolish the Blasphemy Act; the limits of free speech towards religion must 
be defined by ethical awareness, a sense of responsibility and empathy – not by the law. 
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On January 28, newspapers revealed that government parties Labor and Socialist Left 
opposed the proposal; which was the outcome of a horse trade with the Center Party – 
the only coalition partner which wanted to maintain the Blasphemy Act. Put this way, it 
was not consideration for Muslim feelings, but of traditional Christian voters of the 
agrarian Center Party. On February 2, Prime Minister Stoltenberg was still determined 
that the decision was final; Labor would vote unanimously for the law proposal in 
Parliament. The next day, after Christian Democrat leader Dagfinn Høybråten declared 
that his party would not support the law, which would serve Muslims more than 
Christians as he saw it, Stoltenberg held a press conference in a failed attempt to clear 
up confusion and appease critics. On February 4, Center Party leader Liv Signe 
Navarsete, on behalf of the government, gave in to massive criticism and withdrew the 
proposal to extend the Hate Speech Act, admitting that; we made a mistake. We messed 
up... The proposal to abolish the Blasphemy Act passed Parliament in May 2009. 
While reservations in the law proposal indicate that the government did not necessarily 
intend the law to be enforced as strictly as to make publications such as the Mohammed 
cartoons punishable, the chosen wording went beyond what both Christians and 
Muslims had asked for, as Leirvik notes in an op-ed (Dagbladet, February 28, 2009). 
Especially the lack of a clear distinction between protecting religious believers and 
religious beliefs as such, while perhaps correctly reflecting empirical reality, opened the 
law proposal to criticism from secular defenders of free speech and from Islam critics, 
who claimed that the proposal gave in to ‘fundamentalist’ demands. My analysis of 
Muslim demands indicates that Norwegian Muslims primarily sought protection as a 
religious group, and that this demand could have been accommodated by a stricter 
enforcement of existing hate speech legislation (as discussed earlier), without extending 
the wording of the law to include ‘religions’ rather than ‘religious groups’, a distinction 
that is not clear-cut in practice, but may be analytically and theoretically useful.  
The second Norwegian cartoon affair in 2010 
On February 3, 2010, Dagbladet’s front page showed a cartoon of Prophet Mohammed 
as a pig, to illustrate a story that someone had posted a link to such a cartoon on the 
Facebook pages of the Police Security Service. The specific drawing reportedly 
originates in Israel, where it caused riots in 1998, and a woman responsible for it was 
convicted for racism in an Israeli court. Dagbladet’s source was Arfan Bhatti, a 
Norwegian Muslim with extremist views, who later took part in organizing the 
demonstration. In the following days, Muslim shop-owners protested by refusing to sell 
Dagbladet, and about 1000 of Oslo’s mostly Muslim taxi drivers went on strike. On 
February 9, Amir Sheikh, Oslo City Council member for the Conservative Party, took 
the initiative for a dialogue meeting between Dagbladet editor Lars Helle and imam 
Mehboob ur-Rehman. The editor refused to accommodate the imam’s request for a 
statement of regret, telling Aftenposten (online, February 9); we knew that the 
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publication of these cartoons would cause reactions, but we chose to publish it anyway. 
People have been angry with Dagbladet since 1869 [when the newspaper was founded], 
so we are used to it. It’s not our thing to be conciliatory. Sheikh thus described the 
meeting as without results, and said; I think Dagbladet’s editor should have been more 
humble in meeting the imam, and I think he could have expressed regret as well as 
greater sympathy with Muslim views. Dagbladet, which was the most negative in its 
2006 coverage of Muslim protests, now shifted to more confrontational rhetoric. 
A demonstration was called to be held on February 12, organized by a diverse group of 
six Norwegian Muslims; Qasim Ali, Waqas Sarwar, Per Bartho Hansen a.k.a. Youssef 
Assidiq (an ethnic Norwegian convert), Itrat Zishan (who was not quoted in the media), 
Arfan Bhatti and Mohyeldeen Mohammad. The two latter have been unanimously 
identified as ‘extremists’ by mainstream Norwegian Muslims, and by the security 
police. Before the demonstration, media focused mostly on the involvement of Bhatti, 
who is known to the public for his criminal past, and figured as main suspect in 
Norway’s only case of ‘Muslim terror’ where prosecution failed to produce evidence 
that he was in fact planning an act of terror and not simply an armed robbery. On the 
morning of the demonstration, Qasim Ali is interviewed by the national public 
broadcaster, NRK (online), expressing that the organizers don’t want to be called 
‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’. He says that Facebook had closed down the group’s pages 
because of ‘hate speech’. He says that; it is just sad that an impression has been created 
that we want to cause trouble, and that they have worked hard to find and approve 
guards to keep order during the demonstration, and have a good dialogue with the 
police. Shoaib Sultan at the Islamic Council says that they have good contact with  
organizers and rejects that they are extremists.  
As in 2006, Muslim leaders advised against the demonstration; Islamic Association 
leader Basim Ghozlan said to Klassekampen (February 11); I fear that certain 
individuals exploit this demonstration to create division and conflict. These are persons 
with little interest in Islam, who want confrontations with mainstream society. Islamic 
Council secretary general Shoaib Sultan said the demonstration was not advisable. On 
behalf of organizers, Qasim Ali rejects the above, saying that this was a spontaneous 
movement, independent of organized circles. He criticized Muslim leaders, saying that; 
I am sorry that those who are supposed to take charge fail to do so. That leaves us 
young people to do the job. Vice-President of the Norwegian Parliament, Akhtar 
Chaudry, initially advised against the demonstration, claiming that; this is a group of 
angry, young men who don’t have broad support in the Muslim community, later 
however he changed his mind and expressed support for the demonstration. Several 
editors of the national media said that it was unwise to publish the cartoon, but defended 
Dagbladet’s right to do so. Aftenposten (February 12) noted that the Norwegian Muslim 
community is unusually unison in criticizing Dagbladet for publishing this cartoon; 
persons as diverse as Conservative city council member Amir Sheikh, debate 
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contributor Mohammed Usman Rana (see chapter 5), author Amal Aden, who has 
written several books strongly criticizing negative practices in her own Norwegian 
Somali community (see chapter 3), and Shazia Sarwar, editor of the internet magazine 
X-plosiv, were all provoked and insulted. 
Three thousand people joined the demonstration, twice as many as in 2006. It was 
covered with double pages in both Dagsavisen and Dagbladet. Dagsavisen’s article has 
a positive angle; the demonstration is described as peaceful; it is noted that two local 
politicians, Athar Ali (former Red Electoral Alliance) and Khalid Mahmood (Labor), 
took part, and several slogans are quoted; Islam condemns terror; Dagbladet and the 
PST [Police Security Service] divide the nation; and Stop publishing the cartoons. As in 
2006, slogans were directed at the media, for publishing the cartoons and harassing 
Muslims. One of the speakers, a sharia student with extremist viewpoints, Mohyeldeen 
Mohammad, is quoted; we don’t want to restrict free speech, but we want an end to 
being harassed in the media. He continues with a ‘warning’ that otherwise, there might 
be ‘a Norwegian 9/11’ – adding; this is not a threat, it is a warning. Even Dagbladet’s 
coverage had a more positive framing than in 2006, although it focused largely on the 
absence of violent incidents and relied on interviews with police, as organizers refused 
to speak to their journalists. Some slogans were quoted; Stop hate speech against 
Muslims; Islam is a part of Norway; and Islam condemns terror. None of these news 
reports sensationalized the ‘terror threat’, which came into focus in the coming days. 
After the demonstration, the so-called ‘terror threat’ became the main focus in the 
media, and was condemned by Foreign Minister Støre and other politicians, as well as 
by the Islamic Council, and several editorials. Klassekampen (February 16) put the 
quote in context, as a ‘warning, not a threat’ and quotes from Mohyeldeen’s speech; 
When will Norwegian authorities understand that this is serious? Maybe not 
before it’s too late? Maybe not until we get a 9/11 or 7/7 on Norwegian soil? 
This is not a threat, but a warning.  
Peace activist Reza Rezaee points out that there is nothing controversial about this 
‘warning’ as there is widespread agreement that provocations such as the cartoons may 
increase the risk of terror. As a warning, it is in line with official security assessments 
given by police. Klassekampen editor Bjørgulv Braanen agreed with this interpretation, 
and criticized his colleagues in VG and Aftenposten, who condemned this statement. 
While this statement is no proof of ‘extremism’, Mohyeldeen expressed more 
unacceptable views in an interview with Klassekampen; defending killing gay people 
and claiming Islam is incompatible with democracy. These statements reveal that he 
holds extreme views, unanimously condemned by Norwegian Muslims, including 
Liberal politician Abid Raja; Shoaib Sultan, Basim Ghozlan, and fellow protest 
organizer Youssef Assidiq, who all emphasize that Mohyeldeen’s extreme views are 
marginal and do not represent the views of Norwegian Muslims (Klassekampen, 
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February 17). In Dagsavisen (February 19), head of Muslim Student Society Bushra 
Ishaq says she was harassed by Mohyeldeen for not wearing a hijab. Ishaq had a high 
profile during the hijab debate in 2009, when she defended Muslim women’s right to 
wear the hijab, even though she does not wear it herself (see chapter 4). 
On February 13, some Muslim community organizations held their own demonstration, 
with three hundred participants. Organizer Fatima Khalil said to Klassekampen that it is 
independent from the larger demonstration, but the message is the same; Stop hate 
speech against Muslims. She is skeptical about Bhatti’s involvement, and wants her 
protest to be child-friendly. She says they demand that anti-discrimination legislation 
be used to follow up cases such as the one in Dagbladet. If not, hate speech against 
Muslims will be repeated over and over. She also criticizes the Islamic Council; instead 
of asking people to stay away, they should rather ask people to show up and make sure 
things remain calm. This only proves that the Islamic Council doesn’t represent all 
Muslims. On February 18, Aftenposten reported from a dialogue meeting between 
Muslim leaders and youth, held at the Islamic Association. Youssef Assidiq said; no one 
remembers that it was a fantastic peaceful demonstration gathering 3000 people. [...] 
what everyone talks about now is one speech [by Mohyeldeen]. Assidiq pointed out that 
organizers were inexperienced, and several others said that if the Islamic Council [...] 
had listened to the young and joined the demonstration [...] a speech of this kind would 
have been prevented. Being called, Asghar Ali of the Islamic Council apologized to 
young Muslims for not listening to them. 
In an op-ed published in VG (February 24), Waqas Sarwar writes on behalf of 
organizers, that the only thing they shared was a desire to protest against hate speech 
and ridicule of Muslims. Mohyeldeen had already formed a Facebook group, before the 
organizing committee was formed and the other five men became co-administrators. 
Sarwar clarifies the diversity of opinions among them; 
Several disagreements, both ideological and strategic, had to be put aside in 
order to organize the demonstration. The negative media focus was always 
present. We were categorized as ex-criminals, gang members and radicals. 
Some Muslim spokespersons used the description extremists. 
Sarwar explains that Mohyeldeen’s views were known and discussed by the others; 
however he was enthusiastic and wanted to speak; he was told not to air his personal 
opinions and was given a written script. Co-organizers were thus as surprised as the 
audience when the warning about 9/11 on Norwegian soil came... Mohyeldeen quoted 
the Police Security Service as source of the warning and said he was personally against 
terrorism in Norway. Sarwar points out that organizers are ‘sad’ that media focused on 
words that should not have been said, and distracted from the focus of the protest.  
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The day after the demonstration, Progress Party leader Siv Jensen referred to it in her 
speech at the Oslo Progress Party’s annual meeting. In VG online, she is quoted; 
These are extreme groups who think we should not have free speech in Norway. 
It is incomprehensible to me why they come to Norway to demand to introduce 
the oppression they fled from in their home countries. Now it is time that the 
silent majority among the integrated Muslims also speak up clearly. 
Jensen’s statement is framed within a discourse that sees free speech as absolute; she 
generalizes Norwegian Muslims as ‘refugees’ (a category to which the largest group, 
Pakistanis do not belong), and stereotypes protesters as extremists, drawing a contrast to 
a ‘silent majority’ among Muslims, who are ‘integrated’ and do not protest against the 
cartoons. She takes this as evidence for her claims about an allegedly dramatic 
development, where Norwegian values are under ever stronger pressure, and 
Islamization is going on for full. She also picks up on the reference to ‘a Norwegian 
9/11’ and criticizes the government; 
And as if this is not enough, we were served a threat that Norwegian society can 
be hit by terror attacks modelled on 9/11 if we do not ban criticism of religion. 
Now we need politicians who stand firm, not shy away like the government. 
Taking a position close to the Jyllands-Posten editors and the Danish government, 
Jensen argues that the Labor Party has failed to stand up for free speech since the 
Rushdie affair, when fear of retaliation entered Norwegian reality. Foreign Minister 
Støre counters her accusations by saying that Jensen plays politics with the help of 
horror images and uses a rhetoric that judges all Muslims for the actions of a few 
extremists. He points out that; Norwegian democracy is strong and guarantees free 
speech, human rights and legal procedures for everyone, including Muslims and 
Progress Party people. In an interview with NRK (online, February 12), Conservative 
Party leader Erna Solberg called the ‘terror threat’ a serious setback for integration. 
Solberg continues; today Norwegian Muslims got to use free speech to say they were 
morally outraged. They have a right to do so. But when this hinders open and liberal 
dialogue by [causing] fear of terrorism, it is very wrong, she implicitly claims that the 
speaker at the rally ‘abused’ free speech. In VG (February 22), Labor Party secretary 
Raymond Johansen strikes back at the Progress Party, who wants to fight ‘extreme 
Islamism’ with ‘stricter integration policy’. The Labor representative defends ‘dialogue’ 
as solution, drawing a parallel to how ‘we’ fought a ‘totalitarian, radical movement’ in 
the 1970s (referring to the Maoist ‘Workers Communist Party’) using words, debate 
and free exchange of opinions. This time, Solberg agrees with Labor, saying that 
prohibitions and sanctions combined with not respecting their religion will radicalize 
‘young frustrated Muslims’. The Conservative leader seems to agree that there might be 
a link between the cartoons and Muslim radicalism, as Mohyeldeen suggested. 
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Conclusions 
A decade ago, Norwegian media were frequently criticized for talking about Muslims 
rather than with them, it seems that access to the media was no longer the main problem 
for Norwegian Muslims at the time of the cartoon affair, as there has been a 
breakthrough for well-integrated Norwegian Muslim voices in public debate, indicating 
that Norway is becoming a more multicultural society. The analysis of newspaper 
coverage of Muslim protests showed diversity in coverage, with little systematic 
differences corresponding to the political positioning of various newspapers. If any, 
liberal newspapers were more negative and populist ones more positive in their 
coverage. Early reports about plans to protest gave voice to Norwegian Muslims; later 
focus changed towards more negative coverage focused on fear, threat, violence and 
gender inequality, reflecting argumentative strategies typical of racist discourse as 
identified by Wodak and Reisigl (2001) and common stereotypes also found by John 
Richardson (2004) in his study of British media. These were evident in the coverage of 
the protest, which was represented as more ‘conservative’ and more ‘religious’ than 
more detailed analysis can justify. The diverse message of the protesters reached the 
public through pictures showing slogans on posters. These suggested that media 
coverage of Muslims was a main target of criticism; the cartoons were seen in the 
context of a generally negative focus on Muslims. There was considerable diversity 
with regard to how this should be dealt with; ranging from ethical appeals to the media 
to use free speech responsibly, to requests to government to revive the blasphemy law 
or protect Muslims against hate speech. Some demands were phrased in a liberal 
language of freedom of religion; in a multicultural language of mutual respect; in an 
antiracist language of hate speech; and in a religious language of blasphemy. While 
‘translation’ from religious to secular language in Habermas’ (2005) sense was evident 
in efforts by the International Socialists and later also by the government, the slogans 
indicate that Norwegian Muslim protesters merge these discourses in ways that defy an 
easy distinction between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ language, which corresponds to 
Modood’s (2005:104) point that antiracism for Muslims inevitably will have a religious 
dimension. 
More stereotypical coverage was found in headlines, while content was often more 
moderate, especially when written by minority journalists. News reports gave voice to 
Norwegian Muslims, but media tended to favor those who supported dominant views, 
while misrepresenting those who challenge majority views; conservative Muslims in 
particular are often negatively portrayed. Disagreements between Muslim leaders and 
the younger generation played out in public, perhaps for the first time as noted by Lena 
Larsen (Dagbladet, February 13, 2010), to the possible benefit of both. The imams and 
the Islamic Council, who had previously been criticized for being authoritarian, 
traditional and un-integrated, were now criticized for cooperating too closely with the 
government after a government-sponsored reconciliation meeting where they shook 
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hands with the editor who published the cartoons and called off further protests. The 
younger generation, who used to be portrayed as facing a choice between obeying 
community leaders and rejecting their religion in favor of assimilation, now showed the 
public that they could defend their religion while criticizing both minority and majority 
leaders. Coverage of the 2010 protest focused disproportionately on two extremist 
individuals among protest organizers. However, a wide range of Norwegian Muslims 
were interviewed; they disagreed on whether to join the street protest, but left a general 
impression of unanimous criticism of the cartoon, as well as unanimous rejection of 
extremism. As Aftenposten’s commentator Inger Anne Olsen noted (February 3, 2012) 
after these two extremists again organized a small demonstration condemned by other 
Muslims;  larger society’s perception of where the Muslim danger lies has been altered; 
and the Islamic Council is no longer seen as an enemy but as a stable cooperation 
partner of the state.  
The cartoon affair can be analyzed as a number of discursive struggles between four 
ideological positions identified in the introduction. Internationally, it appeared to be 
primarily a clash between ‘confrontational liberalism’ which claimed that free speech is 
absolute, and a ‘religious fundamentalist’ position that condemned the cartoons as 
blasphemy (Mahmood 2009:66). Analysis of national contexts shows that discursive 
struggles went on within majorities, where hegemony shifted between the 
confrontational position and ‘dialogic liberalism’ which acknowledges ethical and legal 
limits to free speech. The Norwegian majority was evenly divided between the two; 
Press secretary Per Edgar Kokkvold and the Progress Party sided with the Danish 
government’s confrontational approach, insisting that free speech included the right to 
insult. Mainstream newspapers, with the exception of Dagbladet in 2010, followed 
Foreign Minister Støre and the government’s contextual understanding of free speech. 
With the Muslim protest, an antiracist counter-discourse emerged in public debate; 
protesting Muslims showed a range of opinions on whether the cartoons were primarily 
blasphemous or racist, or simply showed lack of respect. Thus, a discursive struggle can 
be identified between a ‘communitarian’ position which wanted to ban blasphemy, and 
‘antiracist multiculturalism’. As Basim Ghozlan (2008) comments, the government’s 
position was well-received by many Muslims (ibid, 96), being compatible with a 
Muslim view that sees the cartoons as hate speech (ibid, 99-100). This shows that 
Norwegian and Muslim values may be quite similar and that majority and minority may 
agree that free speech is not absolute and non-negotiable, but contextual and subject to 
limitations. The discursive struggle between these two dialogic positions corresponds to 
Werbner’s (2012) distinction between a top-down state multiculturalism or diversity 
management, and a critical antiracist multiculturalism from below, where the latter 
demands that the former takes into account the antiracist perspective. 
While the dialogue approach can be characterized as a form of ambivalent 
multiculturalism (Engebrigtsen 2010) because it consults with Muslim leaders and later 
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sought to extend hate speech legislation, it is also open to criticism as a form of 
diversity management that seeks to contain minority resistance. Such shortcomings 
became clear when sixty mainstream organizations held a peace demonstration which 
only gathered 300 people, many of them high-profile politicians and most of them 
white, but no Muslims. Analyzing the speech given by the Socialist Party leader shows 
that she spoke from a majority perspective which did not sufficiently take into account 
minority perspectives, and which played down the extent of anti-Muslim racism. The 
message that such cartoons can be seen as anti-Muslim racism or hate speech was more 
explicit in 2010, when it was expressed by a variety of individuals, including non-
practicing Muslims. The relative absence of fear and threat, as evidenced when 
Dagbladet editor John Olav Egeland could stand in the middle of the protest and did not 
feel threatened (Dagbladet online, February 12), and the absence of an international 
crisis allowed the 2010 rerun to be framed more as a domestic ‘integration debate’. This 
contributed to more nuanced coverage, where the discursive struggle between 
‘dialogue’ and ‘antiracism’ played a greater role, allowing majority and minority to 
accommodate each other in a multicultural learning process, even though media again 
highlighted a few ‘fundamentalist’ voices, and ‘confrontational’ politicians discredited 
the protesters as extremists.  
While public debate has become more diversified and multicultural, policy and 
legislation are lagging behind despite a government initiative to extend hate speech 
protection to religious groups. While the law proposal reflected that the protection of 
religion is not easily distinguishable from the protection of religious believers in 
practice, Muslim protesters may have called for ethical restraints more than legal 
prohibitions. This proposal was withdrawn because of massive opposition from the 
media, politicians and public opinion. As suggested by Modood (2007:57), the ethical 
dimension including mutual respect and empathy may be more important in the 
development of a multicultural society than policy and legislation. Public debate plays a 
central role as a place of a learning process towards mutual understanding, when 
minorities challenge majority ways and the majority responds by taking minority 
sentiments into consideration. While the need to take minority perspectives into account 
remains controversial among the majority population, the cartoon debates have 
contributed to a more nuanced understanding of Muslim views as compatible with 
liberal principles while remaining religious. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The ’Coconut Debate’ 
 
 
In this chapter, I analyze a debate started by Iffit Qureshi in Aftenposten in 2006 that 
was called the ‘coconut debate’ by the newspaper. While this debate did not attract a lot 
of attention in itself, it addresses and problematizes an important issue; the widespread 
use of minority persons as ‘native informants’ to validate an anti-multiculturalist agenda 
and criticize minority cultures and religions. While the term ‘coconut’, which Qureshi 
used to describe these persons, is sometimes used to refer to ‘assimilated minority 
persons’ in general, and conflated with stereotypes against ‘over-integrated’ persons 
within minority groups (Andersson 2000:249-262), she used it in a specific sense 
reflecting Fanon’s theory of internalized racism and Malcolm X’s criticism of the 
‘Uncle Tom’ figure. 
When Muslims accused Rushdie of apostasy, Kymlicka (1993b:93) interpreted this as 
meaning that the British Muslim community sought to limit its own members’ freedom 
to individual dissent. Arguing that this account is misleading, Modood (1993b:97-98) 
writes that the charge of apostasy as expressed by Ali Mazrui (1989) among others, had 
“not to do with private beliefs, but of a betrayal of one’s community. The charge was 
more like that of a ‘coconut’ (brown on the outside but white inside) or ‘class traitor’ or 
‘collaborator’.” In other words, Muslim protesters were not concerned with “mere belief 
or apostasy proper” but with how Rushdie’s book contributed to Western domination 
over Muslims. While Kymlicka (1993b:93) defined apostasy as an “intra-community 
matter – a kind of internal treason or betrayal”, sociologist of religion David Bromley 
(1998c:vii) defines it in a sociological rather than theological sense as a “highly 
politicized form of exit” that is distinct from mere ‘defection’. Not unlike the Islamic 
understanding of apostasy as a political rather than theological offense (Akhtar 1989), 
Bromley’s sociological concept refers to exit in a situation of conflict between a 
religious group and larger society, where the exiting individual joins hostile political 
forces that see the religious group as ‘subversive’ (Bromley 1998a:23-25). 
Liz Fekete (2009:125-129) discusses how ‘defectors’ from Islam have been used as 
‘native informants’ on Muslim groups construed as ‘subversive’. She writes that in 
remarkably similar ways across European countries, persons of Muslim background 
who have “integrated into European values” have been officially promoted. Drawing on 
Gullestad’s (2006) analysis of how Norwegian media has privileged minority voices 
that support assimilationist agendas, Fekete mentions the young women Kadra Noor 
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(later Kadra Yusuf) and Shabana Rehman, who became media celebrities after 
cooperating with the organization Human Rights Service (discussed in the introduction), 
while other, more ‘conservative’ Muslims have been silenced and ridiculed. 
Internationally, minority politicians such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands 
(discussed below) and Naser Khader in Denmark (who has also been criticized as an 
‘Uncle Tom’ and ‘coconut’ by young Muslims, see Hervik 2011:155), and Professor 
Bassam Tibi in Germany, have been celebrated as ‘assimilated’ Muslims in contrast to 
the negative reception in the public sphere of ‘conservative’ Muslims such as Danish 
politician Asmaa Abdol-Hamid and Swiss professor Tariq Ramadan (discussed below). 
In European integration debates, assertive Muslims have often been suspected of being 
‘closet fundamentalists’ and asked to denounce terrorism, violence and sharia law. In 
2007, Abdol-Hamid, who wears a hijab, ran for Danish Parliament and faced a hostile 
media campaign (Andreassen 2011:164-168). Khader described her as someone “who 
confirms all the prejudices about a Muslim speaking with two tongues” (Information, 
October 12, 2007). Comparing Denmark and France, Boe and Hervik (2008:214-215) 
found that in public debates in both countries, what they call the ‘Civilized Other’ 
emerges as a cultural figure; “a person of Muslim background, who has embraced “Our” 
values and denounces Islam and “Islamism””. They argue that persons like Hirsi Ali, 
Rushdie and Khader present themselves, or are represented, as ‘Civilized Others’ and 
function as an ‘ethnic warranty’ in criticizing multiculturalism (ibid, 227);  
their judgments on “the dangers of Islamism” in any manifestation of Islam are 
often harsher and less nuanced than other international public intellectuals 
whose background does not protect them as well from criticism, as being 
identified as having a Muslim heritage does. (Boe & Hervik 2008:227)  
In other words, they let white critics of Islam hide behind ‘native informants’ whose 
Muslim background protects them against accusations of racism (ibid, 230). Because of 
Khader’s background, Danish journalists and politicians refer to him as if he were a 
spokesperson for the Muslim minority (ibid, 228). 
Hamid Dabashi (2011) uses postcolonial theory to criticize the role of ‘native 
informants’ like Rushdie and Hirsi Ali (ibid, 17) in propagating contemporary ideas of a 
clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. He extends Gayatri Spivak’s critique 
of the role of ‘native informant’ in anthropological ethnography (ibid, 13) and 
elaborates on what Said called the ‘aye-sayers’ among ‘intellectuals in exile’ (ibid, 22). 
Further, Dabashi adapts Fanon’s theory of colonial mentality and internalized inferiority 
in the context of colonial color-racism to the contemporary context of anti-Muslim 
racism at the imperial center (ibid, 21-37). Drawing on these theories, Dabashi analyzes 
the role of those Kwame Anthony Appiah called ‘comprador intellectuals’ and Malcolm 
X called ‘house negroes’ (ibid, 38-45) in validating contemporary Orientalism and 
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Islamophobia to a white audience, and contributing to the enemy image of Muslims in 
order to legitimize American imperialism (Dabashi 2011:17-20). In the following, I 
pursue the theoretical perspectives most relevant to analyze the politics of racism and 
multiculturalism, and I focus less on individual psychology. As a background, I discuss 
the political views of Malcolm X and Hirsi Ali, which Qureshi refers to, and outline a 
theoretical distinction between a liberal ‘colorblind’ position towards racism and a 
‘color-conscious’ minority perspective. I also review an earlier Norwegian debate about 
similar issues, when Gullestad criticized Rehman in 2002. Then I turn to the empirical 
material from the ‘coconut debate’, before discussing the question of individual dissent 
and exit in multicultural theory, and Bromley’s theory of ‘apostasy’ as ‘politicized exit’,  
My analysis focuses on three theoretical issues. The first is the issue of ‘internalized 
racism’ which has been a theme in African American postcolonial literature (Fanon 
1967; Malcolm X 1989). These theorists draw on Gramsci’s concept of a hegemonic 
ideology, which legitimizes the power structure of society and serves the political 
interests of the dominant group, and is disseminated through civil society institutions 
controlled by this group, including the education system and the media. This ideology is 
internalized by some individuals of the subordinated group, who then rationalize and 
accept their inferior position rather than assert their collective interests. The theory of 
‘internalized oppression’ may apply to various dominated groups such as workers, 
women and racialized minorities in Marxist, feminist and postcolonial theory. It 
represents a political analysis of dominance which often treats ‘culture’ as a secondary 
phenomenon. 
A second issue, often raised as an objection against the ‘coconut’ concept is the 
question of ‘internal restrictions’ (Kymlicka 1995:35-44) and individuals’ ‘right to exit’ 
(Phillips 2007:133-157) from their group, in contrast to demands for ‘loyalty to culture’ 
(Parekh 2000:154-162). Qureshi and others do not appeal to the state to restrict these 
persons’ right to criticize their group (e.g. hate speech laws); but seek to morally 
discredit them to limit their influence. Such interventions in public debate can be seen 
as a form of ‘ideological struggle’ to delegitimize dominant ideologies; this is also part 
of ‘multicultural negotiations’ beyond Kymlicka’s and Phillips’ focus on rights. Public 
criticism and protest can be seen as attempts to demand ‘protection’ against threats to 
minority interests by ethical rather than legal means. Those who promote so-called 
‘coconuts’ as models for successful ‘integration’ tend to perceive criticism as a threat to 
these persons’ individual freedom. The question of ‘exit’ and the relationship between 
individuals and groups is central in many theoretical discussions of multiculturalism, 
and I discuss the perspectives of Kymlicka (1995), Modood (2007), Parekh (2000) and 
Phillips (2007). Kymlicka frames the relationship between individual rights and group 
rights by his distinction between ‘external protections’ and ‘internal restrictions’, where 
only the former type can be justified as legitimate in liberal terms. Also Phillips 
prioritizes individual rights, while Parekh seeks to ‘balance’ individual and group rights, 
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seeing claims about ‘loyalty’ to one’s cultural community as legitimate. Parekh also 
explicitly discusses the question of ‘coconuts’, while Modood is less concerned with 
possible conflicts between individual and group interests, as his focus lies more on 
mobilization and debate than on legal rights.  
A third question concerns the way anti-multiculturalist organizations use ‘native 
informants’ politically to validate their views. Multicultural theories have mostly been 
concerned with possibilities and conditions for exit, rather than problematizing the 
politics of exit and what these individuals do politically upon leaving. Here, I draw on 
Bromley’s (1998) analysis of the ‘politics of apostasy’ as a specific form of exit from 
religious groups. Studying exit from American ‘new religious movements’, Bromley 
has problematized how ‘anti-cult groups’ rely on ‘apostates’ to validate their claims 
against these religious movements. His analysis throws light on key aspects of the role 
played by ‘native informants’ in contemporary anti-Muslim discourse.  
The ‘Black consciousness’ of Malcolm X 
Malcolm X played a central role in the African American ‘Black consciousness’ 
movement which has inspired minority mobilization elsewhere. As the best known and 
most respected Western Muslim besides Muhammad Ali (the boxing champion), he is a 
role model for minority activists and his political views have influenced European 
Muslim assertiveness, especially in Britain (see Modood 2007:158). Being influenced 
by Fanon, Malcolm X (1989:25-46) speaks about ‘coconuts’ or more specifically about 
the African American equivalents ‘Uncle Tom’ or ‘house negro’. Giving a speech to a 
white audience at Michigan State University in 1963, he pointed out that those African 
Americans whites usually listen to, don’t represent Blacks; “they’re not speaking for 
Black people, they’re saying exactly what they know the white man who put them in 
that position wants to hear them say” (ibid, 26-27). He calls them the ‘Uncle Tom’ type; 
who “never opens up his mouth in defense of a Black man” but only “in defense of the 
white man, in defense of America, in defense of the American government” (ibid, 36). 
Like the ‘house negro’ during slavery, who as domestic servant was closer to the white 
master than those working the fields, “he always identified… [as] his master identified 
himself” (ibid, 29), “speaks the same phraseology, the same language” and “tries to 
speak it better than you do” (ibid, 30). The ‘Uncle Tom’ type is “ashamed of being 
Black” (ibid, 28) and never identifies as Black. Usually, “he hates Black and loves 
white. He doesn’t want to be Black, he wants to be white” (ibid, 32). Malcolm X holds 
white racism responsible for this condition; it is “not his fault; he is sick” (ibid). 
Paraphrasing Fanon, he argues that the ‘Uncle Tom’ or ‘coconut’ type has internalized 
white superiority and black inferiority; he says; “this is the result of 400 years of 
brainwashing here in America; you have taken a man who is black on the outside and 
made him white on the inside” (ibid, 31). The education system is partly responsible; 
‘Uncle Tom’ believes what he learned in school, where he was taught nothing about 
122 
 
ancient African civilizations; only that before he came to America, “he was a savage in 
the jungle” (Malcolm X 1989:37). However, the Uncle Tom type is a small minority 
among Blacks, they are “usually the handpicked Negro [sic] who benefits from token 
integration” (ibid, 27); who is “begging to be integrated into American society despite 
the fact that the attitude and actions of whites are sufficient proof that he is not wanted” 
(ibid, 32). This situation is perpetuated by whites who “pose as a liberal and pretend that 
the Negro should be integrated, as long as he integrates into someone else’s 
neighborhood” (ibid, 33). In contrast, there is what Malcolm X calls a “new type” of 
assertive Blacks; “the type that the white man seldom ever comes in contact with” and 
who white people think are “Black supremacists or racists or extremists who believe in 
violence” (ibid, 38). They reject “token integration” (i.e. assimilation) and instead want 
“separation” (i.e. self-determination). He specifies that what he means by ‘separation’ is 
contrary to ‘segregation’ which is “forced upon inferiors by superiors” (ibid); 
“separation is when you have your own; you control your economy; you control your 
own politics; you control your own society” (ibid), as white people do in white 
communities and the Chinese do in Chinatown.  
Malcolm X’s speech is still relevant for minority struggles 50 years later, with Muslims 
now in the role of Blacks. Now as then, minority persons promoted in the white public 
sphere often do not represent their communities. These individuals identify with whites 
rather than with their own group, and frequently use the same rhetoric as white 
nationalists, while assertive minority persons who make demands instead of begging for 
acceptance, are seen as ‘extremists’. While many European Muslims are inspired by 
Malcolm X’s analysis of racism, they do not generally endorse his ‘separatism’ but 
insist on negotiating the terms of integration and demand a degree of self-determination 
in reforming their religious traditions. 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, one of the most prominent voices in contemporary anti-Muslim 
discourse, came as a refugee from Somalia to the Netherlands, where she became a 
politician for the right-wing People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in 
2003. In 2006, she resigned from Parliament after media found she had given false 
information in her asylum application, and risked losing her Dutch citizenship (Phillips 
2007:8). Hirsi Ali then moved to the US, where she joined a conservative think tank, the 
American Enterprise Institute. She is a well-known author of several books; The Caged 
Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (2004), an autobiography 
called Infidel (2006), and Nomad: From Islam to America. A Personal Journey through 
the Clash of Civilizations (2010). She also wrote the script for the short film 
Submission, whose producer Theo van Gogh was murdered in 2004 (see introduction). 
In Dutch politics and in the above publications, she has been a strong critic of 
multiculturalism, holding Islam responsible for violence, against women in particular 
(Phillips 2007:7). 
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Dutch anthropologist Halleh Ghorashi (2003) writes that as a refugee from Iran, she 
could initially identify with Hirsi Ali’s approach to the emancipation of Muslim women. 
However, Ghorashi soon found that Hirsi Ali’s views were dogmatic and had no room 
for nuances, and that she had become “a welcome mouthpiece for the dominant 
discourse on Islam in the Netherlands that pictures Islamic migrants as problems and 
enemies of the nation” (ibid, 163); an exclusionary discourse operating with a 
dichotomy between ‘their culture’ which is blamed for problems among immigrants, 
and ‘our culture’ into which immigrants should assimilate. Immigrant women are 
construed as passive individuals, who need to be saved from their family, community, 
religion and ‘culture’. Ghorashi writes that even as an atheist and former Marxist who 
“came to the Netherlands from Iran with much hatred towards Islam” (ibid, 169), she 
still found it “necessary to defend Islam in the face of such a homogenizing and 
patronizing approach” (ibid, 168). Among Muslims, there is a diversity of views on 
gender equality, including religious and secular forms of feminism (as discussed in 
detail in chapter 4); Ghorashi (ibid, 170) points out that many of these are more 
“conscious of their rights” and more well-versed in feminist theory than some of their 
‘enlightened’ Western counterparts.  
Promoting a Norwegian translation of Nomad, Hirsi Ali was interviewed in Aftenposten, 
Dagbladet and Dagsavisen (November 16, 2010). Dagsavisen quotes from her book; 
Western civilization is superior; and Islam is permeated by violence and encourages 
violence. When asked if she thinks we are moving towards a clash of civilizations, Hirsi 
Ali says; This is a clash […] I am convinced that it is through confrontation and 
conflict that real assimilation takes place. To her, assimilation is a positive concept that 
means replacing submission to Allah’s will with freedom. In Aftenposten, she continues;  
The only solution is that Muslims give up their clan and tribal thinking and 
completely assimilate into European societies […] To achieve this, we have to 
liberate Muslim women from the power of their husbands, fathers and male 
family members, and here, Western feminists should have a major responsibility.  
Dagbladet quotes from the book that Hirsi Ali has no faith in reforming Islam along the 
lines of the Christian Church’s gradual acceptance of ‘Enlightenment ideals’. When 
asked why she rejects and ridicules internal Muslim reformers and Muslim feminists, 
she says; the only thing that can open their  [Muslims’] eyes is external pressure. To 
elaborate, the interviewer again cites her book; 
In addition to a military battle against Islamism, a massive propaganda 
campaign must be started to win the “hearts and minds” of Muslims. A key part 
of this […] is a missionary offensive directed at Muslims. Like missionaries once 
had “such a strong civilizing force in Africa”, the Church, led by the Pope, must 
now join the war against Islam. Christians worldwide should “map Muslim 
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societies” so that they can “convince Muslims that the challenges of life can best 
be overcome with traditional Christian values” […] “Teach them hygiene, 
discipline, work ethics and what you believe in”.  
When asked to explain her sudden turn to Christianity, Hirsi Ali says; I don’t think the 
Church should do this alone; they have to do it together with feminists, humanists and 
atheists. The political views expressed in these interviews include statements of 
Western superiority, generalizations about Islam, belief in confrontation, demands for 
assimilation, calls on ‘the West’ to ‘save’ Muslim women, and support for the 
‘civilizing mission’ that are remarkably explicit. Such views have been characterized as 
‘recycled Orientalism’ (Thorbjørnsrud 2005:42) and similar rhetoric used by a white 
person would certainly be met with charges of racism. 
Six months before, when the English edition of Nomad appeared, Aftenposten debate 
editor Knut Olav Åmås (May 18, 2010) had recommended Norwegian publishers to 
‘take a break’ from Tariq Ramadan, and instead translate books by Hirsi Ali and Paul 
Berman. Åmås questions why Hirsi Ali is ‘condemned’ while Ramadan, a Muslim 
reformer who argues Islam is compatible with ‘Western values’ has become a hero 
among Muslim minorities and some Western intellectuals. Apparently, only internal 
reformers are trusted to influence the development of the Islamic religion, while atheists 
are dismissed, as are Rehman and Sara Azmeh Rasmussen in Norway. Regardless of 
whether they enjoy support in their communities, Åmås seems to prefer Muslim 
defectors over reformers, and agrees with Berman’s characteristic of Ramadan as ‘a 
wolf in sheep’s clothes’. 
Arun Kundnani (2008) discusses how Hirsi Ali and Ramadan serve as examples of 
‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’ in the rhetoric of confrontational liberals inspired 
by Bernard Lewis’ dichotomy between ‘modern, secularized and westernized’ Muslims 
and ‘fundamentalists and potential terrorists’ (see Mamdani 2004:20-24). This 
American foreign policy discourse has been translated into European debates on 
multiculturalism, where the ‘war on terror’ is reinterpreted as “a cold war against 
Islamism, defined as a totalitarian political movement analogous to fascism or 
Stalinism” (Kundnani 2008:40). Contemporary “culture war” is modeled on McCarthy-
style anti-communism campaigns, including the use of compliant intellectuals, media 
campaigns, loyalty pledges, removal from employment, deportation, harassment and 
surveillance of those who are suspected of supporting an ‘evil ideology’ (ibid, 41). 
Those who defend ‘Enlightenment values’ and enlist ‘ex-Muslims’ in their struggle 
against ‘Islamists’ (ibid, 42), typically operate with an ambiguous distinction between 
‘Islam’ and ‘Islamism’. They tend to see Muslim minorities as a “potential fifth column 
for Islamism” and argue that Europe is infiltrated by secret networks and organizations 
wanting to ‘Islamicize’ Europe (ibid, 44). In Norway, this rhetoric has been used by 
Progress Party leader Siv Jensen. In media coverage, the discourse of Islamist threat 
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conflates extremism with Muslim minorities in general, who are suspected of being 
“extremists hidden behind a moderate façade” (Kundnani 2008:44).  
Rather than ‘a wolf in sheep’s clothes’, Kundnani (ibid, 51-52) argues that Ramadan 
shows how ideas derived from Islamism can be adapted and reworked to play a positive 
role in European society, promoting an active European citizenship. More specifically, 
By going back to the original sources, Ramadan argues, universal Islamic values, 
after being separated from the particular immigrant cultures they are bound up 
with, are found to be entirely compatible with the sort of values that British [or 
European] society is meant to be based on. This provides an Islamic basis for 
active citizenship and engagement for social justice, rather than a one-sided 
adaptation to British [or European] norms. (ibid, 58) 
Seen this way, Ramadan’s project is to detach ‘original’ Muslim values from particular 
cultural norms and show that these are compatible with universal values promoted by 
the West. This line of thinking is attractive to the younger generation who are asserting 
themselves as ‘European Muslims’ and distancing themselves from their parents’ ethnic 
cultures. A sort of fundamentalism (‘going back to the original sources’) can thus 
become a road to integration, and a strategy to challenge oppressive cultural traditions 
(discussed in more detail in chapter 4). While those who believe in incompatibility of 
values see manifestations of politicized Muslim identity as ‘subversive’, most European 
Muslims do not want an ‘Islamic state’ but a democratic, multicultural one.  
The Shabana Rehman debate 
Norwegian media has also tended to fit Muslims into polarized categories, favoring the 
‘assimilated’ over the ‘conservative’ (Eide & Nikunen 2011:9-11; Phillips 2008:112-
114). During the early years of the new millennium, newspapers focused on practices in 
Muslim minority communities that oppress women, such as female circumcision, forced 
marriages and honor killings. A few minority women went public with negative 
experiences within their communities. Known by their first names, young women like 
Shabana and Kadra were celebrated in the media as heroines struggling against 
patriarchal traditions (Gullestad 2006b:50-56). 
In 2002, Gullestad (2006b:63-66) publicly criticized Rehman’s media role in an op-ed 
article in Aftenposten. In one of her first appearances as a new celebrity in January 
2000, Rehman was pictured naked with a Norwegian flag painted on her body while 
throwing away her Pakistani clothes, an act Gullestad (ibid, 52) analyzed as a 
dramatization of an ethnic “conversion” from ‘Pakistani’ to ‘Norwegian’. She argues 
that such persons become media stars in a ‘white public space’ because they transcend 
their minority background and become ‘honorary Norwegians’ by identifying with 
hegemonic values (ibid, 51). Drawing on Aihwa Ong, Adriana Valdez Young 
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(2009:179) has defined ‘honorary whiteness’ as an extension of white privilege to non-
whites. She writes; 
‘Honorary whiteness’ differs from ethnic or racial whiteness in that it is 
conditional. […] individuals who gain ‘honorary whiteness’ must continually 
defend their status by actively excluding others and repressing parts of 
themselves – as a result, perpetuating political inequality and psychological 
instability. 
In Gullestad’s analysis, Rehman’s legitimate project of “individual emancipation 
against patriarchal and religious oppression” where she “defends her right to choose her 
own life” (2006b:52), leaves out her minority group’s collective interests in struggling 
against racism (ibid, 53). In Kymlicka’s (1995:35-44) terminology, she focuses only on 
‘internal restrictions’ but not on a minority group’s need for ‘external protections’. She 
“usually formulates her criticism of oppressive practices in the name of religion in ways 
that contribute to stigmatizing stereotypes and paternalist attitudes in relation to the 
Muslim minorities in Norway” (Gullestad 2006b:54). While Kymlicka (1995:43) argues 
that “laws that are justified in terms of external protection [such as hate-speech laws] 
can open the door to internal restrictions”, Gullestad’s analysis of Rehman shows that a 
focus on internal restrictions can undermine demands for external protection.  
Gullestad (2006b:56) concludes that the result of turning “a handful of immigrant 
women who explicitly distance themselves from their background” into “media stars” is 
a “diversion of public attention and a crippling of critical awareness” where the media 
“silence[s] or ridicule[s] voices with other points of view, in particular the voices of 
conservative Muslims”. More specifically; 
[Media] have not appreciated the voices of the women who for a long time have 
worked for the very same causes within the various minority social circles without 
allowing their opposition to truly harmful practices to be used as a reinforcement of 
paternalist and denigrating majority-minority relations. (ibid.) 
Commenting on the debate between Rehman and Gullestad, Thomas Hylland Eriksen 
(2006:78-82) notes that “Rehman’s views could easily be appropriated by people who 
demanded cultural assimilation from immigrants” (ibid, 80). He explains Rehman’s 
popularity with the ‘coconut’ term;  
The reason, to put it more bluntly than Gullestad did in her very polite article, 
was that Rehman functioned as a female ‘Uncle Tom’ or, as they say in Britain, 
a ‘coconut’ – black on the outside, white on the inside. (Eriksen 2006:80) 
Elsewhere, Eriksen (2004a:189) has defined the term ‘coconut’ as “people who look 
black but imitate white people’s culture and ways of being” [my translation] and as 
127 
 
paraphrasing Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1967), which analyzes the inferiority 
complex internalized by blacks subjected to ideas of white superiority. Beyond these 
anthropological interventions, the widespread criticism of ‘coconuts’ within minority 
groups is not well understood by the majority. In the ‘Shabana debate’, most minority 
persons supported Gullestad’s analysis while white Norwegians tended to defend 
Rehman (Eriksen 2006:81; Gullestad 2006b:67), indicating systematic differences 
between majority and minority perspectives.  
Shortly after this debate, anthropologist Cicilie Fagerlid wrote about how the ‘coconut’ 
term is used among British South Asians, in Klassekampen (September 3, 2002). She 
writes that the term is frequently used by dark-skinned people about other dark-skinned 
people to refer to and reveal a form of “racial treason” as an ethnic equivalent to 
“class treason”. As such, it expresses criticism of and contempt for those who turn 
their back on their own group. Beyond Eriksen’s focus on cultural imitation, Fagerlid 
emphasizes a political sense of the term, ‘turning their back on their group’. She adds 
that the sense of betrayal lies not in the dark-skinned person’s joining an enemy, but 
that the person seems to regard whites as better to such a high extent that they wish to 
become like them. Despite an implicit reference to Fanon’s concept of ‘internalized 
inferiority’, Fagerlid does not seem to acknowledge that accepting a racist discourse 
may be seen as equivalent to ‘joining an enemy’. She understands the term as 
expressing a ‘cultural essentialist’ view which claims that a ‘coconut’ has done 
something that is natural for whites to do, but that is inappropriate for non-whites, as 
when ethnic Muslims do not acknowledge that they are Muslim. She points out that this 
call to be proud of one’s identity may be abused when directed at individuals who want 
to go their own ways in choosing friends, partners, religion, education and jobs. With 
implicit reference to Shabana, she writes that Norwegian Pakistani girls that are 
criticized for being “too Western” often see the criticism rather as an attempt to 
oppress them than a well-meant advice to be proud of their own background. In such 
cases, she argues, accusations of “racial treason” may be attempts to abuse power and 
demand rigid conformity. Similar to Kymlicka, Fagerlid sees the issue as primarily 
about ‘cultural defection’ rather than ‘politicized exit’. While these two meanings may 
sometimes be conflated in empirical criticism of ‘coconuts’, the specific sense of 
‘coconut’ as describing a political betrayal in the antiracist struggle is analytically and 
theoretically distinct from a generic and somewhat misleading account of ‘coconuts’ as 
culturally assimilated individuals. 
Fagerlid objects to the term on the grounds of a cultural rather than political analysis; 
she argues that it reflects a sort of cultural relativism that says Africans should stick to 
their cultural heritage, or else they lose their identity and dignity, a view she compares 
to South African apartheid and finds very frightening. Kymlicka (1995:36) notes that 
such a reference to apartheid as a possible outcome of minority demands to ‘preserve 
their culture’ is characteristically used by critics of ‘collective rights’. In a follow-up 
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(Klassekampen, October 22, 2002), Fagerlid elaborates; “coconut” is a racializing term 
that makes distinctions between skin colors and ascribes essential differences to this 
distinction. Further, the term coconut is based on the existence of objective criteria for 
“white” and “dark-skinned” behavior, while Fagerlid rejects race as an objective 
category. While Fagerlid is right to reject cultural essentialism and is aware that not 
everyone using the term coconut subscribes to race theories, she seems to exaggerate 
elements of essentialism implied when the term is used empirically (Modood 2007:97-
98). Anti-essentialist rhetoric has been used politically to deny minority claims for 
group rights, and Modood (ibid, 89-97) points out that the political use of culture or 
ethnicity (in minority assertiveness and mobilization) does not depend on a belief in 
cultural essentialism (see introduction). 
With regard to debates on multiculturalism, Fagerlid writes that she does not believe in 
“preserving cultures” and wants people to be free from ethnic categorizations and skin 
color to be irrelevant. This is a common position among ‘dialogical liberals’; a 
‘colorblind’ perspective that supports cultural hybridity but opposes minority 
assertiveness. From the perspective of critical whiteness studies, Frankenberg (cited in 
O’Brien 2000:43-44) identifies three discourses on race, which she calls (1) 
‘essentialism’, i.e. the classic ‘racist’ view that sees racial differences in a prejudiced 
and discriminatory way, (2) ‘color and power evasive’, i.e. a colorblind approach that 
evades or denies racial differences, and (3) ‘race cognizant’, i.e. a color-conscious 
approach (such as Malcolm X’s perspective) which recognizes racialized power 
structures. The ‘colorblind’ perspective, which rejects ‘race’ as an objective category 
and argues that skin color should be irrelevant, as Fagerlid does, dominates among 
white Americans, who reject racial essentialism by claiming that “seeing” skin color is a 
‘bad’ or ‘offensive’ thing to do. The colorblind approach rests on a narrow definition of 
racism, which rejects racial/cultural essentialism, but ignores the question of political 
power; thus making it possible to accuse assertive minorities of “reverse racism”. The 
colorblind ideology sees ‘difference’ (as opposed to diversity) as a problem and as 
potentially racist. According to Ashley W. Doane (cited in O’Brien 2000:44), the 
colorblind ideology perpetuates racism by masking white interests as everyone’s 
interests and discrediting minority experiences of racism. Among African Americans, 
the color-conscious perspective is widespread. As a key advocate of this perspective, 
Malcolm X was often framed by white media as a ‘reverse racist’ who hated white 
people. While he did agitate against white liberals, who adhere to a colorblind ideology, 
he recognized white antiracists who broke with this perspective and acknowledged that 
equal treatment falls short of recognizing difference (O’Brien 2000:42).  
The ‘Coconut Debate’ 
The ‘coconut debate’ started with an op-ed article by Iffit Qureshi, a minority activist 
and regular contributor to public debate. A woman of Pakistani origin, she grew up in 
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Scotland and has lived in Norway for over 20 years. She prefers to identify herself as a 
British or Scottish Pakistani rather than as a Norwegian or Norwegian Muslim. 
Qureshi’s public contributions have been primarily antiracist rather than expressing 
Muslim identity politics. Her article criticizing ‘coconuts’ was phrased in a 
‘postcolonial’ language resembling the rhetoric of Malcolm X, and stirred a debate. 
Hostile responses came from ‘Islam critics’ and from those she had called ‘coconuts’, 
while Norwegian Muslim spokespersons supported her. I focus only on those 
contributions from regular participants in public debate (there were some others).  
Qureshi’s article in Aftenposten (May 24, 2006) responds to a text by Shakil Rehman 
(Shabana’s brother), whom she criticizes and describes as a ‘coconut’. She writes; 
“Coconuts” or “Uncle Toms” are terms used in Britain and the US for ethnic 
minorities who have internalized racist attitudes and denigrating views of larger 
society. And because of lack of insight and negative experiences with for 
example child-rearing methods of their parents or with media’s exaggerated 
negative coverage, they have developed ethnic self-hatred and seek belonging 
and acceptance from majority society. Rehman and other minorities that are 
given space in the media in integration debates use the same generalizations and 
stigmatizing rhetoric as anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic parties and 
organizations such as the Progress Party and Human Rights Service. 
Qureshi places the concepts of ‘coconut’ and ‘Uncle Tom’ in an American and British 
context, where they are used by African Americans and British South Asians as 
addressed by Fagerlid and Malcolm X. She defines the term as having ‘internalized 
racist attitudes’, a perspective in line with the ‘Black psychology’ tradition inspired by 
Fanon (1967), which argues that non-white minorities in a ‘racist’ society have 
internalized hegemonic ideas about their own group’s inferiority and thus ‘developed 
ethnic self-hatred’. Some of Qureshi’s arguments reflect the position of Malcolm X, 
who said that the ‘Uncle Tom’ figure “hates Black and loves white” (1989:32), that they 
use the same rhetoric as whites and even “tries to speak it better than [whites] do” (ibid, 
30) and that they defend white interests rather than minority interests (ibid, 36). 
Speaking about these persons who ‘are given space in the media’, she refers to media 
preference for those who confirm the dominant discourse (see Eide & Nikunen 2011:9-
11; Phillips 2008:112-114; Gullestad 2006b:50-56). She also reflects Malcolm X’s 
argument about ‘handpicked’ individuals who benefit from ‘token integration’, who say 
“exactly what they know the white man who put them in that position wants to hear 
them say” (Malcolm X 1989:26-27).  
While Malcolm X had explained ‘internalized inferiority’ as “the result of 400 years of 
brainwashing” (ibid, 31) through the education system and other institutions which 
disseminate ideas of a superiority ‘white civilization’ and portray non-whites as 
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backward, Qureshi adapts the Black American perspective to a contemporary situation, 
where media plays a larger role, and focus is on oppressive practices in Muslim 
families. ‘Internal restrictions’ and oppression of women and children in minority 
communities are central to contemporary discourses about Muslims, and personal 
experiences with such practices may also provide a ‘motive’ for individuals to leave 
their communities and try to assimilate into larger society. Qureshi elaborates; 
These “coconuts” have long since left their representative [sic] minority 
communities. Some of them have also misused their cultural background and the 
prejudices of larger society to promote their own position among the majority. 
They profit from media images of Muslims as scary characters. They believe that 
if “we” assimilate, discriminatory practices will disappear. They do not see the 
unjust balance of power that exists, and that prevents minorities from being 
included in society. Neither do they see that skin color, name and religion will 
always be a barrier regardless of how good citizens they try to be. 
Here, Qureshi notes that these persons have ‘left’ their communities, thus raising the 
question of ‘exit’ that I take up in more detail later. Arguing that ‘some of them’ have 
‘misused their cultural background’, she points to an aspect that opens up for 
accusations of betrayal; i.e. the combination of leaving one’s cultural community and 
taking the role of a ‘native informant’ who uses her inside knowledge of the community 
for the benefit of hostile outsiders. The combined rejection and use of one’s ethnic 
background is discussed by Gullestad (2006b:51-52) and Boe and Hervik (2008:227-
230), in their analysis of Rehman and Khader (see above). While they identify with the 
majority, their ‘ethnic’ background enables them to become ‘native informants’. This 
analysis parallel Bromley’s (1998:39-43) discussion of how the American ‘anti-cult 
movement’ used ‘apostates’ to validate an enemy image of new religious movements.  
Towards the end of her article, Qureshi writes that; these people do not understand that 
they are being used as pawns in a bigger political game that is more about stricter 
immigration policy and less about human rights. Qureshi constructs these persons as 
both active and passive; they ‘use’ their cultural background, but cannot necessarily 
control the political circumstances where they are often ‘used’ by hostile forces. While 
Malcolm X argued that ‘Uncle Tom’ is “brainwashed” (1989:31) and that it is “not his 
fault” (ibid, 32), some of those Qureshi calls ‘coconuts’ are also active players with 
various motives; to ‘profit’ and ‘promote their own position’. Norwegian Muslims have 
criticized those persons as attention-seeking and as trying to gain popularity with the 
majority at the expense of minorities. On the other hand, Qureshi also seems to 
acknowledge assimilation as an individual strategy to escape discrimination; ‘they 
believe that if “we” assimilate, discriminatory practices will disappear’. However, this 
strategy fails if ‘skin color, name and religion will always be a barrier’ regardless of 
how much an individual tries to assimilate. The point that assimilated individuals may 
131 
 
still be discriminated against has been made by theorists such as Phillips (2007:15), 
Modood (2005:9) and Parekh (2000:162; 198) in discussions of racism and assimilation.  
The degree of political insight and control varies among these individuals. It is greater 
for Hirsi Ali, who chose to become a right-wing politician, than for the stand-up 
comedian Shabana, who primarily drew attention to problems in certain Muslim 
families and was celebrated as a person fighting for individual freedom by the media, 
and less for Kadra and other young girls, who later felt that Storhaug had taken 
advantage of their vulnerable position to promote her own political agenda (to be 
discussed later). Qureshi takes Hirsi Ali as a prototypical example; 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a good example of one of these “coconuts” or “Uncle Toms”. 
She quickly discovered that in order to make a breakthrough in the Netherlands, 
she had to exploit society’s prejudices by lying about her past and use the same 
Islamophobic rhetoric that was used by the majority. She profited from the 
suffering of vulnerable Somali women. Rehman, Hirsi Ali and I may have the 
same views on women’s liberation and loathe oppression and violence. But I 
strongly dislike that they use their own negative experiences to define the 
situation for all minorities. 
Hirsi Ali’s political moves are described as deliberate; she ‘exploited’ majority 
prejudice to become popular, and she ‘profited’ from the suffering of other women in 
the Somali community she turned her back on. This places Hirsi Ali at one end of a 
continuum from ‘native informants’ to ‘defectors’ who merely change their individual 
identity and practices without seeking conflict and politicizing their negative 
experiences in a group. Bromley (1998:19-48) distinguishes between three ideal types 
of exit; the ‘apostate’ who joins the enemy, the ‘whistleblower’ who appeals to external 
authorities in his struggle against certain internal practices, and the ‘defector’. In his 
analysis, the forms of exit also depend on the group’s relationship with mainstream 
society, the degree of conflict and the group’s legitimacy in larger society; i.e. when the 
group is seen as ‘allegiant’ and legitimate, defection is more likely; when it is seen as 
‘contestant’ and subject to external regulation, whistleblowing is an option; but only 
when a group is considered ‘subversive’ and illegitimate, the politicized form of exit 
called ‘apostasy’ may take place. 
Responses from ‘Islam critics’ 
The first responses to Qureshi’s article came from activists critical of Islam. Hans 
Rustad, editor of a website called “Document.no” (where the terrorist Anders Behring 
Breivik was active), is dedicated to the struggle for individual rights against ‘leftist’ 
group thinking and cultural relativism. His main targets are multiculturalism, antiracism 
and Islamism. The second response came from Storhaug, one of Norway’s most 
132 
 
influential lobbyists against multiculturalism. She is the leader of the organization 
Human Rights Service, which describes itself primarily as a think tank, but has also 
acted as a feminist support group for young Muslim girls in conflict with their families. 
Rustad (May 27) writes that Qureshi’s article violates some of the most fundamental 
[…] standards of civilized debate. Putting aside the implied characterization of Qureshi 
as ‘uncivilized’, he may have a point when he characterizes her writing on internalized 
racism as condescendingly psychologizing. It is a tendency in psychology (and she 
draws on the psychiatrist Fanon) that analysts ascribe motives to individuals and offer 
explanations which are rejected by their objects of study; psychologists call this 
‘denial’. More interesting for a political analysis is Rustad’s argument that Qureshi 
labels people based on skin color and group belonging – something that would qualify 
as “racism” if the claim had been made the other way around. This can be interpreted 
as an argument that using the ‘coconut’ term represents ‘reverse racism’ especially in 
the light of Rustad’s following elaboration; 
Qureshi uses the term “coconut” about Shakil Rehman: brown on the outside 
and white on the inside. Rehman is judged based on his skin color. If his 
opinions differ from Qureshi’s, he has betrayed his skin color! This is the mark 
of racism. People are defined by their skin color. 
Rustad refers to a definition of ‘coconut’ as ‘brown on the outside and white on the 
inside’ (see Modood 1993b:98; Eriksen 2006:80; Malcolm X 1989:3). This definition 
was not given by Qureshi herself (who instead focused on ‘internalized racist attitudes’; 
see above), indicating that Rustad is familiar with the term. However, he takes the 
definition quite literally; as ‘defining people by their skin color’ which qualifies as 
‘racism’ in his view. Such an understanding of racism reflects a ‘colorblind’ perspective 
(Frankenberg 1993; cited in O’Brien 2000:43-44) common among white majorities. 
This view holds that skin color should be irrelevant and sees the use of racial categories 
as ‘offensive’ (Rustad’s view). Accusations of ‘reverse racism’ can be made because 
this perspective leaves out the structural dimension of dominance, and mistakes ‘color-
conscious’ minority perspectives as implying ‘racial essentialism’ (as discussed earlier). 
Rustad also notes the accusation of ‘betrayal’. In a follow-up article (July 27), Qureshi 
specifies that the focus of her first article was primarily on internalized racist attitudes 
and lacking insight into the balance of power, and she hoped to move beyond the 
“coconut” concept, to focus on ‘attitudes’ and ‘lack of knowledge’ rather than on 
whether these individuals ‘betray their own group’ or are ‘brown on the outside and 
white on the inside’. Although she did not use the two latter phrases, which her 
opponents tended to emphasize, a sense of betrayal and focus on skin color can 
reasonably be inferred from her content and ideological references. It seems that 
Qureshi wanted to move beyond ideas of ‘racial betrayal’ and instead problematize that 
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these persons support a dominant discourse hostile to minority interests. The same terms 
are interpreted differently depending on the ideological frames; from a liberal colorblind 
perspective, reference to skin color is seen as an indicator of cultural/racial essentialism, 
whereas in radical antiracism, ‘race’ is seen as socially constructed, but the concept is 
used to critically analyze racialized social structures. 
Rustad also objects to Qureshi’s expression ‘misused their cultural background’, which 
leads him to ask if there are rules for how to use one’s cultural background, and if there 
are ways that are forbidden? Rustad’s own answer is that this is group-based self-
jurisdiction, contrary to all individual liberation and autonomy. Here, he translates a 
debate on the ethics of using inside information for the benefit of hostile outsiders, into 
a legal discourse of individual versus collective rights. His position is clear; he sees any 
reference to collective interests as placing the group over the individual. According to 
Kymlicka (1995:35; 44-47), rhetoric about individual versus collective rights represents 
a false dichotomy which is irrelevant if the ‘source of threat’ is external to the group. 
Instead of granting priority to one kind of rights, he distinguishes between ‘internal 
restrictions’ and ‘external protections’. Only if a group seeks protection against insiders, 
there may be a conflict between individual and collective rights. The distinction 
between inside and outside sources is central to the ‘coconut’ problematic. Following 
Kymlicka, it is legitimate for a minority group to defend itself against ‘threats’ posed by 
external forces (‘external protection’). If a ‘coconut’ or ‘apostate’ is defined as a person 
who has left their group to become part of a hostile external force, then the threat is 
external. However, with regard to Rushdie, Kymlicka (1993b:93) defined apostasy as an 
internal betrayal. The argument that demands for protection against these individuals 
constitutes illegitimate internal restrictions (Rustad’s view) can be made because these 
individuals are still identified along ethnic lines despite the colorblind rhetoric and their 
efforts to assimilate. It is their ambiguous status as ‘ex-members’ which protects them 
against accusations of racism in the dominant discourse, allowing them to use stronger 
rhetoric than members of the majority could legitimately do. In contrast to Rustad’s 
anti-essentialist rhetoric, where group thinking as such is construed as racist, Parekh 
(2000:154-162) defends a notion of ‘loyalty to culture’ that goes beyond Kymlicka’s 
(1995:36) concept of group solidarity, which he sees as a possible basis for individual 
oppression. I return to a more detailed discussion of the group and individual in 
multicultural theory after analyzing the remaining debate contributions.  
Storhaug’s response (June 2) begins with stating her opposition to multiculturalism. On 
behalf of the Human Rights Service, she writes; We work politically for a well-
functioning multiethnic and multi-religious society. We don’t want a multicultural 
society. Note that she not only opposes multiculturalism as a policy, but also rejects a 
multicultural society. Her acceptance of a ‘multiethnic’ and ‘multi-religious’ society can 
be interpreted as tolerating ethnic backgrounds and religion in the private sphere. In the 
following elaboration, Storhaug makes clear that her ideal nation resembles the ‘French 
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model’ which does not recognize minority identities and seeks to assimilate minorities 
into a culturally unified nation. She writes; 
A precondition for creating and maintaining a peaceful nation-state like Norway 
is a strong national community; […] A community with high degree of trust and 
unity among citizens. A social cohesion built on a “we”, where “we” is based 
on shared language, fundamental values and central cultural characteristics. 
Where the population supports secular Norwegian democracy built on gender 
equality, equal dignity, religious freedom, free speech and pluralism. 
When Storhaug argues that a ‘peaceful nation-state’ requires a ‘strong national 
community’, she implies that a multicultural society necessarily leads to conflict. She 
argues that citizens need to share a common language and ‘fundamental values’ like 
secularism, gender equality and free speech. This is emphasized also in official 
Norwegian integration policy (see introduction), but a difference lies in interpreting 
these values, and Storhaug has made it clear elsewhere that she thinks Islam is 
incompatible with these values. However, she goes beyond official policy in demanding 
‘shared cultural characteristics’ indicating that assimilation is her ideal. So far, she has 
expressed relatively moderate views (with the exception of rejecting ‘multicultural 
society’). Her support for a ‘civic’ nation of the French type is clarified in the following 
(note the paternalist language when speaking about her ‘little friend’ from the ‘jungle’); 
To be a Norwegian citizen has nothing to do with ethnicity. One may thus be 
born in the jungle in Gambia, like my little friend [name deleted] and have a 
strong sense of belonging to Norway, and be a citizen as good as the members of 
the royal family. 
Storhaug goes on to promote Hirsi Ali as a role model for ‘good immigrant citizens’; 
The greatest European of our times, Somali-born Ayaan Hirsi Ali, is the clearest 
example that ethnicity and birth country is not a precondition for living as a full-
fledged citizen in Europe. I claim that not a single person in contemporary 
Europe has made a stronger contribution to manifest that equal dignity and 
human rights shall apply to every citizen here. […] I am personally humbled and 
grateful for Hirsi Ali’s contribution to the European struggle for freedom – the 
new battle against totalitarian religious forces that want to deny freedom and 
human dignity to women in particular. As a European I am proud to be able to 
identify with a real European like Hirsi Ali. 
Here, the language is no longer moderate; Storhaug describes Hirsi Ali as ‘the greatest 
European of our times’ – a ‘freedom fighter’ against ‘totalitarian religious forces’. 
When stating her ideological position, she used general terms that most people can 
agree with (‘democracy’, ‘gender equality’, ‘free speech’), but that are open to diverse 
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interpretations. By praising Hirsi Ali in such exaggerated language, Storhaug lends her 
support to Hirsi Ali’s explicitly anti-Muslim rhetoric analyzed earlier. It may thus be 
argued that Storhaug ‘hides’ behind a ‘native informant’ who validates her views. 
Elsewhere she has used much more explicit rhetoric (see chapter 4). There is little doubt 
that Storhaug and Hirsi Ali are allies in a ‘confrontational liberalist’ offensive against 
Islam (see also Fekete 2006:13-16; 19). Storhaug finds it disturbing that Qureshi defines 
Hirsi Ali as a traitor, who should not be listened to. Storhaug writes that she feels a 
fearful numbness and shame when Qureshi claims the right to exclude voices from the 
most important debate of our times; the debate about what we want for the future of 
Norway and Europe. She agrees with Rustad that calling Rehman a ‘coconut’ implies 
that he has betrayed his ethnic Pakistani origin by joining the [national] community. In 
line with her ideas of a culturally unified nation, she interprest the ‘coconut’ term as 
presenting minority persons with a choice between remaining in their communities, or 
join the national community and be seen as traitors. While both Rustad and Storhaug 
claim to reject group thinking and argue that it constitutes racism when citizens are 
classified according to ethnic and religious roots, their view on nationality and ethnicity 
is better described as conflicting loyalties rather than as individualism. It seems that 
their individualism and rejection of group thinking is restricted to criticism of ethnic 
minorities, while supporting nationalist communitarianism at the state level.    
As discussed in the introduction, racism requires the elements of differentiation, 
inferiorization and power (see Hervik 2004:151-153), and assimilation represents part 
of the problem rather than a solution to it (Modood 2005:14-17). Even classical anti-
Black racism allowed for “selective assimilation, the degree and kind determined by 
whites” (ibid). Modood points out that several contradictory views on assimilation can 
be compatible with racism; (1) that a group is unassimilable because of its religion; (2) 
that forced assimilation is necessary; and even (3) a policy of voluntary assimilation 
which puts (subtle) pressure on a racialized group to “voluntarily” assimilate to a 
majority culture believed to be superior. Storhaug writes from an ideological position 
that sees Islam as incompatible with ‘Western values’, demands assimilation and holds 
a belief in Western cultural superiority. This form of ‘new racism’ (Hervik 2004:151-
153) typically denies that this is a form of racism. Using a liberal rhetoric that only 
recognizes individual rights, this definition of racism is detached from structural 
analysis of power relations between majority and minority, and racism is narrowly 
defined as categorizing individuals into groups based on skin color, ethnicity or 
religion. Thus, multiculturalism can be rejected as ‘racist’ and minority demands 
dismissed as illegitimate attempts to deny individual rights of minority women.  
Responses from ‘native informants’ 
The next two responses came from those who had been called ‘coconuts’. Shakil 
Rehman (June 3), who was mentioned in Qureshi’s article, followed by Walid al-
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Kubaisi (June 8), a state-funded writer of Iraqi origin. For many years, al-Kubaisi has 
been an active participant in public debate, as a secularist and an opponent of the 
antiracist movement. Rehman writes that Qureshi tries to discredit him by calling him 
racist, and writes that she should apologize for having insulted the Norwegian majority 
by calling them racist. Rehman’s main point is that instead of “pulling the racism card” 
when Muslims are criticized, self-styled minority spokespersons should listen to 
constructive criticism of tradition and religion. Qureshi on the contrary, seems to see 
the majority as an enemy when religion or tradition is criticized. Rehman rejects that he 
has developed ‘ethnic self-hatred’ and presents himself as someone who wants respect 
and clean up our traditions that cause us public ridicule, give us a bad reputation and 
create xenophobia. Here, he does not distinguish between legitimate criticism of 
religion and culture on one hand, and anti-Muslim racism on the other. Further, he holds 
Muslim minorities responsible for racism against them, thus ‘blaming the victim’. These 
are examples of using ‘the same rhetoric as the Progress Party’. He criticizes Qureshi 
for pointing out that discrimination does not disappear when minorities assimilate, and 
calls this a pessimistic, demoralizing statement that prevents integration, and which 
encourages immigrant youth to stick together and avoid whites. Rehman thus places 
responsibility for integration exclusively on the minority, and identifies the obstacles to 
integration not in majority racism, but only in minority self-segregation. This rhetorical 
move combines ‘denial of racism’ and ‘blaming the victim’. In short, Rehman thinks 
that minorities should assimilate and pretend that racism does not exist, rather than 
defending their religious and cultural identities. In an attempt to support this argument, 
he draws a comparison with the Christian Reformation; 
When individual Christians started criticizing hierarchy, power and Christianity 
because of superstition and exploitation of people in the name of religion 400 
years ago, they were also harassed and many were burned alive. Were they 
racists, did they have “ethnic self-hatred” and [were they] “coconuts” […] ? 
While the secularization process in the Christian religion in earlier centuries has 
sometimes been construed as a parallel to contemporary attempts to reform Islam, a key 
weakness of this comparison becomes obvious when Rehman suggests that medieval 
Christian ‘heretics’ may have been construed as ‘racist’. Here, he disregards a 
fundamental aspect of racism as a relation of dominance between racialized (or ethno-
religious) groups. The reformation of Christianity was a process internal to European 
history, while contemporary attempts to reform Islam, although also driven by internal 
forces, cannot be seen apart from external pressure from the West. Internal Muslim 
reformers must thus avoid being seen as agents of the dominant West, if they want to 
have legitimacy in Muslim communities. 
Al-Kubaisi claims that Qureshi transfers these derogatory terms [‘coconut’ or ‘Uncle 
Tom’] from religious communities to the public sphere. In his view, these persons are 
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the brightest spot in the immigrant community, namely persons that have 
integrated, developed their individualist reflection on immigration and with 
courage and strength have managed to hold a nuanced view of both the 
immigrant community and larger society. 
His claim that the accounts of ‘native informants’ are nuanced is betrayed by his own 
article, where he presents many of the same arguments as Rehman, often more explicit; 
that Muslims themselves are to blame when the fear of Islam is confirmed as legitimate, 
and no longer is an illusory Islamophobia, and that minority communities need to be 
criticized; revealing negative aspects of immigrant communities is courageous loyalty 
to immigrants first, and then to the majority. In contrast to Rehman, al-Kubaisi’s 
rhetoric is structured around a dichotomy between the cultures of immigrants’ home 
countries, characterized by cruel traditions like forced marriages, female genital 
mutilation, gang crime, religious fanaticism and Islamist proselytizing; and Norway, a 
civilized and democratic society, with a tradition of self-criticism, tolerance and respect 
for people of a different opinion. Instead of learning from this good Norwegian 
tradition, Qureshi is accused of exercising a medieval tradition of intolerance 
automatically transferred from our home countries. In al-Kubaisi’s view, the prime 
distinction between ‘Norwegian’ and ‘immigrant’ culture is a dichotomy between 
individual freedom and the religious community; his criterion for successful 
“integration” is whether minority persons have ‘developed individualist reflection’ and 
do not defend their ‘religious community’ against criticism. Al-Kubaisi sees such 
individuals as an exception to a general picture of failed integration, characterized by 
the immigrant community’s 40 year-long stagnation. While Shakil Rehman, like his 
sister Shabana, is primarily concerned with ‘constructive criticism’ and reform of 
minority practices (though he demonstrates a weak analysis of racism), al-Kubaisi’s 
rhetoric is closer to Hirsi Ali’s confrontational position. Al-Kubasi is an ideological 
secularist, and his ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric reflects anti-Muslim discourse.  
Responses from Norwegian Muslims 
Omar Tanweer and Shoaib Sultan, later secretary-general of the Islamic Council 
Norway (2007-2010), summarize the debate in a commentary (June 26) formulated in a 
more modest language than Qureshi and her critics; 
Shabana Rehman and other Islam critics of Muslim origin are praised in 
Norway. They have little support from ethnic communities, but it may seem that 
the larger society needs them to confirm their own prejudices. 
They write that the integration debate has become more polarized and “more brutal” in 
the last decade, at the same time as new voices have emerged; some are praised, others 
are attacked. In line with research discussed earlier (Eide & Nikunen 2011:9-11; 
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Phillips 2008:112-114; Gullestad 2006b:50-56), they note that larger society indeed 
wants more immigrant voices, but prefers that these think, speak and act like them, and 
support their own worldview. They continue; 
One voice who obviously does not do this, and who has annoyed a number of 
people, is Iffit Qureshi. Her contribution to Aftenposten on May 24 triggered a 
landslide of criticism. Her fresh writing style and brutally honest descriptions 
have obviously been heavy to digest for many. Predictably, most of those who 
have criticized Qureshi belong to the camp that usually supplies the media with 
Islamophobic contributions. 
Sultan and Tanweer support Qureshi’s observations if not necessarily her writing style, 
which they describe as ‘brutally honest’; Even for many people of other ethnic origin 
than Norwegian, Qureshi’s article is hard to digest. But they nevertheless feel that she 
says what they don’t dare to say themselves. In the remainder of their piece, Sultan and 
Tanweer discuss whether Qureshi’s claims, which are supported by many minority 
persons, are correct. They take the case of Shabana Rehman as an example; the 
Norwegian public praised her as a representative of “oppressed Muslim women”: That 
most “oppressed Muslim women” did not want Rehman as spokeswoman, did not 
matter much. They don’t know their own good… The Muslim writers further point out; 
It is not Rehman’s opinions as such that are the problem; she may think 
whatever she likes. It is rather that larger society embraces these opinions, 
which is difficult. What the Rehman siblings say is not interesting to most 
Muslims in this country. What matters is that they do not represent us. It may 
seem that these are “perfect immigrants”, people who think and act Western, but 
who are a little brown on the outside. Thus, they also become a perfect alibi for 
anti-immigrant parties and their integration program. This is clearly the type of 
integration Hege Storhaug of the Human Rights Service talk about…  
Here, the two Muslim spokespersons argue that the main problem with ‘native 
informants’ is not that they have ‘internalized racism’ as Qureshi focused on, but how 
they are used to validate anti-immigrant politicians and activists, as when Storhaug calls 
Hirsi Ali a ‘real European’; a badge of honor you apparently get only for attacking 
Islam and Muslims in the hardest possible way, as Sultan and Tanweer observe. 
They criticize the logic of al-Kubaisi’s article, which constructs a dichotomy between 
Western individualism and Muslim religious collectivism. For al-Kubaisi, they write; 
Individualism apparently means to take over a number of objections against a 
given group. […] Individualism is reduced to apply to one specific viewpoint. If 
you criticize Islam, you are an individualist, an integrated, well-functioning and 
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bright example. Those who defend Islam and Muslims are automatically 
perceived as brainwashed… 
They point out an important contradiction in the rhetoric about individualism; criticism 
of religion is conflated with critical individualism and ‘free thinking’, even though 
secularism is now hegemonic and taken-for-granted in many European countries rather 
than a conscious choice between alternatives. Defense of religion, on the other hand, is 
conflated with being “brainwashed”. Sultan and Tanweer here agree with Jeff Spinner-
Halev’s (cited in Modood 2005:179-180) analysis, where members of marginalized 
conservative religious minorities “cannot be characterized as lacking autonomy or 
“knowing no better” in a society with constant temptations of a dominant liberal 
lifestyle. Rather, commitment to religion is a “constant choice” in the midst of a 
powerful secular-liberal mainstream that leaves no one unaware of its existence as an 
alternative. Back to the ‘coconut debate’, the two writers conclude; 
You may think what you want about Qureshi’s terminology, and it may have 
been too strong. But the debate she raises is of decisive significance. Qureshi 
deals with one aspect of the issue, that is how individuals acquire opinions that 
give them credibility and popularity in larger society. Another and perhaps more 
important problem is the larger picture, that is, that larger society creates a 
need for such persons. Either you call them coconuts or well-integrated 
individuals, it is very clear that parts of society have a preference for them. 
These Norwegians use the viewpoints of assimilated persons to confirm their 
own prejudices. 
This paragraph suggests that Sultan and Tanweer’s approach differs from Qureshi’s. 
Where Qureshi focuses on criticizing minority persons who have taken over racist 
rhetoric; Sultan and Tanweer emphasize majority society’s preference for minority 
persons who confirm their prejudice. While Qureshi focuses on individual agency, and 
holds minority persons who seek majority acceptance at the expense of their group, 
responsible, Sultan and Tanweer’s focus is structural; the main problem is the 
majority’s assimilation pressure on minorities. As Parekh (2000:204) writes in this 
regard; “Subjected to the relentless assimilationist pressure of the dominant culture”, 
members of minority cultures, “especially youth, internalize their inferior status and opt 
for uncritical assimilation”. 
In an interview in the left-wing weekly magazine Ny Tid (November 17, 2006), Qureshi 
is interviewed about the ‘coconut debate’. Here, she says; obviously I hit a sore spot. A 
friend of mine thinks I should never have used the word coconut. I should have called 
them ass-kissers. She continues; I get almost exclusively positive feedback from the 
immigrant community. Several people have told me that I write what they themselves 
feel, but have never dared to say in public. Members of the majority, on the other hand, 
140 
 
have claimed that she denies free speech to her opponents, and that she is brainwashed 
by her own community. She tells the following example; 
I have been stopped on the street and scolded: “How do you dare say this to 
Hege Storhaug?” a man told me after I had written in the newspaper. I 
answered back that he had bad manners. “Are you trying to prevent me from 
using my freedom of expression?” he said… 
Qureshi emphasizes that she supports free speech. Neither is she a conservative Muslim. 
Unlike some other Norwegian Muslims, she rarely refers to religion, though she joined 
the ‘hijab brigade’ to defend Muslim women’s right to wear the hijab (see chapter 4).  
Theoretical discussion: groups and individuals in multicultural theory 
Possible conflicts between the interests of groups and individuals have been a central 
issue in theories of multiculturalism. According to Kymlicka (1995:47), this dichotomy 
is only relevant in cases of ‘internal restrictions’ while in cases of ‘external protections’, 
i.e. when a minority group seeks protection against racism and majority pressure to 
assimilate, there is no conflict between the interests and ‘rights’ of the individual and 
group. ‘Native informants’ criticize the oppression of individual rights within minority 
groups, and have often had negative personal experiences with practices such as forced 
marriages and female circumcision, which Kymlicka (1995:40-41) discusses as 
examples of traditional cultural practices a minority group may want to impose on its 
members. Defenders of group interests are often accused of wanting to deny these 
individuals the right to criticize and revise traditional practices, i.e. impose restrictions 
on internal dissent. In her article, Qureshi wrote that she supports ‘women’s liberation’ 
and the battle against ‘oppression and violence’, but emphasized that this is an internal 
struggle. Many minority women work against these practices within their communities, 
in contrast to the ‘generalizing and stigmatizing rhetoric’ of ‘coconuts’ who use ‘their 
own negative experiences to define the situation for all minorities’. ‘Native informants’ 
are not criticized for their ‘internal dissent’, defined by Kymlicka (1995:35) as for 
example, “the decision of individual members not to follow traditional practices or 
customs”, but for joining external forces hostile to community interests. As such, they 
can be understood as part of larger society, whose racism and assimilation pressure 
minority groups may legitimately ask protection against. Qureshi criticizes ‘coconuts’ 
for leaving the group rather than working for change internally; reflecting Albert 
Hirschman’s distinction between ‘exit’ (flight) or ‘voice’ (fight) strategies. Many 
feminists argue, as does Hirschman himself, that ‘voice’ is a better strategy than 
individual exit if the goal is to generate internal change (Phillips 2007:139-140). 
Kymlicka (1995:36) notes that critics of group rights typically focus on “theocratic and 
patriarchal cultures” which may seek to impose restrictions on the individual freedom to 
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choose one’s religion and to break with traditional gender roles. He acknowledges that 
group rights justified in terms of external protections may also be used to impose 
internal restrictions, depending on the circumstances (Kymlicka 1995:37). Kymlicka 
discusses this possibility with regard to indigenous people, immigrant groups and 
religious minorities. It has been claimed that Native American groups may want to 
control internal dissent and oppress individuals “in the name of group solidarity or 
cultural purity” (ibid, 39), but many members of these groups “insist that this fear of 
sexual oppression reflects misinformed or prejudiced stereotypes about their cultures”. 
They argue for self-determination not because they want to restrict individual freedom, 
but because they worry that white authorities will “impose their own culturally specific 
form of democracy, without considering whether traditional […] practices are an 
equally valid interpretation of democratic principles” (ibid). 
Kymlicka (ibid, 41) argues that while the threat to individual rights from internal 
restrictions is real enough, existing multicultural policies consistently endorse some 
external protections but reject internal restrictions. Furthermore, he argues that very few 
immigrant organizations have sought policies that impose internal restrictions; and that 
those groups who do demand internal restrictions are typically religious communities. 
Kymlicka argues that such demands are rare (ibid, 42), and his examples are primarily 
Christian sects like the Amish (which he categorizes as ‘isolationist religious groups’), 
and which may also want to restrict their members’ ability to ‘exit’, but he also refers to 
British Muslim leaders seeking legal recognition of sharia law in family affairs. Most 
interesting for our discussion, Kymlicka (ibid, 43) mentions British Muslim demands to 
extend hate speech laws to protect religious groups in the Rushdie affair, and argues that 
such laws “can also be used to restrict the spread of blasphemy or apostasy within a 
religious community”. Citing the Rushdie Affair as an example, Kymlicka argues that; 
“there is reason to think that some Muslim leaders seek such laws primarily to control 
apostasy within the Muslim community, rather than to control the expression of non-
Muslims”. Here, it seems Kymlicka identifies Rushdie as simultaneously an apostate 
(who left Islam) and still a Muslim. This apparent contradiction can be explained if we 
note that Rushdie still identifies as a Muslim, while Muslims see him as an apostate. 
Constructed this way, Rushdie did not leave the Muslim community as much as he was 
excluded because of how he wrote about Islam. This view is in line with Phillips 
(2007:137), who argues that a more common problem than groups denying individuals 
the ‘right to exit’ is that “people, who continue to identify with their group, but break 
some of its cultural prescriptions, may find themselves excluded against their wishes”.  
Concept of community in the Muslim tradition 
Beliefs and practices are increasingly individualized among young European Muslims, 
who transform their inherited Muslim identity into a personal choice (Jacobsen 
2011:373). At the same time, Muslim identity also remains a communal identity; either 
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it is thought of as belonging to a worldwide Muslim community, the umma (Jacobsen 
2011:107-109), or to traditional ethnic and cultural communities of the parental 
generation (ibid, 371). Modood (2005:16) points out that in the South Asian context, 
persons who define themselves as atheists are still categorized as Muslims; and “giving 
up one’s religion is likely to be seen as a form of selling out”. Renouncing one’s 
Muslim identity is then less about individual religious belief, and more like light-
skinned African Americans ‘passing for white’ rather than asserting their Black identity; 
similar to the ‘Uncle Tom’ figure. 
Mazrui (1989:80-81) argues that according to many Muslims, Rushdie was guilty of 
“cultural treason”; Rushdie had not merely rejected or disagreed with Islam, but abused 
the religion and in return for this, was praised, rewarded and financed by hostile critics 
and enemies of Islam. Mazrui attempts to explain the concept of ‘apostasy’ as almost 
synonymous with ‘treason to the religious community’ (the umma), and makes a 
parallel to the concept of ‘treason to the state’, which can be generally defined as 
collaboration with the enemy, usually in times of war or a war-like situation. In order to 
make the Islamic tradition of capital punishment for this kind of treason understandable 
to Westerners, he cites an example from the McCarthy era in the US, when two 
American communists were executed for treason. Whether they were actually Soviet 
spies or merely American dissenters, is not clear.   
Akhtar (1989:71-79), in his discussion of the Rushdie affair, gives a more detailed 
elaboration on the concept of ‘apostasy’ in the Islamic tradition. Given that the early 
Islamic state in Medina at the time of Prophet Mohammed was in a state of war with 
external political forces, the Qur’an contains detailed discussions of punishments for 
‘traitors’ against the Islamic state and other collaborators with the enemy. In Akhtar’s 
understanding, the holy book does not prescribe a penalty for apostasy alone; however, 
it prescribes the death penalty if aggravated by treason in a military context, breach of 
treaty with a Muslim party, ideological or physical enmity to Muslims, or attempts to 
bring Islam into disrepute. Although there are Islamic jurists, including contemporary 
Islamists, who have demanded the death penalty for “privately committed apostasy”, 
Akhtar argues that “only those suspected of spying are likely to face execution for 
broadly political (as opposed to religious) considerations of security” (ibid, 73). There is 
no consensus among learned authorities on a ‘correct’ attitude towards apostasy; many 
reject the view that apostasy is a capital offence, while some Islamists see conversion as 
a one-way street, allowing “no way out” of Islam. The latter tend to define “Muslim” as 
including any self-identified Muslim individuals regardless of whether they practice the 
religion, as many Muslims fail to fulfill religious obligations. Akhtar (ibid, 76) points 
out that suspected apostates are often forgiven, and sums up that this means in general; 
Muslims who privately commit apostasy are not harassed by the Islamic 
establishment. However, those who publicly insult the Prophet or launch abusive 
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attacks on the contents of the Koran and the […] Islamic tradition are almost 
always taken to task for it. 
Further, he notes that “enlightened Muslim opinion” now recognizes that many 
individuals are Muslims by chance rather than by choice, and that the fear of apostasy 
must be balanced with due regard for freedom of belief; “if there is a God, it can be 
safely assumed that he wants a voluntary response born of genuine conviction” and 
would prefer ‘apostasy’ to “hypocritical attachment to orthodox opinion out of the fear 
of public sanctions” (Akhtar 1989:76). 
In Rushdie’s case, Islamic jurists have interpreted his attack on Islam as an act of 
treason because his “privately committed apostasy” was “aggravated by a public 
declaration of ideological enmity” (ibid, 77); many Muslims have known that Rushdie 
was an apostate and atheist for many years, but few criticized him or threatened his life 
until the publication of the Satanic Verses (ibid, 78). Numerous other individuals of 
Muslim background have repudiated Islam, and been tolerated by Muslims. In Akhtar’s 
view, people like Rushdie are entitled to reject or reinterpret Islam as a “personal” 
option, as well as to publicly criticize Muslim individuals, such as fundamentalists, but 
when publicly attacking an entire religion and reviling things held sacred, they should 
be aware of the risk that Muslims will react. 
The Islamic concept of apostasy can thus be understood in a restricted sense as “cultural 
treason” or in a broader sense including private defection from the faith. In either sense, 
it is understood less as a matter of individual freedom of belief, and more in terms of 
leaving the Muslim community; some strands of Muslim thinking are reluctant to allow 
this individual ‘right to exit’. Returning to our discussion of multicultural theories, here 
the ‘right to exit’ is “one of the few uncontested rights” (Phillips 2007:136) and usually 
suggested as one possible solution when individual and group interests are in conflict. 
The point of theoretical disagreement is not whether individuals should have the right to 
leave their cultural community, but whether the ‘right to exit’ offers enough protection 
against “cultural pressures” (ibid, 137) or ‘internal restrictions’. 
The ‘right to exit’ 
From a feminist perspective, Phillips (ibid, 138-139) is skeptical of relying on ‘exit’ as a 
solution to internal oppression, and identifies two main difficulties; (1) that the ‘right to 
exit’ may be unrealistic in practice because the individual costs of exit are high, and (2) 
that favoring the ‘exit’ solution discourages change, as internal dissenters leave rather 
than fight for reforms. Both of these objections are relevant to empirical example from 
British (and Norwegian) government initiatives to fight forced marriages, which have 
tended to focus on ‘exit’; helping individuals to escape from their family and 
community. Phillips (ibid, 149) argues that the ‘exit’ approach offers these individuals 
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with a choice between ‘two evils’; when rejecting an unwanted marriage partner comes 
at the cost of losing one’s family, cultural identity and religious community, the costs 
are too high, and many “rescued” individuals have drifted back to their families because 
of loneliness. The second objection is that the ‘exit’ approach encourages Okin’s view 
that some minority women would be better off if they assimilate and their ‘culture’ 
becomes extinct. This individualist approach offers no solution to most young minority 
individuals, who wish to stay members of their cultural or religious groups, while 
wanting to change certain oppressive practices (Phillips 2007:157). Phillips thus 
discusses the problems of the ‘exit’ approach as a solution for individuals seeking to 
escape internal oppression, but does not address ‘external protections’ against racism. 
This individualist focus allows her, among other things, to discuss Storhaug and the 
Human Rights Service as an organization helping minority women against forced 
marriages (ibid, 175) without problematizing its racist views (Razack 2008).  
Like Modood, Phillips seeks to defend an anti-essentialist version of multiculturalism 
without reducing it to a cosmopolitan celebration of hybridity (Phillips 2007:68-70), but 
her “multiculturalism without culture” differs from Modood in being restricted to 
recognizing individual rights, not group rights (ibid, 162-165). Phillips (ibid, 161-164) 
is critical of versions of multiculturalism understood as negotiations with cultural 
communities because this ‘dialogue’ approach relies on consulting with and 
accommodating interests of male community leaders, who falsely represent themselves 
as spokespersons of their group. Modood’s (2007) version of multiculturalism is not 
based on an essentialist concept of culture (ibid, 93-97), but nevertheless defined as 
recognizing group interests, where groups are based on ‘politicized ethnic and religious 
identities’ rather than ‘culture’ (ibid, 43). He argues that there is nothing fictitious about 
the “unity” resulting from a minority group’s mobilization on the basis of shared 
interests (ibid, 111-114); and that recognizing Muslims as a group does not necessarily 
mean promoting religious leaders as spokespersons of the community (ibid, 133-136). 
Modood’s perspective thus focuses primarily on minority groups’ political mobilization 
against racism, and while recognizing a diversity of viewpoints within each group 
(2007:133-136), he has less to say about the relationship between individual and group 
interests.  
Parekh (2000) is skeptical of politicized ethnic and religious identities (ibid, 199), but 
defends the collective interests of cultural communities against those who give primacy 
to individual rights (ibid, 213-216). Contrary to theorists like Modood and Phillips who 
reject the concept of ‘culture’, Parekh defends a more nuanced understanding of the 
term. He distinguishes between two related dimensions of a “cultural community”; i.e. 
“culture” and “community” (ibid, 154). To illustrate that these two aspects are distinct, 
he mentions minority individuals who “cherish their culture, but leave their community” 
because they find it oppressive; or who “reject their culture, but remain deeply attached 
to their community” in cases where the community tolerates dissent. In the latter case, 
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traditional cultural practices of a community may change while it retains its ethnic 
identity (Parekh 2000:155). Growing up in a cultural community means being deeply 
influenced by its cultural content, which shapes individual identity; and develops a 
sense of belonging and communal solidarity with a group of people (ibid, 156). Parekh 
acknowledges that “every culture includes several, sometimes conflicting, strands of 
thought and is subject to contestation and conflicting interpretations” and thus rejects an 
essentialist view of homogenous and unchanging cultures that determine thought and 
practice of its passive members (ibid, 157). 
‘Loyalty to culture’ 
Parekh discusses Rushdie’s “lack of loyalty” (Said’s view) or “cultural treason” 
(Mazrui’s view) in the context of the African American terms ‘coconut’ and ‘Uncle 
Tom’ which criticize those who “fail to stand up for their community, turn their backs 
on it, or go over ‘to the other side’ and feed the cultural and racist prejudices of the 
white majority” (ibid, 159). He uses this as a starting point for discussing individual 
obligations to their community (ibid, 158-162). He acknowledges that the idea might 
appear strange, but explains that ‘loyalty to culture’ is no different from being “true to 
the central values and ideals” of science or art, religion or the liberal tradition. Unless 
we think that our culture is worthless, oppressive and has distorted our intellectual and 
moral development, we feel a sense of loyalty which generates a duty to preserve and 
pass on to the next generation the aspects we find valuable, defend it against “perverse 
misrepresentations” and “protect it against wanton attempts to destroy or discard it” 
(ibid, 160). Loyalty to culture also involves the duty to develop it further, including 
criticizing and removing its defects and injustices. 
Loyalty to community is similar to loyalty to family, and includes being grateful for a 
network of support and solidarity. The obligation of loyalty is stronger if the community 
faces an external threat; Parekh argues (ibid, 161). This aspect of loyalty generates 
duties owed to other community members rather than to ideals, and these duties may 
persist even if one rejects the culture. Parekh argues that members of a cultural 
community have a duty to resist the temptation to “circumvent cultural and moral 
constraints in pursuit of narrow self-interest or gratification of fleeting impulses” since 
this will destroy the cultural community. Parekh (ibid) explicitly criticizes ‘coconuts’; 
[Community members] have a duty to defend it against mischievous 
misrepresentations and not to allow themselves to be used by others for such 
purposes, a point made by many African Americans against those of them who 
readily endorse anti-black prejudices in the hope of material and other rewards. 
With regard to the ‘coconut debate’, Parekh places responsibility on minority 
individuals “not to allow themselves to be used” by hostile forces among the majority. 
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However, this does not mean that individuals should not criticize negative practices in 
their communities. On the contrary, he emphasizes that the ‘duty to respect culture’ is 
similar to the duty to respect other persons; it “does not prevent us from judging and 
criticizing their choices and ways of life” based on a “sympathetic understanding” after 
“careful consideration and listening to their defence” (Parekh 2000:176). We may insist 
on respect for human dignity and personal choice, but should not confuse these with 
liberal individualism and full-scale autonomy. Parekh criticizes both mono-culturalist 
universalism, which argues that some cultures are superior and have the right to impose 
themselves on others and thus ignores a community’s right to its culture; and cultural 
relativism, which argues that we are not entitled to judge, criticize or press for changes 
in beliefs and practices. In cases where we find these beliefs and practices “outrageous 
and it seems incapable of changing them”, Parekh reminds us that every culture has 
reformist tendencies and its beliefs and practices are best changed from within, as the 
outsider is “unlikely to fully understand its complexity” (ibid, 177). 
Parekh criticizes the assimilationist view expressed by Storhaug in the ‘coconut debate’, 
which “takes the nation state as its ideal and believes that no polity can be stable and 
cohesive unless its members share a common national culture, including common 
values, ideals of excellence, moral beliefs and social practices” (ibid, 197). In this view, 
minorities are faced with a choice between becoming equal members of society, in 
which case they have to assimilate; or insist on retaining their separate cultures, in 
which case they should not complain about exclusion and discrimination. Parekh 
emphasizes that “there is nothing wrong with assimilation. If minorities freely decide to 
assimilate into the dominant culture, their decisions should be respected and they should 
be given every opportunity and help to do so”, but imposing assimilation by making it a 
condition for equal citizenship is not only “indefensible and likely to provoke 
resistance”, but also misguided, as the larger society is rarely as homogenous, coherent 
and unified as the assimilationist assumes (ibid, 197). 
While Parekh argues that individual rights can be used to destroy communities, and 
defends the right of cultural communities to resist assimilation, he recognizes that group 
rights may also threaten individual rights, as when a group wants to “enforce moral 
conformity or expel its members or deny them the right to exit” (ibid, 216). He seeks to 
‘balance’ the interests of individuals and groups (ibid, 216-219), and suggests a “trade-
off between these [collective] and individual rights in cases of conflict”. While outsiders 
do have a right to sympathetic criticism of cultural beliefs and practices, these should 
preferably be reformed by internal forces. On the other hand, Parekh acknowledges that 
cultural communities may be “internally oppressive and refuse to change” (ibid, 219), 
and insists that a collectivity’s internal decision-making process should enjoy broad 
support from its members, provide them with an acceptable mode of redress, and allow 
them the right to exit “without excessive cost” since “individual rights are just as, or 
even more, important and deserve to be safeguarded” (ibid, 218-219). 
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Parekh (2000:161-162) criticizes a liberal tendency to reduce cultural communities to 
voluntary associations like “clubs, political parties and pressure groups” which 
individuals can easily ‘exit’ from (see also Phillips 2007:134), and insists that they are 
“wholly misunderstood if conceptualized as such”. The decisive difference relates to the 
question of individual choice and the possibility of exit; while individuals freely join 
and leave voluntary organizations according to their personal interests, membership in a 
cultural community is usually by birth rather than by choice, and whereas exit is 
possible, it tends to be partial rather than complete, as individuals have internalized the 
values and ideals of the cultural community they have grown up in.  
The ‘politics of exit’ 
Parekh thoroughly discusses the cultural aspects of the ‘coconut’ problematic, but he 
does not offer a political analysis of power relations between majority and minority, 
which is central to a structural understanding of individual exit. Sociologist of religion, 
David Bromley, offers such an analysis of different ‘exit roles’ and the specific 
phenomenon of exiting individuals who join hostile external forces. He defines 
“apostasy” as “a contested and highly politicized form of exit” from religious groups in 
conflict with larger society, which construes them as “subversive” (Bromley 1998c:vii). 
His empirical data is primarily drawn from “new religious movements” in the United 
States, which tend to be more ‘isolationist’ than immigrant minorities like European 
Muslims, who generally want to ‘integrate’ (Kymlicka 2002:353-357; Parekh 
2000:178). Theorists of multiculturalism frequently use “religious sects” like the Amish 
(Kymlicka 1995:41; Phillips 2007:141-143; Parekh 2000:217) as example to illustrate 
dilemmas between individual and group rights, and a comparison of European Muslims 
and “religious sects” (as already suggested by Kymlicka) may offer additional insights 
into the often conflictual relationship between Muslim minorities and majority society. 
Specifically, Bromley’s study of how exiting ‘sect members’ are used by hostile ‘anti-
cult’ groups to support their political agenda parallels the use of ‘native informants’ by 
anti-Islam groups. Bromley (1998a:19-48) distinguishes three types of exit, which 
correspond to three types of ‘organizations’ based on their degree of tension with, and 
legitimacy in, mainstream society. The typology can in principle be applied to any 
social organization, but Bromley’s empirical focus is on religious groups and more 
specifically, on “new religious movements” or “religious sects” (ibid, 19). These three 
types are understood as ideal types along a continuum (ibid, 21), and specific religious 
groups may move from one type to another over time, and more importantly, the same 
group may simultaneously fit various ideal types depending on political circumstances, 
as was the case with the Mormons and Catholics, who have moved over time from 
‘subversive’ to ‘allegiant’ in the US, but are still seen as ‘contestant’ in certain contexts 
(Bromley 1998b:6; see also Mauss 1998:53).  
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“Allegiant” groups (Bromley 1998a:21-22), such as mainstream churches (e.g. 
Catholics in contemporary secular-protestant societies), have a low degree of tension 
with mainstream society; their interests coincide to a large extent with majority society, 
which takes a neutral or allied position towards them. Enjoying legitimacy, they are able 
to exercise a high degree of autonomy in resolving disputes internally. The typical exit 
role from allegiant groups is the “defector” (ibid, 27-31), who negotiates exit with group 
leaders without challenging the group. Individual exit is common to all three types of 
religious group, and most cases do not involve public conflict between group and 
individual; allegiant groups are most likely to be able to prevent public conflict. As 
Bromley points out, most ‘organizations’ including religious groups have internally 
accepted negative practices that may lead to internal conflict, and which may discredit 
the group if disclosed to the general public. In allegiant groups, these practices usually 
remain unexposed, since disputes are resolved internally, either the ‘organization’ 
reforms its practices or “punishes” the dissident. In the latter case, the dissident is faced 
with a choice between ‘loyalty’, ‘voice’ or ‘exit’ in Hirschman’s terminology.    
“Contestant” groups (ibid, 22-23) have a moderate degree of tension with larger society, 
where they find both allies and opponents. They are deemed legitimate, but also subject 
to challenge and constraint. Thus, they have limited autonomy, and are subject to 
external regulations. The typical exit role from contestant groups is the “whistleblower” 
(ibid, 31-35), defined as an individual member who forms an alliance with an external 
regulatory unit, and offers personal testimony of negative practices that is then used to 
sanction the organization. These individuals can be thought of as internal “heretics” 
who involve external parties in a conflict in order to achieve internal change, but who 
often end up leaving the group, because leadership perceives them as disloyal. In most 
cases, individuals accept negative practices because they do not want to take on the risk 
of whistleblowing. To external regulatory units, whistleblowers play an important role 
because of the inside information they can provide, and are often seen as heroes. 
Bromley notes that whistleblowing is uncommon in religious organizations, which are 
usually not subject to this type of external regulation, but there are exceptions like the 
recent sexual abuse cases in the Catholic Church, which were taken to the media by 
victims not satisfied with how cases were handled internally. When official regulatory 
units are absent, independent groups often assume the task, focusing on sectarian 
churches in particular. 
“Subversive” groups (ibid, 23-25), typically “religious sects”, have a high degree of 
tension and low degree of shared interests with the larger society. They often subscribe 
to alternative versions of social order, are resistant to the dominant order, and have 
strong internal solidarity. By opponents seeking to discredit them, they are stigmatized 
as subversive, dangerous and threatening, even as “essentially evil”. There are largely 
seen as illegitimate and face continuous opposition; they are likely to be targets of 
social control measures “designed to contain, suppress or destroy” them, including 
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“covert surveillance, planting of undercover agents, or even instigation of provocative 
incidents by agents provocateurs” (Bromley 1998a:24). The counter-subversion 
ideology of their opponents constructs these groups as secretive, conspiratorial and 
rapidly growing; and their goals and principles as opposed to those of the legitimate 
social order. Groups labeled subversive face great difficulties defending themselves 
against coercive control measures, as their spokespersons are often denied access to the 
public or their claims are publicly denounced. The typical exit role from subversive 
groups is the “apostate” (ibid, 35-39), a term which in Bromley’s usage does not include 
religious exit in general, but is reserved for oppositional exit. An apostate can be 
defined as “a role that is constructed when an organization is in a high state of tension 
with its surrounding environment and that involves an individual exiting the 
organization to form an alliance with an oppositional coalition” (ibid, 19). In the 
process, the apostate “undertakes a total change of loyalties” (ibid, 36). The only 
distinction from a traitor is that the apostate is constructed as having no other choice 
than to “escape” from an “essentially evil” group.  
Despite the small number of individuals, apostasy is a significant social phenomenon, as 
these individuals form an important part of a political campaign to control a religious 
group, their accounts are prominent in the media and heavily influence public opinion to 
mobilize opposition to a religious group and impose sanctions on it (ibid, 20). In its 
prototypical form, apostasy is thus 
created in a situation of intense conflict and power imbalance where claims of 
subversion are advanced against a group […]. This form of claims-making is 
employed to authorize an expansion in the scope and severity of social control 
measures. Dramatic, compelling evidence of the alleged evil is imperative to 
mobilize and sustain an opposition coalition and neutralize potential resistance. 
Apostates play a pivotal role in creating such evidence, offering personal 
testimony in which they attest to witnessing and being compelled to participate 
in the target movement’s nefarious activities. The role is constructed in 
interaction between the individuals exiting putatively subversive movements and 
one or more parties in the oppositional coalition. (ibid, 20-21) 
Exiting members of subversive groups find a large number of external parties to whom 
they can turn for support; these even actively recruit exiting individuals into the 
oppositional roles, and provide “social networks through which exiting members can 
reinterpret personal troubles as organizational problems” (ibid, 36). Bromley notes that 
given the polarized situation and power imbalance, there is strong pressure on 
individuals who exit from subversive organizations to negotiate a narrative with the 
oppositional groups (ibid, 37). Yet only a few exiting individuals turn their negative 
experiences into a moral campaign against their former group, and pursue “apostate 
careers” as “professional ex-members” aligned with a countermovement (Wright 
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1998:97). These apostates polarize their former and present identities, and their exit is 
framed as a conversion; a “darkness-to-light personal transformation”. The 
countermovement ideologically constructs members of subversive groups as “enemies 
of freedom” or of the state, and their leaders may be cast as terrorists (ibid, 98-99), but it 
has a special role for ex-members, who often take a “victim” role, as a person to be 
“helped” rather than punished. Drawing on Bromley’s theoretical perspective, Stuart 
Wright (1998:100) argues that the apostate role is constructed by the countermovement 
and exists independently of specific individuals who are expected to perform the role as 
defined by the countermovement, which provides “help” to transform personal trauma 
into a political campaign against the religious group (ibid, 101). Apostate narratives are 
typically structured around “captivity” and “escape” or “rescue”. Ex-members renounce 
their previous loyalty, and warn the public of the dangers of the group they were part of. 
Often, they pursue “apostate careers” where they use their personal experiences from 
inside the group to support the opposition; often modifying their story to appeal to 
specific interests among the opposition (Bromley 1998c:38). Bromley writes that 
“apostates must completely renounce the former organization even while their careers 
depend upon highlighting and displaying their former membership as the basis of their 
credibility”, and thus “their participation in mainstream society is predicated on 
preserving their prior identity” (ibid.). 
Anson Shupe (1998:210-211) points out that “new religious movements” are not the 
only religious groups seen as subversive by counter-movements which used apostate 
narratives of personal experiences with ‘evil’ practices to legitimize their ideology, and 
draws attention to nineteenth century anti-Catholic and anti-Mormon hate literature. 
American anti-cult literature appeared in the 1970s in the form of local newspaper and 
magazine reports, creating public awareness of a “cult problem” and influencing public 
opinion, followed by autobiographical accounts in book form, before experiencing a 
decline in media interest in the 1980s, when it became clear to anti-cult activists that the 
US government would tolerate these religious groups (ibid, 214), atrocity stories were 
undermined by empirical research (ibid, 215), and “new religious movements” became 
more mainstream (ibid, 216).  
Muslims as a subversive group 
With the emerging new enemy image of Muslims after the Cold War, a new category of 
apostate narratives became popular, i.e. the “behind-the-veil” genre about oppressed 
Muslim women, which is characterized as “recycled Orientalism” by Thorbjørnsrud 
(2005:42), who discusses how Muslim women are constructed as “objects of pity”; they 
are described as oppressed by “barbarian” Muslim men and thus in need of “help” or 
“rescue” from the majority; these discursive constructions revive Orientalist stereotypes 
about Muslim women, which served to legitimize colonialism (Thorbjørnsrud 
2003:134-137; see also Abu-Lughod 2002; Razack 2008). Forced marriages, physical 
151 
 
abuse and other forms of oppression are serious problems for a significant number of 
Muslim women; however, they are not “typical” of Muslim society as these 
generalizing narratives and media stories would have us believe (Thorbjørnsrud 
2003:139). She describes the “behind-the-veil” genre of books as “soap documentaries” 
about personal tragedies of Muslim women, a genre that has become widely popular 
also in Norway since Betty Mahmoudi’s Not without my daughter from 1988. These 
books, written by Muslim women who have “escaped” their predicament, are often 
introduced as being about Muslim women in general, as revealing the truth about “life 
behind the veil”. In newspaper reviews, such books tend to be praised as the most 
important book published, as if each book is a groundbreaking new revelation of a truth 
that has not been discussed before (ibid, 140-142). Thorbjørnsrud (2005:42) points out 
that in relation to such books, publishers and reviewers “seem often to lose any form of 
normal critical distance”, as these accounts are usually fictionalized and sometimes even 
based on fabricated stories (ibid, 42-49). The literature about women escaping 
oppressive Muslim communities shares central features of apostate narratives as 
discussed by Daniel Carson Johnson (1998:115-138; see also Bromley 1998b:8-9), who 
describes them as a “distinctive literary genre” balancing a thin line between fact and 
fiction (Johnson 1998:116). While some accounts are demonstrably fabricated; the 
fictionalization of personal history and religious context varies in extent, but usually 
goes beyond the selective reconstruction of an individual life story in most other 
autobiographies, because apostate narratives are shaped by a political concern to make 
the religious group look as bad as possible (ibid, 118-119). Further, the narrative is 
spatially and temporally separated from its readers, making it difficult to determine 
whether the accounts are true. To increase their credibility, they are typically 
accompanied by political statements denouncing the religious group as ‘subversive’.  
While the anti-Muslim discourse in media and politics construes Muslims as subversive, 
the relationship between Western majorities and Muslim minorities is more diversified 
and complex. Applying Bromley’s typology to Muslim communities in contemporary 
Norway, we may say that their position is politically contested and they fit different 
types in different political settings. Most Norwegian Muslims would want their 
religious community to be seen as “allegiant” and emphasize the shared interests with 
the mainstream. From a multiculturalist perspective, which recognizes groups, Muslim 
communities should enjoy legitimacy and autonomy, and let individuals exit without 
public attention. The position of the Norwegian government, for some years 
increasingly concerned with negative practices that violate individual rights, and 
consulting with “whistleblowers” like Kadra and Amal Aden, probably fits best with 
framing Muslim communities as “contestant” groups, subjected to external regulations. 
This view would be in line with a liberal multiculturalism along the lines of Kymlicka. 
The anti-Muslim network of populist right parties and various organizations, including 
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the Progress Party and the Human Rights Service, construe Muslim communities as 
‘subversive’, and use ‘apostates’ like Hirsi Ali to validate their views.  
The contemporary European network of “Islam critics” constructs Muslim minorities as 
potentially subversive; allegedly adhering to values incompatible with those of Europe, 
and see Muslim leaders as “closet Islamists” who threaten to “Islamicize” European 
societies (Kundnani 2008:40-44). Their ideology and practice shows several parallels 
with Bromley’s (1998b:39-43) analysis of the American anti-cult movement’s 
organized campaign against “religious sects”. Like the anti-cult movement, which styled 
itself as a “social control organization” that successfully shaped public opinion and 
lobbied the government to increase control measures against “cults”, the Human Rights 
Service has investigated and exposed negative practices in Muslim communities, 
reported suspected instances of female circumcision and forced marriage to authorities, 
influenced public opinion and successfully lobbied the government to tighten 
regulations on family reunification and stricter integration policy. They have also 
recruited several young Muslim women, whose “apostate narratives” construct them as 
escaping or being rescued from internal oppression by their families and communities 
and their “evil” practices. Storhaug’s construction of veiled Muslim women as 
“brainwashed” individuals who do not know their own best interest (discussed in 
chapter 4) parallels the ideology of the anti-cult movement as described by Bromley.  
While most exiting members do not get involved in a conflict between a religious group 
and mainstream society, public debate tends to be dominated by a small number of 
apostates that have been recruited by oppositional forces. In certain aspects, Storhaug’s 
methods of “helping” young Muslim women resemble practices of the anti-cult 
movement, especially at the more voluntary end of a continuum ranging from 
“counseling” to “deprogramming”. Bromley notes that while apostates occasionally 
function as whistleblowers, offering evidence of negative practices that can become a 
basis for legal action, generally their primary function is moral condemnation of the 
group they have left. Their personal narratives typically recount personal captivity and 
witnessing atrocities, and highlight media reports and countermovement lobbying 
campaigns. This moral condemnation of ‘fundamental and massive’ violations serves to 
create a hostile public opinion which discredits any defense from the religious groups; 
whose contented members are dismissed as ‘brainwashed’. In the final section of this 
chapter, I discuss some empirical examples of politically contested exit in Norwegian 
public debate. 
Politically contested ‘exit’ from Norwegian Muslim communities 
In 2004, Kadra and two other Muslim girls who had been “helped” and collaborated 
with Storhaug and her organization, went public in VG (February 28; in an article 
written by Kadafi Zaman) and criticized Storhaug for having exploited girls in a 
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vulnerable position to promote her own political agenda. Kadra, who had revealed 
certain imams’ attitudes towards female circumcision using a hidden camera and 
microphone in a TV documentary in 2000, said to VG; Hege Storhaug […] talks about 
protecting young girls, but that’s not what she does. At times, she made my life hell. 
Nadia, who was brought to Morocco against her will to be forcedly married, says; I 
don’t want to have anything to do with the Human Rights Service or Hege Storhaug 
anymore. After my personal experiences with them, I also warn other girls against 
contacting the organization. Saynab, who was taken to Somalia to be circumcised when 
she was eight years old, says; The Human Rights Service has pressured girls to tell 
exaggerated stories and reveal secrets from the community, so that the foundation can 
get even more money from naïve politicians. She also says that organizations such as the 
Human Rights Service draw an ‘exaggerated image of misery’ of Norwegian Muslim 
communities, and that they seek out women’s shelters to actively recruit young minority 
girls. This was neither the first nor last time the organization’s ethics had been 
criticized; already in 2002, the Center for Gender Equality had received similar 
complaints about the organization anonymously from minority girls, and alerted the 
Ministry. Similarly, Tove Smaadahl, leader of the Women’s Shelter Secretariat, also 
received complaints about the organization’s activities. 
All three young women say that they want to continue fighting against forced marriages 
and female circumcision on their own terms, without pressure from Norwegian 
organizations, and want to prevent that Storhaug exploits other vulnerable girls in the 
future. In the interview with VG, Saynab acknowledges Storhaug’s efforts to put the 
problem of female circumcision on the agenda, but argues that they do it all wrong; 
HRS criticizes our entire culture and religion, and only finds faults. I decided to 
go public against female circumcision; not because I hated my own culture, but 
because I wanted to correct wrongdoings. There are many [others] who put 
things on the agenda, and who help women in need, but they don’t make girls 
feel contempt for themselves. 
The strongest allegations against Storhaug came from Amal Aden, a young Norwegian 
Somali woman, in 2009. A year before, she had assumed the role of a whistleblower, 
publishing a book that strongly criticized practices among Norwegian Somalians. Now, 
she presented herself as a whistleblower against the Human Rights Service, alerting 
authorities and the general public about the organization’s unethical practices. Having 
worked for the organization for three months, Aden could reportedly document that they 
tried to pressure her to go ‘undercover’ to obtain information from Muslim 
congregations, asking her to pretend she had “returned to Islam” and wanted to have her 
daughters circumcised (similar to Kadra’s undercover mission in the 2000 TV 
documentary). Aden further claims that the HRS has offered money to minority girls 
who say they have been circumcised or threatened to use a hijab (she cannot document 
154 
 
the latter claim, which is denied by Storhaug). In Klassekampen (June 13, 2009), Aden 
says she never stopped being a Muslim; 
I don’t look like a Muslim on the outside, because I don’t cover myself. But 
inside me, I am a Muslim. I am deeply insulted when it is taken for granted that I 
have left Islam. […] They [the HRS] have told me: “You shall be our weapon in 
our struggle to exterminate Islam”. […] I wrote the book “See us” to help 
Somali children and women; not to harm the Somali community. To the 
contrary; I love my community. But unfortunately, certain individuals have 
misinterpreted my book to mean that I distance myself from my community and 
my religion. 
Whether Storhaug used the words ‘You shall be our weapon in our struggle to 
exterminate Islam’ is unclear; but rhetoric of a “war against Islam” is used by her role 
model Hirsi Ali. In Bromley’s terminology, Aden makes it clear that she is not an 
apostate, who has left her community and turned against it; and that she is insulted 
when Storhaug wants to use her in a struggle against Islam. Rather, she portrays herself 
as a whistleblower, exposing negative practices in order to get external help to change 
them. This distinction is important in the discussion of ‘native informants’; Hirsi Ali 
may be a typical apostate, while Shabana Rehman, Kadra and Amal Aden may be better 
described as whistleblowers. Even though they were recruited by the Human Rights 
Service, they primarily sought roles as whistleblowers to alert the public and the 
government about negative practices in their communities, but seem to have 
underestimated Storhaug’s hostility towards Muslims and their need for ‘native 
informants’ or ‘apostates’ to support their agenda.  
Aden also complained to the Ministry, and filed a police report against the Human 
Rights Service for illegal surveillance of employees. In Dagbladet (July 2, 2009), she 
claims that Storhaug had put vodka in her coffee, and served her pork at a visit in the 
organization’s office. Storhaug dismisses the accusation with the comment; if you have 
non-Western immigrant background, it seems much easier to make the strangest claims 
in the press; and says that she considers a counter-lawsuit. However, Storhaug confirms 
another incident taking place during a visit to Copenhagen, where Rustad also took part, 
for talks with representatives of the Danish government. In Denmark, Storhaug brought 
Aden to an open meeting in the ‘Society for Press Freedom’, where a Dutch artist, 
Gregorius Neckshot, previously arrested on blasphemy charges, presented cartoons of 
Prophet Mohammed having sex with animals. Storhaug’s comment was that she also 
‘reacted’ to the cartoons; she was not impressed with these amateur drawings. In 
Aden’s words, Storhaug justified all these acts as attempts to “test how integrated I 
[Amal Aden] am”. As ‘tests of integration’ these alleged events resemble “exit rituals” 
used by the American anti-cult movement discussed by Bromley, where ex-members 
are expected to denounce their former religion and ‘convert’ to mainstream society.   
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Aden’s complaints led to an investigation of the Human Rights Service by the 
Directorate for Integration and Diversity, but authorities concluded in June 2010 that 
documentation was insufficient to stop public funding; however it did ask the 
organization to review its ethical guidelines. Bureaucrats and politicians are aware of 
repeated criticism of Storhaug, but the Progress Party has guaranteed public funding in 
state budget negotiations. Storhaug has played a central role as a policy advisor to the 
Progress Party on integration issues, and her lobbying also influenced policy initiatives 
of the Labor Party minister for gender equality (2000-01 and 2005-07), Karita 
Bekkemellem, who sees them as a valuable contributor and advisor on integration. In 
Klassekampen (August 1, 2009), Aden criticizes the police, who had already dropped 
her case, and the Ministry, which had not yet concluded, for discrimination;  
[Minister of Labor and Social Inclusion] Dag Terje Andersen listened to my 
criticism of immigrant communities. Why is he not listening when I criticize the 
Human Rights Service? […] I understand that the police don’t always have 
capacity, but when Hege Storhaug calls them about an immigrant family, they 
put 15-20 persons on the case. When I report the HRS, they drop the case. This 
[…] says something about how Norwegian society works. 
Aden’s criticism of government institutions emphasizes that her criticism is not one-
sided (she also criticized the Mohammed cartoons, see chapter 2), as in the case of 
‘native informants’ who only criticize the minority and defend majority society. While 
HRS is controversial, public officials, politicians and public opinion continue to be 
more sympathetic to its claims than to minority counter-claims, another parallel with the 
US cult controversy (Bromley 1998b:14-15). 
Using the example of US “cults”, James Richardson (1998:171-189) discusses the role 
of apostates and whistleblowers in exerting social control over minority religious 
groups. Social control includes official legal or regulatory actions as well as media 
impact on public opinion. Trying to make a case for public intervention, organizations 
hostile to a certain religious group seek to turn exiting individuals with traumatic 
experiences into apostates and whistleblowers despite their own ambivalence towards 
the group (Bromley 1998b:13). Using inside knowledge, apostates-turned-
whistleblowers tell “atrocity tales” about events that “violate some fundamental cultural 
values and which evoke moral outrage to the extent that social control actions against 
the group perpetrating the event are warranted” (Richardson 1998:173). These accounts 
may be self-serving as well as serving the interests of those seeking to discredit a 
religious group. Besides claims about terrorism and violations of individual autonomy, 
accusations of child abuse made in the media effectively create a ‘moral panic’ 
provoking immediate government action, such as intervention to remove children from 
their parents. False accusations have severe consequences to a religious group, even 
when parents are acquitted and children returned to them, their public image will be 
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damaged (Richardson 1998:182-183). In Norway, the Kadra documentary on female 
circumcision in 2000, created such a moral panic, forced politicians to increase social 
control, and demonized Muslim religious leaders. 
Conclusions 
The term ‘coconut’ is often used by members of minority groups to criticize and 
discredit minority individuals who give in to majority pressure to assimilate and take 
over racist attitudes. As a concept referring to persons who are ‘racially’ black but have 
internalized ideas of white superiority, it reflects the positions of Black theorists like 
Frantz Fanon and Malcolm X. The ‘coconut debate’ can be understood as a discursive 
struggle between majority and minority perspectives about the legitimacy of the 
political position of individuals so categorized, as well as over meanings and 
implications of the term. Persons from the majority side tend to see the term as ‘racist’ 
because it allegedly classifies individuals according to their skin color, and expects 
them to behave in certain ways, representing a form of ‘minority communitarianism’ 
imposing ‘internal restrictions’ (Will Kymlicka) on their freedom to criticize cultural 
practices, or denying the ‘right to exit’ (Anne Phillips) from their cultural community. 
While the term itself is controversial, it corresponds to the postcolonial concept of the 
‘native informant’ who provides empirical evidence to validate Orientalist discourses. 
The criticism entailed in the concept can thus be defended from an antiracist position 
that understands racism in Gramscian terms of hegemony. Defending a notion of 
collective interests, Bhikhu Parekh distinguishes between the individual right (and 
obligation) to criticize negative practices within a cultural community, and even their 
right to leave the community and assimilate, on one hand, and allowing oneself to be 
used by hostile external forces who want to destroy the community. David Bromley’s 
concept of ‘apostasy’ as ‘politicized exit’ captures the postcolonial meaning of ‘native 
informant’, the meaning of apostasy in traditional Islam and the ‘coconut’ concept, 
which all refer to a form of political betrayal when an exiting individual forms an 
alliance with hostile external forces.  
While the concepts of ‘coconut’ and ‘apostate’ are sometimes used inaccurately to refer 
to individuals who merely leave their culture or religion in favor of assimilating into the 
majority (without getting involved in a political conflict), the defining characteristics of 
such concepts are grounded less in ‘loyalty’ to a cultural or religious community, and 
more on the external, political alliances with racist and assimilationist forces among the 
majority. While defending the right of minority individuals to criticize cultural and 
religious practices of their group as well as their right to leave the minority group and 
assimilate into the majority, when these individuals politicize their negative experiences 
with the group and lend their support to ideas of ‘white’ cultural superiority and 
assimilation policy, they become legitimate targets of antiracist criticism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The hijab debates 
 
 
When feminism is reduced to taking off clothes, and integration to atheism, 
oppression is hidden behind a mask of liberation rhetoric. 
Ambreen Pervez, Iffit Qureshi, Nazia Parveen, Javaria Tanveer, Fazila 
Mahmood and Sophia Hussain (Aftenposten, March 8, 2010) 
 
Questions about gender and Islam have played a central role in criticism of 
multiculturalism in the last two decades, especially since Okin (1999:9-24) asked “Is 
multiculturalism bad for women?” in a 1997 essay. Here, she discusses what should be 
done when minority demands for group rights clash with liberal norms of gender 
equality. She argues that feminists ought to be skeptical of multiculturalism, also of 
those versions that only support collective rights for internally liberal groups (like 
Kymlicka) because gender oppression often takes place in the private sphere of the 
family, where religious and cultural minorities control women through customs related 
to marriage and child-raising, e.g. in practices of veiling, polygamy, female 
circumcision, forced marriages and honor killings. Okin argues that cultural minorities 
tend to be more patriarchal than surrounding majority cultures, and that most demands 
for group rights and ‘cultural defenses’ in criminal cases relate to gendered practices. 
Extending Kymlicka’s requirement for internal liberalism to the private sphere, Okin 
argues that traditional religious groups that control women within the family, cannot 
legitimately claim group rights. She argues that minority women 
might be much better off if the culture into which they were born were either to 
become extinct (so that its members would become integrated into the less sexist 
surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to 
reinforce the equality of women – at least to the degree to which this value is 
upheld in the majority culture (ibid, 22-23) 
Okin suggests that assimilation could be in the interest of minority women, and as a 
preferable solution; she suggests that Western liberal states should ‘encourage’ minority 
cultures to change towards gender equality, using majority culture as a standard. In 
order to protect women’s interests in negotiations about group rights, Okin argues that 
the state should listen to younger minority women rather than to the older generation 
who are often “co-opted into reinforcing gender inequality” (ibid, 24). 
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When Okin published her essay, these ideas were already reflected in Norwegian 
integration policy (Gressgård & Jacobsen 2003:73-74). In a white paper 
(Stortingsmelding no. 17 on Immigration and Multicultural Norway, 1996/97), the 
government promotes a form of ‘multiculturalism’ which mentions neither group rights 
nor public recognition of cultural identities. It goes beyond Kymlicka’s demand that 
minority groups should be internally liberal, and is concerned with women’s daily life 
in the private sphere of the family. The document mentions female circumcision and 
forced marriages (which were already illegal in Norway) as examples of unacceptable 
and oppressive traditions, and suggests that minority cultures should adopt majority 
norms. The Norwegian Gender Equality Act is taken as a non-negotiable framework for 
integration policy; turning women’s liberation into a question of integration. The 
government argues that equal opportunity for minority women requires educating 
minority communities about “what gender equality between men and women means in 
Norwegian daily life” (quoted in Gressgård & Jacobsen, ibid). Minorities are expected 
not only to comply with the law, but also adopt Norwegian everyday practices. 
Gressgård and Jacobsen (ibid) conclude that this is in effect an assimilation policy. 
Critics have pointed out several problems with this approach to minority women’s 
rights. First, underlying this perspective is an essentialist understanding of culture 
(Amir-Moazami, Jacobsen & Malik 2011:2), which fails to distinguish between ideals 
and practices, and ignores that in every culture there are competing norms and ideals, 
competing interpretations of these, and a variety of practices that may or may not 
comply with norms and ideals. Okin and especially the Norwegian policy document 
make unwarranted generalizations; the Gender Equality Act is taken to reflect 
‘Norwegian values’, without problematizing whether everyday practices comply with 
the law, or which feminist ideals are reflected in it (Gressgård & Jacobsen 2003:74-76). 
Religious practices like veiling are lumped together with criminal practices such as 
forced marriages and honor killings, and construct an image of essentially patriarchal 
minority cultures. Such generalizations depend on leaving out internal struggles, 
notably efforts of Muslim women who reject religious justifications for abuse in the 
name of culture, and emphasize that Islam prohibits violence against women (al-Hibri 
1999:41-46; see below). In other words, a ‘comparative slip’ is committed when 
‘Western’ ideals are contrasted with (worst) practices among ‘non-western’ minorities.  
A second problem is that majority ideals are constructed as a superior realization of 
universal norms, while negative minority practices are particularized and ‘culturalized’, 
i.e. explained as resulting from cultural values falling short of the universal standard 
(Gressgård & Jacobsen 2003:71). This ‘Eurocentric’ confusion of the universal and the 
culturally specific (Sayyid 2003) depends on silencing minority voices (al-Hibri 
1999:42) and reinforces ideas of western cultural superiority. In Gressgård and 
Jacobsen’s (2003:76) view, the Norwegian white paper’s approach can be characterized 
as a monologue, where goals are already defined as non-negotiable by the majority. 
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Such a one-way process is characteristic of assimilation rather than integration, which 
implies a mutual process of adjustment through dialogue between majority and 
minority, which is open to discuss how to interpret different values. Phillips (2007:36-
37) argues that there may be universal agreement on fundamental principles, but much 
disagreement on how to interpret these, resulting in different versions of gender 
equality, e.g. equal opportunity to make choices (a common Western interpretation), 
equal representation of men and women in politics, professions and business 
boardrooms (a dominant ideal in Norway), or equal division of paid work, housework 
and childcare (supported by many feminists including Okin). In contrast to 
interpretations of gender equality that take male practices as a standard for women’s 
liberation, ‘difference feminism’ (a view often supported by Muslims, Catholics and 
some strands of western feminism) emphasizes that men and women are ‘different, but 
equal’ and favors gender complementarity (e.g. fathers support the family and mothers 
care for young children), and degrees of segregation in some contexts. Muslim feminist 
Azizah al-Hibri (1999:42) argues that Okin’s inaccuracies and erroneous generalizations 
about Islam as hostile to women’s rights could have been avoided if she had approached 
Muslims in a dialogue that takes Muslim feminist arguments seriously as contributions 
to debates about women’s liberation. Norwegian anthropologist Tordis Borchgrevink 
(1997; 2002) takes into account Muslim feminist perspectives of Shaheen Sardar Ali 
and Ziba Mir-Hosseini in a nuanced theoretical discussion, which still remains caught 
up in a ‘dilemma’ between women’s individual rights and minorities’ collective rights. 
A third problem is that when a range of practices from veiling to mutilation and murder 
are generalized as examples of the same phenomenon, religious norms, cultural norms 
and universal norms are confused and conflated. Forced marriages and honor killings 
violate universal human rights, and are better seen as criminal excesses of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern traditions of arranged marriages and family honor, rather than as a 
part of those cultural traditions. Female circumcision is a traditional African custom that 
is gradually being abandoned. Al-Hibri (1999:43-45) points out that some of these 
practices have been tolerated by Islam because the religion accepts cultural diversity, 
but none of them have to do with religion per se. Seen as instances of violence against 
women, they are punishable under Islamic law. Muslim feminists emphasize working 
within a religious framework against oppressive traditions; because in order for Muslim 
communities to accept women’s liberation, it needs to be sanctioned by religion. They 
emphasize each individual Muslim man or woman’s right to ijtihad (jurisprudential 
interpretation of religious texts) to reinterpret sacred texts in accordance with 
contemporary society. Their strategy is to distinguish between religious and cultural 
practices; reexamine traditional jurisprudence to identify cultural elements from past 
times; and provide modern interpretations reflecting contemporary Muslim society. In 
short, they argue that practices like female circumcision, forced marriages and honor 
killings that have been construed as ‘Islamic’, are either cultural traditions or result from 
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patriarchal interpretations of the religion. Such practices violate both human rights and 
Islamic law, and Islam is a possible ally in the struggle to end them. Western and 
Muslim feminists agree on fighting these practices, but disagree on strategy and the role 
of religion. Veiling practices are quite different; they may violate a particular Western 
interpretation of gender equality, but as a religious practice, they are protected by 
freedom of religion. Relations between veiling and individual freedom of Muslim 
women are far more complex than the view of some ‘white feminists’ who equate hijab 
with oppression. As al-Hibri (1999:46) and Gressgård and Jacobsen (2003:72) point 
out; there is nothing essentially liberating about wearing a mini-skirt, nor anything 
essentially oppressive about wearing a hijab. Excluding veiled women from education, 
as in France or Turkey, or from certain types of work, as in Norway, may be as 
oppressive as when veiling is imposed by a government like Iran or by a woman’s 
community (ibid, 72-75). 
Fourth, postcolonial theorists (Abu-Lughod 2002; Razack 2008; Yegenoglu 1998; al-
Hibri 1999:45) have criticized western attempts to liberate Muslim women from their 
culture or religion, and argue that current feminist justifications of using western state 
power to control minority communities, repeat colonial history. In her essay “Do 
Muslim Women Really Need Saving?”, Lila Abu-Lughod (2002:783-790) discusses 
how contemporary western discourses about Muslim women resonate with colonial and 
missionary rhetoric. Specifically, she points out how the Bush administration’s attempt 
to justify military intervention in Afghanistan with rhetoric about liberating Afghan 
women from the Taliban parallels British and French ‘colonial feminism’ in Egypt and 
Algeria (see also Thorbjørnsrud 2004:39-41). In these historical cases, the colonial 
powers where ‘obsessed’ with the Muslim veil as a sign of oppression. Abu-Lughod 
(ibid, 786) criticizes this reductive interpretation where veiling in itself is made to stand 
for lack of agency. Like al-Hibri (1999:44-46), she argues that many veiled women, 
especially those wearing the modern headscarf or hijab, are well-educated women who 
have made reflected choices about how to practice their religion. Western pity for veiled 
women is perceived as patronizing and condescending (ibid), and depends on ideas of 
western superiority (Abu-Lughod 2002:788-789). Drawing on Spivak’s notion of ‘white 
men saving brown women from brown men’ (quoted in ibid, 784; see also Razack 
2008:17), Razack (2008:108) criticizes rhetoric about ‘saving’ Muslim women from 
patriarchal culture as a ‘racist logic’ consisting of three figures; the dangerous Muslim 
man, the imperiled Muslim woman, and the civilized European. In a feminist reading of 
Orientalism, Meyda Yegenoglu (1998:40-44) explores the gendered fantasies of this 
discourse, where a Western ‘desire’ to unveil Muslim women is linked to imperialism. 
Drawing on Fanon’s essay “Algeria Unveiled” (1989:35-67), she discusses how the veil 
resists European control by making Muslim women unavailable to the western gaze. 
Schirin Amir-Moazami, Christine Jacobsen and Maleiha Malik (2011:3-4) point out that 
while contemporary debates about veiling or forced marriages are framed by particular 
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contexts; feminist arguments similar to Okin’s have been transformed into populist 
rhetoric against multiculturalism across Europe. These debates have been placed in a 
‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm, where oppression of women is described as a feature 
of Muslim traditional culture, in contrast to Western liberal society. Thus, it becomes 
urgent that Muslim women are “integrated” into the latter. When women’s liberation is 
equated with ‘integration’ in this way, violence against women is culturalized and 
racialized, and anti-Muslim racism can be disguised behind legitimate concerns for 
minority women. 
Focus of this chapter 
In this chapter, I draw on the above theoretical perspectives to analyze Norwegian hijab 
debates in the period 2004-2010, including debates on a hijab ban in 2004 and 2007, the 
debate about hijab in the police in 2009, and the debate about the so-called ‘morality 
police’ in 2010. While early debates were dominated by a white feminist perspective, 
Muslim feminist voices gradually emerged. Theoretically, my analysis draws primarily 
on postcolonial and Muslim feminist theory (Göle 1996; Yegenoglu 1998; Razack 
2008). Besides problematizing western feminism, I discuss the relationship between the 
hijab and ‘Islamism’ as expressed by Muslim student movements that combine religious 
revivalism with multiculturalist identity politics (Jacobsen 2011). In Norway, which has 
a national self-image as the nation of gender equality, women’s issues have figured as 
the main argument against multiculturalism since the 1990s. As a background to the 
hijab debates, I shortly discuss these debates about Muslim women. Narrowing down 
focus to the hijab issue, I then review the French hijab affair in 1989, which eventually 
resulted in a ban in schools in 2004, and triggered debates in other countries, including 
Norway and Germany, where several Länder (states) have banned the hijab for teachers.   
In Norway, attacks on multiculturalism in the name of concern for minority women 
started in the early 1990s and made a breakthrough in 1995, when anthropologist Unni 
Wikan (1995) set out to try to change integration policy (Wikan 2002:1; see also 
Borchgrevink 1997:31). By 2002, Wikan (ibid) noted that “much has been achieved” in 
terms of her political project. Critics described Wikan’s contributions to political debate 
as reinforcing the populist rhetoric of the Progress Party and other anti-immigrant forces 
(Borchgrevink 1997:33-34; Fuglerud 2002:248; Hervik 2002:253). While Wikan (1995) 
does not use the term ‘multiculturalism’, she attacks what she calls ‘cultural 
fundamentalism’ or ‘identity politics’ and the concept of ‘culture’ itself, and rejects 
‘cultural relativism’ and ‘political correctness’ (see also Jacobsen 2008:35-44), which 
she describes as the government’s “generous betrayal” of minority women. Wikan’s 
target is not Islam as a religion, but the traditional culture of Muslim societies. Wikan 
(1995:88-90; 183-190; also cited in Gressgård 2010:35-36) draws up a dichotomy 
between Western liberal culture, which is ‘inclusive, neutral and universal’ and minority 
cultures, which are ‘reactionary, traditional and collective’; and asserts that “all 
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reasonable, rational individuals with a free will must choose to adapt to western values” 
(cited in Gressgård 2010:36). Her criticism of minority cultures and multicultural policy 
goes beyond Okin, and draws explicitly on the civilizational paradigm when she writes 
about a ‘culture clash’ between patriarchal and oppressive minority cultures and 
‘Norwegian values’ of gender equality and individual freedom (Razack 2008:117-125). 
Media attention on these issues peaked in the years 2000-2002, with widespread 
coverage of the personal stories of several young Muslim women (see also chapter 3, 
and Gullestad 2006b:50-56). In October 2000, a TV documentary ‘revealed’ that some 
imams in Norway support female circumcision. The research for this documentary had 
been done by journalist Storhaug, who had been working on these issues since 1992, 
and was also behind two documentaries on forced marriages in the Norwegian Pakistani 
community in September 1999 (see Wikan 2002:230). A young Somalian girl, Kadra 
Noor (later Yusuf) was equipped with a hidden camera and microphone, and sent to 
private consultation with several imams. She was asked to act as an ‘agent provocateur’ 
(see chapter 3) and tell the imams a false story that her parents wanted to have her 
circumcised, and that she sought advice on whether to do it or not. One of the imams, 
Kebba Secka, at the time leader of the Islamic Council, advised the girl to obey her 
parents. This caused a ‘moral panic’ among the general public, the Muslim community 
was blamed for endorsing the practice, which had been banned in a specific new law in 
1995, and Secka was forced to resign. Media demanded immediate action from the 
government, which devised an action plan against the practice. The documentary won 
journalistic awards, but researchers criticized its manipulative and ethical aspects (Talle 
2003:87-99; Dessau 2003; Gylseth 2001; Thorbjørnsrud & Johansen 2000). 
In January 2002, the honor killing of a Kurdish girl, Fadime Sahindal, in Sweden, 
attracted widespread media attention in Norway. According to Nazneen Khan-Østrem 
(2005:223-224), what became known as the ‘Fadime case’ had a greater impact on 
Norwegian Muslims than the 9/11 terror attacks. Although Fadime’s family was not 
Muslim, Norwegian media placed her murder in the context of the abovementioned girls 
that had escaped female circumcision and forced marriages (Jacobsen 2005:168). The 
murder was erroneously linked to Islam, and Norwegian Muslims held accountable and 
asked to publicly declare that they oppose such practices. As the Christian Democrat 
Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik said in Dagbladet (January 27, 2002);  
I warn those fathers and brothers who think that a family’s honor can be 
preserved by killing female family members: Such attitudes are not acceptable in 
Norway. […] In our culture, murder is a crime and a shame. Everyone living in 
Norway must acknowledge that. Communities that have a different perception 
must clean up their backyard.  
Here, the Prime Minister draws up a contrast between minority communities that 
presumably justify such criminal acts in the name of culture, and ‘Norwegian culture’ 
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where this is unacceptable. He warns minority communities and demands their 
compliance with Norwegian norms. Oslo bishop, Gunnar Stålsett, also links the crime to 
culture or religion, and asks Muslim leaders to take a stand; Take responsibility before it 
is too late. No religion or culture can be allowed to glorify or defend a misdeed like that 
in Sweden (Dagbladet, January 27, 2002).  
These demands led to two separate demonstrations in February 2002 (Jacobsen 
2005:155); both with about one thousand participants and both were described as 
‘historical’ by the media. The first one was initiated by Shabana Rehman (see chapter 3) 
and joined by Kadra and other media celebrities, who protested against the parental 
generations’ attempts to restrict their children’s freedom. This march was dominated by 
white Norwegians (ibid), including high-profile politicians such as Minister for 
Children and Family Affairs, Laila Dåvøy (Christian Democrat), Socialist Party leader 
Kristin Halvorsen, and Trond Giske (Labor Party), who later became minister of 
culture. Muslim leaders reportedly stayed in the background, trying to convince the 
majority that they also wanted to solve these problems, but that it had nothing to do with 
religion (Dagbladet, February 3, 2002). 
A week later, the Islamic Council, representing 26 mosques, held its own demonstration 
led by Abid Raja from the World Islamic Mission. The demonstrators condemned 
oppression of women, honor killings and forced marriages, but pointed out that these 
acts of violence had nothing to do with the Islamic religion, and denounced the 
generalizations, harassment and hatred against Muslims (Jacobsen 2005:155). 
Specifically, they protested against negative media coverage. As Jehangir Bahadur said 
in Aftenposten (February 10, 2002);  
We take distance from coercion and oppression […] but such acts are based on 
culture and tradition, not religion. The recently created media image of Muslims 
gives an impression that all Muslims support coercion and oppression. That is 
incorrect. That is why we want to show that we are fed up with generalizations.  
He emphasized that Shabana Rehman does not represent immigrant women in Norway. 
The fact that she had it difficult does not mean all Muslim girls experience the same. 
The European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI 2004) later supported the 
Muslim view that public debate on these issues used unwarranted generalizations that 
stigmatized Muslims. 
While violence against women is a serious problem for those affected, it is not generally 
accepted and much less publicly defended by the Muslim community. Minority 
feminists like the MiRA Resource Center have been fighting these practices within their 
communities before the issues were addressed by the media. Minority and majority 
agree that these practices are unacceptable, but disagree on how to explain and fight 
them. Muslim communities were put on the defensive as they had to convince an 
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outraged and impatient majority that they made enough effort. Gradually, Muslim 
spokespersons, minority feminists and researchers succeeded in educating the public 
that these practices are not ‘Islamic’. They also criticized Wikan’s and Storhaug’s 
attempts to use the issue of forced marriages as an argument to tighten immigration 
regulations on family reunification. In the proposal for a new immigration law in 2007, 
the government dropped the widely-criticized ‘Danish rules’ on family reunification, 
which Storhaug had lobbied for (see Razack 2008:129; Fekete 2006:6; 13-14). Instead, 
they increased the income requirement (see Gudbrandsen 2011:378-379) to a level that 
makes family reunification difficult to obtain for many couples, with possible negative 
consequences for more families than the restrictions in Denmark. 
When Storhaug (2007) moved on to campaign against the hijab with her book Veiled. 
Unveiled, Norwegian Muslims were no longer on the defensive but mobilized to assert 
their religious identity. The hijab issue differs from the practices discussed above; it 
does not violate human rights, but can be defended with reference to freedom of 
religion. Unlike violent excesses of certain cultural traditions, veiling is a religious 
practice that has become a central part of Muslim women’s identity. In my analysis, I 
focus on Muslim women’s responses leading to a ‘breakthrough’ for Muslim feminism 
in the public sphere in 2009. My analysis is restricted to debates about the headscarf or 
hijab, and does not discuss calls to ban the less common ‘burqa’ and ‘niqab’ that cover 
the entire face. (Opposition to these forms of veiling is backed by stronger arguments, 
e.g. that covering the face prevents communication and identification, and mainstream 
Muslims do not defend these. There is thus less to debate, besides the important issue of 
whether it is wise to criminalize these rather marginal forms of veiling.) 
The French hijab affair 
The first Norwegian hijab debate was directly inspired by the French ban in 2004, the 
end result of l’affaire du foulard (the ‘headscarf affair’) which started fifteen years 
earlier and is regarded, together with the Rushdie Affair in Britain, as one of two public 
controversies in 1989 that marked the start of a European turn against multiculturalism. 
The controversy started when three North African Muslim girls wore hijabs to school in 
Creil outside Paris. The headmaster argued that this violated the principle of laïcité (the 
French version of secularism) and suspended the girls. Other Muslim school girls 
showed solidarity by wearing hijabs, taking a local controversy to the national level. 
The Socialist Education Minister Lionel Jospin referred to the Conseil d’Etat (Supreme 
Court), which ruled that the hijab did not violate laïcité, provided it was not an act of 
“pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda”. Whether it was, should be decided 
by local authorities from case to case (Parekh 2000:249; Kastoryano 2006; 57-59). 
Some years later, veiled girls were again expelled from school, followed by acts of 
solidarity by other Muslim girls. In 1994, Conservative Education Minister Francois 
Bayrou ruled that while wearing “discreet” religious symbols was acceptable, the hijab 
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was an “ostentatious” symbol that in itself contains elements of proselytism or 
discrimination, and it was banned as a matter of public policy (Kastoryano 2006:59; 
Parekh 2000:250-251). This decision resulted in a national debate, where one side 
advocated the right to difference and negotiations with Muslims, while the dominant 
position defended strict laïcité and was hostile to compromises with Muslims. As 
described by Parekh (ibid), the majority position was that; 
France was a single and indivisible nation based on a single culture. The school 
was the central tool of assimilation into French culture and could not tolerate 
ethnic self-expression. The hijab was particularly objectionable because it 
symbolized both a wholly alien culture and the subordinate status of women. 
Wearing it implied a refusal to become French, to integrate… 
This position implies that opposition to the hijab is not only based on laïcité but also 
linked to the French model of the nation, with its policy ideal of assimilation (see also 
Amir-Moazami 2004:89-91). As Riva Kastoryano (2006:61-62) points out, laïcité is a 
central part of the French republican model, and described in the constitution as 
assuring equality to all citizens regardless of “origin, race or religion”. In this model of 
the nation, the public sphere is supposedly neutral with regard to religion, while the 
state tolerates religion (as belief or practice) and culture (including religious identity) as 
long as they are exercized by individuals in the private sphere. The presence of Islam 
challenges this model in several ways; as a religious minority with a public expression 
in a country where both religion and minorities should have no public role. The hijab 
affair constructed Islam as incompatible with (Western) secularism and Muslims as an 
unassimilable minority (ibid, 58). The universalist French model sees assimilation as 
basis for equality, and public schools have a central role in “unifying the nation” (see 
also Freedman 2004:10). Like the American model, the French republic rejects the 
‘German’ emphasis on ethnicity and ancestry and defines belonging to the nation 
primarily in terms of citizenship. But unlike the United States, which publicly 
recognizes cultural communities, the French model is individualist and seeks to 
assimilate its citizens (Kastoryano 2006:62). 
Jane Freedman (2004:16-17; see also Amir-Moazami 2004:117-118; Plesner 2004:160) 
points out that there have always been different interpretations of the concept of laïcité, 
with an important distinction between a more “strict” version that seeks to keep religion 
strictly in the private sphere, and a more “open” or “inclusive” version with more room 
for pluralism. Throughout post-revolutionary history in France, the strict form of 
secularism has tended to be intolerant and hostile to religion, at times restricting 
individual rights to religious freedom, persecuting believers and placing congregations 
under state surveillance and control. In the hijab affair, political opinion was divided 
across party lines; only the Front National unanimously supported a ban in line with 
public opinion according to polls. The Socialist Party was especially divided, which 
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explains why Jospin turned to the Conseil d’Etat to make a decision, which turned out 
to reflect an ‘open’ version of laïcité (Freedman 2004:13-19). Also conservative 
politicians, including Bayrou in 1989 and Nicolas Sarkozy (who later became President, 
2007-2012) in 2003 initially favored an ‘inclusive’ version of secularism that would 
allow the hijab, but later turned towards a strict interpretation. When the ban was passed 
in 2004, it was backed by an overwhelming majority in Parliament, which Freedman 
(ibid, 19) interprets as a ‘return’ to strict laïcité and assimilation.  
Drawing on Sartre and Fanon, Max Silverman (2007:59-75) seeks to “unveil the hidden 
ideology” of the French model, and focuses on the paradox of denying ‘race’ and racism 
while simultaneously racializing difference. He argues that the ideology of 
Enlightenment universalism which claims to assure equality through cultural 
assimilation, in practice essentializes difference when individuals of certain 
backgrounds need to be liberated from their particular cultures in order to become equal, 
while natural-born Frenchmen do not. Despite stated intentions not to see difference, 
highlighting the hijab as a “threat to secularized, Western civilization” (ibid, 67) that 
needs to be outlawed, stigmatizes veiled Muslim women, and makes them more visible 
in the homogenizing French public sphere than in pluralist Britain and the US, where 
such ‘difference’ is seen as ‘normal’. While French republicans claim that British and 
American multiculturalism leads to racial segregation; France itself is a deeply divided 
nation with a racialized underclass. 
French assimilation policy is historically linked to the colonial strategy of the civilizing 
mission. In Algeria, French colonizers were intent on unveiling Muslim women in the 
1930s. In Fanon’s (1989:37-38) words, their political doctrine was; 
“If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for 
resistance, we must first of all conquer the women; we must go and find them 
behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men 
keep them out of sight”. 
Fanon argues that the colonial power tried to break down traditional Algerian society by 
targeting women for assimilation and exposing them to the colonizer. There are two 
justifications behind this desire to unveil; first the veil represents or symbolizes 
tradition, and second, it also hinders assimilation efforts by ‘hiding’ women from the 
colonizers’ supervision (Thorbjørnsrud 2004:38). The strategy to ‘conquer the women’ 
also seems to inspire Storhaug’s organization Human Rights Service, whose strategy of 
“feminine integration” builds on the idea that women play a key role in ‘integration’ as 
noted in their slogan: “If you integrate the mothers, two-thirds of the work is done, 
because she will integrate the children” (see HRS website). Given that the organization 
favors assimilation and opposes veiling, it can be seen to reflect ideas from French 
colonial policy. 
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Rather than challenging the republican model, French Muslims argued in the hijab affair 
that they were not treated equal to other religious groups like Catholics and Jews. 
Bayrou defended the ban by arguing that the hijab could not be compared to symbols of 
other groups; first, it is proselytizing because it puts pressure on other Muslim girls; 
second, it represents oppression of women; and third, it is an “ideologically motivated 
assertion of religious identity” (see Parekh 2000:251) inspired by ‘Islamism’. Other 
politicians justified unequal treatment with reference to liberating girls from patriarchal 
traditions (ibid, 253), emphasizing that the state should protect individual freedom 
(Kastoryano 2006:60). Parekh (ibid, 251-253) argues that religious symbols cannot be 
discussed as abstract equivalents, and emphasizes that the validity of arguments needs 
to be assessed empirically. The hijab affair was not settled until 2003, when President 
Jacques Chiraq appointed a commission led by Bernard Stasi, which suggested that the 
hijab, along with other ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols, should be banned in public 
schools. The new law was passed early in 2004 (Kastoryano 2006:59). These French 
events were a direct pretext for debates in other European countries. 
Germany also had national hijab debates, although less intense than in France, resulting 
in at least seven German states banning the hijab for school teachers (Amir-Moazami 
2005:269; Phillips 2007:115; Rottmann & Ferree 2008:491). German Muslims, mainly 
of Turkish origin, are largely working-class and poorly educated, and even younger 
educated Turkish women find limited work opportunities (ibid, 489). As they have been 
perceived as ‘guest workers’ who would return home, their ‘integration’ has been 
largely treated with indifference (Amir-Moazami 2005:269). In the German public 
sphere, religion plays a significant role as a result of church and state co-operation, 
which represents a German model of secularism in-between strict French separation and 
British establishment (ibid, 270). German debates started in 1998 when a hijab-wearing 
teacher, Fereshta Ludin, lost her job. Here, the hijab was perceived as a sign of ‘cultural 
segregation’ inappropriate for public servants. Unlike France, where ‘neutrality’ is 
understood in universalistic terms; in Germany, a ‘neutral’ public sphere is perceived as 
one being based on the ‘Christian-occidental’ character of German society (ibid). A 
prominent German ‘secular Muslim’, political scientist Bassam Tibi, argued that the 
hijab represents ‘segregation’, while ‘integration’ requires a secularized and 
depoliticized “Euro-Islam” adapted to a European Leitkultur (‘guiding culture’) (ibid, 
273-275). German hijab debates tended to be framed in terms of a clash of civilizations 
discourse, where Islam is perceived as incompatible with Christian-Western values, 
including gender equality (ibid, 271). Susan Rottmann and Myra Marx Ferree 
(2008:487-488) note that the dominant form of German feminism is based on an idea of 
gender difference and skeptical of liberal notions of equality as sameness; a view shared 
with Muslim feminism. However, in German feminist discourse, Turkish and German 
cultures are seen as opposed (ibid, 495); the former seen as ‘oppressive’ and the latter as 
‘liberated’. Many German feminists supported a hijab ban, using arguments similar to 
168 
 
Okin in calling for state intervention to protect Muslim women’s individual autonomy 
against ‘Islamic patriarchy’ in the private sphere (Rottmann & Ferree 2008:497-500). 
Some also argued that wearing a hijab should be seen as a ‘free choice’ but this view 
was rare in German public debate.    
In neither France nor Germany did hijab-wearing Muslim women have a strong voice in 
public debates. A study (cited by Phillips 2007:117 and Killian 2003:572) among 
French Muslim women found three main reasons for wearing a hijab; (1) older 
immigrant women who had been wearing hijab since they were young, saw it as part of 
their ethnic or cultural identity; (2) young women who started wearing the hijab to 
assert their religious identity, often against parents’ advice; and (3) younger girls who 
complied with parental pressure, in return for being allowed to go out alone and 
continuing education. Caitlin Killian’s (2003) study among Maghrebi women in France, 
who are for the most part poorly educated and few have acquired French citizenship 
(ibid, 569) found that while older North African immigrants were often opposed to the 
hijab as “a lack of discretion by immigrants living in a host country” (ibid, 573), 
younger women, more likely to be educated and French citizens, wore the hijab as part 
of negotiating between parental cultural traditions and French society. They reject 
pressure to assimilate and demand recognition as both Muslim and French (ibid, 572; 
see also Amir-Moazami 2004:240-252), and defend the hijab as a matter of individual 
choice and respect for difference (Killian 2003:573). Killian (ibid, 586-588) 
distinguishes between three categories of Muslim women; (1) older and less educated 
women, either pro- or anti-hijab, did not engage with French arguments on secularism 
but saw religion as a personal matter that should not affect French public space; (2) 
young educated women criticized French racism and assimilation policy and used a 
discourse of individual rights and religious freedom; while a third group (3) supported 
the dominant French view and adopted majority arguments.  
Comparing Muslim women’s voices in these two countries, Amir-Moazami (2004:176-
177) found that intense debate and general hostility towards Islam in France has “not 
encouraged women to opt for the headscarf in public spaces or to speak about the 
issue”, which made it “more difficult to find interview partners in France than in 
Germany, where covered women have become a common part of the public life in 
larger cities”. From hijab-wearing women’s standpoint, the German public sphere 
seems more tolerant than the French (ibid, 197-198), especially for Turkish women who 
compare Germany favorably to the Turkish state’s ‘intolerance’ (ibid, 236). Analyzing 
German debates, Rottmann and Ferree (2008:500-501) note that Muslim women’s 
voices were not common in mainstream media, except two prominent anti-hijab 
advocates of Turkish origin (Seyran Ates and Necla Kelek), while hijab-wearing women 
“only seldom and reluctantly” joined debate. Studies show that mainstream German 
newspapers rarely quoted assertive Turkish voices in the 1990s, but Muslim voices have 
been publicized in ‘alternative’ smaller-circulation media (Amir-Moazami 2005:268).  
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Discussing British Muslims, Werbner (2007:126-129) notes that veiling can be a 
traditional practice as well as a strategic act, where “being observant Muslims 
empowers […] young men and women” to for example choose marriage partners 
against their parents’ will. Also there, young Muslims criticize the parental generation’s 
cultural traditions, which are seen as distortions of a ‘true’ Islam that stands for gender 
equality and gives them personal freedom. In Norway, a similar Islamic revivalism 
takes place among Muslim students, some of whom have been among the foremost 
public defenders of the hijab (Jacobsen 2005:155-162). The more multicultural and 
pragmatic British state has preferred persuasion and dialogue rather than legal 
prohibitions in relation to minority women’s issues (Werbner 2007:120-121; 126-129). 
There, the hijab is seen as an expression of ethnic identity and protected by anti-
discrimination laws; in contrast to France, which defines veiling as religious and linked 
to Islamism and oppression of women. In Norway, veiling is perceived as a religious 
rather than ethnic practice, and usually framed in terms of freedom of religion. While 
Parliament has passed special laws against female circumcision (1995) and forced 
marriages (2003), both of which were already illegal under existing legislation as law 
professor Anne Hellum points out (Aftenposten, April 12, 2005); in other cases 
politicians have shared the British reluctance to use the law in matters of ‘integration’ 
and rather relied on dialogue. Storhaug’s lobbying for restrictions on family 
reunification and for a hijab ban have thus been unsuccessful, although her position is 
supported by a significant political minority, also within the ruling Labor Party.   
Norway: First round of the hijab debates, 2004 
The “first round” of Norwegian hijab debates took place early in 2004, when French 
arguments to ban the hijab in schools were introduced to Norway (Larsen 2004:52; 
Døving 2012b:28-30).  Storhaug and the Progress Party praised the French ban, and 
proposed a ban against “religious symbols” in Norwegian schools (Eriksen 2004:98). In 
an interview with Klassekampen (December 16, 2003), Storhaug argues that the hijab in 
itself oppresses women, and rejects that a ban would be discriminating as the French law 
applies to all religions. She argues that; hijab is ok after school hours, but not in school, 
adding that; not that it is ok after school hours, we still have the problem with women’s 
oppression, but it is harder to control what people do in private. She argues that the 
hijab indicates an increasing influence of immensely powerful religious forces. Unless 
the hijab is banned, she fears that;  
large groups of second- and third generation immigrants will have primary 
loyalty to Islam and secondarily to their grandparents’ home country. In other 
words, we will have a situation with lack of integration and develop a new 
underclass…  
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Here, she implies a conflict of loyalty between Norway and Islam, where wearing a 
hijab means choosing Islam over Norway. In an interview with Dagsavisen (February 7, 
2004), she elaborates; 
Hijab is a political uniform that stands for a totalitarian, antidemocratic and 
fascist ideology. And if you wear the hijab, you directly or indirectly sympathize 
with violent Islamists […] : Al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Mullah Krekar. 
Here, she portrays Islam not as a religion, but as a political ideology, and uses 
arguments typical of anti-Muslim rhetoric. She blurs the distinction between Muslim 
religious practice and identity on one hand, and political Islam, which she equates with 
extremism and terrorism and compares to fascism (see Kundnani 2008:40-44; discussed 
in chapter 3). She implicitly refers to ‘Islamo-fascism’ which is common in the 
‘Eurabia’ literature (see chapter 1), makes unwarranted generalizations about Muslim 
women and essentializes the hijab. In the same interview, she explicitly compares the 
hijab to political uniforms such as the swastika and the Ku Klux Klan hood. In these 
quotes, she also uses arguments from the French anti-hijab campaign; (1) that the hijab 
is essentially oppressive, (2) that it is a political symbol of Islamism, and (3) that it is an 
obstacle to integration. 
Also in the winter 2003-2004, Ambreen Pervez, a 25-year-old Norwegian Pakistani 
student lost her part-time job at a furniture store in Oslo, A-møbler, because she chose 
to wear a hijab at work. She complained to the ombudsman for gender equality, who 
supported her and rejected the employers’ arguments about neutral dress code 
(Aftenposten, January 18, 2004; see also Jacobsen 2011:162). Eventually, she was 
allowed to resume her job (see also Eriksen 2004:99). On January 17, 2004, Muslim 
demonstrations took place in major European and Middle Eastern cities to defend the 
right to use the hijab and oppose the French law proposal. In Oslo, young women from 
the Muslim Student Society mobilized for the demonstration, in cooperation with 
mosques and the Centre against Ethnic Discrimination (SMED). Some hundred people 
protested against the French ban, suggestions to ban the hijab in Norway, and workplace 
discrimination of hijab-wearing women (Jacobsen 2011:160-162). They emphasized 
that the hijab is about freedom of religion, and that it is an individual choice and not a 
sign of oppression (Aftenposten, January 18, 2004), as expressed in slogans quoted by 
Jacobsen (ibid): “Don’t touch my hijab”, “Hijab is my dignity”, “Language is the key, 
hijab is no hindrance”, “Hijab is our pride and joy”, “Do not get blinded by my 
beautiful hijab”, “Let the children know their parents’ religious convictions”, “I’m 
intelligent and qualified”, “My hijab hurts no-one”, “Media creates harassment and 
much ado. They do not decide what we shall do”, “Hijab is my identity” and “Stop the 
Islamophobia”. These slogans mostly reflect a language of anti-racism and freedom of 
religion, but also reflect what Modood (2007:39) called ‘turning a negative difference 
into a positive identity’ which is central to multiculturalism (Jacobsen 2011:162-163). 
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Eriksen (2004) summarizes what we might call the “first round” of Norwegian hijab 
debates that took place during the winter months of 2003-2004. He notes that the 
Progress Party was the only political party that followed up Storhaug’s suggestion for a 
ban (ibid, 99; see also Jacobsen 2011:161-162). In major newspapers, editorials and 
commentaries were almost unanimously opposed to a ban, while contributions to 
opinion pages were split in the middle between pros and cons. Eriksen’s (ibid, 100-110) 
content analysis shows that Storhaug’s arguments were widespread among the majority; 
most common was that the hijab oppresses women, followed by claims that it prevents 
“integration” (as expressed by the Progress Party), symbolizes Islamism (also Progress 
Party), and threatens Western civilization (philosopher Nina Karin Monsen). Even 
majority Norwegians opposed to a ban, tended to see veiling as “unfortunate” and were 
“provoked” that Muslim women did not want (or were not allowed) to ”be free”. Some 
Muslims supported a ban, but most Muslim women defended their right to wear a hijab 
as a personal choice and expressed pride of being Muslim in the face of stigmatization.  
Second round: Veiled. Unveiled, 2007 
In the autumn of 2007, Storhaug published the book Veiled. Unveiled, where she 
supports a hijab ban for school children and public servants. The book stirred a debate 
in national newspapers, including Aftenposten, Dagbladet and Klassekampen. In an 
article targeting Dagbladet journalist Zakia Ahmed Akkouh, who wrote that she freely 
chooses to wear a hijab for religious, not political, reasons (Dagbladet online, 5 October 
2007), Storhaug summarizes her main arguments under the headline; Anti-human hijab 
(Dagbladet Magasinet, 9 October 2007). Starting with a reference to the Enlightenment 
as the midwife of democracy with its revolt against religious dogma and oppression, she 
argues that the hijab symbolizes an ideology that stands for an outright darkening [a 
reference to the Dark Ages] of our society and destruction of human rights. She argues 
that either hijab-wearing women are aware of it or not, the hijab is constructed by […] 
Islamists […] and its essential values are the totalitarian ideology of Islamism and a 
state ruled by sharia; and specifies that she refers to an antihuman ideology and 
barbarian sharia law. Hijab is accompanied by “a full package” of demands for gender 
segregation […] and women’s rights are restricted […] in most areas of life. Finally, 
hijab breeds hijab. Hijab breeds un-freedom for the individuals involved, and increases 
the pressure on our values of freedom.  
Here, we can identify three arguments also used by the French education minister, as 
discussed by Parekh (2000:251). To start with the latter two; Storhaug claims that ‘hijab 
breeds hijab’ i.e. it is proselytizing, and it is linked to oppression of women. It appears 
that a third argument is more important to Storhaug; that the hijab represents a 
‘barbaric’ and ‘anti-human’ ideology from the Dark Ages that threatens the values 
inherited from the Enlightenment; e.g. freedom, democracy and human rights. Critical 
reviewers in Dagbladet (October 5, 2007) and Aftenposten (October 7) focused on 
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Storhaug’s perception of Islam as a threat (Aftenposten) and her irrational fear of Islam 
(Dagbladet), resulting from generalizations and lack of nuances, where she equates 
Muslim religious practice with political Islam, and political Islam with extremism. Both 
reviews note that her current crusade (Dagbladet) against hijab (Storhaug 2007) repeats 
many arguments of her previous polemic against Islam (Aftenposten) in the book But 
the Greatest of These is Freedom (Storhaug 2006). In this book, a chapter on “what 
went wrong” with Islam (ibid, 157-167) is based on the writings of Lewis, who 
Storhaug characterizes as “perhaps the most prominent academic expert on Islam” (ibid, 
157). Lewis argues that the ‘absence of secularism’ explains the gap between Islam and 
modernity, and is the cause of current problems in Islamic civilization characterized by 
“lack of freedom”. While recognizing a struggle among Muslims, Lewis essentializes 
Islam as an “unchanging doctrine” and uses the West as a standard against which to 
measure which Muslims are doctrinal and “fundamentalist” and which ones are modern, 
secular and westernized (see Mamdani 2004:20-24).   
In Orientalism, Said (1994) discusses Lewis as an example of an academic who 
“purports to be liberal [and] objective” but is in fact “aggressively ideological” in his 
“propaganda against his subject matter” (ibid, 316), and who has an “extraordinary 
capacity for getting nearly everything wrong” by “distorting the truth” and “making 
false analogies” (ibid, 342). Orientalist scholarship essentializes Islam; Muslims are 
Muslims, they never change, and they need to be “watched” because they hate and 
threaten the West (ibid, 317-318). According to Said, Lewis uses “extreme levels of 
generalization” which ignore differences among Muslims; he insists that Islam never 
secularized, and warns Westerners against the “threat of an enraged, congenitally 
undemocratic and violent Islamic world” (ibid, 342). Said notes the exchange of ideas 
between academic Orientalism and politicians’ and journalists’ rhetoric about Islam 
(ibid, 343). Storhaug follows a historical pattern of European “combination of fear and 
hostility” (ibid) towards Muslims. 
In the debate that followed in Aftenposten, Dagbladet and Klassekampen, most 
contributors were critical of the book. Several Muslim women argued that wearing the 
hijab is a matter of free choice and religious practice, while some individuals from both 
majority and minority defended Storhaug’s position. Among the latter was Sara Azmeh 
Rasmussen (Klassekampen, 1 November 2007). Most contributions focused on the 
claim that the hijab represents political extremism; an argument that was pursued in two 
different ways. One focused on Muslim women, their degree of choice in wearing the 
hijab, and the complex relationship between hijab and political Islam, which can neither 
be equated nor dismissed. Another category of contributions problematized 
generalizations and negative portrayal of Islam, and sought to explain why some 
western feminists were provoked by the hijab, by placing that position in a larger 
political context of an alleged ‘clash of civilizations’. In the following, I analyze 
selected contributions to newspapers’ opinion pages, starting with those problematizing 
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the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis in light of postcolonial theoretical perspectives 
(Razack 2008, Yegenoglu 1998, Göle 1996), before returning to the question of 
‘Islamism’ and discuss Muslim women’s contributions in light of Muslim feminist 
theory and contemporary Islamic revivalism (Jacobsen 2011; Mahmood 2005). 
Problematizing Western imperialist feminism 
Several contributors, including Iffit Qureshi (Dagbladet, October 18, 2007), 
anthropologist Kristin Engh Førde (Klassekampen, November 3, 2007) and philosopher 
Morten Lyngeng (Dagbladet, December 3, 2007), question Storhaug’s feminist 
credentials and argue that her campaign is better understood in the context of 
nationalism and the “clash of civilizations” ideology. Aftenposten’s reviewer also wrote 
that Storhaug is embraced by the anti-immigrant right, which has suddenly and 
unexpectedly become an advocate of […] women’s liberation, gender equality and 
secularism. These critical contributions indicate that in 2007, there was greater 
awareness in the Norwegian public sphere of postcolonial feminist positions that reject 
both traditional patriarchy and western imperialism, than in debates three years earlier. 
While postcolonial perspectives are implicit in many minority contributions, 
international scholars like Razack (2008:83-106) and Fekete (2006) have discussed 
contemporary alliances between western feminists and the anti-Muslim right. Fekete 
(ibid, 15) argues that “an assimilationist, monocultural society needs its feminist 
cheerleaders” and Razack (2008:84) identifies the “culture clash logic” as a factor that 
enables “blatant racism to be articulated in the name of feminism”. Like Razack (ibid, 
107-144), Fekete (2006:14) discusses Storhaug’s role in Norwegian debates, and notes 
that she “marshals feminist sentiment to support giving the state additional powers to 
enforce assimilation”. 
In an explicitly postcolonial feminist contribution Qureshi writes that practicing Muslim 
women are currently fighting for the right to make their decisions independent from 
self-appointed guardians like Hege Storhaug, who marginalize and stigmatize them. 
She argues that the main problem does not lie in Muslim practices, but in the fact that;  
politicians and organizations like the Human Rights Service […] create a one-
sided and erroneous image of Muslims as barbarians who oppress women, while 
inciting enough media attention to spread a wave of fear throughout society. 
Similarly, Førde, who did fieldwork among young hijab-wearing Muslim women in 
Oslo during the 2004 debate, quotes a young Muslim woman; Muslim women don’t 
need Muslim men to oppress us [when] we got Hege Storhaug. Another ‘informant’ 
said; if she [Storhaug] had been on our side, she would listen to what we say. Førde 
argues that it is unlikely that Storhaug’s attack on the hijab is motivated by solidarity 
with Muslim women, and points out that while she had previously succeeded in 
presenting herself as a protector of minority women; her real concern is obvious in the 
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new book (Storhaug 2007); she perceives the presence of Islam in the West in itself as a 
threat to modern democracy, and reduces Muslim women to a battleground in a ‘culture 
war’. Førde argues that the claim that Islamists force women to wear the hijab is 
empirically incorrect. Most young women make their own choice to wear the hijab; 
some are encouraged by their parents, while others do it against parental advice. They 
all justify wearing hijab with reference to religion; some take religious practice very 
personal, while others express a collective identity as Muslims. While acknowledging 
that some justifications for the hijab are problematic from a feminist viewpoint, Førde 
never heard anything that can be interpreted as a rejection of human rights. She argues 
that Storhaug’s incomprehension of Muslim feminism would not make sense if 
women’s liberation were her objective, and concludes that hijab is probably a greater 
problem for the majority than for Muslim women. Førde thus agrees with Razack 
(2008:143) who argues that feminists should focus on racism rather than on 
multiculturalism as a greater problem for minority women.   
Qureshi explicitly criticizes Storhaug’s Eurocentrism and Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” thesis and discusses historical links between the Enlightenment and 
imperialism; a point often made by postcolonial theorists. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s 
discussion of secularism, Bangstad (2012:56-57) discusses the modern myth of the 
Enlightenment as a transition from darkness to light, from religious irrationality to a 
secular rationality with a privileged status in the public sphere. He refers to “dogmatic 
and simplistic” perceptions of European Enlightenment in secularist rhetoric of al-
Kubaisi and Hirsi Ali, who have “monopolized the Enlightenment for use in anti-
Islamic discourse” (ibid). Drawing on Todorov, Bangstad argues that it is a myth that 
the Enlightenment should imply liberal standardization of religious others; instead, 
historical Enlightenment thinkers recognized both universal values and cultural 
pluralism. Yegenoglu (1998:95-96) argues that key humanist ideas from the 
Enlightenment, such as progress, modernization and universalism, legitimized the 
colonial civilizing mission. The roots of ‘clash of civilizations’ thinking can be traced to 
Enlightenment thinking, which constructed an irreconcilable opposition between the 
West as a model for modern civilization, and traditional ways of life. Citing Sartre, 
Yegenoglu emphasizes that the connection between humanism and imperialism is more 
than a historical coincidence; rather, the universal humanist ideal depends on a racist 
construction of the other as ‘uncivilized’. Similarly, Spivak (cited in ibid) writes that the 
Western sovereign subject defines itself as human, civilized and universal by 
constructing the other as ‘backward’ and traditional, and thus as temporally distant. 
Pushing other cultures back in time enabled the West to construct itself as the subject of 
history; as the most developed and superior civilization it is entitled to dominate and 
impose its version of modernity universally. 
Orientalist scholarship contrasted the Muslim world with the West, seeking to 
demonstrate that the Muslim world lacks freedom, progress, humanism and secularism. 
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Yegenoglu (1998:97-99) argues that the status of women became a prime indicator of 
Oriental backwardness. In colonial discourse, the veiled Muslim woman became the 
“concrete embodiment of oppressive Islamic traditions” (ibid), which prevented the 
Muslim world from catching up with Western progress. Criticism of cultural and 
religious practices in Muslim societies as oppressing women became central in 
ideological justifications of colonialism, and enabled liberal feminist rhetoric to be used 
in the service of imperialism. As a temporal contrast between tradition and modernity is 
essential to the difference between the West and the Muslim world, Orientalist 
discourse remains committed to proving that Muslim communities do not change. 
Assuming the situation of Muslim women to be the same today, contemporary feminist 
rhetoric shows remarkable similarities with colonial rhetoric, notably in a persistent 
desire to unveil Muslim women. As a highly visible marker of religious tradition, the 
veil is “taken as the sign of the inherently oppressive and unfree nature of the entire 
tradition of Islam and oriental cultures” (ibid). Political actors like Storhaug use 
Enlightenment rhetoric in contemporary integration debate, where, in Fekete’s (2006:8-
9) words; “non-western immigrants must cast off their ‘backward culture’ and 
assimilate into the modern, secular values of the Enlightenment”. Fekete argues that an 
“Enlightenment fundamentalism” which understands the Enlightenment as a “sacred, 
finished process” not open to interpretation or adaptation, has become a dominant 
ideology in the wake of the “clash of civilizations” thesis, which European right-wing 
populists adapted in their rhetoric about a ‘culture clash’. 
In the hijab debate, Lyngeng (Dagbladet, December 3, 2007) suggests that rather than 
debating Muslims we should ask what functions stereotypical images of Muslims serve 
for a Norwegian national self-image. He argues that Storhaug does not hold these 
stereotypes because she is genuinely concerned about Muslim women and children, but 
because she is worried about Norwegian society. As expressed in her previous book; 
Focus must be on the national community – how we maintain the citizens’ sense 
of belonging to Norwegian society; how this unity must be continued, through 
common language, shared basic values, knowledge about our history and 
culture; the glue that keeps us together as a people (Storhaug 2006:258). 
In Lyngeng’s analysis, Storhaug is primarily a nationalist rather than a feminist. 
Drawing on Lacanian psychology, he suggests that the “glue” keeping the nation 
together in Storhaug’s imagination, is a stereotype of an anti-Western Muslim who 
represents a negation of all things Norwegian. Even if the nation were purified of all 
Muslim influence, the national self-image would still depend on the fantasy of the 
demonic Muslim; it is not the actual presence of […] women’s oppression that is the 
cause of […] Islamophobia, but one’s own need to maintain a fantasy that 
simultaneously contrasts and confirms one’s own self-image. What Lyngeng describes 
resembles the ‘Orientalist fantasy’ analyzed by Yegenoglu (1998:106), who argues that 
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the sub-text of feminist desire to liberate Muslim women from oppressive traditions was 
to achieve a self-representation as sovereign subjects. Drawing on the Lacanian notion 
of ‘fantasy’ (Yegenoglu 1998:4), she examines the unconscious psychological processes 
of Orientalism as “a set of discursive effects that constitute the subject” (ibid, 2). In 
other words, she discusses how one becomes a Western subject through a process of 
imagining oneself within a collective fantasy of belonging to a “Western culture” (ibid, 
4). The idea of the modern “subject” has been criticized by feminists for universalizing 
the category of “man” while marking “woman” as a radically different other with 
characteristics opposed to those of the subject (ibid, 6). Following this analysis; since 
the universal has been appropriated by men, women can only achieve this subject 
position by denying their difference and assuming a masculine position (ibid, 105). One 
way of doing this is for western feminists to take on the ‘white woman’s burden’ to 
civilize Muslim women, which places them in a dominant position of power towards 
other women, while evading the issue of women’s oppression in the west. Yegenoglu 
suggests that Western women seek to achieve a status as sovereign subjects by imitating 
the masculine act of imperialism. In Razack’s (2008:86) words, the Western subject 
becomes a subject by signifying the Other as different, and the veiled Oriental woman 
confirms the Western subject position. Unveiling Muslim women, as an act of 
imperialism, constitutes western women as colonial subjects (ibid, 109). 
In public debate about Storhaug’s book, critics pointed out that her ideal is the extreme 
secularism (Førde) found in France and Turkey (Aftenposten’s review). While I return 
to a more detailed discussion of moderate and radical secularism in chapter 5, the case 
of Turkey as a Muslim country with a westernizing ideology is illustrative. Yegenoglu 
(1998:122) discusses how Orientalist discourse was reproduced in nationalist projects 
within Muslim countries. Like in the Algerian liberation struggle, the question of 
women and the veil is turned into a battleground also in the Turkish struggle between 
‘Islamism’ and the ‘Westernist’ ideology of the state (see also Göle 1996:31; 50). 
Yegenoglu (ibid, 126) notes that the Turkish nationalist project, led by Mustafa Kemal, 
took Westernization as its ideology and emphasized the principles of the European 
Enlightenment in the construction of Turkey as a modern secular nation-state. In 
Kemalist ideology, to be civilized was equated with Westernization, and progress was 
measured by distancing from Islam (p. 131; see also Göle 1996:16), which was blamed 
for keeping women in the dark ages. Turkish reformers took over a Eurocentric concept 
of civilization that implies Western superiority and attributes universality to the Western 
model (ibid, 58), or more accurately, to the cultural model of European upper classes 
(ibid, 13) and denounced traditional Islamic values while glorifying western humanist 
notions of rationality, progress and freedom. Kemal was very specific about women’s 
dress and behavior; the new Turkish woman was supposed to be unveiled, educated and 
Westernized. On the other hand, she should not imitate western women, but retain 
“feminine virtues” and authentic cultural traditions (Yegenoglu 1998:134). On the 
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Islamic side, the decline of the Ottoman Empire was blamed on the “contamination of 
Islamic values by Western culture” (Yegenoglu 1998:128). On either side, women did 
not have an autonomous subject position from which they could speak as women; 
rather, both Westernist and Islamic ideologies sought to define women’s behavior in 
terms of ‘true’ national identity. When women took part in debate, it was always within 
terms “already established by the discursive polarization” (ibid, 130).  
In her analysis of the “veiling movement” that emerged among Turkish students who 
mobilized to protest the ban against headscarves in the universities in the 1980s, Nilüfer 
Göle (1996:82-85) notes that the question of women has once again emerged at the 
center of political polarization, but this time, women are no longer simply objects and 
symbols of political struggles, but became active participants and political subjects. In 
contemporary ‘Islamist’ movements, veiling emerges not only as a “symbol of 
Islamization” but as a “political claim asserted by women” (ibid, 83). Göle rejects the 
dualistic framework that sees Islamist movements as anti-Western, anti-modern, 
traditionalist and reactionary (ibid, 137), and determined by external factors, either a 
cultural-religious essence or a political context of oppression and poverty (ibid, 8-9). 
Instead, she approaches them as ‘social movements’ with their own complex internal 
dynamics (ibid, 87), as active movements asserting Muslim identity and resisting 
homogenizing forces of Western modernity expressed in the Kemalist “civilizing 
project” which equated modernity with Western culture. Göle argues that in their 
criticism of Enlightenment modernity and the universalizing forces of Western 
civilization (ibid, 17), Islamic movements are similar to ‘postmodern’ social movements 
in the West, including feminism, environmentalism and particularly Black identity 
politics that rejects assimilation into white culture and turns ‘difference’ into a source of 
empowerment (ibid, 138). The politicization of Islam offers a religious way of life as an 
alternative to ‘western’ lifestyle (ibid, 92). Questions of gender and sexuality are central 
to this critique of Western modernity (ibid, 1).  
Göle (ibid, 88-92) argues that contemporary veiling cannot easily be explained as 
enforced by men, as a rural tradition or as an effect of religious education, but primarily 
becomes a symbol of asserting Muslim ‘difference’. It can be understood as the 
“outcome of a new interpretation of Islamic religion”, by educated and “intellectual” 
young Muslim women and men, who reject their parents’ traditional interpretations of 
Islam as well as a “secular way of life” (ibid, 17), and whose decision to veil often goes 
against the will of their families. Rather than passively accepting traditional norms and 
practices, veiled university students are assertive women who emerge in the public 
sphere seeking modern opportunities through education, “reappropriate” the Islamic 
faith in a radical way to reject traditional interpretations and seek a “true” Islam by 
returning to original scriptural sources (ibid, 4-5). In this sense, fundamentalism is used 
to criticize tradition and construct a vision of modernity different from the Western 
version (ibid, 104). 
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Islamist students argue that in a utopian “Golden Age” of Islam, there was gender 
equality, and that gender roles and oppression of women result from misinterpretations 
(Göle 1996:104-105). They draw on religious scriptures to argue against traditional 
misinterpretations, pointing out for example that the Prophet did housework and that 
women worked as traders. Nevertheless, in Islamic tradition, veiling represents a social 
order based on gender complementarity and segregation (ibid, 93-95). Islamist women 
conform to this Muslim ideal of hiding their sexuality, and criticize Western feminist 
ideals, arguing that “sexually liberated” western women are exploited in capitalist 
economy (ibid, 101), paralleling claims by western radical feminists. They question a 
Western ideal of working women, sometimes with reference to economic exploitation. 
On one hand, politicized Islam promotes a traditional ideal of gender segregation that 
emphasizes women’s modesty and morality and assigns them to the private sphere, but 
on the other hand, Islamism moves women to the political scene and replaces a 
traditional image of passive Muslim women with an image of a politically active, 
outspoken and militant Muslim woman (ibid, 21; 84). Educated Islamist women’s 
political participation in the public sphere thus challenges traditional gender segregation 
with its separate gender roles that assign women to the private sphere (ibid, 1).  
The ‘fundamentalist’ return to a ‘true’ Islam provides the movement with a utopian 
vision of an ideal society and an alternative lifestyle. However, there are different ways 
of interpreting original scriptures and reappropriating ‘true’ Islam, and that results in 
different political positions within the movement (ibid, 108). Drawing on Gilles Kepel, 
Göle (ibid, 108-110) distinguishes between two main directions within radical 
Islamism, which both advocate a ‘return to the sources’ to revive Islam; which she calls 
“political Islam” and “cultural Islam”. Political Islam focuses on a “revolutionary” 
struggle against an external enemy of Western “imperialism” and prioritizes seizing 
state power to implement change top-down, with the Iranian revolution and 
establishment of an “Islamic state” based on sharia law as example. “Cultural Islam” 
also has a political dimension, but focuses on individual empowerment. Its relationship 
with the West is defined in terms of “interaction” rather than “reaction”, and rather than 
changing the political “system”, this direction aims at bottom-up ‘Islamization’ 
understood as “inner transformation” of individual religiosity and moral values of a 
community. 
‘Political Islam’ provides women with an “activist-missionary identity” (ibid, 112-114), 
which empowers them to claim individual freedom but falls short of questioning 
traditional gender relations. The cultural orientation focuses on the individual and opens 
up for “transformative forces of intellectual Muslim women” (ibid, 127) including 
Muslim feminists who “identify Muslim men, instead of the Western world or 
traditions, as the main source of oppression and domination of women” (ibid, 129). 
While veiling becomes a basis for perpetuating gender segregation, Islamic women 
simultaneously enter the public sphere via political movements and initiate an 
179 
 
irreversible process of individualization within the movement, where they question the 
“private sphere” and transform existing gender relations (Göle 1996:139-140). Göle 
(ibid) concludes;  
Gender relations will be the key determinant to whether the Islamist movements 
evolve towards pluralism, which recognizes individual rights and civil society, 
or to the terrain of countersociety, which produces totalitarian tendencies. 
Similarly, Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2007:1) distinguishes between a “neo-traditionalist” 
tendency associated with political Islam, which is “absolutist, dogmatic and patriarchal” 
and “makes little concession to contemporary realities and the aspiration of Muslims”, 
and a “reformist” tendency (including Muslim feminism), which is “democratic, 
pluralist and rights-based” and makes “room for these realities and values, including 
gender equality”. Rejecting a dualism between ‘secularized Muslims’ and 
‘fundamentalists’, Mamdani (2004:38) emphasizes that the main distinction within 
‘Islamism’ goes between those who are society-centered and democratic, and those who 
are state-centered and authoritarian. He argues that the position on ‘ijtihad’ – “the 
institutionalized practice of interpreting the sharia to take into account changing 
historical circumstances and, therefore, different points of view” – is the decisive issue 
that distinguishes democratic, society-centered and progressive Islamists from 
authoritarian, state-centered and reactionary ones (ibid, 60); in the former view, every 
Muslim individual has the right to interpret scriptures (as emphasized by Muslim 
feminists like al-Hibri; 1999:43-45), while the latter view reserves this right for a small 
elite of clerics. Mamdani (ibid, 50) links this distinction to two meanings of ‘jihad’; a 
Muslim duty to make a spiritual, social, personal and political “effort” (or “struggle”) to 
create a just and egalitarian society. The ‘greater jihad’ refers to a personal struggle for 
piety; the effort of each Muslim to become a better person; while the ‘lesser jihad’ can 
be defined as a “just war” (rather than holy war) against an external enemy. Since Islam 
sanctions rebellion against unjust rulers, Islamists like Abul A’la Mawdudi and Sayyid 
Qutb have reformulated ‘jihad’ to mean military struggle to seize state power (ibid, 54). 
Mawdudi founded Jamaat-i-Islami, a religious movement and a Leninist-style 
authoritarian political party in Pakistan. While Mawdudi’s ethical and intellectual vision 
was influential among the young, educated middle-class, the party did not gain much 
support in elections. However, it did become a conservative religious legitimizer of 
Zia’s military dictatorship (see Modood 2010:24).  
Hijab and “Islamism” among Norwegian Muslims 
Those warning about the dangers of Islamism usually fail to distinguish between these 
two tendencies within the movement. Drawing on an essentialist understanding of 
Islamism as inherently anti-democratic, Storhaug (2006:182-183) claims that Islam 
practiced in Norway is a “mirror image” of Islam preached in Muslim countries, and 
that not one single Norwegian Muslim congregation promotes gender equality. In 
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particular, she focuses on how Norwegian Pakistani congregations, the Islamic Cultural 
Center and Idara Minhaj ul-Quran, are Norwegian representatives of Jamaat-i-Islami 
(Storhaug 2006:177-182); and on Ramadan’s link to the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid, 
171-177), echoing Berman’s claim that he is an “Islamist in sheep’s clothes” (ibid, 173). 
In Aftenposten (October 13, 2007), anthropologist Inger Lise Lien sums up Storhaug’s 
project in the book Veiled. Unveiled as speculating on links between Islamism, hijab and 
moderate religious congregations, a claim that is too serious to be ignored. With regard 
to Idara Minhaj ul-Quran, Lien notes that; if the most moderate of moderate mosques is 
a bunch of Islamists, then we have a problem. Lien writes that we know too little about 
Islamist influence among Norwegian Muslims, and wants to know; Are they against 
democracy? Do they want sharia law and the caliphate? In the following (and in 
chapter 5), I investigate these questions. 
In Aftenposten (November 2, 2007), spokeswomen Mariam Javed and Bushra Ishaq 
responded on behalf of the Muslim Student Society in Oslo, seeking to nuance the 
image of Muslims in Norwegian society. They argue that; many of the values implied by 
liberal society are already present in Islam. We follow the Islamic way of life when we 
are integrated as good citizens, and we are good Muslims only if we are good citizens. 
In other words, they argue that liberal and Muslim values are compatible. They attribute 
the erroneous public image of anti-democratic Muslims to media, which give space to 
extremists like Storhaug, who creates polarization, rather than to experts, researchers 
and practicing Muslims, who could provide understanding and knowledge. They argue 
that Storhaug is anti-liberal since she wants to restrict individual freedom by proposing 
bans, and that she stigmatizes and condemns Muslim organizations that work for a well-
integrated society, when she presents Minhaj as an extreme organization, while the 
mosque actively works against […] forced marriages […] and for greater participation 
of Muslim women in employment. Javed and Ishaq argue that liberalism and Islam have 
many shared values, that following an Islamic lifestyle means integrating as active 
citizens of society, and that extremists like Storhaug work against integration by 
promoting an erroneous image of Islam as opposed to liberal society.  
Storhaug responds in the same newspaper (November 5, 2007), and argues that 
integration is particularly about internalizing core values of the society one lives in, and 
challenges them to answer whether they follow Norwegian law because they are 
integrated, or because Islam requires them to do so. In other words, her understanding 
of ‘integration’ is closer to ‘assimilation’, and she insists that they have to choose 
whether to have primary loyalty to Norway or to Islam; and that they cannot be both at 
the same time. She questions Javed’s and Ishaq’s definition of themselves, of Minhaj ul-
Quran and of Islam as “liberal”, and describes the Muslim Student Society as a 
conservative organization that invites Islamists to give lectures (November 23, 2007). 
Storhaug (November 5, 2007) challenges the two Muslim students to answer a number 
of specific questions where sharia is supposedly in conflict with liberal notions of 
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gender equality; whether they defend that young girls should wear the hijab, if unrelated 
boys and girls can have joint social activities, if Muslim girls can marry non-Muslims 
and Muslim boys can marry girls from non-monotheistic religions, if Muslim women 
can work closely together with male strangers, and whether women have a duty to obey 
their husbands. Ishaq and Javed answer (November 8, 2007) that; if Muslims work for 
an integrated society based on their duty [both] as citizens and as practicing Muslims, 
this reflects a double obligation which should be welcomed as positive. In other words, 
they reject that one has to choose a primary loyalty. With regard to the other questions, 
they reply that they work for the right [of Muslim women] to decide for themselves and 
the freedom to self-realization as independent individuals. Storhaug (November 13, 
2007) repeats the questions because she is not satisfied with this answer. Ishaq and 
Javed (November 20, 2007) elaborate; 
The questions asked by Storhaug are completely irrelevant with regard to 
integration and Norwegian law. Like everyone else in a liberal society, Muslims 
have the freedom to decide their own social activities and dresscode. […] When 
the individual right to independent choices is upheld and there is no coercion, 
one may practice one’s beliefs as one wishes, of course provided that one fulfills 
one’s duties as a citizen. 
Ishaq and Javed here use liberal arguments, particularly the individual freedom to 
choose how to practice one’s religion. They answer the questions about following 
specific sharia prescriptions, by emphasizing that this should be the decision of each 
individual Muslim. They refuse to impose religious prescriptions on others, but at the 
same time defend the individual right to choose to comply with such prescriptions. In 
other words, they assert their individual right to make choices that differ from 
Storhaug’s cultural preferences. Ishaq and Javed position themselves within the 
“progressive” tendency in the Islamic movement, promoting the practice of Islam as an 
individual choice, in contrast to those who try to impose their own interpretations on 
others (Göle 1996:140; Mamdani 2004:60; al-Hibri 1999:43-45).  
While some Norwegian Muslim congregations have organizational links to the 
Pakistani Islamist party, and distribute Islamist literature such as Mawdudi’s (Storhaug 
2006:181; Jacobsen 2011:18; 64), it is not clear whether an ideological influence of 
Mawdudi or other Islamist writers is reflected among its members. Jamaat-i-Islami is 
also established in Britain, and has some idealist supporters, but otherwise little 
influence among politically pragmatic and non-ideological British Pakistanis (Modood 
2010:23-24). As with other organizations, we can expect to find a diversity of 
viewpoints expressing various degrees of engagement with different writings rather than 
strict ideological adherence. Thorbjørnsrud (2004:48) argues that while the hijab as an 
ideological symbol (still) exists, it would be mistaken to claim that it necessarily implies 
Islamist sympathies for most hijab-wearing women. While the meanings of the hijab are 
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complex, what Thorbjørnsrud calls “the new veil” is always a marker of a woman’s 
religious identity. Leaving these congregations aside, I focus on the discourse in the 
Muslim Student Society in Oslo, because several of the organization’s leaders, 
including Mohammed Usman Rana (2007-08), Mariam Javed (2008-09) and Bushra 
Ishaq (2009-10), would emerge as high-profile debate contributors in the years 2008-
2010. Rana started the ‘secularism debate’ (see chapter 5) in 2008, while Ishaq was 
central to the public breakthrough of Muslim feminism in 2009. While the political, 
cultural and religious context in twenty-first century Oslo differs from 1980s Turkey in 
important ways, there are interesting parallels between the Islamic revivalist student 
movements as analyzed by Jacobsen (2011) and Göle (1996), respectively. 
The ‘hijab-in-the-police’ debate in 2009 
A third round of Norwegian hijab debates, which led to the public breakthrough of 
Muslim feminist perspectives took place in February 2009. The debate about hijab in 
the police (see also Døving 2012b:30-33) started when a young Muslim woman who 
wanted to study at the police academy, Keltoum Hasnaoui Missoum from Sandnes 
wrote a letter to the Police Directorate asking whether she would be allowed to wear a 
hijab with the police uniform. From September 26, 2008, the issue was covered by the 
regional newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad, a newspaper which, according to editor Tom 
Hetland (2009:63) has a “positive attitude towards multicultural society” and from the 
start supported Missoum, arguing that allowing female Muslim police officers to wear a 
hijab with the uniform, as they do in Sweden and Britain, would promote integration. 
Until February 2009, Stavanger Aftenblad was alone to follow the case, reporting on 
various viewpoints and following up authorities’ processing of the request. Both the 
Police Directorate and the Justice Ministry refused to answer questions from the media. 
On February 4, 2009, a recommendation from the Directorate to the Ministry, dated 
November 10, 2008, was publicized. In the letter, the Directorate emphasized that in 
order to maintain trust among all sections of society, the police force should reflect 
diversity; and “it is hardly decisive for […] police neutrality that one cannot show one’s 
difference by religious headgear, but only by diversity based on other, non-uniform-
related aspects” (quoted in Spigseth 2010:43). The same day, the Ministry confirmed in 
a press release that “police uniform regulations will be changed to allow the use of 
religious headgear together with police uniform” (Hetland 2009:64; Spigseth 2010:45). 
In a letter to the Directorate dated February 10, the Ministry wrote that the hijab should 
be “adapted to the uniform” and “be neutral” (quoted by ibid, 48).  
This decision caused massive protest, from the Norwegian Police Union represented by 
leader Arne Johannessen to politicians from coalition parties and opposition, not least 
the Progress Party. Massive public pressure caused the government to retreat, first 
calling for a more thorough exploration of the issue, and then, on February 20, Justice 
Minister Knut Storberget announced at a press conference that the decision to allow the 
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hijab had been a “mistake”. The initial press release of February 4 was withdrawn, and 
replaced by a new one, quoting Storberget that “debate has shown that such a change 
can weaken perceptions of police neutrality”, and that; 
“In light of public debate that has taken place in recent weeks, I have concluded 
that general trust in perceiving the police as neutral, must carry more weight in 
this issue. I have thus requested that the further process in the Police Directorate 
be stopped.” (Ministry of Justice, February 20, 2009).   
It also says that “in the period after requesting further exploration of the issue, it has 
become clear that there is little support within the police force, in the general population 
and in Parliament, to make changes to Police uniform regulations” (ibid). Discussing 
the neutrality argument in these debates, Bangstad (2012:60-61) argues that these 
concerns are speculative because so far, there are no hijab-wearing Muslim women in 
the police or courts who may undermine perceptions of neutrality. Notably, countries 
like Sweden and Britain have allowed hijabs without perceiving it as a threat to 
neutrality. Later, the Ministry explained to the Equality and Anti-Discrimination 
ombud, which had requested further justification, that “in recent public debate [there] 
have been different perceptions about whether the hijab is only a religious headgear. It 
has been claimed that hijab is also a political symbol” (quoted in Spigseth 2010:47). 
The ombud recognized that the neutrality argument was valid, but argued that a ban on 
religious headgear is unnecessary to maintain neutrality; it is “hard to see that the 
Justice Ministry has justified its position that it is necessary to ban the use of religious 
headgear in order to appear as neutral and impartial towards the public” (quoted in ibid, 
50). Concluding that the decision against police hijabs violates Gender Equality and 
Anti-Discrimination Acts, the ombud agreed with the Ministry’s original position, that 
hijab is compatible with neutrality. In its final reply to the ombud, the Ministry writes 
that; “Trust is […] based on the fact that Norwegian police is perceived by large parts of 
the population as a neutral agency and not an instrument for specific interests, nor 
religious congregations or faiths” (quoted in ibid, 52). The exchange shows that 
‘neutrality’ is about perceptions; for one side, it is assured by reflecting diversity, while 
from another perspective, what counts as ‘neutrality’ is determined by public opinion, 
favoring the majority and discriminating minorities (see Modood 2007:24-26).   
In official justifications, the Justice Ministry acknowledged that it had changed its 
position as a direct result of public debate. Analysts agreed that the government gave in 
to public pressure because they were not “prepared to handle the principled and 
ideological aspects of the hijab issue” (Hetland 2009:65). Leirvik (Dagbladet, February 
28, 2009) draws a parallel to the same Ministry’s turnaround on the blasphemy issue 
two weeks earlier (see chapter 2), and comments that the government chose the 
cowardly way out when resistance came. Partly out of fear for losing voters to the 
Progress Party (one would believe), the proposal was withdrawn. Before the 
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withdrawal, election researcher Bernt Aardal (Aftenposten, February 18, 2007), also 
noted this parallel, and predicted that the Progress Party would have most to gain from 
this debate, regardless of the final outcome. By this time, former Progress Party leader 
Carl I. Hagen had already linked the hijab in the police to snikislamisering (literally, 
‘sneak-Islamization’ or ‘subtle Islamification’ as translated by Jacobsen; 2011:169; 
197). He argued that countless Muslim demands for special treatment are frightening 
(Aftenposten, February 15, 2009). At the party’s national congress a day after the 
government’s retreat, party leader Siv Jensen, who had already started campaigning for 
the September 2009 national elections, repeated Hagen’s warning against 
accommodating Muslim demands for ‘special treatment’. She also characterized the 
request for a police hijab as ‘subtle Islamification’ of Norwegian society (Dagsavisen, 
February 21, 2009). From this perspective, the government was quietly trying to 
accommodate Muslim demands, but two controversial attempts (the blasphemy law and 
the police hijab) were stopped by public watchdogs.  
In March, Labor party secretary Martin Kolberg announced that Labor would take up 
the battle against ‘radical Islam’ and was criticized within the party for using Progress 
Party rhetoric. At the same time, the Progress Party became the largest party in some 
opinion polls, with up to 30 per cent of votes. The party leader attributed the strong 
polls to the hijab debate, as did Dagsavisen’s political editor Arne Strand; Labor’s fall 
started when the justice minister tripped over the Muslim headscarf and Labor 
politicians went a long way to support Progress Party views (Dagsavisen, March 18, 
2009). The hijab debate demonstrated a division within Labor over issues of 
multiculturalism, where Justice Minister Storberget, Foreign Minister Støre and the 
Labor Youth League (AUF) are positive to accommodate minority demands, while 
party secretary Kolberg and the party’s women’s group are against. These tendencies 
within Labor were criticized by Islamic Council secretary general Shoaib Sultan 
(Dagsavisen, March 18, 2009), who said; we expect something else from Labor than 
from the Progress Party. Kolberg’s statement […] was perceived as Labor jumping on 
the bandwagon of Progress Party rhetoric.  
Ambreen Pervez and Farah Khan (Aftenposten, March 1, 2009) criticized the 
government for condoning xenophobia with its retreat on the hijab issue. They mention 
former minister of gender equality (2005-07) and Labor Party women’s movement 
leader Karita Bekkemellem’s comparison of the hijab with female genital mutilation; 
and Labor MP Marit Nybakk’s underestimation of hijab-wearing women, as examples 
of anti-Muslim attitudes in the social-democratic party. They write; we are hurt that the 
party that has for decades fought for justice in Norway, has powerful politicians who do 
not want to extend justice to thousands of Norwegian Muslim girls. They emphasize that 
we don’t need to swear to western feminism and women’s liberation in order to realize 
ourselves as modern and independent women, and; we do not need forces like Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali […] in order to become successful Western women. Pervez and Khan were two 
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among many assertive Muslim women who joined public debate in the aftermath of the 
hijab-in-the-police debate, fought for the right to be ‘different, but equal’ and demanded 
to be accepted as modern and independent Norwegian (even ‘Western’) women, while 
practicing Islam, wearing a hijab, and asserting a public identity as Muslim women. 
This emergence of Muslim women in public debate was noted in Klassekampen 
(February 23, 2009), where Socialist Left politician Reza Rezaee commented that this 
debate marks the start of Norwegian Muslim women fighting for their rights on their 
own terms. Even though the government rejected the request for a police hijab, Rezaee 
argues that; this has contributed to raise consciousness. Muslim women now use their 
voice in larger society to strike back. Abid Raja, who had now become a Liberal Party 
politician and organized ‘dialogue meetings’ at the Literature House in Oslo, agrees; 
even if the girls lost the battle, they have won a place in public debate. He adds; we now 
see five to ten new strong hijab-wearing Muslim women’s voices. I think this can no 
longer be controlled by politicians nor anyone else. One of the most visible Muslim 
voices was the new leader of the Muslim Student Society, Bushra Ishaq, who does not 
wear a hijab but defends other women’s right to do so. 
Public emergence of Muslim feminism 
The term ‘Muslim feminism’ had occasionally been mentioned in Norwegian media, for 
example when covering Iranian anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s attendance at a 
conference in Oslo. On this occasion, she was interviewed in Klassekampen (June 11, 
2008) by Amal Wahab, and a shortened version of Mir-Hosseini’s lecture was printed in 
Dagbladet (June 4, 2008), translated by Marte Michelet. (It is no coincidence that these 
two journalists were respectively a Muslim woman (Wahab) and a radical feminist 
(Michelet). In her text, Mir-Hosseini writes about the polarized debate between western 
feminists and Muslim women, where being a feminist implied being against hijab and 
everything it stood for, including “Islam” and on the other side, choosing hijab implied 
being religious – or seduced by political Islam – and thus, it was impossible to be 
feminist. Like Göle, Mir-Hosseini argues that this dualistic debate fails to see that 
political Islam contributed to create a space, an arena, where Muslim women could 
unite their faith and identity with a “feminist” battle for gender equality (see also Mir-
Hosseini 2006:639). This was not because Islamist leaders offered an egalitarian 
interpretation of religious texts, but because their main agenda, “returning to sharia”, 
gave Muslim women a language and legitimacy they needed to overcome a dominant 
discourse where demands for women’s liberation were seen as a Western agenda (see 
also Mir-Hosseini 2007:23). Islamist attempts to turn patriarchal and anachronistic 
interpretations of sharia into law, provoked women to criticize and argue that there is no 
contradiction between Muslim faith and feminism. In the early 1990s, Mir-Hosseini 
(ibid) writes, a new discourse on gender emerged that was  
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“feminist” in its ambitions and demands, and simultaneously “Muslim” in its 
language and source of legitimacy. Some versions of this new discourse have 
been labeled “Muslim feminism” – an expression that is disturbing both to many 
Islamists and to some secular feminists. 
Mir-Hosseini emphasizes the potential of Muslim feminists to contribute to rewrite the 
conventional narrative about Islam, which is a necessary first step for a meaningful 
debate about the place of Muslims in Europe, as an alternative to unconstructive 
Western support for women like Hirsi Ali, who confirm Euro-American colonial policy, 
perceptions about moral and cultural superiority, and a narrative where Muslim women 
are presented as captives that must be saved from outside, but who read the holy 
scriptures of Islam in an equally patriarchal and dogmatic way as the Taliban they 
loudly and self-righteously condemn. Mir-Hosseini (2006:632) argues that Muslim 
women struggle against two opposed ideologies, an Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ that 
glorifies Islam without acknowledging abuses in its name, and a secular 
‘fundamentalism’, which condemns Islam by equating it with those abuses. Both these 
ideologies, like Muslim traditionalists, share an essentialist understanding of Islam 
(ibid, 641) as incompatible with feminism. Muslim feminists emphasize that “human 
understanding of Islam is flexible” (2007:23), and distinguish between ‘sharia’ 
understood as revealed law or a “totality of God’s will as revealed to the Prophet 
Mohammed” and ‘fiqh’, the “science of jurisprudence”. Sharia is sacred and universal; 
fiqh is subject to change (2006:632-633). Fiqh is often equated with sharia, but what 
Islamists present as sharia is actually their own patriarchal interpretations of God’s will.  
In Dagbladet (June 9, 2008), Qureshi supports Mir-Hosseini’s position. She points out 
that the central argument in the Klassekampen interview is that Western secular 
feminism inspired Muslim women in the 20th century, but has nothing more to offer. 
Now, Muslim women define their own feminism, and since Muslim societies are 
religious, only a women’s movement that starts with religious texts will be able to leave 
an impact on Muslim societies (see also ibid, 644). Mir-Hosseini writes that she has 
regular dialogue meetings with Iranian religious leaders, who are open to and respect 
her as a Muslim feminist. She argues that the situation for Iranian women is improving; 
two-thirds of Iranian students are women, women increasingly participate in the public 
sphere, and a women’s movement is growing. 
In Norway, Muslim feminism emerged primarily among students, and many ‘new 
voices’ in public debate have a background from student organizations in Oslo; 
including Ambreen Pervez, leader of the Pakistani Student Society (PSS) in 2006-07; 
Ilham Hassan, leader of the Somali Student Association (2007); and Mariam Javed and 
Bushra Ishaq, leaders of the Muslim Student Society (MSS) in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively. When Pervez, who became known to the public in 2004, was elected PSS 
leader, she was interviewed in Aftenposten Aften (November 3, 2006). Here, we learn 
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that all six PSS board members were female, because more Pakistani girls than boys 
study and girls are more interested in organizational work. In the interview, she says 
that she identifies as both ‘Norwegian’ and ‘Pakistani’, but primarily as ‘Muslim’. She 
does not use the word ‘feminism’, but uses Islam to argue for the importance of higher 
education, and to criticize negative aspects of ‘Pakistani culture’ such as forced 
marriages; a common strategy among Muslim feminists (al-Hibri 1999:43-45; Göle 
1996:88-92). 
When Javed became the first female MSS leader, Aftenposten Aften (May 27, 2008) 
highlighted the fact that seven of nine board members were girls, all of them Pakistani. 
Under the sub-heading Growing feminism, it says that MSS girls don’t want to 
emphasize gender, but acknowledge that they serve as role models, showing that 
Muslim girls can be active in the public sphere. On the other hand, they reportedly want 
to prioritize family over career, even though most of them do master’s degrees. In this 
sense, there is a parallel with the Turkish student activists studied by Göle (ibid, 92-95; 
99-100), who pursued higher education and were active in the public sphere while 
upholding aspects of traditional Muslim gender segregation and wanted to prioritize 
family over career, despite having higher education. In an interview in Klassekampen 
(May 21, 2008), Javed elaborates on her views on gender equality; 
I support terms like equal dignity [likeverd] and difference feminism more than 
equal status [likestilling]. There should be room for a way of thinking that 
upholds differences between genders. When we go beneath a simplistic idea of 
equal status and see that we are different, that’s when we respect each other. 
Here, she explicitly favors ‘difference feminism’ over forms of feminism that hold male 
practice as a standard for women. In practice, this implies that in most circumstances, 
she sees it as a matter of course that women and men participate equally, but supports 
gender segregation during prayers; it is a Western idea that there should be equal status 
in every context. When we pray, focus should be on God. It is much easier to be 
separate, because then you can focus on God in peace and quiet. While not identifying 
as a feminist, Javed discusses different versions of gender equality and tries to define an 
interpretation that is compatible with Islam. Anthropologist Christine Jacobsen 
(2011:270-271), who studied the Muslim Student Society, notes that the organization’s 
members commonly criticized gender injustice and argued that gender equality is a 
‘fundamental principle’ in Islam, but most often did not identify with ‘feminism’, which 
they associated with western feminists’ patronizing attitudes towards them (see also 
Thorbjørnsrud 2004:41). They used Muslim feminist strategies of criticizing patriarchal 
‘interpretations’ and based their criticism of gender injustice on a return to sacred 
scriptures to recover ‘true’ Islam and separate the ‘cultural’ from the ‘religious’ 
(Jacobsen; ibid). At the same time, they maintained a traditional Muslim view that there 
is an “essential and God-given difference between men and women” (ibid), reflecting a 
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discourse of “gender complementarity” (Jacobsen 2004:7-8), but the MSS was also a 
pioneer among Norwegian and European Muslim organizations to have mixed-gender 
religious activities rather than following traditional principles of segregation (Jacobsen 
2011:89). 
After the debate about the police hijab, Klassekampen (March 7, 2009) reported that a 
group of Muslim feminists had started a hijab brigade, and were going to participate in 
the Women’s Day parade to protest against the government’s dropping the proposal for 
a police hijab. The group was started by former head of the Somalian Student 
Association, the hijab-wearing Ilham Hassan, on Facebook and has mobilized about a 
hundred hijab-wearing women as well as male and female sympathizers, including 
Pervez, who mobilized for the hijab demonstration in 2004, and Qureshi. Pervez and 
Hassan call themselves feminists, and Hassan elaborates in the Klassekampen interview; 
We ourselves have to define the meaning of feminism. […] Feminism means 
equal rights and equal opportunities for all, regardless of gender. Equal pay for 
equal work is important […] as is the right to decide over one’s own body. 
Feminists before us fought for the right to choose abortion and the right to 
control pregnancy. But the right to decide over one’s own body is also about 
being able to decide what to wear. […] For me, the right to wear hijab has 
become an issue to fight for. 
Hassan links Muslim women’s struggle for the hijab to previous feminist struggles to 
decide over one’s own body, and frames the hijab issue as a matter of women’s rights to 
choose what to wear. She elaborates; I support women’s right to decide for themselves, 
not to be forced to do one thing or the other, either that means as little clothes as 
possible or as much clothes as possible. She refers to western feminism in the 1970s, 
and argues that white and black women should together fight against the use of 
women’s bodies in marketing, which puts pressure on teenage girls. She explains; 
I do not think that western women are whores. I think we should stand united. 
We may disagree and still not judge each other. It is up to me to define feminism 
for me, and up to you to define it for yourself. It is such a pity that western 
women see a Muslim woman on the street and think she is oppressed. 
She argues; Hijab is not oppressive, as long as it is chosen, as it is for most women. […] 
People claim they have read the Qur’an and found that it oppresses women, but that 
means they have read it from a negative angle, like the devil reads the Bible. She 
acknowledges that some girls are forced to wear the hijab by their families, and says; 
there are Muslim women who are oppressed and experience domestic violence. But this 
is not particular to Muslims. It is a serious social problem, which feminists are very 
concerned about. She emphasizes that it is not ‘religion’ that oppresses women, but 
‘men’. Pervez also emphasizes the other side of their struggle, against patriarchal 
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cultural traditions of the parental generation; Our women’s struggle is not just to be able 
to wear the hijab, but also to focus on those who are being forced to wear it. We need to 
educate our parental generation about Islam. There is no coercion in religion. Thus, 
they must not force their children into marriage, female circumcision or veiling. That is 
an un-Islamic custom. She points out that for many of them, the struggle with the 
parental generation is also about being allowed to wear hijab; many of us have 
experienced that our parents are against hijab. They are afraid that we will be 
discriminated […] that people will think they are conservative and un-modern.  
Hassan builds her feminism on Islam, and says; I am not a Muslim scholar, but I know 
that the Qur’an gives rights to women. In many Muslim countries, these rights are taken 
away. We have women’s movements in those countries fighting day in and day out to 
get those rights. She compares the situation in Muslim countries to Norway;  
Here in Norway, where the general women’s struggle has come much further, 
Muslim women’s struggle is about discrimination women face everyday because 
of gender and religion. We have gender equality and anti-discrimination laws. 
Nonetheless, hijab-wearing girls cannot get the education and job they want. 
[…] Hijab is allowed in […] low status jobs. But when talking about a 
profession that symbolizes power, it becomes a problem. 
On Women’s Day 2009, the hijab was not only defended but also literally attacked by a 
secularist with a Muslim background, Sara Azmeh Rasmussen, who went on stage and 
burnt a hijab after the official program finished. Perceiving hijab as a very strong 
symbol of oppression, she argues that women who choose to veil, have to accept that by 
making that choice, they limit their options; Women’s right to choose the veil does not 
mean that they are necessarily entitled to wear it everywhere and in every context. The 
veil is a strong religious signal, which is not appropriate everywhere (Aftenposten, 
March 8, 2009). Reportedly, some pro-hijab activists threw snowballs at Rasmussen. 
Public recognition of Ishaq’s debate contributions 
Most media attention was given to medicine student Bushra Ishaq, who made many 
debate contributions during the year she was MSS leader. While defending Muslim 
women’s right to wear hijab, she does not wear it herself; something that may have 
contributed to her popularity with media, in addition to sophisticated writing and 
position as student leader. In March 2010, she received the Freedom of Expression Prize 
from the Norwegian Freedom of Expression Foundation (Fritt Ord), with the 
justification; “Bushra Ishaq has, with her firm grounding in the Muslim faith and 
community, and with her reasoning and bridge-building approach, helped further a 
general understanding of what it means to live in today’s multi-cultural society” (see 
also Døving 2012b:25). In her reception speech, printed in an edited version as an op-ed 
article in Dagbladet (May 11, 2010), she said;  
190 
 
I have defended women’s right to realize herself as an independent individual – 
in a secular and pluralist context that also includes the right to religious self-
realization, in a free democratic society without coercion. I have argued in terms 
of principles based on Norwegian values such as equal dignity, equality before 
the law and gender equality. Because I have supported religious expressions and 
defended the Muslim faith, I have been judged as an Islamist, fundamentalist and 
accused of wanting to subtly Islamize Norway. I have been met with threats and 
harassment like many other Muslim contributors who dare to join debates, 
perhaps even more so because I am a woman. 
In the speech, she clarifies her position that combines women’s individual self-
realization with practicing the Muslim faith. Although she supports ‘Norwegian values’, 
she has been accused of supporting ‘Islamism’. She explains this as a consequence of a 
public discourse, where rhetoric is dominated by demagogy and populism. She refers to 
Esbati (2009; see chapter 1), who draws on Hage (1998) and describes a form of debate, 
where description of a problem is a goal in itself, where debate as such and the affective 
mood it produces, is the purpose; 
In contemporary debate, a perception is cultivated that Muslims constitute a 
problem simply by their existence, and are static carriers of certain 
characteristics that imply social problems – a sort of racism that stigmatizes and 
judges Muslim children before they are born. 
In a polarized climate of anti-Muslim racism, she questions the purpose of her own 
contributions;  
Following my faith as a practicing Muslim, I am supposed to strive for peace 
and thus abstain from activities that may contribute to increase the level of 
conflict in society. My purpose has thus been to introduce the values of dialogue 
into the debate arena – listen to my opponents with an open mind, respect and 
neighborly love despite disagreement. 
Here, Ishaq not only presents a positive image of Islam as a peaceful religion, but also 
makes a case for the relevance of religious perspectives in the public sphere, illustrating 
how faith, as an ethical guide for public behavior, can make a positive contribution to 
society in the public sphere (see also Jacobsen 2011:340). Ishaq’s perspective also 
represents a dialogue approach from below, from the minority side, and can be 
characterized as ‘antiracist multiculturalism’.  
In other contributions, she elaborates a critical perspective on public debate. In an op-ed 
in Dagsavisen (May 4, 2009), she argues that the ‘hijab-in-the-police’ debate went far 
out of proportion. Rather than debating generalizations about Muslim women and 
integration, the debate should have concentrated on the real issues; police neutrality and 
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Muslim women’s choice of profession. Ishaq criticizes the government for failing to 
discuss the issue as a value question in a multi-religious society, where we have to 
discuss where the limits of religious practice should be when defining ourselves as a 
liberalist and democratic society, and instead leaving the scene open to polemics and 
polarization. She argues that there is a general tendency in political rhetoric that the 
issue of integration is not taken seriously, but turned into a populist argument with big 
words without concrete suggestions. In this case, the government’s conclusion to say no 
to hijab is a demand for assimilation, not integration, where one has to change one’s 
religious practice in order to pursue a career. She places the government’s response to 
the police hijab in the context of integration policy, which has turned gender equality 
into a question of integration. This approach universalizes a Norwegian version of 
gender equality which it expects minorities to assimilate to (Gressgård & Jacobsen 
2003:73-74). Ishaq points out that among young Norwegian Muslims; women perform 
better than men in statistical measures of integration, such as education and active 
participation in society.  
In two other op-eds, she positions herself in relation to ‘Muslim feminism’. Before the 
hijab-in-the-police debate culminated, she wrote in Dagbladet (January 31, 2009); 
under the headline Western monopoly on feminism, where she argues that feminism is 
essential to a just society, and should not be restricted to apply only in a western 
context, but also in a multicultural and religious perspective. However, Western 
ideological dominance creates problems, and feminism is often rejected in Muslim 
societies because it is seen as secularist. Ishaq writes that every Islamic expression in 
favor of feminist values is played down with a reference that feminism can only exist in 
a secular context. This makes emergence of feminism among Norwegian Muslim 
women particularly interesting; and she points out that; the Muslim adaptation of 
feminism will differ from the Western one. Islam facilitates gender justice and equal 
dignity more than equal status. Ishaq’s position is in line with ‘difference feminism’ 
argued by the former MSS leader Mariam Javed above, which Jacobsen (2011:270) 
found was widespread in the MSS. But, despite theoretical differences, Ishaq 
emphasizes that; 
The practical approach, however, is not necessarily so different. A Muslim 
woman will, in the same way as Western women, demand the right to realize 
herself as an independent individual, and the Norwegian Muslim tendency is a 
concrete example that this is possible.  […] Many feminist values can be justified 
by Islamic theology. A feminist message can thus be mediated in a religious 
language that seems more constructive in a multicultural society than the 
secular form. […] For those of us not starting with definitions like secular or 
Islamist-reformist feminists, but belong to a category of practicing Muslims with 
a pragmatic approach, feminism is not about well-defined theoretical 
arguments. 
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Ishaq emphasizes that her own position is pragmatic more than theoretical. She does not 
defend one specific theoretical approach, but draws on various Muslim scholars and 
activists who share a view that the Qur’an can be used to defend women’s rights. About 
the Muslim view on women, Ishaq writes; 
Woman in Islam is responsible for a child’s primary care because she has a 
natural capacity to carry the child into the world and later breast-feed. But in no 
way is she required to do housework, and may, equal with other citizens, 
participate actively in society and employment when her primary responsibility 
is fulfilled.  
Here, she argues that women in Islam are entitled not only to pursue education, but also 
to take paid work outside the home. She justifies this view with reference to scriptures, 
and points out that Prophet Mohammed’s wife Khadija was a business woman and the 
Prophet himself was her employee after they married. Ishaq goes further in the direction 
of women’s ‘equal status’ with men than the students interviewed by Aften in 2008, and 
the Turkish students studied by Göle (1996:99-100), who wanted to prioritize family 
over career. Like them, Ishaq also goes back to scriptural sources to defend her position. 
In an interview with Dagsavisen (February 7, 2009), Ishaq praises the initial decision to 
allow hijab with the police uniform, emphasizing that this decision gives Muslim 
women the opportunity to pursue a career in the police. Muslim women’s engagement 
in this debate shows that it is important to them to be able to combine (conservative) 
practice of religion with pursuing a career in a profession of their own choice. 
In an attempt to offer politicians a more nuanced understanding of gender and Islam, 
she elaborates on Muslim feminists’ dual struggle in Aftenposten (September 5, 2009). 
Ishaq relates the high numbers of minority women in education, to a more critical 
attitude towards cultural traditions in parents’ countries of origin. She acknowledges a 
positive influence from Norwegian culture, and credits ‘Norwegian culture’ for the 
emergence of Muslim feminism; 
Without the fundamental influence from Norwegian culture and the values of the 
welfare state, which gives equal rights to all citizens, the emerging Muslim 
feminism would not have existed. […] When additionally, one finds theological 
justifications for the right to pursue higher education and paid work, the battle 
against a strongly traditional parental generation has become easier. 
Ishaq reflects a key characteristic of Muslim feminism; the differentiation between 
culture and religion, where Islamic theology is used to criticize cultural traditions of the 
parental generation. Ishaq emphasizes employment, not only as compatible with 
practicing Islam, but also as an entry point to active participation in society and thus 
‘integration’. This is where educated Muslim women face a second obstacle; not from 
their parents’ conservative traditions, but in the form of majority discrimination. Ishaq 
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writes that, economic independence for Muslim women is important not only for 
integration, but also for the battle for gender equality and degradation of traditional 
gender roles where women belong in the home. Because integration is a mutual process, 
she argues, larger society must be willing to open the labor market to include Muslim 
women. She concludes that; Muslim women are […] fighting a double battle for the 
right to employment, one against the attitudes of larger society, and the other within 
minority communities.  
Regarding the internal struggle, she argues that gender equality is on its way, and that 
much is going on inside Muslim communities, which are about to shape Islam in a new 
age. Influence from Western culture, and steady pressure to explain one’s identity as a 
Muslim, on one hand awakens an increasing interest in faith that we might call neo-
conservatism, at the same time as theologians are pressured to provide new arguments 
that contribute to change attitudes. According to Ishaq, more and more Muslim clerics 
now openly say that women do not belong at home. She argues that when the Muslim 
Student Society invites foreign theologians, they consciously select those with an 
academic background who are familiar with Western culture. What young Norwegian 
Muslims seek, is logical theological arguments expressed in a Western language and 
cultural framework that we recognize, and which equips us to become well-integrated 
individuals with a strong faith. 
Islamic revivalism among Norwegian Muslim students 
In Aftenposten (February 7, 2010), Ishaq discusses Ramadan’s book Radical Reform: 
Islamic Ethics and Liberation, a call for radical reformation in Muslim communities. 
She describes Ramadan as one of the strongest voices in our time who argues that 
women are independent individuals and criticizes prevailing male chauvinist cultural 
norms. He points to the earliest traditions from the Prophet’s time when women 
appeared as powerful players in society. According to Ishaq, Ramadan argues that 
Islamic reformation is not a new phenomenon, but has always been part of the 
‘authentic’ scriptural tradition. Thus, Ramadan stands for traditional Islam and is not 
open to new interpretations, but his opinion is that one needs to take into account the 
society where religion is practiced and thus talks about “context”. While Western 
supporters claim that he “Europeanizes Islam” and critics claim that he wants to 
“Islamicize Europe”, Ishaq comments;  
Ramadan is described as a prominent reformist, but he himself does not want to 
be a Martin Luther – he is opposed to arguing for anything that may conflict 
with the Qur’anic text or the tradition of the Prophet Mohammed. 
While rejecting criticism of Ramadan as an ‘extremist’ speaking with a ‘forked tongue’, 
she writes that his approach is criticized by theologians like Abdul Hakim Murad and 
Hamza Yusuf, who have been invited by the MSS and are preferred by Norwegian 
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Muslims. These are more influential than Ramadan within Western Islam, and argue 
that all tools for evolution and reform exist within traditional methodology. 
Jacobsen (2005:157; 2011:64) writes that the dominant MSS discourse can be described 
as a form of Islamist revivalism called “post-ikhwan” (‘ikhwan’ is the Arabic term for 
‘brotherhood’), which according to Anne Sofie Roald (2005:25) refers to practicing 
Muslims who hold ideas similar to those of the Muslim Brotherhood, but are not part of 
the organization and more open to new interpretations. Typical for this tendency is a 
pragmatic interpretation of scripture based on contemporary perspectives, while seeking 
to return to ‘pure’ sources. As this tendency sees Islam as a “complete way of life”, 
Roald (ibid) characterizes it as “to some extent” Islamist, defined as “Muslims who 
regard Islam as a body of ideas, values, beliefs and practices encompassing all spheres 
of life, including personal and social relationships, economics and politics” (quoted in 
Jacobsen 2011:63). Scholars like Olivier Roy (cited in ibid) reserve the term Islamism 
for those seeking to establish an Islamic state, and refer to the more individualist 
tendency among young European Muslims as “post-Islamism”. Jacobsen (2005:157-
158; 2011:65-67) writes that the MSS does not follow any coherent position or 
particular scholar, but rather an eclectic approach that changes over time, and that 
individual views of members vary. She argues that “young Muslims’ relationship to the 
Islamic tradition is not individualized in the sense of being disembedded from […] 
Islamic authorities” (ibid, 13) but rather that, through MSS activities, individual 
members encounter and engage with certain “aspects of Islamic discourse” including 
authoritative sources of inspiration like the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid, 64), Yusuf al-
Qaradawi and Ramadan (Jacobsen 2005:157-158; 2011:179); Hamza Yusuf as well as 
Turkish philosopher Fetullah Gülen and Egyptian television preacher Amr Khalid, who 
focus more on personal ethics than on political Islamism (ibid, 66). Rather than 
adhering to one ideology, the MSS’ reformist discourse is ‘experience-near’ and 
encourages individual rational reflection (ibid, 67). According to Jacobsen (2005:155-
156), they emphasize “individual reflection” in religious questions and construct 
Muslim identity as an individual choice. Drawing on Jocelyne Cesari, Jacobsen (ibid) 
argues that this individualization can take two forms; a ‘secular’ one that sees religion 
as a private matter, and a ‘collective’ one that links the individual to the ‘umma’, the 
global Muslim community. The latter tendency sees Islam as a “total way of life” with 
public and political relevance. MSS members tend to identify both as “Norwegian 
Muslims” and as part of a global Muslim community (ibid, 161). This tendency to 
detach Islam from ethnic cultures and identify with a global Muslim community is 
common among the ‘second-generation’ in Europe (Jacobsen 2011:69), and the MSS’ 
orientation parallels Muslim student organizations in other European countries, notably 
Sweden and Britain (Jacobsen 2005:157). Despite Muslim revivalist attempts to 
differentiate ‘authentic’ religion from the parental generation’s cultural traditions, for 
many young Muslims, religious identity remains linked to ethnic and cultural belonging. 
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Islamic revivalism is dynamically situated between two analytically distinguishable, but 
“in practice inextricably intertwined” dimensions (Jacobsen 2011:10); the “politics of 
piety” (Mahmood 2005) and “politics of identity”. Saba Mahmood (ibid, 193-194) 
studied the Egyptian piety movement, and criticizes the ‘identity politics’ approach for 
paying insufficient attention to a religious dimension that is more central to this strand 
of ‘Islamism’ than are political questions of identity, rights and recognition. While 
concerned with shaping themselves as pious subjects through reviving and reforming 
Muslim traditions, young European Muslims to a larger extent politicize Islam as a form 
of multiculturalist identity politics. While Islamists in Muslim countries often perceive 
the West as a threat, European Muslims interact with majority culture and seek to 
differentiate ‘universal’ Islam from ethnic and cultural traditions. The MSS identifies 
itself as “modern” and “liberal” in contrast to the “conservatism” and “traditionalism” 
of the parental generation (Jacobsen 2011:82), although they avoid direct confrontation. 
Instead, they describe inter-generational relations as “continuity and a gradual process 
of change” and see themselves as mixing Norwegian culture with their parents’ culture 
(ibid, 85-86). Jeanette Jouili and Amir-Moazami (2006:618-619) describe a similar 
tendency among young Muslims in France and Germany, where educated Muslim 
women combine ‘politics of piety’ with identity politics, and seek to resist pressure to 
assimilate by engaging in a “counter-discursive strategy” to rectify negative images of 
Islam in the public sphere (ibid, 625). Like the MSS, they distinguish between ‘pure 
Islam’ and cultural traditions of the parental generation, criticize restrictions imposed by 
families (including forced marriages) and demand the right to work and study (ibid, 
628-629). While these young Muslims seek theological justifications for individual 
choices, Jouili and Amir-Moazami (ibid, 631-632) write that ‘Muslim feminism’ is 
(still) a marginal phenomenon, which “did not seem to attract the majority of the pious 
Muslim women” they interviewed, especially in Germany. It may seem that educated 
Muslim women in Germany tend to be more conservative than their Norwegian 
counterparts. Amir-Moazami (2004:217) writes with regard to educated Muslim women 
in Germany; “the [Muslim] tradition of clearly outlined gender division is […] 
rhetorically maintained, but in practice negotiated.”  
With regard to the dimension of ‘identity politics’, Jacobsen (2011:180-181) describes 
the MSS as a “context in which youth mobilize a politics of identity on the basis of the 
experience of being treated, seen and talked about as the Other”. Because ‘Muslims’ 
have been categorized on the basis of their religious ‘difference’ as a “quasi-ethnic” 
group marked by “foreign origin”, Muslim identity politics is energized by a 
combination of an ascribed identity and the shared experience of being treated as the 
Other, and broader processes of Islamic revival drawing on religious values. This 
understanding of Muslim mobilization corresponds to what Modood (2007:39-43) 
describes as a feature of antiracist multiculturalism, where minority groups turn an 
ascribed, stigmatized ‘difference’ into a positive self-defined ‘identity’. The MSS seeks 
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to change ‘negative images’ of Muslims in Norwegian public debate by affirming a 
positive group identity that Muslims could be proud of (Jacobsen 2011:183). Like 
Modood (2007:50), Jacobsen (2011:184) argues that Muslim identity politics can be 
seen as a form of integration, which implies that minority members mobilize to 
negotiate and contest dominant public discourses. Islamist identity politics sometimes 
reverses the West vs. Islam dichotomy, and characterizes the West as ‘materialistic’ and 
‘egoistic’ i.e. as a negative mirror image of Islamic virtues. In Western countries, this 
reversal is necessarily asymmetrical since the public sphere is structured by majority 
discourses (ibid, 185). More typical for MSS discourse is a recognition of a multiplicity 
of identities such as religion, gender and race/ethnicity, thus avoiding to reproduce 
essentialist images of Islam and the West. The identities which young Muslims want to 
be publicly recognized are thus “inherently contested and continually negotiated” (ibid, 
186). The intertwining of religious practices and identity politics illustrates Modood’s 
(2005:104-106) point that antiracism among Muslims will inevitably have a religious 
dimension, as their ‘mode of being’ from which they draw strength to criticize the 
‘mode of oppression’ and as basis for a positive identity in which they take pride and 
with which they counter ascribed negative differences. Jacobsen argues that when 
religious ideas and practices like ‘jihad’ and ‘hijab’ are mobilized in identity politics, 
the latter becomes part of religious practice. Thus, political resistance against majority 
hegemony and defending Islam against public misrecognition is defined as part of a 
‘greater jihad’ (Jacobsen 2005:159-160). Countering negative representations of Islam, 
through debate contributions in newspapers, street protests, knowledge distribution or 
simply being a good role model are understood as ‘religious practices’ (Jacobsen 
2011:188). Because of dominant assumptions about Muslim women as passive and 
oppressed, they have additional reason to take an active public role to counter this 
image (ibid, 194). Jacobsen (ibid) writes that when educated Muslim women choose to 
wear hijab, it represents a strategy that resists and displaces the dichotomies between 
modern, secular individualism and traditional, religious collectivism. While the hijab is 
primarily a religious practice central to a ‘politics of piety’ (ibid, 367), it is also 
politicized as symbol of defending Muslim identity (ibid, 195). Jacobsen (ibid, 312-313) 
writes that hijab use is generally encouraged in the MSS, primarily as a symbol of 
modesty appropriate for pious Muslim women, although in practice, about half of 
female members did not regularly wear it, and neither was it required in organizational 
activities. Although the hijab is seen as important, imposing it or wearing it out of habit 
was discouraged as representing “cultural traditions” rather than ‘true Islam’, 
understood as a personal relationship between individual and God. Thus, it may matter 
more why one wears a hijab than whether one does, and the ‘better’ reason is religious 
self-discipline, in line with an emphasis in Islamic tradition that religious practice 
should be accompanied by a certain state of mind (ibid, 314-316), i.e. that the practice 
should be ‘sincere’. Wearing a hijab, as a visible sign of religious identity, also comes 
with a responsibility to act in accordance with Islamic ethics (ibid, 200). 
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Debate about the ‘morality police’ 
In January 2010, Aftenposten initiated  a debate about a ‘morality police’ based on a 
series of anecdotal reports about anonymous ‘Muslim men’ harassing gay men and 
‘immodest’ young women on the streets of Grønland, a multicultural neighborhood in 
Oslo. This form of moral or social control exerted by “bearded men” was constructed as 
a ‘religious police’ and several politicians joined the debate (see Bangstad 2012:47-51). 
Labor MP Hadia Tajik (Aftenposten, January 12, 2010) saw the ‘morality police’ as 
representing  
a conflict between traditional and modern values. In other words: Between a 
way of thinking that favors the collective, and one that gives room for 
individuals. It is reinforced by religious, cultural or social communities. It exists 
in rural Norway and in Grønland. 
This view defines the problem of social control as a remnant of traditional, collectivist 
societies, and acknowledges that it exists among the majority as a phenomenon found in 
traditional villages, but has no place in modern, individualist society. This dominant 
view is based on a dichotomy, where hegemonic liberal and secular values are under 
pressure from conservative and religious norms (ibid, 47). Jacobsen (2011:376) argues 
that in dominant discourse in Norway, ‘free choice’ is linked to the modern and secular, 
while the traditional and religious is associated with coercion. In the hijab debates, this 
construction of free choice often prevented majority members from understanding how 
Muslim women could ‘choose’ to ‘submit’ to religion, indicating that “only some 
choices are considered as properly free within the majority discourse on autonomy” 
(ibid, 381).  
Bangstad (ibid, 50-51) argues that there was a monological consensus among media 
commentators, politicians and academics that understood social control as a Muslim 
problem, based on a secular-religious dichotomy. However, a minority view was 
expressed by Hassan (Morgenbladet, January 15, 2010), Pervez (Aftenposten, January 
22, 2010), Qureshi (VG, January 23, 2010), Ishaq (Dagbladet, January 25, 2010) and 
leader of the MiRA Center, Fakhra Salimi (Klassekampen, February 11, 2010), who 
describes herself as a ‘Black feminist’ in the tradition of bell hooks. These minority 
feminists all acknowledge that social control exists and represents a problem. However, 
they criticized media coverage for being biased and exaggerated; Qureshi emphasizes 
that the morality police consists of a few individual men, whom Ishaq describes as 
people who are not integrated and do not follow media; and thus, the debate will not 
reach them anyway. Hassan speaks of individual cases that cannot be called organized 
moralizing activity. She gives an example of how an elderly Somalian man reacted 
negatively to her becoming a student leader, and recommends girls to answer back to 
those controlling bullies who are not used to being stood up to. They all link criticism 
of the morality police to criticism of moralizing attitudes among majority Norwegians. 
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Most explicitly, Hassan directs attention to the social control exerted by “modern” 
moralists, who want a world free from hijab and modesty. She mentions an incident 
where an elderly lady on the subway lectured her about democracy and suggested that 
she burn her hijab. Hassan argues that the greater problem of social control comes from 
the majority; there are others than Muslims who elevate themselves to a morality police 
and try to impose their values and morality on others. […] These moralists not only 
stand along the street pointing fingers, we [Muslim girls] see them on TV, in the 
newspapers, in schools, behind desks, at work and everywhere else in public space. 
Qureshi argues that the debate about ‘moral surveillance’ should also focus on hundreds 
of […] Muslim and Indian girls that are harassed based on their clothing and visible 
religiosity. Ishaq writes that various types of social control are also exerted by ethnic 
Norwegians […] for example women are spat on because they wear hijab, and 
emphasizes that this is as serious. Similarly, Pervez points out that Muslim women 
wearing hijab are scolded and physically attacked, and criticizes that media ignores that 
ethnic and religious minorities experience social control all over the city and country. 
Pervez and Hassan suggest that we all need to ‘respect differences’. Salimi says; 
Minority women are being observed all the time, in the West End [a mostly white part of 
Oslo] they look at the way they dress, and almost want to pull off your hijab, in the East 
End [mixed or mostly non-white areas], you get critical looks because you don’t wear 
hijab. The judgmental looks restrict women’s freedom. 
In debates about multiculturalism and feminism, the exercise of social control within 
minority groups has been theorized in terms of ‘internal restrictions’ while moralizing 
attempts from the majority are seen as undue ‘pressure to assimilate’ against which 
minority groups may seek ‘external protections’ (Kymlicka 1995:35-44). The 
arguments from minority feminists suggest a different reading. Seeing themselves as 
full-fledged members of Norwegian society, they see exercise of social control by 
majority members and state institutions not primarily in terms of majority-minority 
relations, but as ‘internal restrictions’ imposed on members of the national community. 
Like minority leaders have been suspected of seeking ‘external protections’ to restrict 
individual freedom (see chapter 3), European states justify restrictions on citizens’ hijab 
use in terms of protecting ‘national values’ (like secularism in France and Turkey) 
against an external threat of ‘Islamism’. While the claim of an external threat is 
questionable, the European Human Rights Court accepted this argument when ruling 
that the Turkish hijab ban is legitimate. Citing Asad, Bangstad (2012:52) points out that 
secularism expresses the sovereign power of the nation-state, and in Norway, where 
state and society are closely linked (in contrast to the US and many other countries), the 
secularity of the state is easily absolutized to imply secularism in civil society.     
The phenomenon of a ‘morality police’ cannot be mapped on to a dichotomy between 
traditional and modern. It appears that ‘liberal’ individuals and institutions are equally 
concerned with controlling behavior. The state and majority also exercise a form of 
199 
 
collectivism that restricts individual freedom. In his analysis of the morality police 
debate, Bangstad (2012:47) points out that rather than reflecting a secular-religious 
conflict, the debate illustrates a distinction between ideological, absolutist ideas of 
secularism, and an open, pragmatic and dialogical secularism. In ideological versions of 
secularism, liberals are concerned with imposing liberalism on others rather than 
finding a platform for pluralism (ibid, 62). Jacobsen (2011:13) also questions a dualistic 
understanding of modern individual choice contrasted to traditional conformity with 
community norms. Instead, she suggests a Foucauldian approach that links normative 
emphasis on autonomy, freedom and choice to the making of “individualized self-
regulating subjects” in modern forms of governance and discipline (ibid, 376). Jacobsen 
describes how Norwegian integration policy, which emphasizes “teaching” minority 
women and children “the right to individual freedom”, imposes a  particular, secularist 
understanding of freedom (ibid, 382), and thus represents a ‘morality police’ in an 
institutionalized form. With regard to hijab-wearing women, this restricted 
understanding of individual freedom implies a logic where  “either you are oppressed by 
some external force and not free to choose or you are properly free and can thus choose 
to take the hijab off” (ibid). Jacobsen (ibid, 380) writes that hijab-wearing women  
often experienced how state agents such as teachers and welfare workers took it 
upon themselves to teach them (or in some cases enforce on them) individual 
freedom, for instance by insisting that they should not wear the hijab.  
Political responses 
The idea that individual freedom needs to be taught or even enforced on Muslim women 
was expressed by politicians both on the left and right in the aftermath of the hijab 
debates, when political parties discussed whether hijab use in certain contexts should be 
regulated by law. A ban in schools, following a French example, was discussed and 
rejected by the government parties in 2010. The Progress Party then presented a law 
proposal in Parliament, which all other parties voted against. In 2011, the ruling Labor 
Party discussed whether to allow hijab in the police and courts, as in Britain, but a 
majority voted against. 
While the Progress Party is the only Norwegian party that wants to follow the French 
example and ban the hijab in primary schools, the debate cuts across all three 
government parties. While having reservations about whether a liberal society should 
legislate dress codes, Socialist Left leader Kristin Halvorsen is quoted in Dagbladet 
(February 24, 2010) as follows; 
In my opinion, hijab for children is absolutely unwanted because it prevents 
children’s development and their opportunity to make independent choices. […] 
The important thing is that we as a society must be clear that we don’t want 
hijab in primary schools. 
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While Halvorsen does not want to enforce dress codes, she argues that the state should 
teach minorities individual freedom. Ola Borten Moe (VG, June 6, 2010), a Center Party 
politician, also argues that the hijab doesn’t belong in primary school. In the Labor 
Party, deputy leader Helga Pedersen said she considers supporting a ban, while Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg (Dagbladet, February 25, 2010) rejects the proposal, arguing that 
there is no need for a national ban since any possible problems can be solved locally 
(reflecting a British rather than French approach). 
Norwegian Muslims publicly criticized these politicians. Hassan pointed out that a hijab 
ban is as bad as a hijab requirement (Dagbladet, March 8, 2010), in line with 
arguments by Gressgård and Jacobsen (2003:72), who describe French and Iranian 
legislation as equally coercive. Pervez (VG, March 3, 2010) writes with reference to 
Halvorsen that; it is disappointing that socialists copy right-wing populism’s 
problematization of Muslims to attract voters, and refers to the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Children, which guarantees parents the right to raise their children as they 
want within the limits of protecting human rights. Former MSS leader Rana 
characterized Borten Moe’s view as representing a neo-nationalist fear of Muslim 
visibility (VG, June 6, 2010). He also criticizes Pedersen for wanting the state to act as a 
morality police (Dagbladet, February 24, 2010). Deputy leader of the Conservatives and 
former Governing Mayor of Oslo, Erling Lae (Dagbladet, February 24, 2010), defends 
Muslims’ individual freedom against state interference in line with conservative 
rhetoric. He argues that Norway should learn from the American approach to diversity; 
This comes close to harassment of Muslims. Hijab has never been a problem in 
Oslo schools. This is a condescending attitude and a misunderstood idea of 
equality. […] A hijab ban is an expression of a narrow-minded and patronizing 
attitude that comes close to bullying.  
In late 2010, the Progress Party presented a law proposal to Parliament for a total ban on 
hijabs in primary school (see Bangstad 2012:59-60). In the proposal, it reads; when 
children are forced to wear hijab, they are taught gender apartheid, which preaches 
that women are inferior and have to cover in order not to arouse men’s uncontrolled 
sexual lust. Blaming women for rape in such a way is serious… (Aftenposten, December 
6, 2010). Progress Party MP Mette Hanekamhaug adds, in line with French arguments, 
that; primary school must be an arena where culture and religion is left at home, and 
that; hijab is a cultural symbol of women’s oppression, which the Christian crucifix is 
not. Neither is the crucifix big and conspicuous, nor does it prevent participation in 
swimming classes. All six other parties in Parliament rejected this proposal, arguing that 
there is a distinction between what one dislikes, and what one wants to ban. The battle 
against totalitarianism can soon become totalitarian itself (Dagsavisen, March 16, 
2011). Liberal Party leader Trine Skei Grande, who headed the processing committee, 
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said that; personally, I think it is disgusting to see a hijab on small children, but I don’t 
want to ban it by law. 
On April 10, 2011, the Labor Party’s national congress passed a resolution not to allow 
visible religious symbols for police officers, public prosecutors and judges (see 
Bangstad 2012:60). It was passed with a majority of 163 against 125 votes; the 
opposition included the Labor Youth League. Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, who 
has advocated a more inclusive Norwegian national identity, and who leads Labor’s 
integration committee, said he is a little bothered by the dilemma that many hijab-
wearing law students will be denied careers as prosecutors and judges. He explained 
there had been tough internal discussions before arriving at a compromise where we say 
that there is a high threshold in a society like ours for regulating dress code, but that 
there should be a neutral uniform in the police, and no visible religious symbols among 
public prosecutors and judges. In this regard, Bangstad (ibid) comments that Labor 
Party decisions have been influenced by a public opinion favorable to hijab bans. 
Conclusions 
Early hijab debates can be seen as “ritual debates” as Titley and Lentin (2011:128-129) 
describe recurring and repetitive integration debates (see chapter 1). Drawing on Hage’s 
(1998:233-244) analysis of Australian debates before the emergence of Pauline 
Hanson’s populist party, they argue that contemporary debates in Europe can be 
primarily understood as a performative “ritual of white empowerment” (ibid, 241; 
Titley & Lentin 2011:130), where nationalists and liberal multiculturalists from the 
majority discuss the limits of their tolerance towards ‘problems’ posed by minorities; in 
a debate of “recited truths” (ibid, 21-22) largely unrelated to empirical reality and with 
little impact on policy (ibid, 130). While this may accurately describe Norwegian debate 
in 2004, when majority members set an agenda by importing French debate into 
Norwegian reality, and Muslims mainly responded with street protest; later 
developments indicate a closer fit between public debate and the empirical reality of an 
emerging multicultural society -- notably because debates are no longer conducted 
among the majority speaking about minorities as ‘problems’, but have, as a result of 
increased minority participation, moved towards what Modood (2007:18-19; 39) 
describes as ‘negotiations’ of political multiculturalism, consisting of minority 
mobilization on concrete policy issues and state responses to these. Taking into account 
specific government attempts to accommodate minority demands, as well as pressure 
from a right-wing populist party, politicians cannot be described as “unresponsive” to 
debates in 2009-2010.  
The debates did not result in changes of policy or law, not because politicians are 
unresponsive, but rather because of compromises within the ruling party between those 
wanting to accommodate minority demands, and those wanting to accommodate right-
wing populism. A fraction of the Labor Party, including Foreign Minister Støre, Justice 
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Minister Storberget and the Youth League, was willing to accommodate Muslim 
requests to allow the hijab in the police and courtrooms, while other Labor politicians 
supported the suggestion to outlaw the hijab in schools. In the cartoon affair (see 
chapter 2), Støre was a main advocate of dialogue, and Storberget proposed legislation 
that would protect religious sensibilities. In both cases, the Justice Ministry gave in to 
public pressure and internal opposition, and reversed its decisions (see also Bangstad 
2012:60). While political responsiveness to public debate can be seen as a feature of 
deliberative democracy in Habermas’ sense, it is problematic when the government is 
unable to publicly defend its decisions and gives in to pressure from a public discourse 
hostile to minorities, and influenced by right-wing populism.  
Multiculturalism is not only about law and policy, which according to Modood 
(2006:41) may be less important than political debate, which may lead to change in 
attitudes, media representations and national symbols as a result of discursive struggles 
in the public sphere. In terms of the four ideological positions (chapter 1; see also 
Kunelius & Eide 2007:16-18; Kunelius & Alhassan 2008:90-95), ‘Muslim feminists’ 
represent ‘antiracist multiculturalism’. As such, they position themselves against 
‘minority communitarianism’ whether conservative cultural traditionalism or 
reactionary forms of Islamism. They also criticize ‘confrontational liberalism’ among 
the majority, negotiate with the government to allow a police hijab and reject a hijab 
ban in schools proposed by the Progress Party. Politicians from coalition parties are 
faced with a choice between a pragmatic and dialogical liberal approach, which 
accommodates minority demands as the Justice Ministry originally did, or to 
accommodate ‘confrontational liberalism’ (see Bangstad 2012:62-63). Politicians from 
all three coalition partners either supported, or considered supporting, a hijab ban in 
primary schools. The government thus seems caught in a ‘liberal dilemma’, as reflected 
in Okin’s and Kymlicka’s theories. 
At the same time, public debate has changed as media and particularly mainstream 
newspapers have given increasingly more space to voices representing ‘multiculturalism 
from below’, i.e. assertive Muslim voices that seek to negotiate the ‘terms of 
integration’ and meanings of liberalism. In the early years of the new millennium, 
debate was dominated by a few voices of secular minority women criticizing their own 
communities and validating anti-Muslim views. When Storhaug published Veiled. 
Unveiled in 2007, practicing Muslim women’s voices started to be heard and public 
opinion was more critical towards Storhaug; her agenda was increasingly seen as anti-
Muslim rather than feminist. In 2009, public voices explicitly defining themselves as 
Muslim feminists, started asserting themselves against negative images, and turned the 
hijab, which in majority discourse was a symbol that stigmatized Muslim women as 
oppressed, into a symbol of pride in Muslim identity in an act typical of ‘antiracist 
multiculturalism’ that Modood (2007:39) calls “turning a negative difference into a 
positive difference”. 
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Comparing the 2004 and 2009 debates, Døving (2012b:28-33) found that in 2004, the 
debate was mainly among the majority, between feminists opposed to the hijab and 
newspaper editorials and reports with a positive angle. A few Muslim contributors 
rejected white feminist claims that equated hijab with oppression, and emphasized that 
they are proud of their choice to wear the hijab. Significant differences in 2009 were an 
increased presence of Muslim women, but also an increased focus on Islamization, 
notably by the Progress Party (ibid, 32). While the free speech award for Ishaq was 
justified with a reference that there should be room for religious expressions in the 
public sphere, Døving (ibid, 25-27) questions whether Muslim contributors actually 
expressed themselves in a religious language. She argues that increased Muslim 
presence in the public sphere is not necessarily religious, as Muslim contributors to the 
hijab debate primarily used a secular language of human rights, which however may be 
authentically religious. Muslim women defended the hijab mostly with reference to 
gender equality and freedom of religion, combined with occasional references to the 
Qur’an and Islamic discourses (ibid, 30; 34-38). Døving (ibid, 38-44) questions whether 
this is necessarily a result of a ‘translation’ from religious to secular language. Their 
fluency in secular language indicates that discourses of identity and human rights can be 
seen as their first language. Importantly, religious arguments may be indistinguishably 
merged with dominant secular language, thus challenging the secular-religious 
distinction of liberal theorists like Rawls and Habermas. While Muslim contributors 
support a secular state and argue in a language of ‘public reason’, they challenge Rawls’ 
division between the political and private spheres when demanding state recognition of 
religious identity. But they do not ask the state to comply with Islamic norms or to take 
a stand on whether the hijab is a religious requirement. 
While my analysis found a greater presence of ‘religious arguments’ and references to 
the Qur’an than Døving’s, I agree with her conclusion that Muslim feminists merge 
religious and secular arguments in a way that defies dominant dichotomies. This finding 
is also in line with Jacobsen’s (2011) analysis of the Muslim Student Society as 
combining identity politics and religious revivalism, and Modood’s (2005) point that 
antiracism for Muslims will necessarily have a religious dimension. In the hijab debate, 
Muslim women appropriated and negotiated the free choice rhetoric, and emphasized 
that wearing hijab was simultaneously an “individual choice” and a “religious 
obligation” albeit one that individual Muslim women ‘choose’ to comply with when 
“ready” to take this step in a process of self-realization as a pious subject (Jacobsen 
2011:306-311; 373). Obviously, choices are not made in a social vacuum (ibid, 307) but 
encouraged or discouraged in different social contexts, which exert ‘discipline’ in a 
Foucauldian sense (ibid, 312-314). Drawing on Mahmood, Jacobsen (ibid, 326-328) 
argues that Muslim women may achieve “self-fulfillment” by ‘submitting’ to God’s will 
and try to resist ‘egoistic’ desires, or by negotiating liberal-secular and Muslim 
understandings of self-realization. As the debate on the ‘morality police’ illustrates, 
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communitarianism in Muslim communities is assumed and defined as a problem. From 
an Islamic viewpoint, Muslim feminists reject moralizing, and criticize social control 
exerted through notions of ‘honor’ and ‘shame’ in ethnic communities (ibid, 339; 372-
373), arguing that moral conformity is an individual responsibility (ibid, 359).  
From the vantage point of being a religious minority in a society where secularism is 
hegemonic, they recognize that also the majority, despite ideological adherence to 
individualism, attempts to impose certain moralities and thus exercises collectivist 
control to discipline individuals. Kymlicka (2002:338) may be right that debates about 
multiculturalism are not between individualists and collectivists, or between a liberal 
majority and communitarian minorities, but “debates amongst liberals about the 
meaning of liberalism”. Individualist and collectivist tendencies coexist empirically 
among both minority and majority, and the debate about the ‘morality police’ suggests 
that debate is sometimes amongst communitarians using liberal rhetoric. In any case, 
they defy the dichotomy between a modern Western culture promoting individual 
autonomy, and a collectivist Muslim tradition preventing self-realization (Jacobsen 
2011:326).  
The emerging Muslim feminist perspective challenges hegemonic dualist thinking that 
constructs secular and religious, and individual and collective as hierarchically opposed, 
where the former is seen as positive and claimed to be ‘Western’ and the latter is 
defined negatively and ascribed to the Muslim Other. Their public breakthrough has 
consequences beyond media as it provides a newspaper-reading public with a more 
nuanced understanding of these issues, making it more difficult for promoters of a 
culture clash ideology to retain legitimacy. Media, often seen as an agent for spreading 
anti-Muslim prejudice, have changed the discursive field in favor of multiculturalism by 
giving access to Norwegian Muslim voices. Politicians have followed up to a lesser 
extent, and Ishaq’s characterization of not allowing the police hijab as ‘a demand for 
assimilation, not integration’ indicates that policy is still framed by Okin’s and 
Kymlicka’s perspective (see Jacobsen & Gressgård 2003:73; Gressgård 2005), despite 
ambivalent attempts at multicultural accommodation (Engebrigtsen 2010) and a 
rhetorical turn towards ‘inclusion’ and ‘dialogue’ which allows for pluralist 
interpretation of liberal values (Rawls 1999). Legal regulations of hijab use are not 
settled once and for all, and are likely to be reconsidered at some point in the future. It is 
likely that the presence of hijab-wearing women in the public sphere becomes more 
‘normalized’ and public opinion becomes more favorable to accommodate Muslims. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The secularism debate 
 
 
A number of scholars have noted a recent revival of religion in many parts of the world, 
and started questioning the long-held ‘secularization thesis’ (Berger 1999; Sardar 
1999:44-48; Asad 2003:181; Habermas 2005:11-13; Levey 2009:1). The secularization 
thesis has been described as a simultaneously descriptive and normative theory (Asad 
2003:181), which holds that secularization is central to the development of modernity 
(Bangstad 2009:37; Modood & Kastoryano 2006:162; Sardar 1999:52). As a process, 
secularization consists of three elements; structural separation of religion and politics, 
privatization of religion, and declining social significance of religion (Casanova cited in 
Asad 2003:181; Bangstad 2009:38). Veit Bader (2009:110) argues that two of these 
elements, an allegedly inevitable decline and privatization of religion; do not fit with 
empirical evidence (see also Bracke & Fadil 2008:8-9). José Casanova (cited in 
Yegenoglu 2006) uses the term ‘deprivatized’ to describe modern religions refusing to 
accept a marginal role ascribed to them by secularization theorists. Casanova 
(2009:143-144) acknowledges an increasing religious decline in Western Europe, but 
questions the interpretation of this development as a “normal and progressive” 
consequence of becoming “modern and enlightened”. Rather than understanding 
European secularization as a teleological process linked to modernization, he suggests 
that it can better be explained in terms of a rising “hegemonic knowledge regime of 
secularism” (see also Yegenoglu 2006). With significant variation among individual 
countries, contemporary Western European societies can generally be characterized as 
secular societies, where a majority of the population no longer takes part in traditional 
religious practices like attending church, although many continue to privately hold 
religious beliefs and maintain a Christian cultural identity. These two tendencies have 
been characterized as “believing without belonging” and “belonging without believing” 
(Davie cited in Thorbjørnsrud & Døving 2012:12), indicating that Christian identity 
(and/or church membership) has been detached from personal beliefs. This situation 
may be more accurately described as “religious individualization” rather than as 
secularization.  
Secularism as a political doctrine for separating state and religion is distinct from 
secularism as a comprehensive worldview or ideology, and it is primarily the latter 
which insists on privatization of religion (Bangstad 2009:20-21). Secularist ideology 
constructs a dichotomy between those who favor secularism as a political doctrine 
calling for separation of religion and politics, and those who reject it (Sayyid 2009:186-
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187). From this perspective, secularism is defined as “progressive, liberal and modern” 
and contrasted with an image of (conservative) ‘religion’ as “reactionary, 
fundamentalist and anti-modern” (Casanova 2009:147); parallel to a dichotomy between 
‘the West’ and ‘Islam’ in contemporary ‘culture clash’, e.g. Lewis’ claim that “absence 
of secularism” is a key defining characteristic that sets Islam apart from modernity 
(Mamdani 2004:23; Sayyid 2009:189; Yegenoglu 2006; Bangstad 2009:103; for Islam 
as secularism’s ‘Other’, see also Casanova 2009:147-148; Harding 2008:48; Sardar 
1999:48; Said 1979). As discussed by Sarah Bracke and Nadia Fadil (2008:2-14), 
academic use of concepts like ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘secularization’ plays a central role 
in sustaining a construction of Islam as the essentialized ‘Other’ to modern, Western 
secularity. Rather than being a universal aspect of modernization, secularism as a 
political doctrine arguing strict separation of religion and politics emerged in response 
to a particular European historical experience, which includes absolutist theocracy and 
the Inquisition, the Enlightenment and conflict between science and church; Protestant 
Reformation; religious wars and the peace at Westphalia; and the French Revolution 
(Bangstad 2009:29-35; Modood & Kastoryano 2006:162; Sayyid 2009:190-191). Based 
on European experience, it is argued that secularism is a precondition for scientific 
progress, for ensuring peace, and for democracy (ibid, 188). Thus, secularism is central 
to the definition of modernity as a narrative of western exceptionality. 
While the secular-religious divide is not so clear-cut in the Muslim tradition (ibid, 197), 
mainstream Islam distinguishes between human and divine spheres; thus science can 
peacefully coexist with religion (ibid, 191). In the Muslim world, there was no 
counterpart to historical European absolutist theocracy, where the state appropriated 
religious power, until modern Islamist intellectuals developed the idea of an Islamic 
state (Sardar 1999:48). Drawing on Reinhard Schulze, Mamdani (2004:46-48) argues 
that due to the absence of an institutionalized religious hierarchy in mainstream Islam, 
there was no conflict between religious clergy and secular power, and secular thought 
could develop within Islam rather than in opposition to it. Thus, Islamic religious 
movements are not necessarily anti-secular; and modern Islamist discourse is largely 
secular in the sense of being concerned with political issues in a context of colonialism 
rather than with spiritual concerns. Mamdani points out that with the exception of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Iranian theocracy, Islamism was not developed by religious 
scholars but by secular intellectuals, who argued that Islam should be a political identity 
in addition to a religious or cultural identity. Among these, Mawdudi turned Islam into a 
political ideology and advocated for an Islamic state, while many other Islamist 
intellectuals, including Muhammad Iqbal, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Ali Shariati, 
preferred secular democracy; even Sayyid Qutb’s revolutionary ideology is far more 
society-centered than Mawdudi’s idea of an Islamic state (ibid, 53-59). 
Contemporary religious revivalism, whether Islamic or other, primarily challenges the 
privatization of religion, an aspect of secularization that has become taken-for-granted 
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in European self-understanding as modern, secular societies (Casanova 2009:148). Most 
provoking to European secularists is the reassertion of Islam in the public sphere 
(Sayyid 2009:187), in other words, the “deprivatization” of religion associated with 
European Muslim revivalism and mobilization of collective identity, which demands a 
legitimate role for religion in the public sphere. This is partly because Islam is ‘the 
Other’ not only of Europe and Christianity, but in addition because Muslim religiosity 
has been defined in contrast to European secularity (Casanova 2009:148). 
Contemporary western debates on secularism thus tend to focus on the need to 
secularize Muslim minorities (Sayyid 2009:187). While some Muslims advocate a 
“secular Islam”, many remain critical of aspects of secularism (ibid, 189), which in the 
history of the Muslim world has most often meant de-Islamization imposed by 
colonialism or Kemalism (ibid, 192). In this context, contemporary secularist rhetoric is 
less about separating religion from politics to ensure democracy and pluralism, and 
more about depoliticizing Muslims and maintaining western hegemony (ibid, 199). 
Looking to American secularism as an alternative to versions dominant in Europe, 
Casanova (cited in Asad 2003:182-183) argues that religion “can play a positive 
political role” in modern, secular society, and that politicized religion may be fully 
compatible with modernity depending on how it becomes public. Asad (ibid) observes 
that religion is allowed to enter the public sphere on the condition that it accepts 
“assumptions of liberal discourse” and engages in rational debate to “persuade rather 
than coerce” opponents. He argues that the liberal-democratic public sphere, as 
theorized by Habermas, “systematically excludes various kinds of people, or types of 
claims, from serious consideration” (ibid). This is because exercise of free speech in the 
public sphere presupposes not merely the ability to speak, but also to be heard and 
understood. As such, political debate is not equally open to all, and upon entering it, a 
religious discourse “may have to disrupt existing assumptions [in order to] be heard” 
(ibid, 184). In a pluralist society, the question remains “how a deprivatized religion can 
effectively appeal to the consciences of those who don’t accept its values” (ibid, 186).  
In “Religion in the Public Sphere”, Habermas (2005:12-13) acknowledges that the 
supposedly ‘normal’ model of secular modernity may not be universal, but restricted to 
the special-case of Europe, and more specifically, the European educated elite (see also 
Sardar 1999:44-48; Casanova 2009:143-144). Advocating a more inclusive attitude 
towards religion in the public sphere, Habermas (ibid, 18) now speaks of a “post-secular 
society” where secular citizens must make an effort to take religious contributions 
seriously; i.e. “open their minds to the possible truth content” (ibid, 16) of religious 
contributions, and overcome “secularist stubbornness” (ibid, 20). This seems to imply 
that Habermas now acknowledges that ideological secularism may be as dogmatic and 
absolutist as religious ‘fundamentalism’ (see also Rawls 1999; Sayyid 2009:196; 
Bangstad 2009:21).  
208 
 
The Norwegian debate 
In the winter of 2008, debate editor Knut Olav Åmås of Norway’s largest subscription 
newspaper Aftenposten called for contributions to a contest for young writers of op-ed 
articles. The winning piece was titled The Secular Extremism and written by medicine 
student Mohammed Usman Rana, former head of the Pakistani Student Association 
(2006) and later head of the Muslim Student Society (2007), and published in 
Aftenposten on February 25, 2008. This article turned out to be controversial and stirred 
a heated debate, with several responses printed in the newspaper’s opinion pages every 
day over a period of several weeks. The debate attracted widespread attention beyond 
the opinion pages of this newspaper, and on March 31, 2008, Aftenposten organized a 
debate meeting over the topic “Is Norway hostile to religion?” at the Literature House in 
Oslo, where Rana faced former secretary-general of the Norwegian Humanist 
Association, Lars Gule, secularist activist Sara Azmeh Rasmussen and Minister of 
Culture and Church Affairs, Trond Giske, in a panel debate led by Åmås. Aftenposten’s 
journalist Ulf Andenæs wrote in a commentary (April 3, 2008) that the meeting was 
packed, but noted that there were very few Muslims, Christians and ‘Islam critics’ 
among the attendants. He describes the meeting as sounding like a gathering in the 
Norwegian Humanist Association, which is the largest non-religious ‘life-stance’ 
organization, with most members being atheists or agnostics. The debate also attracted 
academic attention, notably from anthropologist Sindre Bangstad, who has done 
research on secularism and Islam. In the wake of this debate, academic seminars and 
conferences on the topic of secularism were held at the University of Oslo, often taking 
Asad’s (2003) “anthropology of the secular” as a starting point. As a public debate 
about public debate, the ‘secularism debate’ directly engaged with theoretical issues 
discussed above, both as a discussion about and as an empirical example of, religious 
contributions to the public sphere in a secularized liberal democracy. My main focus is 
on how the Muslim student leader’s views, as an instance of contemporary Islamic 
revivalism (see chapter 4), challenge specific aspects of hegemonic secularism.  
I organize the chapter around four distinguishable but interlinked points that can be 
identified in Rana’s article, and more explicitly in a follow-up article (March 2, 2008). 
Only some of these points were picked up and discussed in subsequent public and 
academic debate, while others were largely dismissed or ignored. Rana argued that (1) 
conservative religious people tend to be stigmatized as ‘fundamentalists’, and their 
contributions seen as illegitimate, in Norwegian public debate; thus (2) Norway can be 
characterized as a secular hegemony, dominated by an extreme form of secularism 
similar to the one found in France and Turkey, where the state controls and disciplines 
religion and religious expressions are banished from the public sphere. As an 
alternative, he promotes a (3) moderate form of secularism (or religious pluralism) 
found in the US, where religious expressions are commonplace in the public sphere, and 
where religious congregations are independent from the state; and finally, he argues that 
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(4) religious viewpoints can make positive contributions to public debate, primarily by 
promoting a (conservative?) ethics grounded in religion. 
In subsequent debate, a dominant frame was based on a dichotomy between ‘Islamism’ 
and ‘secularism’ rather than on different versions of each and nuances within. In other 
words, Rana was widely perceived as an ‘Islamist’ rejecting ‘secularism’, despite his 
explicit preference for one version of secularism (a moderate American one) over 
another (an extreme, French one). Most contributors focused on the first two points. 
With regard to Rana’s lament that conservative religious views were stigmatized and 
deemed illegitimate, some contributors supported his view, but most disagreed. For the 
most part, Rana’s opponents did not argue against his observations of public debate, but 
labeled him ‘Islamist’ or demanded that he distances himself from ‘Islamism’; thus 
confirming his analysis that conservative religious persons do tend to be stigmatized. A 
number of other contributors engaged with the claim that Norway is a secular 
hegemony; most disagreed with the claim and argued that Norway is not secular 
(enough). Rana’s analysis was supported by Aftenposten’s political editor Harald 
Stanghelle, a member of the jury that chose his text as winner, and by journalist Ulf 
Andenæs. While several Christian leaders or spokespersons defended Rana’s views, 
most contributions came from what Bangstad (2008) called Norway’s “liberal and 
secular intellectual elite”, many of them academics. Hardly any contributor picked up 
Rana’s suggestion of the US as a model of moderate secularism, indicating that 
American public religiosity is generally seen as inappropriate in Norway. The 
suggestion that religious values could represent a positive contribution to public debate 
was mostly dismissed by those who engaged with this point, partly because 
(conservative) religious ethics is primarily identified with traditional family values seen 
as intolerant of homosexuality, divorce and abortion. 
Bangstad (ibid; see also 2009:127-131) offered an analysis of the debate, which was 
published in a shortened version as an op-ed in Aftenposten (May 26, 2008). Here, the 
anthropologist supports Rana’s first two points; that religious people tend to be 
stigmatized in a secular Norwegian hegemony with absolutist and intolerant tendencies. 
Bangstad (2008:21) writes that the Norwegian intellectual elite’s view that religious 
arguments in the public sphere are illegitimate is based on the earlier writings of 
Habermas, whose “post-secular turn” has gone largely unnoticed, and much less 
accepted, in Norway. Unlike other debate contributors, Bangstad (ibid, 24-25) picked up 
Rana’s preference for the American version of secularism, although he has difficulty 
understanding how a Muslim can seek alliances with conservative Christians, and 
promote George W. Bush’s America as an ideal. Differences between American and 
various European versions of secularism, as related to various ways of multicultural 
accommodation of Muslim minorities,  have been discussed by Casanova (2009) and 
Modood; the latter’s argument is similar to Rana’s; that French “ideological secularism” 
is an obstacle to multicultural integration, while moderate secularism (as in the US and 
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most of Europe) is compatible with “moderate Islam” (as Modood defines it, 
“moderate” does not imply “privatized”).  
The ‘Islamist’ label 
Rana claims in The Secular Extremism that religious persons are systematically 
marginalized and stigmatized in the Norwegian public sphere; 
In debates in modern Norway, there is an accelerating tendency that religious 
people, who wish to lead a life centered on God, are marginalized and 
characterized as “brainwashed and narrow-minded fundamentalists”.  
Like Qureshi in the ‘coconut debate’ (chapter 3), Rana draws attention to how Muslims 
are divided into categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the Norwegian public sphere. 
Gullestad (2006:50-56), Eide and Nikunen (2011:9-11) and Phillips (2008:112-114) 
have found that media (perhaps decreasingly) tends to fit Muslims into polarized 
categories, favoring ‘assimilated’ individuals over conservative believers. Unlike 
Qureshi’s antiracist perspective, Rana discusses this tendency not in terms of 
assimilation, but in terms of secularism, something which enables him to draw parallels 
to how conservative Christians are treated in the media. While noting that public debate 
about religion tends to focus on Muslims, who are faced with demands to tone down 
their religiosity in public and modernize and ignore fundamentals of their faith; Rana 
gives examples of how Christians, who defend biblical principles, are reprimanded in 
the public in contrast to modern and politically correct theologians, who condone the 
trends of society and are praised as “progressive forces of the State Church”. Rana 
identifies a national project to “liberate”, “moderate” and “secularize” Muslims; and 
he opposes those forces – consisting of media persons, politicians and ex-Muslims – 
who aim to redefine Islamic theology, and reduce the religion from a complete lifestyle 
to a semi-secular, relativistic and cultural message. Rana claims that Norwegian public 
sphere is dominated by a hegemonic value relativism, accompanied by strong 
antipathies against worldviews that promote the existence of a truth defining right and 
wrong. Instead of trying to qualify as a ‘moderate Muslim’ according to dominant 
definitions, which would imply abandoning religious prescriptions such as bans on 
alcohol and pork, Rana insists on holding on to moral values based on religion. 
In a series of contributions from Storhaug (February 26, 2008), professor Asbjørn 
Aarnes (February 28, 2008), Arild Audin (February 28, 2008), Sara Azmeh Rasmussen 
(February 29, 2008), Knut Michelsen (March 5, 2008) and lawyer Sverre Blandhol 
(March 6, 2008), Rana is more or less explicitly accused of being an ‘Islamist’ or 
‘religious fundamentalist’. Bangstad (2008:21) writes that in order to understand the 
emotional reactions provoked among his opponents, we need to go beyond what Rana 
actually wrote and realize how he challenges a self-understanding of liberal and secular 
hegemony, where religious expressions in the public sphere are seen as illegitimate. 
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Unlike some other Norwegian Muslims, including Rehman, al-Kubaisi and Rasmussen, 
whose media appeal consists, according to Bangstad, in confirming the worldview of 
Norwegian liberal and secular hegemony, Rana insists on “grounding his public 
expressions in his religious convictions”, i.e. a speech act that violates the classical 
Habermasian ideal of stepping out of one’s religious garb before entering public debate. 
The most intolerant and absolutist expression of secularist ideology (Bangstad 2008:21) 
is shown by Storhaug, who under the headline What a Ghastly Betrayal gives the first 
response to Rana. Storhaug not only labels Rana ‘Islamist’ because he allegedly fails to 
distance himself from sharia-sanctioned killing of gays in Iran and because the MSS has 
invited Islamists to give lectures, but she accuses Aftenposten of betraying ‘the struggle 
for freedom’. She writes; 
I take it for granted that Aftenposten’s panel […] thinks that Rana contributes 
with important reflections and values. In that case, their judgment is frightening. 
[…] Islamism is advancing in Norway, with good help from Aftenposten. It is 
almost unbelievable. That the debate editor, who is openly gay, promotes a 
person that almost wants to kill him makes the situation completely absurd and 
ghastly.   
Bangstad (ibid, 22) comments with regard to Aftenposten’s alleged ‘intellectual treason’ 
that the choice of letting Rana win the competition was a brilliant move that served to 
promote the newspaper’s debate and opinion pages, while supporting a “radical-liberal 
understanding of the principle of free speech” associated with Voltaire; to be willing to 
die for others’ right to free speech, even when fundamentally disagreeing with what 
they say. Rana (March 2, 2008) characterized Storhaug’s accusations as an example of 
what logicians call ‘argumentum ad hominem’ – where the opponents’ arguments are 
not argued against, but instead met with irrelevant personal attacks. Bangstad (ibid, 23) 
discusses two stigmatizing and excluding strategies; the accusation that Rana promotes 
‘Islamist’ views, and the “demand that he personally distances himself from any abuse 
committed by Muslims in the name of Islam anywhere in the world”. He argues that the 
debate strategy of Rana’s opponents was obviously to attack the person rather than the 
argument, and concludes that “as a rhetorical strategy for labeling and exclusion this is 
quite effective, but the characterization [of Rana as an Islamist] doesn’t satisfy 
reasonable demands of relevance”.  
A series of contributions exemplify variations of the technique of labeling Rana a 
‘fundamentalist’ and I mention them summarily; Aarnes writes that he can’t remember 
to have read a more cunning and dangerous article; and asks if the intention is not to 
defend religious practice that allows stoning and bodily mutilation. Audin quotes 
Danish Socialist leader Villy Søvndal, who told those who want to live in an Islamist 
society ruled by sharia laws to “Go home!” Rasmussen expresses ‘thank and praise’ 
that narrow-minded fundamentalists are met with skepticism in Norway. Michelsen, a 
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language teacher, comments; when we peel away the inaccurate and partly poor 
language of Rana’s op-ed, there can be no doubt that we have to do with a religious 
fundamentalist. Blandhol argues that Rana speaks with a forked tongue; while praising 
pluralism, Islamic fundamentalism lurks in the background. Blandhol’s text evokes a 
contrast between ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘the West’ as defined by ‘secularism’; 
he juxtaposes Islamic fundamentalism based on a fundamental perception that there is 
no distinction between religion and politics; which leads to enforced standardization, 
tyranny and extremism, and Western societies, where both Norway and the US count as 
members, based on a doctrine that there is a distinction between religion and politics. 
He also argues that religions can be compatible with values such as diversity, 
democracy, human rights, science and pluralism; and criticizes Rana for not touching 
upon this point. In a response (March 14, 2008), Rana writes that; It is liberating and 
encouraging to know that I don’t fit into Blandhol’s well-defined Muslim categories; 
when advocating for more room for religion in the public sphere, simultaneously with a 
moderately secular nation. In this regard, Jacobsen (2011:25) writes that in the 
discourse of (ideological) secularism, Islam is often seen as ‘incompatible’ with 
secularism because it allegedly fails to distinguish ‘religion’ from ‘politics’. Those 
Muslims who speak publicly of Islam as ‘a way of life’ relevant to culture, economics 
and politics beyond the spiritual domain, are accused of ‘Islamism’ or ‘fundamentalism’ 
since they fail to differentiate ‘religion’ from ‘politics’ as secularists do. 
Several contributors also criticized the way Rana was stigmatized, and supported his 
observations about how conservative religious people are treated in Norwegian public 
debate. They variously characterized these rhetorical strategies as intolerance against 
religious groups (secular writer Frode Barkved, February 27), secular bias; intolerance; 
demonizing; devaluing; discrimination and ridicule of religious minorities (historian of 
religion Hanne Nabintu Herland, February 28), generalizing, insulting and in part 
extreme statements about ethnic minorities and Islam (immigrant activist and politician 
Athar Ali, March 4), and contempt; liberal, humanist hate; condemnations; and a 
tendency towards humanist tyranny (Rolf Bjarne Luneng, March 4). Theologian and 
spokesman for the Norwegian Lutheran Mission, Espen Ottosen (March 11) criticizes 
the condemnation and enforced standardization [‘ensretting’], and comments that; it is 
a democratic problem that those who defend classical Christian ethics are labeled as 
recalcitrant, unenlightened and intolerant. He accepts that as a Christian, he belongs to 
a minority, but expects to be met with arguments, not hate speech. In a follow-up article 
(March 2), Rana concludes; Last Monday I warned against that religious people are 
marginalized exactly with such anti-democratic master suppression techniques 
[‘hersketeknikker’, see Berit Ås 1979] in the public sphere. In the name of arrogance, I 
can only conclude that I was right. Both opponents and supporters of Rana contributed 
to confirm his observations about how religious views are received in the Norwegian 
public sphere. 
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Distancing from ‘extremism’ 
Other contributors, including Karine Nygaard (February 27, 2008), Jon Ole Whist of the 
Conservatives (February 29 and March 4, 2008), and Håkon Haugli from Labor (March 
4, 2008) ask Rana to distance himself from oppression in Muslim countries, particularly 
they ask him to condemn the death penalty for ‘practicing homosexuality’ in Iran. In a 
general response to demands to distance himself from oppression in the name of Islam, 
Rana (March 2, 2008) writes; 
Since some contributors have demanded answers from me, and I have learned 
from my mistakes, I will use the opportunity to go on autopilot, stand corrected 
and hereby confirm my distancing from persecution of Islam critics, un-Islamic 
oppression of women and un-Islamic harassment of dissidents. Regarding my 
unambiguous distancing from the death penalty against homosexuals I refer to 
‘Universitas’ of November 14 last year. And for the sake of clarity: In God’s 
name, I distance myself from all injustice that may be committed in God’s name 
in the foreseeable future. 
On March 4, Whist demands a principled answer, because he finds Rana’s statement in 
Universitas ‘ambiguous and unsatisfactory’. In the Oslo University newspaper, Rana 
had said “I personally distance myself from the death penalty against homosexuals, but 
I don’t want to enter into discussions about what other countries do. I am not a 
theologian or Islamic scholar. I am a Norwegian citizen and follow Norwegian laws. 
Rana (March 5) elaborates; pointing out that “I am a Norwegian citizen” is of utmost 
relevance and importance, since I do not want to be held responsible for actions of 
other countries again and again. This exchange illustrates how demands of distancing 
are negotiated. Those who respond insist on rephrasing, which the demanding party 
refuses to accept. What matters to Whist is a ‘principled’ answer, a universal 
condemnation of the death penalty as is typically issued by western countries, while 
Rana points out that although he agrees, it is not up to him to decide for other countries, 
and importantly, that as a Norwegian citizen, he is not responsible for what Muslim 
countries do. While the issue of homosexuality remains problematic in relation to Islam 
(Gressgård & Jacobsen 2008; Bangstad 2009:131-137), mainstream Muslims often 
‘solve’ the dilemma by upholding religious disapproval, while tolerating the individual 
right to a different lifestyle; in a way comparable to how secularists may tolerate 
religion as a “private vice” (Modood & Ahmad 2010:89-91). 
Jacobsen (2011:77) discusses a tendency among Muslims to “distance themselves from 
each other” in response to calls made by European politicians and in public debates on 
‘moderate’ Muslims to take distance from those defined as ‘extremists’ (see also 
Modood & Ahmad 2010:78-79 on ‘moderate’ British Muslims’ ‘self-criticism’). 
Jacobsen (ibid) writes that responses from the Norwegian Muslim community have 
been diverse; some make public declarations to be ‘moderate’, others challenge a 
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“common perception of ‘moderate Muslims’ as those who do not practice Islam or 
reject its fundaments”. Many young Muslims respond by claiming to be ‘moderate’ 
while negotiating the meanings of categories such as “moderate, conservative, 
extremist, radical, liberal and traditionalist” (Jacobsen 2011:77). Discussing the 
meaning of the term ‘moderate Muslim’, Modood and Fauzia Ahmad (2010:80-83) 
point out that it serves to contrast them from ‘non-moderates’ including those who 
invoke Islam in militant political rhetoric and defend terrorism, but also those versions 
of Islam defending dogmatic interpretations (which is not the same as 
‘fundamentalism’). ‘Moderate’ or ‘progressive’ Muslims reject the clash of civilizations 
thesis, and seek positive interaction and multicultural integration between the ‘West’ 
and ‘Islam’, something that distinguishes them also from those persons of Muslim 
background who are hostile to Islam. Some ‘moderate’ Muslims reject the term 
‘moderate’ as a way of distancing themselves from the latter, and regard it as a divisive 
term imposed by media and politicians to sort ‘good’ from ‘bad’ Muslims (ibid). One 
way of redefining the distinction between ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ relates to a 
distinction between democracy and violence rather than a distinction between secularist 
and fundamentalist (Mamdani 2004; see also chapter 4). This political rather than 
religious distinction makes it possible to speak of ‘moderate Islamism’ (Bangstad 
2009:100-101), a term sometimes used about the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, who have 
gradually developed more pragmatic attitudes towards aspects of liberal democracy. 
Even more so in Europe, ‘moderate Islamists’ inspired by the Muslim Brothers do not 
want to create an ‘Islamic state’, much less turn sharia into state law, but are more 
concerned with maintaining identity, culture and religion combined with participating in 
the existing liberal democratic system (Bangstad & Høigilt 2011:131). 
Renegotiating the meaning of ‘moderate’ in such a way, Rana (Morgenbladet, 
September 16, 2011) defines himself as a spokesman for Norwegian Islam, where it is 
possible to be both fully Muslim and fully Norwegian. He emphasizes that Islam can 
function in a liberal constitutional state and draws inspiration from many European and 
American Muslims, including Ramadan. But Rana points out that he is not a “disciple” 
of Ramadan, and that developing a Norwegian Islam has nothing to do with the Muslim 
Brothers. In short, he defines his position as follows (Aftenposten, December 20, 2010); 
I have always defended a secular Norway and liberal democracy – including the 
right to be open about one’s faith. There is no opposition between being a visible 
and practicing Muslim and being a loyal and proud European.  
While Rana’s debate contribution reflects his personal views (he was no longer MSS 
leader at this point), his views can be understood in context of discourses within the 
Muslim Student Society (see Jacobsen 2011 and chapter 4). He refers to Islam as a 
‘complete lifestyle’, which resonates with revivalist emphasis on Islam as a “complete 
way of life”. Whether Islamic revivalism should be understood as a form of (moderate) 
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Islamism is primarily a matter of definition (see chapter 4), but the distinction matters as 
‘Islamism’ is widely associated with violent struggle to establish an ‘Islamic state’ 
where sharia is institutionalized as state law. In The Secular Extremism, Rana explicitly 
criticizes a tendency in public debate that social and moral conservatism among 
Muslims is equated to political radicalism and rejection of democracy. Bangstad 
(2008:23-24) draws on a “classical understanding of Islamism” as movements that 
“want to establish an Islamic state, and/or implement sharia”, and concludes that Rana, 
as an advocate of “moderate secularism” and American religious pluralism, cannot be 
characterized as an Islamist in this sense, even though “human rights, democracy and 
respect for pluralism” have become integral to ‘moderate Islamism’ and ‘post-
Islamism’. Neither can Rana be fitted into the Christian category of ‘fundamentalism’ (a 
misleading term for Islamic movements, see Mamdani 2004:36-37); instead Bangstad 
(ibid) describes him as a “serious and quite religious young man who refuses to relegate 
his God to the private sphere” and “a moderate and conservative Muslim”.  
While acknowledging the importance of Rana’s criticism of secular hegemony, not least 
because his contribution paves the way for other young Norwegian Muslim voices to 
join public debate in the future, Bangstad (ibid, 27-28) is concerned that the ‘secularism 
debate’ may contribute to reinforce a widespread perception among the public that 
Norwegian Muslims in general are religious conservatives. He argues that Rana’s 
conservative views are not representative for a large portion of Norwegian Muslims, 
who instead show great variation in the extent of religious practice, often hold an 
ambivalent position towards religiosity and secularity, and prefer more hybrid identities 
than being primarily defined as the ‘Muslim Other’ of Norwegian secularity. Similar to 
Modood’s criticism of turning hybridity into an ideal for multicultural integration (see 
chapter 1), Jacobsen (2011:31) has reservations about how cultural mixing and 
openness is “constructed in hierarchical contrast to an assumed category of ‘reactionary’ 
or ‘fundamentalist’ ethnic and religious movements”, e.g. when Eriksen contrasts 
“creolized Muslims” who “drink beer and eat roast pork” and “go to the mosque one 
day and to a disco the next” with “cultural puritanism and identity politics”, where the 
latter allegedly results in “lack of integration” and “personal frustrations” (Eriksen 
1999:19; quoted by Jacobsen 2011:31) when faced with individual choices of modern 
hybridity. Jacobsen argues that such a dichotomy between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ identities 
is unhelpful for understanding religious revitalization; it takes for granted “liberalist and 
secular” conceptions of modern individuals detached from traditional memberships and 
moral values, and ignores ‘modern forms of power’ involved in celebrating individual 
choice (ibid, 32). 
A survey (Sandbu 2007:5) indicates that Norwegian Muslims are in fact less religious 
and less conservative than believed by the majority. The average Norwegian believes 
that two-thirds of Norwegian Muslims attend religious ceremonies weekly (62 %), see 
mainstream society as immoral (66 %); and that almost half of them (43 %) want to 
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implement sharia laws in Norway. A comparative survey among Norwegian Muslims 
(TNS Gallup 2006:9; 29) shows that only 18 % attend religious ceremonies weekly; 15 
% think society is immoral; and 14 % want sharia laws. While Progress Party voters are 
most mistaken, and Socialist Left voters most accurately guessed actual Muslim views, 
differences were small; and ignorance and misperceptions widespread among all sectors 
of the majority (Sandbu 2007:16-17). Interestingly, 20 % of the general population 
think that Norwegian society is immoral, as against only 15 % of Muslims (TNS Gallup 
2006:9; 11). The survey also found that 30 % of Norwegian Muslims attend religious 
ceremonies monthly, compared to 19 % of the general population (ibid, 29). For 
comparison, a survey of British Muslims showed that nearly two-thirds attended 
religious ceremonies weekly, compared to only 25 % of white Britons who attend 
monthly (Modood 2005:160). Nearly all British South Asians said they have a religion, 
and 90 % that it was “of personal importance”. Among the British majority, one-third 
said they don’t have a religion, and only 13 % said religion was of personal importance. 
Even among youth, two-thirds of British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis said religion was 
“very important to how they led their lives” compared to only 5 % of young whites. 
These statistics indicate that Norwegian Muslims may be more ‘secular’ than their 
British counterparts, but attending religious ceremonies says little about individual 
practice, personal belief and religious identity. When asked about the ‘importance’ of 
religion, Norwegian Pakistanis and Somalians score as high as their British counterparts 
(NOU 2011:14; p. 315). It may thus be more accurate to say that Norwegian Muslims’ 
religious practice is more ‘individualized’ than in Britain. Studies indicate that 
minorities in general (not only Muslims) perceive religion as more important in their 
lives, have a stronger sense of belonging to a religious community and take more part in 
religious activities than the Norwegian majority (Thorbjørnsrud & Døving 2012:14).   
Bangstad (2009:27) also points out that Rana’s ‘appeal to the Christian Right’ may not 
be shared by many Norwegian Muslims, whose voting pattern suggests that economic 
considerations carry far more weight than conservative values, as an overwhelming 
majority votes for parties on the left; 52 % for Labor and 31 % Socialist Left (compared 
to 33 % and 12 % for the general population) in the 2005 parliamentary elections (TNS 
Gallup 2006:22-23), when a center-left coalition formed a majority government. Since 
then, coalition parties, and the Socialist Left in particular, have lost substantially in 
opinion polls. John Rex (cited in Modood 2010:24) notes a similar political pragmatism 
among British Muslims, who vote overwhelmingly for Labour (based on their material 
interests) despite sharing family values and sexual morality with the conservatives. On 
the other hand, economic redistribution and caring for the poor are also religious values 
for Muslims (expressed in one of the ‘five pillars’; ‘zakat’), thus social democracy 
corresponds to an aspect of Muslim ethics, in line with Ramadan’s suggestion that 
democratic non-Muslim governments may be more “Islamic” than authoritarian 
governments run by Muslims (cited in Jacobsen 2011:126). According to this view, also 
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expressed by some Norwegian Muslims, contemporary Norway comes closer to 
universal Muslim standards of good governance than most Muslim countries (Jacobsen 
2011:126-127). With the exception of a few extremist individuals like Bhatti and 
Mohyeldeen (see chapter 2), no Norwegian Muslim spokesperson has publicly 
suggested institutionalizing sharia, not even in a restricted sense as a council for conflict 
mediation as in Britain (ibid, 212; Zimeri 2011:114). Young Norwegian Muslims’ 
skepticism towards institutionalizing sharia as state law is shared by Muslim feminists 
like Mir-Hosseini (Vogt et al. 2009:210; 214-215), and reformers like Ramadan, who 
are concerned that patriarchal, conservative interpretations would prevail if sharia is 
sanctioned by the state, even though they argue that sharia in itself is compatible with 
human rights and gender equality (Zimeri 2011:117). Among Norwegian Muslims, both 
Ramadan, who rethinks sharia in the context of European democracies, and al-
Qaradawi, who offers non-binding authoritative advice based on sharia, are considered 
well-respected authorities (Jacobsen 2011:125-126).  
Scholar of Islamic law, Abdullahi An-Na’im (2009), argues from a religious perspective 
against the idea of an ‘Islamic state’ that implements and enforces sharia as state law. 
An-Na’im distinguishes between secularism understood as separation of religion and 
state, and as separation of religion and politics. He argues that a widespread negative 
perception of secularism among Muslims is due to confusing these two aspects; which 
“leads to the assumption that the separation of Islam and the state can only mean the 
total relegation of Islam to the purely private domain and its exclusion from public 
policy” (ibid, 146). An-Na’im advocates a ‘moderate’ understanding of secularism (or 
“pluralism”) as “religious neutrality of the state”; which “does not mean that Islam and 
politics should be separated” but on the contrary, “would make it possible to implement 
Islamic principles in official policy and legislation through general political 
deliberation, but not as imperative religious doctrine” (ibid, 145). Theorizing the 
distinction between state and politics, he draws on (the late) Rawls’ concept of “public 
reason”, which implies that; 
Muslims and other believers should be able to propose policy and legislative 
initiatives emanating from their religious beliefs, provided they can support them 
in public, free and open debate by reasons that are accessible and convincing to 
the generality of citizens, regardless of their religion. (ibid, 156) 
Citizens must be able to “make counter-proposals through public debate, without 
exposing themselves to charges of disbelief, apostasy or blasphemy” (ibid, 149), 
because “the whole process of formulating and implementing public policy and 
legislation is constantly subject to human fallibility, which means that it can always be 
challenged or questioned without violating the direct and immediate divine will of God” 
(ibid, 152). An-Na’im argues that institutional separation of state and religion is 
necessary for sharia to have a proper positive role in society, since “the premise of Islam 
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is that each and every Muslim is personally responsible for knowing and complying 
with what is required of him or her as a matter of religious obligation” (an-Na’im 
2009:151). While individual Muslims usually consult Islamic scholars in order to know 
what is required in a given situation, any scholarly understanding of sharia is always the 
product of ‘ijtihad’ i.e. “the meaning and implementation of these [‘sharia’] sources in 
everyday life is always the product of human interpretation [‘fiqh’] and action in a 
specific historical context”. Granting the authority of interpretation to any institution is 
“dangerous because that power will certainly be manipulated for political or other 
reasons” (ibid, 154). Hence, the idea that sharia principles can be enforced by an Islamic 
state is a dangerous illusion (ibid, 148), because  
whatever is enacted and enforced by the state is the political will of the ruling 
elite, not the normative system of Islam as such. Yet, such policies and 
legislation are difficult for the general population to resist or even debate when 
they are presented as the will of God. (ibid, 156)  
Moreover, “compliance [with sharia] must be completely voluntary because it requires 
pious intention […], which is negated by the coercive enforcement by the state”. Thus, 
when properly understood as ethical principles to be freely observed by individual 
believers, “sharia principles can and should be a source of public policy and legislation, 
subject to the fundamental constitutional and human rights of all citizens, men and 
women, Muslims and non-Muslims equally and without discrimination” (ibid, 155). A 
positive public role for sharia principles requires that certain traditional interpretations 
[‘fiqh’] are reformed (ibid, 156), as “the consensus of previous generations cannot be 
binding unless it is accepted as such by every generation for itself, with all due critical 
reflection and debate” (ibid, 153), but this “should not mean the wholesale and 
uncritical adoption of dominant Western theory and practice” (ibid, 158). 
Islamic revivalism in Norway focuses on how to lead religious lives in a non-Muslim 
society rather than being concerned with ‘Islamic law’ (Jacobsen 2011:213). This means 
that behavioral rules as outlined in the sharia are seen in terms of individual ethics 
rather than laws to be implemented by the state (ibid, 339), in line with Asad’s (cited in 
ibid, 109) argument that in the classic theological view, the ‘umma’ as a worldwide 
Muslim community was not imagined as analogous to a modern nation-state, but rather 
as a global network of interconnected “self-governing but not autonomous” individuals 
with “a capacity to discover the rules of sharia” and conform to these as a “morally 
binding” system of practical reason. Public behavior guided by Islam can be described 
as political because it makes Muslim identity relevant for the public exercise of active 
citizenship (ibid, 208), and is expected to influence the public sphere. As such, it 
“challenges one particular secularist understanding of the relationship between religion 
and politics” (ibid, 340), i.e. the view that religion should be kept strictly private. Being 
simultaneously a religious Muslim and an integrated Norwegian citizen, like Rana, 
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represents a “politicization of religious identity” (Jacobsen 2011:34) that challenges a 
hegemonic Norwegian ideology of ‘egalitarian individualism’ which understands 
equality as sameness (ibid, 214-216; see also Gullestad 2006b:169-170). 
Secular hegemony 
Rana’s second point is that Norway is a secular hegemony with tendencies towards an 
‘ideological secularism’ of the French type. He writes (February 25); 
The development in this country regarding the degree of acceptance for exercise 
of religion has several parallels to France and Turkey. […] There are attempts 
in these countries to make public exercise of religion extinct, so that secularism 
and atheism achieve a special position in society. […] The secular paradigm of 
France and Turkey expresses a type of extreme and fanatical ‘enforced 
standardization’ that undermines intellectual diversity in general and the 
individual right to practice one’s faith in particular. 
In his second article (March 2), Rana adds that; several debate contributions give a 
thorough lesson in exactly what I describe as an extreme-secular tradition in 
Norwegian debate. Debate contributions confirmed Rana’s observations of how 
religious people are treated in public debate, mostly by using marginalization and 
stigmatization techniques that themselves are examples of what Rana criticized.  
More ‘serious’ contributors argued against Rana’s analysis which describes Norway as 
a secular hegemony tending towards an ideological form of secularism. Rather than 
speculating on Rana’s links to ‘fundamentalism’, these contributors focused on his 
arguments and discussed the degree and form of secularism in contemporary Norway. 
‘Islam critics’ Gunn Hild Lem (February 28) and Ingvild Heier (March 6) simply stated 
their disagreement; the former argued that; the term secular extremism is becoming ever 
less characteristic of Norway, and to the contrary, the fact that Usman Rana won the 
competition, shows how religious arguments unfortunately are gaining legitimacy 
again. She agrees with Rana that it is not the business of non-believers to change 
theology, but concludes that if popularly elected leaders should stay away from 
religion, however, [it] requires a more rather than less secular society. Heier writes 
that; it is still unclear what he [Rana] thinks is the problem with today’s secular society; 
and argues; when religious fundamentalists, either they are Christian or Muslim, face 
opposition in public debate it is because there are many out there who disagree with 
them. There is no organized “hate” [or persecution] against them and no one has 
denied them the right to speak; implying that Rana’s description of Norwegian society 
as ‘secular extremist’ is unjustified. 
From a Christian perspective, priest Knut Sand Bakken (February 27) comments; there 
is a lot of religiosity in Norwegian society, and persons of faith are certainly not 
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marginalized. Further, when Christian faith influences some politicians’ decisions in 
legislation, for example, this is of course fully legitimate. Also from a Christian 
perspective, two representatives of the Inter-Church Council for the Church of Norway, 
Gard Lindseth and Sven Thore Kloster (March 28), provide a nuanced argument against 
Rana’s description of the status of religious expressions in the Norwegian public sphere; 
The Enlightenment heritage often causes us to see the secular as universal, and 
the religious as something particular that must be subordinated. Secular 
absolutism, however, is equally intolerant and excluding as a religious one. At 
the same time, we are not so sure that Rana’s claim that religious people are 
marginalized in the public sphere is a correct analysis, or at least an accurate 
analysis. […] we think there are many examples that normative arguments 
grounded in religion are taken seriously and even listened to, in the public – at 
least if others can also support them on different grounds. This applies to 
political issues like biotechnology, euthanasia, solidarity and human rights, 
responsibility for the poor and weak, as well as Protecting Creation. The 
interesting question is rather when are religious arguments not heard in the 
public. Often this relates to ethical questions about gender, family and sexuality. 
Rana is right that value-conservative arguments in these ethical fields tend to be 
degraded in public dialogue. 
The writers acknowledge that ‘secular absolutism’ is problematic, but disagree with 
Rana’s analysis that this perspective is dominant in Norway. They argue that religious 
arguments play an important role in many political debates, with the exception of 
conservative views on gender and family issues, which do tend to be marginalized. (I 
return to the issue about religious ethics as a positive contribution to public debate in the 
final section.) Under the headline Norway is not secular, Jens Brun-Pedersen 
representing the Humanist Association (February 26), argues that the description of 
Norwegian society, which has a state religion and strong traits of a dominant majority 
religion, as ‘secular extremist’ depends on one’s perspective. He argues that there is 
much that makes sense in Rana’s text, but a major objection is that; Norwegian society 
is to an equally high extent characterized by religious ‘enforced standardization’. From 
his perspective, Brun-Pedersen agrees with Rana that the state church should be 
abolished, but for a different reason; so that the state can become properly secular.  
While these writers disagree on whether Norway is secular enough (Christian 
contributors Bakken, Lindseth and Kloster, as well as Heier are satisfied with status 
quo, which they in contrast to Rana, see as allowing religious expressions in political 
debate, while Brun-Pedersen and Lem want a more secular society by abolishing the 
state church), they all shared the perception that religion has a significant presence in 
Norwegian society, also in public debate, and that a ‘secular extremist’ view that 
religion should be kept strictly private cannot be said to hold hegemony in Norway. 
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There is a tendency towards ‘secular extremism’ among some parts of what Bangstad 
called the ‘secular intelligentsia’. Rana’s point about Norway being faced with a choice 
between a ‘moderate’ (‘American’) and an ‘extreme’ (‘French’) form of secularism can 
thus be understood as referring to an ideological struggle for hegemony between these 
two positions. 
Rana’s analysis of a secular hegemony was picked up and elaborated on in 
commentaries by Aftenposten’s political editor Harald Stanghelle (March 1) and 
journalist Ulf Andenæs (April 3, 2008). Stanghelle notes that; it is long since so many, 
so intensely and so angrily have felt the need to distance themselves from a social 
observation, and suggests that this may be because Rana hit a blind spot in Norwegian 
public debate. He argues that Rana, from his standpoint as a conservative believer, sees 
some traits of our own society more clearly than many others; and thus offers a sharp 
and observant social analysis. The political editor writes that; we may not always be 
aware of it, but nonetheless we live in an age and a country with a secular and liberal 
hegemony; something which implies freedom from dictates of moralism, but may also 
mean contempt for those who refuse to accept dominant trends of society. Recognizing 
that popular liberation movements, whether communist, Islamist, nationalist, or 
secularist and liberalist, always risk becoming as oppressive as their predecessors when 
they become dominant, Stanghelle notes how an intolerant pressure to conformity has 
developed in the name of tolerance. To explain how this happens, he takes a historical 
perspective and reminds us of how recent the European trend of secularization is. While 
a liberal life-stance and a liberal lifestyle dominate our age, especially in media; many 
of today’s opinion leaders grew up in a different era, when Christian moralists; now so 
easily caricatured as “obscurantists”, really had an influence in this country. Thus, 
many of today’s opinion leaders have a problem seeing that yesterday’s power of faith 
has become devalued to examples of powerlessness, since power of definition in society 
today belongs to the liberal majority; and they continue pounding at the minority as if it 
represents a superior power that must be challenged. In this way, the liberal majority 
may become indistinguishably alike the moralizing majority it defeated a long time ago. 
He concludes that the ‘liberal age’ cannot be taken for granted; whether it provokes a 
counter-reaction partly depends on how liberals handle their newly-won victory. 
Stanghelle’s view corresponds to Jeff Spinner-Halev’s (cited in Modood 2005:179) 
characterization of a ‘liberal mainstream’ and ‘marginalized conservative religious 
minorities’ (to be discussed later). Similarly, Ulf Andenæs describes Rana’s article as 
an observant description of how a Muslim perceives a secularized society in Northern 
Europe, where religious faith has been pushed aside; and adds that; there should not be 
much here with which readers with a degree of religious feelings can be much in 
disagreement. He argues that what matters to religious Christians or Muslims like Rana, 
is not whether the state subsidizes religion, but that; laws and norms of society are 
decreasingly based on religious teachings, and correspondingly more on thoughts and 
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models with a secular basis. With regard to the state church, Andenæs writes that while 
it used to mean that “the public religion of the state” was a guide that gave direction to 
social arrangements, not least in ethics and family law; today the state church means 
that an authority freed from religion, continues to govern a church with less room in 
public, and imposes on the church some of its partly secular-based decisions. Thus, 
many religious people do not feel that a state religion guarantees a state committed to 
religion, but rather that state religion is restraining the church. I discuss Rana’s views 
on the state church in greater detail below. 
National versions of secularism 
In order to discuss the role of secularism in Norwegian society compared to other 
countries like France, Britain or the US, it is necessary to distinguish between different 
versions of secularism. Here, it is important to distinguish between institutional 
separation of church and state, and the insistence that religion should be privatized and 
disconnected from politics (an-Na’im 2009:146). For a comparison of different versions 
of secularism in different countries, and how these relate to various forms of 
multicultural accommodation of Muslim minorities, I draw on Casanova (2009) and 
Modood (2005; 2007; Modood & Kastoryano 2006). 
Starting with a distinction between absolute and relative separation between religion 
and politics generally, and state and religion more specifically, Modood (2005:141-142) 
argues that when discussing the (in)compatibility of Islam and secularism, we need to 
distinguish between ‘moderate’ and ‘ideological’ versions of each; i.e. between 
theocracy and mainstream Islam, and between a ‘radical’ or ‘ideological’ secularism 
arguing for an absolute separation between religion and politics, and mainstream 
European forms of ‘moderate’ secularism with relative separation (Modood 2010:127). 
Criticizing a view even held by Charles Taylor, that Western liberal societies cannot 
extend recognition to Muslims because mainstream Islam does not separate politics and 
religion, Modood argues that while there are Muslim ideologists who want to 
subordinate politics to religious leaders (as in Iranian theocracy), mainstream Islam has 
historically distinguished between political rulers and spiritual leadership, although 
Islam had an official status and was a basis of jurisprudence. While secularism is 
hegemonic across Western Europe today, it is characterized by a moderate and 
pragmatic, “historically evolved and evolving compromise with religion” with 
significant institutional links between state and church, rather than by a radical ideology 
of “absolute separation of religion and politics” (Modood & Kastoryano 2006:162). 
Modood (2005:143-145) argues that ‘radical secularism’ is not neutral, since it would 
“suit and favor private religions” focused on “the inner life or personal conduct or 
individual salvation” over those that include “communal obligations, a public 
philosophy, and political action”. Historically, Protestantism, with its individualized, 
intellectualized, and (usually) privatized, view of religion, has played a central role in 
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the secularization process (Bangstad 2009:31), and in contemporary Europe, Protestant 
countries tend to be less religious than Catholic countries, with the exception of France 
(Casanova 2009:143). In much the same way as Catholicism was historically seen as 
incompatible with secularism, today Islam is seen as the greatest challenge to secular 
hegemony, as Muslim minorities demand to be included in the renegotiation of 
historical compromises between state and church (Modood & Kastoryano 2006:162).  
If the liberal state uses its power to encourage individualistic religions while demanding 
that religions with public ambitions to shape social structures, give these up, the state is 
no longer seen as ‘neutral’, ‘just’ or ‘legitimate’ in the eyes of religious believers such 
as Rana, who want religion to have a public role. Thus, while ‘radical secularism’ 
arguing for absolute separation, is incompatible with Islam, and ‘radical Islam’ rejecting 
separation, is incompatible with secularism; moderate secularism and moderate Islam 
are compatible as both views support a relative separation of religion and politics. As 
“the goal of democratic multiculturalism cannot and should not be cultural neutrality 
but rather inclusion of marginal and disadvantaged groups, including religious 
communities in public life” (Modood 2005:147), Muslims “should not be excluded 
from participation in the multicultural state because their views about politics are not 
secular enough” (ibid, 142). This implies that radical secularism can be seen as an 
obstacle to integration and as incompatible with multiculturalism (ibid, 149; 2007:78). 
In short, Modood (ibid, 85) argues that in order to integrate Muslims, it is necessary to 
include Muslim identity as a public identity and Islam as an organized religion. 
Like Norway and other Scandinavian countries (Bangstad 2009:43; 235; Casanova 
2009:143; Thorbjørnsrud & Døving 2012:8), Britain has been described as among the 
most highly secularized countries in the world, in terms of practice, affiliation and belief 
(Modood & Kastoryano 2006:164). In British political culture, secularism is hegemonic, 
especially on the center-left, and there is widespread skepticism towards Muslim 
identity politics, primarily because it is a “politicized religious identity” (Modood 
2005:167). Like the Norwegian ‘secularism debate’, the Rushdie affair in Britain 
showed that those “most politically opposed to (politicized) Muslims wasn’t Christians 
or even right-wing nationalists but the secular, liberal intelligentsia,” who “frequently 
criticize [Muslims] in the op/ed pages of the broadsheets” (ibid, 169). This ‘ideological 
secularism’ that is currently being developed as “an ideology to oppose Islam and its 
public recognition”, generates “European domestic versions of ‘the clash of 
civilizations’ thesis”. It represents a challenge to pluralism and democracy, and “has to 
be resisted no less than the radical anti-secularism of some Islamists” (Modood 
2007:85-86). 
Despite the presence of ideological secularism among intellectuals, actual institutional 
arrangements across Europe reflect moderate compromises with various degrees of 
relative separation between state and religion (ibid, 72-73; 78). While all Western 
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European countries can be characterized as ‘secular’, interpretations of secularism as 
well as institutional arrangements come in a variety of national versions (Modood & 
Kastoryano 2006:163; 173). The ideology of “Enlightenment rationalism” underpinning 
secularism takes different forms depending on each country’s historical experience; 
since the French revolution, French Enlightenment thinking has often been against (the 
Catholic) religion, less so in Germany where Catholic and Lutheran churches became 
‘partners’ of the state. British Enlightenment thinking was not hostile to religion, as the 
Church of England had less political power compared to the Catholic Church elsewhere 
(ibid). Furthermore, in each country, Muslims have to some extent been pragmatically 
accommodated into existing national institutional arrangements (Modood 2007:78-79; 
Modood & Kastoryano 2006:173); even in France, the state has institutionally 
recognized Islam (ibid, 174). In the radical French model of laïcité, there is no state 
church, and the state “actively promotes the privatization of religion” (Modood 
2007:75). The principle of laïcité represents an ideological secularism where the 
republican state “leads civil society by creating a political culture that is opposed to 
clericalism, or perhaps even to ‘Catholic culture’” in an “active movement” aimed at 
“extracting the individual from religious constraints and integrating him into the 
political community as an individual citizen” (Modood & Kastoryano 2006:166). 
Consequently, there are few signs of religion in the French public sphere or in French 
civil society (ibid, 165). This applies particularly to state schools, which are seen as 
agents of secularization and assimilation (see chapter 4). Nevertheless, the state 
sponsors religious organizations (designed as cultes rather than as communities) in an 
institutional framework that is “as much a form of state control as it is [a form] of 
recognition and falls short of any kind of social partnership, as in Germany (Modood 
2007:75). Rather than recognizing a variety of Muslim voices, the state-controlled 
French “corporatist” form of inclusion creates a hierarchical structure where Muslims 
speak with one voice, and where the state imposes upon Muslims “its own template, 
plans, modes of partnership and chosen imams and leaders” (ibid, 81). Interestingly, this 
means that the republican ideology, contrary to its stated intentions to be ‘blind’ to all 
sorts of ‘difference’, in practice recognizes religious minorities to a greater extent than 
any other minority status (Modood & Kastoryano 2006:175). 
Casanova (2009:141-143) writes that when seeking to accommodate minority religions, 
European countries tend to “replicate their particular model of separation of church and 
state”. French laïcité thus requires “strict privatization of religion, eliminating religion 
from any public forum” while simultaneously  
pressuring religious groups to organize themselves into a single, centralized 
churchlike institutional structure that can be regulated by and serve as 
interlocutor to the state, following the traditional model of the concordat with the 
Catholic Church (ibid).  
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In Germany, internal divisions among Muslims have undermined government attempts 
to create an official Islamic institution from above. In continental Europe, and 
particularly France and Germany, a majority of immigrants are Muslims, and the 
majority of Muslim immigrants come from one country or region (Turkish in Germany; 
North African in France). In this regard, Norway is more similar to Britain, which has a 
much greater diversity of immigrants although the largest Muslim group in both 
countries is Pakistani. Britain, while having a state church, has “historically 
accommodated much greater religious pluralism” and allows a more decentralized 
model of a variety of religious associations lobbying for their interests “directly with 
local authorities” (Casanova 2009:143). 
In Norway, 80 % of the population are members of the national church, but there is also 
widespread skepticism of religion, particularly of organized religion. Public debate is 
often hostile to religion and religious leaders, and 80 % see religion more as a source of 
conflict than of peace (Thorbjørnsrud & Døving 2012:7-8). Unlike several other highly 
secularized European countries, Norway had until recently a state church linked to the 
monarchy as in Britain. In May 2012, Parliament passed changes to the Constitution 
that abolished ‘state religion’. The state church was converted into a state-funded 
‘national church’ but most practical arrangements remain the same. The ‘relative 
separation’ of church and state moved towards disestablishment; notably the 
government no longer appoints bishops and it is no longer required that half the cabinet 
ministers are church members. In Britain, bishops sit in the House of Lords, but the 
Church of England is not directly funded by the state. The Norwegian state continues to 
support the national church and minority congregations with an equal amount per 
member (Henriksen 2012:200). Conversely, England has a large number of state-funded 
religious schools (Modood & Kastoryano 2006:164), while Norwegian social-
democratic politicians are skeptical of allowing and funding religious (and private) 
schools, partly because of the role of the ‘unitary school’ system in Norwegian nation-
building, with some parallel to France. Also resembling the French system where the 
state controls the church (Bangstad 2008:25-26), Norwegian politicians have actively 
used their power to ‘liberalize’ and ‘secularize’ the church (Jacobsen 2011:22), e.g. in 
appointing bishops. Disagreements between Muslim leaders and Muslim youth during 
the cartoon affair (see chapter 2) indicate that the Norwegian government seeks to exert 
similar disciplinary power on the Islamic Council, although less so than in France (ibid, 
124). Like in Britain, Germany and the US, but unlike France, the Norwegian church 
has played an active role in civil society political movements for peace and social 
justice (Modood 2007:75; Modood & Kastoryano 2006:163). 
Views on the state church 
Bangstad (ibid) points out that Rana’s characterization of France and Turkey, as 
allegedly seeking ‘to make the public exercise of religion extinct’ is inaccurate, as these 
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two “models” are better described as forms of state regulation and control of religion. 
Turkish secularism “does not imply a separation between religion and state, but 
extensive state control and discipline of religion” (Bangstad 2008:25-26), while French 
secularism is “primarily based on a strict and quite authoritarian control with the 
exercise of religion among French citizens, but does not prevent the French state from 
financing religious activities” (ibid). However, Rana’s criticism of the French model is 
consistent with his criticism of privatizing religion, and of the state church as an 
‘instrument’ of state control (February 25); 
It is not exactly far-fetched to regard the state church as an instrument for 
[agnostic or atheist] politicians and lobbyists with varying and questionable 
degrees of grounding in the Christian faith. They want a democratization of 
Christian theology so that in terms of values, it becomes a mirror image of 
society’s latest trends instead of reflecting the teachings of the Bible. 
In the follow-up (March 2), he adds;   
The state church is used as an entry point to ritualize, politically dictate and 
secularize theology, creating an expectation that other Christian denominations 
and other religions should follow suit. In order not to completely sacrifice 
diversity and freedom of religion on the altar of political correctness, it may thus 
be of fundamental importance that state and church are separated, so that the 
theological independence of congregations can be maintained in accordance 
with article 18 of the Declaration of Human Rights. 
He adds that this does not imply that religious movements can or should be exempt from 
well-reasoned criticism in a transparent and democratic society. 
As Jacobsen (2011:21-22) writes, the Norwegian state church system is currently under 
revision and has been challenged both by those who want to protect the church against 
“constraints of state power” and by those arguing for a secular (in the sense of ‘neutral’) 
state. The 2012 constitutional changes accommodate both these arguments; the Church 
supports disestablishment because it gives them freedom to appoint bishops 
independent of government, and appointment of cabinet ministers is now independent 
of their church membership. In support of establishment, it has been argued that without 
state control, the church would become more ‘conservative’. In this regard, Jan-Olav 
Henriksen (2012:201) argues that the Church has ‘democratized’ in order to secure a 
degree of autonomy from state control. Thorbjørnsrud and Døving (2012:13-14) argue 
that the general public feels a sense of ownership over the national church, which gives 
them a right to an opinion on church matters even if they hardly ever attend church. 
Many also feel entitled to judge on religious issues in other congregations where they 
are not members. On the other side, it has been argued that disestablishment would 
“weaken the legitimacy of religion in the public sphere” (Jacobsen; ibid). The Islamic 
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Council opposed state-church separation because they fear that this would lead to 
further secularization of the French type (see also Bangstad 2008:24), where religion is 
relegated to the private sphere; but also because of a concern for a religiously-supported 
public morality and current financial benefits (which remain unchanged after 2012), 
where minority congregations receive subsidies according to membership to ensure that 
all religions are treated equal. Rana’s main argument to separate church and state is to 
protect religion against state control (see also ibid), as (particularly Labor) governments 
since the 1970s have supported liberals over conservatives within the state church, 
especially with regard to gender equality, calling on the church to be open towards 
female bishops and gay ministers (Jacobsen 2011:22). While Rana criticizes similar 
government efforts to ‘secularize’ Islam, Jacobsen (ibid, 124) points out that the 
Norwegian government has been less directly involved in shaping a “Norwegian Islam” 
in comparison to the French government, although Norwegian politicians and others 
have repeatedly encouraged Muslims to ‘modernize’ their interpretations in a more 
‘progressive’ direction. The debate about revising the Norwegian church illustrates that 
both secularists and religious spokespersons, including the Muslim minority, see 
advantages and disadvantages with current pragmatic compromises between state and 
church (Modood & Kastoryano 2006:168). 
Modood, like Rana, criticizes French ‘ideological secularism’ and advocates for 
‘moderate secularism’ and ‘religious pluralism’. However, rather than promoting the 
US model, Modood (2010:128-129) prefers a pragmatic and “accommodative” 
secularism typical of northwestern Europe, where organized religions are ‘social 
partners’ of the state; thus advocating a revised version of the state church system, 
where state-religion links are gradually pluralized or multiculturalized. Modood 
(2005:168) points out that religious minority spokespersons in Britain, like the Islamic 
Council in Norway  (Bangstad 2008:24; Jacobsen 2011:21-22) have not challenged the 
state church or demanded that it be disestablished because it privileges one religion over 
others, but instead want to maintain and extend state-religion links. As an alternative to 
disestablishment, Modood (2005:143-145) proposes to “approximate inclusiveness 
rather than neutrality”, which implies compensating marginalized religions by giving 
them “access to influence so their voices are nevertheless heard”. Wishing to ensure 
state support for minority religions, his preferred form of ‘moderate secularism’ is 
closer to the Indian version of secularism than to the American one. Trying to identify 
“a version of secularism that meets the most important religious objections”, Rajeev 
Bhargava (2009) suggests the Indian model as an alternative to a “very individualist, 
American liberal secularism” (ibid, 109). According to Bhargava (ibid, 101-107), the 
Indian version is characterized by valuing not only individual freedom of religion, but 
also the right of religious communities to preserve their traditions through educational 
institutions; it is concerned with inter-religious equality and recognizes community-
specific rights; it keeps a flexible “principled distance” which recognizes that religion is 
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important to people and allows public religious justifications (rather than promoting the 
post-Enlightenment idea of mutual exclusion of religion and politics); it is not hostile to 
public religion; it combines critique of practices like untouchability and gender 
oppression with respect for religion (rather than choosing between hostility and 
indifference); it is open to contextual moral reasoning, allowing differential treatment 
and encouraging accommodation, letting different societies work out their own 
secularisms; and represents a modern, but non-western alternative, thus defying 
dominant dichotomies. In short, “Indian secularism is an ethically sensitive negotiated 
settlement between diverse groups and divergent values” which attempts to bring 
together “seemingly incompatible values” (Bhargava 2009:107). For countries with an 
established state church, Modood prefers “pluralizing the state-religion link” something 
which is happening to some extent in both Britain and Norway. A reformed state church 
can thus be one way of “institutionalizing religious pluralism in Britain and similar 
countries” (Modood 2005:148).  
While both advocating ‘religious pluralism’, Modood and Rana have different aims. 
While open to ‘respect for religion’, Modood (2010:132) is more concerned with public 
recognition of (politicized) religious identity and state support for religious minorities, 
while Rana, as a religious revivalist, is more concerned with protecting religion against 
the state (Casanova 2009:151; Rawls 199:166), (individual) religious freedom in civil 
society, and possible contributions of religious values in the public sphere and society in 
general. Thus, Modood favors reforming the state church system to include minority 
religions along lines already underway in Britain, while Rana favors the US, a “deeply 
religious society”. 
Multiculturalism and post-secular society 
Advocating ‘moderate secularism’ and ‘religious pluralism’, Rana points to the USA as 
a model. He asks (February 25); Should Norway be a moderate secular nation that 
maintains freedom of religion, or should society be extreme-secular, where the state 
and political correctness dominates and defines what Norwegian citizens are allowed to 
believe? As an alternative to developments he observes in Norway, he suggests; 
The American approach to this central identity issue is clearly distinct from the 
development in Norway. The secular model of the USA represents diversity, but 
it guarantees individual religious freedom, belief in God is given space in the 
public sphere, and President Bush can openly promote his Christian views on 
family forms without being harassed by the media and political opponents. 
Comparing the US to Europe draws attention to a distinction between state and civil 
society. Like France, the United States has no state church; but unlike the French state, 
which “actively promotes the privatization of religion” (Modood & Kastoryano 
2006:165), the US constitution ‘protects religious diversity’ (ibid, 164). The difference 
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between French and American versions of secularism lies not in the constitutional 
separation of church and state, which is strict in both countries, but in “the place of 
religion in civil society and its relationship to the state, the interpretation – not its 
juridical definition – of the principle of separation of Church and state” (Modood & 
Kastoryano 2006:166). While in France, the state promotes secularism in civil society, 
in the USA, organized religion seeks to influence politics from civil society (ibid). 
While some of the most secular countries in Europe have state churches, the United 
States has been described as a “deeply religious society” (ibid, 164; Modood 2007:73), 
with higher levels of church attendance than in Europe, and with a politically influential 
Protestant fundamentalism that is rare in Europe. Modood (ibid, 74) points out that in 
the US, despite its constitutional “wall of separation” between state and church, “it is 
not at all unusual for politicians – in fact for President George W. Bush, it is most usual 
– to publicly talk about their faith, [and] to appeal to religion” while in establishment 
Britain, where bishops sit in the upper house of legislature, “politicians rarely talk about 
their religion” and even former Prime Minister Tony Blair, “one of the most openly 
professed and active Christians ever to hold that office” said that his religious beliefs are 
“a private matter” (ibid). In the US, organized religion is a powerful force in civil 
society and seeks to influence politics (ibid, 75; Modood & Kastoryano 2006:164-165). 
As in Britain, churches and priests have been involved in progressive political 
movements for anti-racism, social justice and peace, such as the Civil Rights Movement 
(Modood 2007:75; see also Rawls 1999:154), indicating that religious involvement in 
politics need not be reactionary (Mamdani 2004:42-44). 
Americans in general tend to be more religious than people in Europe or other modern 
societies (Casanova 2009:148-151). Over 90 per cent of them profess to be religious 
(Rawls 2003:140), and 68 per cent report that religion is of personal importance in their 
lives, compared to 28 per cent in Britain (Espositio & Mogahed 2007:47). Interestingly, 
Americans tend to exaggerate their religiosity, in contrast to a European tendency to 
play it down; indicating that “Americans think they are supposed to be religious, while 
Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious” (Casanova 2009:150; see also 
Bangstad 2009:44). Public religious identities play an important role in a “vibrant 
American religious pluralism” (Casanova 2009:140) that plays a central role in the 
integration of new immigrants. Significantly, only a small number of immigrants to the 
USA are Muslims; these are very diverse in terms of countries of origin; and about one-
third of American Muslims are African American converts (ibid, 142). The US 
constitutional principle of separation serves not only to protect the state from religion, 
but also to protect religion from the state. It differentiates between a political 
community of citizens and a diversity of religious ‘denominations’ (ibid, 151). While 
America was historically defined as a Christian nation and religious pluralism only 
applied to Protestant denominations; Catholics and Jews were later accommodated and 
became “American religions” (ibid, 152). Like Islam today, Catholicism was once 
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stigmatized as a fundamentalist religion incompatible with modern democracy and 
individual freedom (Casanova 2009:160). And like Catholicism, Casanova argues that 
Islam is now in the process of being recognized as an American religion (ibid, 161). 
While disagreeing with Modood on the role of the state church, Rana also links 
‘religious pluralism’ to multicultural integration; and argues that because of greater 
acceptance of religion in that country, American Muslims are far better integrated than 
their European fellow believers. He further elaborates on pluralism; 
It is our duty to work towards Norway remaining a multifaceted and well-
functioning democracy, which means that pluralism is invaluable. It should not 
be forgotten that also religious freedom, political opinions based on religious 
convictions, and politically incorrect views are part of pluralism.  
In his follow-up article (March 2), he elaborates; 
Norway should strive towards being a moderately secular nation, aiming to 
avoid a development towards enforced secular standardization and other forms 
of majority tyranny. I warn that diversity may become history unless public 
space in Norway is liberalized so that also references to God and value 
conservatism are regarded as an integral part of Norwegian democracy. 
He adds that this of course also includes respect and appreciation for non-religious 
viewpoints. Again, he points to the American model; which perhaps most closely 
approaches pluralistic tolerance and harmony; and demonstrates compatibility of 
religion with one of the world’s most advanced; progressive, modern and open 
societies. Rana invokes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18, to 
support the public role of religion, stating the right to public exercise, missionary 
activity and manifestation of one’s religion.  
Bangstad (2008:24-25) is skeptical of how a Muslim can “promote George W. Bush’s 
USA as a model to follow”. Bangstad finds this ‘remarkable’ because of the Bush 
administration’s attacks on the American ‘wall of separation’; arguing that “what Rana 
sees as positive religious expressions in American politics can […] also be seen as […] 
instrumentalizing and ideologizing religion with the purpose to promote certain 
religious and political agendas”; i.e. those of a politicized Christian Right hostile to 
Islam. It seems that Bangstad may exaggerate the importance of Rana’s mention of 
Bush as example of religious expressions in the American public. Rana may well 
support the American model as such rather than developments under President Bush. 
Religion in the public sphere 
Bangstad’s op-ed on May 26, 2008, can be seen as a final contribution to the 
‘secularism debate’ in Aftenposten. Here, he discusses an intolerant tendency towards 
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religious expressions in the public sphere among parts of the ‘secular and liberal 
Norwegian intelligentsia’ in terms of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere; 
In Norway, it is already from the start ‘read and approved’ that one need not 
listen to, nor can learn anything whatsoever, from Islamists and fundamentalists. 
Rana’s op-ed represented a direct challenge to a key idea among members of the 
secular and liberal Norwegian intelligentsia; namely that religious expressions 
refusing to dress in a secular language, cannot be legitimate expressions of 
communicative rationality. 
Bangstad links this hegemonic idea among the Norwegian intellectual elite to the early 
work of Habermas; since Habermas’ influence on thinking about this issue among 
Norwegian intellectuals after 1968 can hardly be overstated. In Habermas’ early work 
on the domination-free dialogue (i.e. ideal speech situation), he emphasized that (in 
Bangstad’s words) religious citizens so to speak “translate” their religious convictions 
into a secular language when speaking in public. However, while; 
Habermas seems to have acknowledged that the idea that religiosity will 
gradually disappear with modernity is and will remain a secular-liberal utopia, 
[…] far from all Norwegian members of the liberal and secular intelligentsia 
have noticed, much less are willing to accept, Habermas’ post-secular turn. 
While Habermas (2005:18-20) has turned away from a “stubbornly secularist” view, 
Bangstad (2008:21-22) argues that in contemporary Norway, where society is 
“thoroughly secularized”, secularism is increasingly understood as something more than 
a “political doctrine prescribing the separation of church and state and/or privatization 
of religion”. Rather, modern Norwegian secularism is imagined as a ‘neutral’, 
“independent political ethic” (Taylor cited in Bangstad 2009:33-34; 128) beyond history 
and politics; a perception which Rana exposed as a “secular myth”. Bangstad (2008:21-
22) argues that like religious worldviews, “liberalism as a political doctrine” has an 
illiberal and intolerant potential if it is made absolute. In other words; “a secular 
absolutism” emerges, which seeks to “relegate religious expressions to closed rooms at 
the margins of society” (ibid). 
Explaining his ‘post-secular turn’, Habermas’ (ibid, 11-13) notes the revival of religion 
in many parts of the world, which makes the secularization thesis appear as describing 
only a special-case scenario of Western Europe. Habermas does not have a particularly 
positive view of these developments, which he describes as “a provocative issue that 
bothers many of us” (ibid, 11) and he particularly laments “political revitalization of 
religion” in the US, which seems to have reverted to religion and abandoned the 
modernization process towards a more liberal society; “the European states seem now to 
be moving forward alone down the path they had trodden side by side with the United 
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States” (Habermas 2005:12). There are good reasons to be critical of American ‘culture 
wars’ and the Christian Right, but Habermas also shows a European secularist bias. 
Nevertheless, he proposes that in today’s ‘post-secular society’, it is not only religious 
citizens who have to adapt to challenges of modernity, but also secular citizens need to 
develop a ‘post-metaphysical mentality’; in other words both religious and non-
religious citizens need to develop ‘self-reflective attitudes’ and engage in mutual 
‘learning processes’ to assure cooperation and respect (ibid, 13). Drawing on Rawls’s 
concept of a ‘duty of civility’ where “citizens owe one another good reasons for their 
political statements”, Habermas argues that political decisions are only legitimate if 
justified in “a language which is equally accessible to all citizens”, regardless of their 
religion. With regard to “duties of citizens in the political public sphere”, he refers to 
Rawls’ ‘proviso’ (Rawls 1999:152; quoted in Habermas 2005:14); 
Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be 
introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course 
proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by comprehensive 
doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support. 
Habermas interprets ‘the proviso’ as applying to citizens’ “public use of non-public, that 
is religious reasons”, which need to be given “secular justification” (ibid). Habermas 
points out that ‘the proviso’ is controversial and has been countered by many objections 
(especially when interpreted as Habermas does, which is neither the only nor most 
reasonable interpretation of Rawls, as I discuss below). Seeking to accommodate 
objections from religious citizens, he writes (ibid, 15); 
Every citizen must know that only secular reasons count beyond the institutional 
threshold that divides the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, and 
administrations. But this recognition need not deter religious citizens from 
publicly expressing and justifying their convictions by resorting to religious 
language. 
The ‘post-secular’ Habermas allows religious citizens to use ‘religious language’ in the 
public sphere, as long as it is later translated into ‘secular language’, and even 
acknowledges that non-religious citizens may learn something from religious 
contributions “under certain circumstances”. In order to a alleviate religious citizens 
from an ‘asymmetrical burden’, Habermas argues that non-religious citizens must 
participate in the process of translation (ibid, 16); 
Whereas citizens of faith may make public contributions in their own religious 
language only subject to the proviso that these get translated, the secular citizens 
must open their minds to the possible truth content of those presentations and 
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even enter into dialogues from which religious reasons then might emerge in the 
transformed guise of generally accessible arguments. 
Habermas (2005:16) allows religious ‘truth content’ to enter political institutions 
(parliament and courts) if already translated in “the political public sphere”. He requires 
secular citizens to develop a ‘post-metaphysical mentality’ (ibid, 18) since a ‘secularist 
consciousness’ is insufficient to respect and cooperate with religious citizens. He 
defines such a “secularist” view as perceiving religions as “archaic relics of pre-modern 
societies” and freedom of religion only as “the natural preservation of an endangered 
species” (ibid); such a “paternalistic” (ibid) view of religion “can obviously not be 
expected to take religious contributions to contentious political issues seriously – or 
even help to assess them for a substance that can possibly be expressed in a secular 
language”. Instead, secular citizens also have to adapt to living in a ‘post-secular 
society’ and develop a self-reflective ‘post-metaphysical mentality’ that acknowledges 
“limits of secular reason”, and “rejects a narrow scientistic conception of reason” that 
reduces knowledge to a naturalist world-view. Such a “self-reflective overcoming of a 
secularist stubbornness” (ibid, 20) resulting in a “more generous post-metaphysical 
thought” (ibid) means being “prepared to learn from religion while remaining strictly 
agnostic” (ibid, 19), and “refrain from the rationalist temptation” to unilaterally pass 
judgment on which parts of religious doctrines are rational. 
Habermas’ ‘post-metaphysical’ turn seems to be ‘more generous’ towards admitting 
religious contributions; however, his argument about an ‘asymmetrical burden’ reveals 
similar ‘paternalistic’ and ‘secularist’ views as he criticizes, since it presupposes a 
hierarchical dichotomy between secular and religious that does not correspond well with 
empirical realities of contemporary religion (see chapter 4), even in ‘fundamentalist’ 
varieties. Habermas (ibid, 17) argues that political liberalism “always already” counts 
on “large scale mental changes” such as “modernization of religious consciousness” in 
Western culture since the Reformation and Enlightenment, which means that 
“traditional communities of faith” face an ‘asymmetrical burden’ of having to “process 
cognitive dissonances” which secular citizens are spared. He believes that religious 
consciousness must “acquire new epistemic attitudes” through a self-reflective learning 
process within religious traditions, where sacred truths are reconstructed in response to 
challenges of pluralism, of modern science, and of secular law and morality. This means 
that they have to “relate their religious beliefs to competing doctrines in such a way that 
their own exclusive claim to truth can be maintained” and accept the “independence of 
secular from sacred knowledge and the institutionalized monopoly of modern science” 
by reconstructing the relationship between “dogmatic and scientific beliefs in such a 
way that the autonomous progress in secular knowledge cannot come to contradict their 
faith” and make a “connection between the egalitarian individualism and universalism 
of modern law and morality and the premises of their own comprehensive doctrines” 
(ibid). I discuss the latter point later in relation to Rawls. 
234 
 
Habermas reproduces an image of ‘traditional religion’ as inverted ‘Other’ of ‘modern 
secularity’ in the passages regarding separation and opposition between ‘science’ and 
‘religion’. He ascribes ’dogmatism’ and ‘exclusive claims to truth’ to religion, while 
describing science as ‘independent’, ‘autonomous’, ‘progressive’ and entitled to a 
‘monopoly’. Ziauddin Sardar (1999:48) argues that a secularist argument that “religious 
worldviews cannot sustain plurality is parallel to the colonial suggestion that Other 
cultures are not civilized”. Habermas seems to exaggerate the extent to which religion is 
about mutually exclusive, competing truth claims. To the contrary, it has been argued 
that pluralism is part of the Islamic tradition (Modood & Ahmad 2010:87-89), and 
mainstream Islam has a historical record of respect for diversity and other religions, 
peaceful co-existence with other faith communities and religious syncretism (Modood 
2010:130-131), and does not perceive science as in conflict with religion. Contemporary 
Islamism also emphasizes that Islam is a “rational religion” compatible with science, 
which differs from American Protestant fundamentalists’ promotion of Creationism and 
rejection of Darwinism. But also Christian fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction 
against an imposed secular modernity rather than as a preservation of religious tradition 
(Mamdani 2004:39-41). Thus, actually existing religious worldviews may be less 
absolutist and more self-reflective, rational and pluralist than Habermas suggests. As 
Spinner-Halev (cited in Modood 2005:179-180) points out, marginalized conservative 
religious minorities living in a society where liberal secularism is hegemonic, cannot be 
said to be unaware of alternative ways of life, and commitment to a conservative 
lifestyle is thus necessarily a choice. Døving’s (2012b:40-44) analysis of Norwegian 
hijab debates (chapter 4), where Muslim feminists argue that wearing hijab or not 
should be a matter of individual choice, suggests that religious persons may be better 
equipped for the task of ‘translation’ than those who subscribe to a dominant secular 
worldview, and need not take religion seriously. She questions Habermas’ claim of an 
‘asymmetrical cognitive burden’ and writes that when Muslim feminists use ‘secular’ 
arguments, this is not necessarily a result of ‘translation’ from religious to secular 
language. Rather, their fluency in secular language indicates that discourses of identity 
and human rights can be seen as a ‘first language’. She argues that Habermas 
underestimates how well-integrated religious citizens are in secular society, and that the 
assumption of a cognitive burden essentializes religiosity as fundamentally different 
from secular worldviews. Neither Rawls nor Habermas acknowledge that religious 
arguments can be indistinguishably merged with dominant secular language. Døving 
writes that Norwegian Muslim contributors argued as Rawls says they should (in a 
language of public reason), but at the same time they challenge his division between 
political and private spheres when demanding recognition of their religious identity 
while supporting a secular state. However, they did not argue that the state should 
comply with Islamic principles or confirm that the hijab is a religious requirement. 
Rather, they referred to individual freedom of religion. 
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Dogmatism and absolutism are thus not particular characteristics of religion, but result 
from hegemonic power, e.g. when an ideology (religious or secular) is linked to state 
power. Bader (2009) argues that “it is crucial not to understand or phrase the conflict 
between political ‘absolutism’ (of all sorts) and priority for democracy in terms of 
‘religious fundamentalism’ versus ‘secularism’” (ibid, 114). He criticizes political 
philosophers who “do not seem to trust” liberal-democratic processes to provide enough 
stability and legitimacy in cases of “deep religious and cultural diversity or ‘reasonable 
pluralism’” and who exclude ‘religious reasons’ from public deliberation (ibid, 115); 
Fear and distrust of religious reasons is clearly very intense, since the ways that 
‘exclusionary secularists’ seek to control, regulate and discipline ‘allowable’ 
reasons and participants in public debate seem plainly incompatible with fairly 
extensive constitutional freedoms of political communication. (ibid) 
Bader argues that “liberal democrats and liberal-political philosophers should not be 
secularists” (ibid, 111). Drawing on Casanova, he writes that “religions increasingly 
have learned to bracket the ‘truth question’ in politics and to resolve their 
‘fundamentalist dilemma’” (ibid, 113). Bader criticizes Habermas’ “misleading” 
terminological ‘confusion’ of ‘public reason’ and ‘secular reason’ because it “seduces 
us into justifying the inevitable non-neutrality of liberal democracy in terms of secular-
versus-religious arguments” while ignoring “principled religious or theological 
foundations of liberal democracy”, and “directs our criticism of absolutism or 
fundamentalism in politics in a one-sided and myopic manner against religious or 
theological fundamentalism and tends to neglect all secular threats to liberal 
democracy” (ibid). Similar to Habermas’ post-secular turn, Bader suggests an “anti-
paternalistic mode of decision-making” (ibid, 114) where defenders of any truth, 
whether religious, philosophical or scientistic, have to resolve their ‘fundamentalist 
dilemma’. Thus, possible “threats to liberal democracy” come not only from religious 
fundamentalism, but also from secularists; not only from totalitarians, but also from 
‘scientism’ as an ideology; and from “radical and aggressively secularist 
‘Enlightenment’ philosophy”; thus, ideological secularism is “incompatible with 
reasonable pluralism” (ibid, 111). Bader acknowledges differences between Habermas 
and Rawls, where the former defends an “independent political ethics” based on 
‘secular’ reason or rationality, while the latter’s “political, not metaphysical” theory of 
an “overlapping consensus” has increasingly “been cleansed of secularist biases by 
Rawls himself” (ibid, 112).  
While the early Rawls’ Theory of Justice was a “comprehensive doctrine of liberalism” 
(Rawls 2003:140), his later Political Liberalism “is sharply different from and rejects 
Enlightenment Liberalism” (Rawls 1999:176), and sees such a society as impossible 
due to a fact of “reasonable pluralism”. While any society contains many ‘unreasonable 
doctrines’ incompatible with democracy (including, but not limited to, ‘religious 
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fundamentalism’), there is an ‘overlapping consensus’ of irreconcilable, but reasonable 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ which support a “political conception of justice underwriting 
a constitutional democratic society” (Rawls 1999:172). The late Rawls proposes ‘public 
reason’ as a “way of reasoning about political values shared by free and equal citizens 
that does not trespass on citizens’ comprehensive doctrines so long as these doctrines 
are consistent with a democratic polity” (ibid, 179-180). Defining persons as citizens 
means assigning the same political position to each person, and not viewing persons as 
socially situated in terms of class or ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (ibid, 171). “Central to 
the idea of public reason”, he writes, “is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as the doctrine is 
incompatible with […] a constitutional democratic regime” (ibid, 132). The content of 
‘public reason’ is “given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a 
single one. There are many liberalisms” (ibid, 140-141) which endorse underlying ideas 
of free and equal citizens in a fair society, but they “can be interpreted in various ways” 
resulting in “different formulations of the principles of justice” (ibid). Like Parekh (see 
chapter 1), Rawls argues that citizens should have mutual knowledge of each other’s 
religious and nonreligious doctrines, since the roots of their allegiance to constitutional 
democracy lie in their ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (ibid, 153-154). As a “perfect example 
of overlapping consensus” where a religious doctrine endorses constitutional 
democracy, he refers to an-Na’im’s interpretation of sharia (see above), which argues 
that traditional interpretations of sharia are based on the Medina period, where the 
“eternal and fundamental message of Islam” was adapted to a seventh-century historical 
context. “Now that historical conditions have changed”, Muslims should return to an 
“earlier Mecca interpretation of sharia [that] supports equality of men and women, and 
complete freedom of choice in matters of faith and religion” (ibid, 151 n. 46). 
Habermas (2005) equates Rawls’ concepts of ‘public reason’ with ‘secular reason’, 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ with religious doctrines, and ‘public political forums’ with 
the ‘public sphere’; thus arriving at a stricter version of legitimate political discourse 
than Rawls, who distinguishes ‘public reason’ from “secular reason” and defines the 
latter as “reasoning in terms of comprehensive nonreligious doctrines” that are “on a 
level with religion” (1999:143). He rejects a secularist idea that religious reasons are 
illegitimate, but that secularist arguments defined as “reflective and critical, publicly 
intelligible and rational” can justify legislation. Rawls “views all such arguments the 
same way it views religious ones” (ibid, 148). ‘Public reason’ applies only to 
discussions in the ‘public political forum’, i.e. discourses of judges, government 
officials, and candidates for public office (ibid, 133). It does not apply in what 
Habermas calls ‘the public sphere’ (ibid, 142 n. 28; see also Bader 2009:120 n. 13) 
which Rawls calls ‘background culture’, i.e. civil society, where he defends “full and 
open discussion” (Rawls 1999:134). However, ‘public reason’ serves as “moral duty” 
(ibid, 136) rather than legal duty, also for “citizens who are not government officials” 
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since “ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators” when 
reasoning in the public sphere (Rawls 1999:135). According to Bader (2009:119), 
Rawls is thus ambiguous about whether ‘public reason’ should apply to public debate. 
In a ‘deliberative democracy’, citizens “suppose that their political opinions may be 
revised by discussion with other citizens” (Rawls 1999:138). Defending ‘public reason’ 
constraints against an “open view” (held by Bader), Rawls answers that ‘public reason’ 
does not try “to settle political questions in advance” (ibid, 164); rather “reasoning is 
not closed once and for all in public reason any more than it is closed in any form of 
reasoning” and “should not always lead to a general agreement” (ibid, 170). He writes 
that constraints on ‘public reason’ are “useful primarily when a society is sharply 
divided and contains many hostile religious associations and secular groups”, something 
which is likely to happen without citizens’ allegiance to ‘public reason’ (ibid, 174). The 
‘proviso’ “still allows us to introduce into political discussion at any time our 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give 
properly public reasons” (ibid, 144). 
Rawls distinguishes ‘public reason’ from ‘secular reason’ and softens restraints on 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ in public debate (see also Bader 2009:112-113). Replacing a 
‘comprehensive liberal theory’ with a ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical’ theory, he 
has, in Bader’s (ibid, 116) view, replaced “distrust of all religion” with a “fully open 
relationship between religion and democracy”. Bader (ibid, 117) concludes that “Rawls 
is no longer an exclusionist ‘secularist’, and cannot and should not be accused of 
secularism”. Rather, Rawls criticizes Habermas for “sticking to comprehensive, secular 
moral theories” (ibid, 116 n. 3). Bader writes that despite the ‘post-secular turn’, 
Habermas “has consistently refused to take the decisive step […] otherwise he would 
now be really convinced by the late Rawls and drop his ‘post-traditional’ and 
epistemologically rationalist, secularist provisos” (ibid). Bader considers Rawls, 
following his “shift towards a more inclusive position” as the “most considered version 
of public-reason restraint arguments” (ibid, 116); and as approaching his own view of a 
“moderately agonistic democracy” (ibid, 113) which sees deliberation as negotiation, 
does not discriminate between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ views but “encourage[s] as 
many voices as possible to be raised, listened to and responded to”. Rawls (1999:141; 
cited in Bader 2009:124) recognizes that there are ‘many liberalisms’ and 
‘interpretations’ so that public reason cannot be ‘fixed’ once and for all. Bader argues 
that only by allowing public reason to be ‘inclusive’ can we “challenge predominant 
particularist interpretations hiding behind the ‘universal’ version of a fixed, 
predominant idea of public reason” (ibid, 126), i.e. what is called ‘Eurocentrism’ by 
postcolonial theorists like S. Sayyid (2003). As these ideas are always contested, “the 
meaning of the [reasonability] constraints becomes increasingly hollow” (Bader 
2009:128) and “less rigidly applied” by political philosophers (ibid, 131). Parekh 
(2000:312-313; quoted in Bader 2009:132-133) criticizes Rawls’ and Habermas’ 
238 
 
versions of ‘public reason’ for having a rationalist bias, with an exclusive focus on what 
is said rather than who says it, and attempting to universalize a single model (the 
American one in the case of Rawls) without taking cultural or national contexts into 
account. Bader (2009:113-115) suggests instead that liberal democracy should be seen 
as “an open project”  where decisions are “always revisable” without “exclusivist 
‘reasonability constraints’”. 
Rawls’ theory reflects the American model of pluralism (Rawls 1999:144-149; 
2003:140), notably when discussing reasons for the US version of separation between 
church and state (Rawls 1999:166-168); it protects the state from religion, religion from 
the state, and individuals from their ‘churches’ (heresy and apostasy are not crimes). 
Rawls argues that ‘political liberalism’ is not individualistic because it protects both 
individual and associational freedom. Further, he argues that it is erroneous to see 
church-state separation as primarily protecting secular culture; instead, Rawls argues 
that “the vitality and wide acceptance of religion in America” is because religions are 
protected from the state and no religion has been able to dominate and suppress others 
by using coercive powers of the state. Rawls cites Tocqueville that complete separation 
of church and state is a main cause of strength of religion in the US, while close links 
between state and church have led to decline of religion in Europe (ibid, 167 n. 76). In 
other words, European secularization can be seen as a result of religion being corrupted 
by state power and losing legitimacy in the eyes of the population.   
Habermas reflects a secularist hegemony among European intellectuals, while Rawls 
reflects an American model, where a strictly secular state protects religious pluralism. 
While Habermas continues to defend liberalism as a ‘comprehensive doctrine’, the late 
Rawls rejects ideological “Enlightenment Liberalism” and restricts his ‘liberalism’ to 
the ‘political’ in a similar way as Modood contrasts ‘political multiculturalism’ from 
‘philosophical’ versions. Discussing religion in the public sphere, Modood’s (2005:145-
147) emphasis on including religious minorities seems consistent with Habermas’ ‘post-
secular’ turn, and Modood also refers to ‘translation’ of religious language. Agreeing 
that contributions to public debate should be seen as relevant by all citizens, Modood 
writes that “religious considerations come to be translated into nonreligious 
considerations” but this does not imply “relegation of religious views to the private 
sphere” (ibid). Being more concerned with inclusion of religious minorities than with 
religious ethics, Modood suggests that religious contributions at least “make it possible 
for secular thinkers to appreciate the force that other points of view have for those who 
adhere to them” (ibid, 147). Habermas goes further in asking secularists to ‘open their 
minds’ to the ‘possible truth content’ of religious ethics. 
Regarding religious and secular ideologies in the public sphere, Modood holds a 
‘moderate’ position similar to Rawls. He writes that political debate should (ibid, 145); 
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Be defined so that those of different theologies and those of none can reason 
with each other and can reach conclusions that are perceived to have some 
legitimacy for those who do not share a religious faith. Moreover, if people are 
to occupy the same political space without conflict, they mutually have to limit 
the extent to which they subject each other’s fundamental beliefs to criticism.   
Like Rawls, Modood is concerned with an ‘overlapping consensus’ and agrees that 
there need be some constraints; with regard to ensuring peace by avoiding criticism of 
each other’s ‘comprehensive doctrines’. In Modood’s words; while politics can never be 
completely autonomous from religion, there should be a “constraint on ideology” (ibid). 
Where ideological arguments can influence specific political issues, “it is not at all clear 
that religious ideologies are taboo” (ibid). The distinction between a “practical and 
reasonable nature of politics” and a “totalizing and dogmatic nature of religion” is better 
understood as “a distinction between politics and ideology” (ibid). Modood argues that 
there should be constraints on ideological dogmatism in general, not specifically on 
religion, and points out that ideologically minded religious people are more likely to 
criticize contemporary secularism when secular ideologies critical of religion, are 
prevalent. Writing that “all ideologies, secular and religious, are capable of 
fundamentalism” (ibid), Modood’s notion of ‘ideology’ corresponds to Rawls’ concept 
of ‘comprehensive doctrine’.  
Religious contributions to public debate 
Rana’s last point concerns the positive role of religious contributions in the public 
sphere, or in Habermas’ words, the “possible truth content” of religious expressions. 
This is least elaborated in Rana’s articles, and the suggestion that Islamic ethics can 
contribute positively in terms of offering a critique of certain tendencies in modern, 
Western society, was largely met with incomprehension in the debate, with some 
exceptions. Rana (March 2) writes that; 
For example, Christians and Muslims will fight against greed and materialism, 
for sanctity and inviolability of life, for solidarity and against egoism, for the 
family and marriage as framework for children’s upbringing.  
A few respondents picked up on this, including Lindseth and Kloster (March 28), who 
from a Christian perspective considered which parts of normative religious arguments 
that may contribute to public debate. With regard to what Rana refers to as ‘family and 
marriage as framework for children’s upbringing’, they write; 
The interesting question is rather when religious arguments are not heard in the 
public. Often this relates to ethical questions about gender, family and sexuality. 
Rana is right that value-conservative arguments in these ethical fields tend to be 
degraded in public dialogue. 
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Conservative family values are shared by conservative Christians and conservative 
Muslims but have been challenged and redefined by reformists in both religions (see 
chapter 4). These values are rejected as ‘reactionary’ in liberal political discourse, 
although they have some political influence through the New Christian Right, more so 
in the US than in Norway. Lindseth and Kloster argue that other values, including 
‘sanctity and inviolability of life’ and ‘solidarity’, contribute legitimately to political 
debate and are also heard. Such  
Normative arguments grounded in religion are taken seriously and even listened 
to, in the public – at least if others can also support them on different grounds. 
This applies to political issues like biotechnology, euthanasia, solidarity and 
human rights, responsibility for the poor and weak, and Protecting Creation.  
In many secular countries including Norway, Britain and the US, organized religion 
plays a role in political movements for solidarity and human rights. One contributor, 
Oftestad (March 4) suggests that a religious ethics may offer a solution to the ecological 
crisis caused by materialist society; something that has also been suggested by Muslims. 
He questions whether a ruling ideology with its ideals of freedom and equality 
combined with capitalist market economy is fit to face challenges from Islam and the 
ecological crisis, and calls for something more and something else than to continue the 
liberal project of emancipation. This contribution can be read as a (vague) criticism of 
dominant western ways of thinking.  
In this final section, I focus on the aspects of religious ethics least elaborated in the 
debate, which are nevertheless politically significant; a critique of ‘greed’, ‘materialism’ 
and ‘egoism’, sometimes seen by Islamists as characteristics of Western society, but 
more accurately seen as characteristics of modern capitalist society. Spinner-Halev 
(cited in Modood 2005:179-180) theorizes conservative religious minorities 
marginalized by a secular, liberal mainstream, which can be characterized as 
“individualistic, consumerist, materialist, and hedonistic” and “shaped by a globalizing 
political economy, the media, and commercialized popular culture”. He argues that 
rejecting this hegemonic culture cannot be described as lacking autonomy or ‘knowing 
no better’ as if they are unaware of alternatives. Choosing a conservative religious 
lifestyle in the midst of temptations from a powerful liberal culture takes commitment 
and character, and represents a counterculture comparable to other alternative lifestyles. 
Here lies a potential political alliance between religious revivalists and the radical left. 
Exploring how ‘Islamist’ ideas intersect with criticism within the West, former British 
diplomat and intelligence agent, now director of the Conflicts Forum which facilitates 
dialogue with Islamist movements, Alastair Crooke (2009:1-32) writes that ‘Islamism’ 
resists a particular “way of thinking” that has become dominant in the West in recent 
centuries and especially in the decades of neoliberal hegemony. The conflict between 
‘Islamism’ and the ‘West’ is a struggle of ideas about the “essence of man” rather than a 
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struggle for political power, although the Muslim world has suffered the consequences 
of Western domination. According to Crooke (2009:4-5), this is at core a religious 
conflict between two universal visions about human beings’ place in the world. A 
dominant western view sees human individuals as separate and takes individuality as its 
organizing principle, while Islam sees human beings as connected to a wider existence 
and takes moral values as its organizing principle (ibid, 29). Islamists criticize the way 
rationality has been redirected from perceiving truth and values to become an 
instrument to fulfill materialistic and psychological desires. By eliminating God from 
society and separating reason from faith, the West has turned toward materialism and 
away from striving for ethical values (ibid, 14). In a worldview dominated by 
instrumental rationality, focused on efficiency and disconnected from a deeper vision of 
life and meaning (ibid, 12), values like justice and human rights are reduced to 
instruments of domination (ibid, 5; 15). The rejection of a moral dimension to politics is 
taken to an extreme by authoritarian thinker Carl Schmitt, who holds that politics is 
about power and survival, and who inspired neoconservative rejection of liberal 
dialogue in favor of confronting an ‘enemy’ (ibid, 248-253; see also Hervik 2011:239). 
A Schmittian view is manifested in the ‘war on terror’ and ‘confrontational liberalism’ 
that perceives Islam as ‘enemy’ of Western civilization, and seeks to build national 
unity on fear of a Muslim Other (ibid, 238-241; Crooke 2009:265).  
According to Crooke, ‘Islamists’ reject that Western secular modernity brings real 
human welfare; they reject instrumental thinking and abuses of power it leads to (ibid, 
16). A source of Western abuse of science to rationalize domination in the name of 
humanity (ibid, 5) can be traced to a distortion of Enlightenment values (ibid, 17), 
which came to dehumanize people instead of liberating them (ibid, 21). This thinking is 
reflected in the ‘Protestant ethic’ (Max Weber cited in ibid, 41; 114), which emphasizes 
individual choice and advocates pursuit of individual interests free from social 
considerations and religious constraints, and in economic theories following Adam 
Smith, which assume that the sum of “rational” individuals pursuing self-interest, 
creates a stable and harmonious society through a mythical ‘invisible hand’ of the free 
market (ibid, 43-46; 110-111; 115-119). Protestants have demonized Catholics and 
Muslims (both communal religions) as illiberal, absolutist and totalitarian ‘enemies of 
freedom’ (ibid, 39-40; 113), as Karl Popper’s ‘open society’ theory demonizes 
socialism (see ibid, 139-141; 155-156). Aware of a human tendency to dominate others, 
‘Islamism’ proposes that a ‘just society’ needs to regulate economic and social activities 
to limit abuses of power (ibid, 6; 119-120). Traditional Islam has been skeptical of 
“theological speculation” and presents itself as a “reminder” of universal truths and 
human values (ibid). Islam is primarily an ethical order, where moral values are seen as 
an intrinsic part of existence. Contrary to a Protestant view that emphasizes an 
individual act of faith, Islam emphasizes that the way to God and to achieve human 
happiness is an ‘effort’ or ‘striving’ (jihad) to ‘restrain the ego’ and live the way God 
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intended, by following an ethics for how to behave towards others (Crooke 2009:15; 58; 
120). Islam sees striving for justice, peace, respect and compassion for others and for 
the environment as a moral duty, because everyone is created by God and thus equal 
(ibid, 16). Seen this way, Islam puts the human being at the center, arguing that 
universal human values can be perceived by everyone via conscience, regardless of time 
and place (ibid).  
While a dominant Western perception denies rationality of ‘Islamism’; as a 
‘comprehensive doctrine’ it may be more reasonable (i.e. compatible with democracy) 
than the dominant Western ideology. Whereas neoliberal ideology sees democracy 
primarily as individual freedom from social constraints, and perceives Islam as 
restricting such freedom; Islamists (like social democrats) argue that excessive 
individual freedom leads to domination over others, and insist that democracy requires 
regulation. According to Crooke, ‘Islamist’ resistance can be seen as a struggle of ideas 
to achieve a change in behavior (ibid) which parallels other resistance movements (ibid, 
32) and Western ‘critical theory’ like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s criticism 
of consumer society as a depoliticized society of alienated individuals fulfilling their 
desires with ‘free choice’ as the dominant value (cited in ibid, 18-20). Crooke draws a 
parallel to secular critical theorists like Habermas’ notion of a critical dialogue to bring 
about change (ibid, 22); from an Islamist perspective, rational discussion is not enough 
as long as Islamism is demonized by Western conservatives opposed to multicultural 
liberalism and critical thinking (ibid, 3-4; 246; 265). Since hegemonic forces do not 
listen, only resistance can bring about genuine dialogue (ibid, 26; 226). Counter-
hegemonic resistance takes many forms, from street protest to discursive struggles that 
defy constraints on thinking by rejecting hegemonic terms of ‘acceptable’ discourse and 
redefining dominant categories (ibid, 262; 272). As Modood (2005:104) writes, Muslim 
minorities draw strength to resist hegemonic discourses from their religion and its 
critique of the West. Crooke (ibid, 27-28) suggests that a critique of hegemony within 
the West, by both Westerners and Muslims, may use Islam as starting point for 
resistance and envisioning a positive alternative, as the focus on a human center of 
society and values of justice, equality and respect resonate with secular westerners and 
are consistent with original Enlightenment aspirations. 
In his discussion of discursive struggles between Eurocentric thinking and ‘Islamist’ 
resistance, S. Sayyid (2003) points out that hegemony works primarily not by 
manufacturing consent but by silencing dissent; it makes resistance invisible by 
considering those who do not speak the language of hegemony, as mute (ibid, xvi; 86). 
Drawing on the discourse-theoretical aspect of Said’s critique of Orientalism, which 
goes beyond a focus on colonial power relations distorting Western representation of 
the Orient, and emphasizes “how orientalism actually constitutes the Orient” (ibid, 32), 
Sayyid (ibid, 32-35) draws on Derrida’s description of Western metaphysics as 
“consisting of a ‘violent hierarchy’ of binary opposition” where an ‘Islamic Other’ is 
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created as negative contrast to the identity of the West. Sayyid points to a weakness in 
Said’s critique of Orientalism, which does not lead to a ‘liberating interpretation of 
Islam’ but rather to a negation of Islam itself. In part due to a reliance on Foucault’s 
idea that hegemonic discourse constructs its objects, Said lacks “another place from 
which to speak”, and remains silent about the possibility of an Islam outside of 
Orientalism. 
Discussing whether it is possible to escape western discourse, Sayyid (2003:135-136) 
argues that the claim that the hegemonic order produces its own resistance that 
necessarily remains locked in western logic; is itself “the last bastion of Eurocentrism”; 
the claim that there is nothing outside the western project. Understood as a project to 
close “the gap between Western cultural formations and universal values” (ibid, xxii), 
Eurocentrism universalizes the West and claims a Western ‘copyright’ on things 
universal. Thus, it is an “attempt to sustain the universality of the western project” at a 
time when Western universalism is already challenged (ibid, 128-129). “Particularly 
irritating” to guardians of Western discourse, who try to reduce ‘Islamism’ to a ‘dialect’ 
of the ‘universal’ language of the West (ibid, 138), is the Islamists’ integration of non-
Islamic elements while insisting that these are genuinely Islamic (ibid, 136). This 
feature of Islamism appears incoherent from a perspective that conflates the universal 
with the West and Islam with particularism. Within this Eurocentric logic, it seems that 
defenders of particularism are caught in a paradox because they depend on universalism 
at the same time as rejecting it (ibid, 139). However, if we follow Sayyid and 
understand ‘the universal’ as a “product of a successful hegemony’s ability to establish 
its worldview as the reflection of the natural order” (ibid, 143), then “a discourse 
appears universal to the extent that it is able to erase the marks of its particularity” (ibid, 
144). However, no hegemony can become completely ‘unmarked’ since it would then 
lose its identity; and “particularity is thus necessary for any attempt at universalism” 
(ibid). The distinction between a universalistic West and a particularistic Islam ignores 
that the West is equally particularistic.  
Both Islamic and western discourses can be understood as particularist interpretations of 
universal values. Thus, in Sayyid’s words, “it is not so much that some elements are 
western and others are not, but rather that eurocentrism operates by laying claim to the 
copyright on some things and rejecting others” (ibid, 148). In other words, Eurocentrism 
‘polices’ universal values by claiming that they are of western origin, an act that 
depends upon an essentialist view of the West (ibid, 151), and on the Orientalist claim 
that the ‘Other’ cannot represent itself without intervention from the West (ibid, 149). 
Islamism rejects these ‘rules of the game’ where the West claims copyright on the 
universal; particularizes Europe and presents an alternative vision of the universal based 
on Islam. Rejecting westernization but not modernity, Islamism shares with postmodern 
critics a suspicion of Western metanarratives, but attempts to replace these with its own 
metanarrative (ibid, 117-118). According to Sayyid (ibid, 156-158), this combination of 
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postmodern deconstruction of Western metanarratives with a non-western alternative 
based on a vision of Islam, explains the relative success of Islamist resistance. Unlike 
certain forms of third-world nationalism, which remain within a Western logic, 
Islamism argues that universal values can be generated from Islam (Sayyid 2003:xxii).  
Conclusions 
Mohammed Usman Rana was often seen as an ‘Islamist’ opposed to ‘secularism’. 
Following a more nuanced understanding that distinguishes between ‘moderate’ and 
‘ideological’ versions of each, Rana is not an Islamist in the sense of wanting an Islamic 
state and sharia laws, but a ‘religious revivalist’ who wants religion to have influence in 
civil society. In other words, he favors an American model of religious pluralism over a 
French model of strict secularism. Institutionally, the Norwegian version of secularism 
can be characterized as ‘moderate’ with relative separation of state and religion. In the 
public sphere, there is a secular hegemony but also some room for religious 
contributions. In the debate, many Norwegian intellectuals expressed an ‘ideological 
secularism’ intolerant of religious expressions in the public sphere; a position that is 
incompatible with multiculturalism according to Modood. A ‘moderate’ version of 
secularism is necessary in a multicultural society, not least in order to prevent religion 
from being abused by state power. In most countries, ‘deprivatized religion’ is 
pragmatically accommodated. A politicized Islam, which combines religious revivalism 
and Muslim identity politics, can contribute positively to the public sphere as long as it 
reflects the ‘democratic’ tendency that focuses on personal ethics and civil society as 
opposed to the state-centered tendency which attempt to use state power to impose its 
own particular interpretations. 
As Modood (2007:64-65; 68) points out, minority perspectives can provide a “critical 
mirror” to larger society, not only in terms of distinct knowledge about majority-
minority relations and processes of marginalization and discrimination, but also by 
offering alternative perspectives on wider political issues. A religious ethics grounded 
in Islam may serve as a counter-hegemonic corrective to taken-for-granted dominant 
ideas, which are also criticized from other standpoints. While more modest than Parekh 
in this regard, Modood suggests that multiculturalism can lead to mutual learning if 
critical minority perspectives on majority attitudes, values and practices are openly 
discussed and allowed influence; including postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism, of 
which politicized Islam represents one strand. Values like freedom, equality and justice 
are universal, but can be interpreted in more than one way. ‘Western’ attempts to 
monopolize interpretation and universally impose its version, are no more legitimate 
than when reactionary Islamists do the same. Democracy implies that everyone is 
entitled to take part in reinterpretation and renegotiation of values, and the outcome of 
this never-ending process remains open as an empirical question for the future. It cannot 
be settled in advance; neither by theology nor by political philosophy. 
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I set out to explore in what ways Norwegian Muslims challenge what has been 
perceived as a ‘white nation’. Analysis of majority and minority discourses in public 
‘integration debates’ (Titley & Lentin 2011; Hage 1998) shows that perceptions of 
Muslim ‘challenge’ differ considerably between a widespread majority view that 
Muslim values are incompatible with Western ones, and a minority perspective arguing 
that values are compatible as long as Muslims can take part in negotiating them. From 
this perspective, Muslims do not reject ‘universal’ values, but Western attempts to 
monopolize interpretation of these. They also criticize attempts to exclude ‘Muslims’ on 
the basis that they are essentially different and inferior (Wievorka 1997:141-148; 
Hervik 2004:151-153; Modood 2005:27-33), as in various expressions of anti-Muslim 
racism (ibid; Abbas 2011), which draw on ideas of a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Kunelius & 
Eide 2007; Mamdani 2004:20-24) and Orientalist discourses that construct Islam as a 
negative mirror image of the West (Said 1979; Yegenoglu 1998). 
As a general framework, I have used Modood’s (2005; 2007) theory of political 
multiculturalism, which focuses on political negotiations in public debate between 
minority mobilization and state policy responses (2005:207-208). According to this 
theory, protest against racism by each minority group is a necessary step along the way 
to integration (2007:50). A key aspect of ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ is that minorities 
turn a negative difference ascribed by the majority, into a positive identity to be proud 
of (ibid, 43). More important than state responses in policy and law, is public debate 
which enables majority and minority to learn to know each other, and may help the 
majority to develop empathy with stigmatized groups and become aware of what is 
experienced as racism by minorities (2006a:40-41; 2007; 57; 64-68).  
Based on analysis of hegemonic and resisting discourses in four empirical case studies 
from ‘integration debates’ in Norwegian national newspapers between 2006 and 2010, I 
have divided majority and minority discourses into ‘dialogical’ ones that interact and 
negotiate with each other, and those that use their own interpretation of values as a 
standard. These four ideological positions I have called ‘confrontational liberalism’ and 
‘dialogical liberalism’ among the majority, and ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ and 
‘minority communitarianism’ among the minority (see also Kunelius & Eide 2007:16-
18; Kunelius & Alhassan 2008:90-95). While some minority individuals express 
majority discourses and vice versa, in general majority and minority perspectives are 
clearly distinguishable in the empirical material. 
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In the cartoon affair (chapter 2), the editor of Magazinet and the Progress Party in 
Norway, like the conservative government and editors of Jyllands-Posten in Denmark, 
expressed the position I have called ‘confrontational liberalism’ and asserted that free 
speech should be absolute and non-negotiable (see Hervik 2006; Klausen 2009; 
Mouritsen 2006; Boe & Hervik 2008) and include the right to ‘mock and ridicule’ 
religion (Hansen 2006:16; Barry 2001:31). The Norwegian government and most 
newspaper editors represented ‘dialogical liberalism’ (see also Leirvik 2006; 2012a; 
Kunelius & Phillips 2008; Steien 2008, Engebrigtsen 2010) which acknowledges that 
free speech is subject to restrictions, e.g. libel, blasphemy and racism (Levey & Modood 
2009; see also Parekh 2000:313-321). As these legal and ethical limits to free speech 
need to be interpreted, free speech is necessarily negotiable. While Muslim leaders 
accepted the government position, which facilitated a dialogue between the Magazinet 
editor and the Islamic Council, but failed to address anti-Muslim racism, younger 
Muslims held large demonstrations directed at mainstream media’s negative portrayal 
of Muslims, and criticized their leaders, who advised against further protest, for being 
co-opted by the government.  
The discursive struggles in the Norwegian cartoon affair resemble those in the Rushdie 
Affair in Britain in 1989 (Parekh 1989; 2000:298-305); both cases marked the 
beginning of Muslim assertiveness in the public sphere (Engebrigtsen 2010; Modood 
2005:203-204; 2007:37-50; 2009:167) and can be seen as steps in the 
multiculturalization of these respective societies. Norwegian media coverage of Muslim 
protest partly reproduced Orientalist and anti-Muslim stereotypes (Richardson 2004), 
but also opened up for more Muslim voices and as a consequence, coverage of Muslims 
gradually became more diverse and nuanced (see also Eide & Nikunen 2011:9-11). Two 
tendencies can be identified in Muslim protesters’ attempts to negotiate ethical or legal 
limits to free speech. The tendency to focus on blasphemy I have called ‘minority 
communitarianism’ because it uses arguments based on values internal to the Muslim 
community, although Muslim religious sensibilities were already translated into a 
Christian concept of blasphemy used in Western law (Modood 1993b:97-98). The other 
tendency, which I have characterized as ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ saw the cartoons in 
the context of anti-Muslim racism. Some protesters wanted the state to use blasphemy 
or hate speech laws, while others made ethical appeals on the media to use free speech 
responsibly (see also Mahmood 2009).  
While attacks on religion may be perceived as attacks on religious believers in practice 
(Modood 2005:21), blasphemy and hate speech are legally distinct. Ethically, legitimate 
criticism of religion is distinct from mockery and ridicule of believers (Levey & 
Modood 2009:222-242). Muslim protesters’ slogans were mostly expressed in ‘secular 
language’ (Rawls 1999; Habermas 2005) and drawn from discourses of human rights, 
multiculturalism and antiracism, but also combined with religious arguments as anti-
racism among Muslims tends to have a religious dimension (Modood 2005:14). While 
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recognizing that these distinctions may be blurred in practice, the Norwegian 
government also blurred the legal distinction between protecting beliefs and believers 
when trying to integrate blasphemy into hate speech legislation in a law proposal that 
was later withdrawn. 
The government’s ‘dialogical liberalism’ was presented as an attempt to reconcile 
‘extremists on both sides’, but it was criticized by Muslim protesters for playing down 
the extent of anti-Muslim sentiment among mainstream media, politicians and majority 
population by placing blame only on the editor who published the cartoons. Further, the 
dialogue approach did not sufficiently acknowledge that not only extremists, but a vast 
majority of Muslims were deeply offended by the cartoons. Thus, while ‘dialogical 
liberalism’ on the majority side and ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ on the minority side 
are compatible in the sense of being open to negotiate with each other (Ghozlan 2008), 
they differ with regard to power and hegemony, and with regard to acknowledging 
racism. As a minority social movement, ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ criticizes the 
dominant majority position of ‘state multiculturalism’ for failing to take minority 
perspectives on racism sufficiently into account (Werbner 2012). 
In the ‘coconut’ debate (chapter 3), ‘confrontational liberalists’ perceived Iffit Qureshi’s 
criticism of ‘coconuts’ as a form of ‘reverse racism’ that demanded ‘ethnic loyalty’ and 
imposed ‘internal restrictions’ on minority individuals’ right to dissent (see Kymlicka 
1993b:93). While the ‘coconut’ term is sometimes used to refer to culturally assimilated 
minority persons in general (reflecting a position of ‘minority communitarianism’), 
Qureshi drew on postcolonial and antiracist perspectives of Fanon (1967) and Malcolm 
X (1989). Her criticism was not directed at individuals who are merely cultural or 
religious ‘defectors’, but targeted those who have ‘politicized’ their exit (Bromley 
1998c:vii) from minority groups and become ‘native informants’ (Spivak cited by 
Dabashi 2011) who go public with negative experiences within the group, give 
ideological support to external forces hostile to the group, and validate anti-Muslim 
perceptions among the majority (Boe & Hervik 2008).  
In many European countries, Muslim counterparts to what African Americans call 
‘Uncle Toms’ (Malcolm X 1989:25-46) have become popular with media and are 
constructed as role models for integration (Fekete 2009:125-129; Gullestad 2006:50-56; 
Boe & Hervik 2008; Hervik 2011:155), in a reflection of Bernard Lewis’ dichotomy 
between good, secularized, westernized Muslims and bad, fundamentalist, anti-Western 
Muslims (see Mamdani 2004:20-24; Kundnani 2008). Either ‘native informants’ are 
described in antiracist terms as ‘coconuts’ or in religious terms as ‘apostates’, these 
concepts primarily refer to the ‘betrayal’ implied by joining hostile political forces 
rather than to personal opinions of dissent (Modood 1993b:97-98; Mazrui 1989; Akhtar 
1989; Parekh 2000:159; Bromley 1998c:vii). This form of ‘politicized exit’ is distinct 
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from ‘whistleblowers’, who go public and appeal to the state in order to change negative 
internal practices (Bromley 1998a:31-35). 
In the hijab debates (chapter 4), ‘confrontational liberalists’ inspired by the French hijab 
ban in 2004, described the hijab as ‘essentially oppressive’ to women and a political 
symbol of ‘Islamism’ (Kastoryano 2006; Parekh 2000:249-253), and argued for a ban in 
Norway (Storhaug 2007; see also Eriksen 2004; Jacobsen 2011:161-162). While the 
French justification was grounded in a strict form of secularism (Freedman 2004; 
Kastoryano 2006), feminist arguments dominated Norwegian debates (Fekete 2006). 
Questions about Muslim women’s oppression had been high on the agenda in Norway 
since the 1990s (see Gressgård & Jacobsen 2003), and represented a major argument 
against multiculturalism (see Okin 1999; Wikan 1995; 2002). A dominant majority 
perspective perceives Norway as a nation of gender equality, contrasted to an image of 
oppressed Muslim women. Replicating colonial policy, many Norwegian feminists 
sought to ‘save’ Muslim women from their men, their religion and their culture (Fanon 
1989; Abu-Lughod 2002; Thorbjørnsrud 2004; Razack 2008). 
Already in 2004, Muslim women held a demonstration to defend the hijab (Jacobsen 
2011:160-162), which they presented as a symbol of pride in Muslim identity. But it 
was not until after a Muslim woman’s formal request for a police hijab was granted by 
the government only to be withdrawn as a result of public pressure (Hetland 2009; 
Bangstad 2012), that Muslim feminist perspectives (see al-Hibri 1999; Mir-Hosseini 
2006; 2007) had a breakthrough in public debate (Døving 2012b). While ‘white 
feminist’ positions had been countered before from postcolonial perspectives (Göle 
1996; Yegenoglu 1998; Razack 2008), the new voices of Muslim feminism merged 
religious and liberal arguments when defending not only the hijab as an individual 
choice, but also referred to the Qur’an to assert women’s rights to pursue education and 
choose a career (Døving 2012b; Jacobsen 2011; Modood 2005; Göle 1996). 
While the claim that the hijab symbolizes ‘Islamism’ is inaccurate and misleading 
(Thorbjørnsrud 2004:48; Phillips 2007:117; Killian 2003; Amir-Moazami 2004; 
Werbner 2007; Parekh 2000:251), the hijab as well as Muslim feminism is linked to an 
Islamic revival movement (Jacobsen 2005; 2011; Göle 1996), which can be seen as 
representing a democratic tendency of politicized Islam, which promotes Muslim values 
as an individual ethics with social consequences in contrast to authoritarian, state-
centered Islamism that seeks to turn sharia into state law (ibid, 140; Mamdani 2004:60; 
al-Hibri 1999:43-45; Mir-Hosseini 2007:1). In a debate about social control of women 
in 2010 (Bangstad 2012), minority feminists argued that attempts to impose particular 
interpretations of morality on women are as widespread among the majority as among 
the minority, suggesting that communitarian tendencies also exist among the secular, 
liberal majority; while religious women defended individual choice. 
251 
 
Muslim feminists, representing a position of ‘antiracist multiculturalism’, not only 
criticized ‘confrontational liberalism’ but also traditional cultural practices and 
interpretations of Islam among their parents’ generation, as well as patriarchal, 
authoritarian versions of Islamism (Mir-Hosseini 2006:632; Jacobsen 2011). The latter 
can be characterized as forms of ‘minority communitarianism’ which only refers to 
minority values and tries to avoid ‘western’ influence. The hijab debates did not result 
in changes in policy and law, because politicians across the spectrum were divided on 
which side to accommodate; the Muslim minority or a public opinion hostile to 
multicultural accommodation of Muslim demands. Mainstream media increasingly gave 
access to assertive Muslim women, thus making it harder for ‘confrontational 
liberalists’ to defend the position that passive and oppressed Muslim women need to be 
liberated by the majority and the state (Okin 1999; Abu-Lughod 2002, Razack 2008). 
In the debate about secularism (chapter 5), Mohammed Usman Rana criticized a 
Norwegian tendency towards an ideological secularism of the French type, and instead 
advocated an American model of religious pluralism (Rawls 1999; Casanova in Asad 
2003:182-183). While ‘confrontational liberalists’ claimed that Rana was an ‘Islamist’ 
who rejects secularism, Rana asserted that he supports liberal democracy and a secular 
state (Bangstad 2008:23-24). At the same time, he can be characterized as part of an 
Islamic revival movement (Jacobsen 2005; 2011) that promotes a religious ethics in 
civil society (ibid, 339-340; an-Na’im 2009) and who argues that religious contributions 
should exert influence in the public sphere. 
Rana criticized a form of secularism that demands privatization of religion (see 
Bangstad 2009:20-21; Casanova 2009:141-143; Modood 2007:75; Modood & 
Kastoryano 2006; Sayyid 2009:186-187) and stigmatizes believers, while supporting a 
‘moderate secularism’ that is not hostile to religion (Modood 2005:143-145). As such, 
his position can be categorized as ‘antiracist multiculturalism’ rather than ‘minority 
communitarianism’. While Norwegian secularism can be described as a compromise 
with relative separation of church and state similar to Britain (Modood 2007:72-73; 
2010:127), the French and American models have a strict institutional separation, while 
holding opposite views on the role of religion in civil society (Modood & Kastoryano 
2006:164-166). While Rawls (1999) and Habermas (2005) in their ‘post-secular’ turn 
accept the legitimacy of religious contributions in the public sphere, the latter still 
reflects a European secularist bias against religion (Bader 2009:113-115; Døving 
2012b:40-44) while the former’s position is in line with religious pluralism in the US 
(Rawls 1999:144-149; Bader 2009:116-117), a more religious society than most 
European countries (Casanova 2009:148-151; Rawls 2003:140; Esposito & Mogahed 
2007:47).  
As a Muslim revivalist, Rana shares ‘Islamist’ advocacy of a religious lifestyle and 
criticism of excesses of liberal capitalist culture, often referred to as ‘greed’, 
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‘materialism’ and ‘egoism’ (Spinner-Halev in Modood 2005:179-180). As such, Islam 
offers an alternative vision of universal values that forms a basis for resistance against 
dominant culture (Crooke 2009). Politicized Islam challenges Eurocentric constructions 
of universal human values, which take Western interpretations as the only legitimate 
ones (Sayyid 2003), and offers an alternative ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrine’ 
(Rawls 1999) that may be more democratic than the prevailing hegemony. As an 
oppositional minority perspective (Modood 2007:64-68) rather than linked to state 
power, politicized Islam has a ‘possible truth content’ (Habermas 2005) and can play a 
role as a corrective to dominant and taken-for-granted ideologies. 
Multiculturalism from above and below 
Official Norwegian ‘integration policy’ promotes a ‘tolerant, multicultural society’ 
through equal rights and duties for individuals regardless of ethnic/religious 
background, and uses ‘dialogue’ with minority organizations as an instrument to 
manage diversity. In a 2004 white paper (St.meld.nr. 49; 2003-2004), the government 
defined its integration policy as a ‘diversity policy’ rather than as ‘multiculturalism’. 
Rather than focusing on a dilemma between individual rights and group rights 
(Kymlicka 1995; 2002; Okin 1999), the government speaks of a dilemma between 
diversity on the individual level on one hand, and the need for social cohesion and 
shared values on the other. These shared values are defined in terms of democratic 
procedures, human rights and gender equality in line with Habermas’ ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ (Habermas 1994:139-149, cited in Modood 1997:17; Rostbøll 2008:24-26), 
and it is pointed out that these are not particularly Norwegian, but should be derived 
from civil society discussions on concrete issues which all citizens are entitled to 
influence, suggesting a minimum definition of values based on a dynamic overlapping 
consensus (Rawls 1999). At the same time, the government wants to act as a normative 
guide to these negotiations, and promote Norwegian conceptions of individual rights 
and gender equality, but also encourage minorities to become more visible in the public 
sphere. Dialogue is emphasized as a strategy to make policies more legitimate by 
including a variety of individual minority voices, regardless of group membership. 
The policy paper refers to similar developments in other European countries, and the 
position resembles the 2008 European Council White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, 
which expresses a European consensus in political rhetoric on defending diversity while 
insisting on universal values (Kymlicka 2012). ‘Intercultural dialogue’ can be seen as a 
form of state management of diversity which is committed to individual rights and 
social cohesion (Levey 2012). European governments do not agree on ‘interculturalism’ 
but share a political rhetoric of ‘integration’ which can be interpreted in both 
assimilationist and multiculturalist directions (Modood & Meer 2012).  
Norwegian policy has been criticized for falling short of genuine multicultural dialogue 
where dominant norms recognize their own particular limits and are allowed to be 
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challenged (Gressgård 2005; 2010), and for inviting minorities to dialogue only insofar 
as their inclusion and influence legitimizes policy based on predefined notions of 
integration which assume that majority values and practices are universal. Turning 
universal values into symbols of political loyalty to Norway, the government suggests 
that immigrants lack knowledge of and need to be educated about human rights, while 
Norwegian citizens are constructed as carriers of universal values. Thus, while 
emphasizing that universal values are open to interpretation, there is a tendency towards 
a Norwegian monologue where goals are defined in advance by the majority. As such, 
integration policy can be seen as a form of assimilation, as Muslim feminist Bushra 
Ishaq described the decision to deny a police hijab. 
Government practice in the cartoon affair has been characterized as ‘ambivalent 
multiculturalism’ (Engebrigtsen 2010), an approach that combines individual 
integration and collective recognition which resulted from Sami mobilization against 
assimilation policy in the 1970s, the only time that a minority challenged hegemony 
until the cartoon affair. This ambivalent approach combines ideas of Norwegian cultural 
superiority with government-sponsored dialogue with minority organizations. The 
cartoon affair showed that Norwegian Muslims had become a powerful minority that 
could mobilize for their interests (Leirvik 2012), and government-sponsored dialogue 
recognized them as Norwegian citizens first and Muslims second. While such 
institutionalized dialogue implies a sort of multiculturalist group recognition, it 
represents a form of state multiculturalism that can be seen as a strategy of containment, 
and which does not take sufficiently into account minority criticism of racism (Werbner 
2012; Gunew 2004; Hage 1998).  
Multiculturalism as mobilization and negotiations 
Norwegian ‘integration debate’ parallels debates in many EU countries where 
‘multiculturalism’ is under attack (Titley & Lentin 2011). My analysis, which focused 
on Muslim challenges of majority hegemony, shows that a ‘multiculturalism from 
below’ in Modood’s (2005; 2007) sense has emerged as assertive Muslims, often 
Norwegian-born ‘second-generation’ Pakistanis, have joined public debate and 
mobilized politically. Contemporary Norwegian debate reflects a ‘discursive struggle’ 
between a critical, antiracist multiculturalism from below and an ambivalent top-down 
state multiculturalism aimed at dialogue and diversity management (Werbner 2012; 
Gunew 2004; see also Modood 2005, 2007). Since the cartoon affair, mainstream media 
have promoted a debate open to a diversity of voices, including anti-Muslim views but 
also actively seeking out critical minority perspectives. The public sphere has thus 
become more multicultural (see also Eide & Nikunen 2011:9-11), with minority 
contributions from a range of perspectives including antiracism, Muslim feminism and 
conservative religion, but policy is lagging behind. In the cartoon affair and the hijab 
debates, the government attempted to accommodate Muslims. The Justice Ministry 
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proposed to incorporate the blasphemy law (which was to be abolished) into hate speech 
legislation, which would be extended to include ‘qualified attacks on religions’ (not just 
religious believers). The Ministry also intended to allow a police hijab. Both proposals 
were withdrawn after pressure from media and opposition. In Britain, similar 
multicultural policies have been pursued at political cost and against public opinion 
(Modood & Meer 2012); in Norway, the government gave in to public pressure at a 
time when the populist Progress Party scored 30 per cent in opinion polls. 
Analysis of these debates and policy responses shows that ‘dialogical liberalism’ and 
‘antiracist multiculturalism’ can be compatible if the government acknowledges critical 
minority perspectives on racism. In the cartoon affair, the government reflected a white 
majority perspective, but the dialogue approach paved the way for more critical Muslim 
perspectives to be expressed first in street protest and later in public debate. Mainstream 
media have appropriated an idea of dialogue that understands free speech as maximizing 
debate, giving access to views hostile to immigration and multiculturalism as well as to 
critical minority perspectives. This ‘radical-liberal’ understanding of public debate 
differs from Rawls (1999), Habermas (2005) and Modood (2005:145-147), who defend 
various versions of restraints on ‘ideology’ or ‘comprehensive doctrines’ in order to 
avoid escalating conflict. Although the government’s rhetorical response after the July 
22, 2011 terror attacks, was to promote ‘more openness’, the media’s practice of giving 
access to extreme views has been questioned also in Norway.  
Stereotypical media portrayal of minorities has played a major role in contributing to 
majority prejudice in the past. Likewise, a diversity of voices in public debate may 
increase majority knowledge about minorities and let them influence mainstream 
society. This function of public debate is perhaps more important than law and policy in 
the process of multiculturalizing a society (Modood 2007). A variety of Muslim voices 
is now heard in public debate, and distinctions between ‘secular Muslims’, 
‘traditionalists’, ‘extremists’ and ‘antiracist multiculturalists’ are available to the general 
public, opening up for political alliances between Muslims and antiracists in the cartoon 
affair, with feminists in the hijab debates, and with Christians in the secularism debate. 
While the dialogue approach currently dominates in Norway, and official rejection of 
multiculturalism is less explicit than in several other European countries, there is also a 
confrontational, anti-multiculturalist and explicitly anti-Muslim opposition from the 
populist right, which reflects a large section of public opinion.  
Diversity of opinion in public debate may assure a democratic ‘balance of power’ and 
prevent any particular ideological outlook from becoming dominant and oppressing 
alternative views. Any ideology that becomes hegemonic and/or is linked to state power 
tends to become dogmatic, narrow-minded and oppressive, as historical examples show 
with regard to state socialism, state-centered Islamism, ideological secularism and 
nationalism. Diverse ideologies including communism, politicized religion, secularism, 
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liberalism, nationalism and multiculturalism, all share a similar agenda that can be 
summed up in different interpretations and variations of freedom, equality and justice. 
From a minority position, they can work as necessary correctives and resist hegemonic 
attempts to standardize and monopolize ways of thinking. Liberalism, secularism and 
nationalism, although in relatively moderate forms, are currently dominant in Norway, 
while multiculturalism, socialism and religious perspectives are the challengers.  
Critical minority perspectives challenge the dualist thinking characteristic of dominant 
ideologies, e.g. the essentialist, hierarchical dichotomies between the ‘secular’ and 
‘religious’, the ‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’, and the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’ 
where the first term is defined positively and claimed for ‘us’ while the second term is 
defined negatively and ascribed to minorities. In a liberal, secular society where 
conservative religion is marginalized, pursuing a religious lifestyle is a choice that takes 
commitment and character. Religious persons thus cannot be described as ‘unaware of 
alternatives’ (Spinner-Halev in Modood 2005:179-180). Well-integrated Norwegian 
Muslim women who participate in mainstream society and wear hijab, merge religious 
values and secular language in a way that challenges dominant liberal dichotomies 
between the secular and the religious (Døving 2012b:42-43). Rather than facing an 
‘asymmetrical cognitive burden’ (Habermas 2005), they may be better equipped for the 
task of ‘translation’ than secular citizens who need not take religious views seriously. 
The dichotomy between religious dogmatism and secular open-mindedness is thus 
untenable, indicating a more accurate distinction between dogmatic, absolutist forms 
and pragmatic, dialogical forms of any worldview (Bangstad 2012:47), corresponding 
to Modood’s distinction between ‘ideological’ and ‘moderate’ forms of religion and 
secularism, and Rawls’ distinction between ‘comprehensive doctrines’ and political 
forms of ‘public reason’.   
The empirical material supports suggestions by Rawls (1999), Parekh (2000), Phillips 
(2007) and Rostbøll (2008) that values such as freedom, equality and justice defined in 
abstract terms can be characterized as universal, but are always interpreted in particular 
political and cultural contexts and come in various versions which may differ from 
principles of ‘liberty’, ‘egalitarianism’ and ‘fairness’ as defined by liberal theorists. 
While one strand of liberals tries to monopolize these principles (Barry 2001), a more 
pluralist perspective holds that there is an ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls 1999) around 
these values, which may be justified by a variety of comprehensive philosophies. 
Minorities insist on their right to be equal partners in a dialogue about interpretating 
these values, and my analysis shows some differences between Muslim interpretations 
and those of ‘confrontational liberalists’. Among other things, Norwegian Muslims have 
emphasized that free speech should be used responsibly, that individual and community 
interests should be balanced (Parekh 2000), a degree of gender complementarity 
(Jacobsen 2004:7-8; Phillips 2007), and a moderate secularism with room for public 
religion. None of these interpretations necessarily contradicts liberal principles.  
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Minority contributions also resist hegemonic attempts to monopolize these values, for 
example when they are defined as national values at the same time as they are claimed 
to be universal. Eurocentrism refers to the construction of Western interpretations as the 
only legitimate versions of the universal at the same time as alternative versions are 
particularized (Gressgård 2010; Sayyid 2003); as when ‘universal values’ are contrasted 
with ‘Muslim values’. When alternative versions of the universal are presented, the 
dominant western perspective is revealed as one particular interpretation. The problem 
with dominant discourses is less their particularism than their universalistic pretensions. 
It is thus more constructive to think of universal principles in terms of an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ (Rawls 1999), even though Rawls’ pluralism has also been criticized for 
being too narrowly liberal (Parekh 2000). While Rawls rightly points out that there will 
always be people holding ‘unreasonable’ views in any society, the kind of cultural 
essentialism that ascribes these views to particular groups should be avoided. 
While we may conclude that Norway is ‘a multicultural society in the making’, this 
does not necessarily imply that anti-Muslim racism is on the decline; rather we may be 
witnessing further polarization not between majority and minority, but between racist 
and multiculturalist views. This thesis has focused almost exclusively on Muslims 
because they have been the most stigmatized and most assertive minority in the last two 
decades. Other minority groups in Norwegian society may have escaped the worst 
stigmatization, and their integration in a multicultural society cannot be modeled on that 
of Muslims although they may benefit from Muslim mobilization, like Muslims have 
learned lessons from the African American struggle (Modood 2005;2007). These other 
minorities need their own mobilization against the specific forms of racism targeting 
them. Now that Muslim presence is increasingly ‘normalized’, it remains to be seen 
which minority group will be next to take up the struggle.     
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